The real power of a prince does not consist so much in the facility he meets with in making conquests as in the difficulty an enemy finds in attacking him, and, if I may so speak, in the immutability of his condition. But the increase of territory obliges a government to lay itself more open to an enemy.
As monarchs, therefore, ought to be endued with wisdom in order to increase their power, they ought likewise to have an equal share of prudence to confine it within bounds. Upon removing the inconveniences of too small a territory, they should have their eye constantly on the inconveniences which attend its extent.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 7. — A Reflection The enemies of a great prince, whose reign was protracted to an unusual length, have very often accused him, rather, I believe, from their own fears than upon any solid foundation, of having formed and carried on a project of universal mon- archy. Had he attained his aim, nothing would have been more fatal to his subjects, to himself, to his family, and to all Europe. Heaven, that knows our true interests, favored him more by preventing the success of his arms than it could have done by crowning him with victories. Instead of raising him to be the only sovereign in Europe, it made him happier by rendering him the most powerful.
The subjects of this prince, who in travelling abroad are never affected but with what they have left at home; who on quitting their own habitations look upon glory as their chief object, and in distant countries as an obstacle to their return; who disgust you even by their good qualities, because they are tainted with so much vanity; who are capable of supporting wounds, perils, and fatigues, but not of foregoing their pleas- ures; who are supremely fond of gayety, and comfort them- selves for the loss of a battle by a song upon the general — those subjects, I say, would never have the solidity requisite for an enterprise of this kind, which if defeated in one country would be unsuccessful everywhere else; and if once unsuccessful would be so forever.
8. — A particular Case in zvhich the defensive Force of a State is inferior to the offensive It was a saying of the Lord of Coucy to King Charles V " that the English are never weaker, nor more easily overcome, than in their own country." The same was observed of the Romans; the same of the Carthaginians; and the same will happen to every power that sends armies to distant countries, in order to re-unite by discipline and military force those who are divided among themselves by political or civil interests. The state finds itself weakened by the disorder that still con- tinues, and more so by the remedy.
The Lord of Coucy's maxim is an exception to the general rule, which disapproves of wars against distant countries. And 132 MONTESQUIEU this exception confirms likewise the rule because it takes place only with regard to those by whom such wars are undertaken.
9. — Of the relative Force of States All grandeur, force, and power are relative. Care, therefore, must be taken that in endeavoring to increase the real grandeur, the relative be not diminished.
During the reign of Louis XIV, France was at its highest pitch of relative grandeur. Germany had not yet produced such powerful princes as have since appeared in that country. Italy wsiS in the same case. England and Scotland were not yet formed into one united kingdom. Aragon was not joined to Castile: the distant branches of the Spanish monarchy were weakened by it, and weakened it in their turn; and Muscovy was as little known in Europe as Crim Tartary.
ID. — Of the Weakness of neighboring States Whensoever a state lies contiguous to another that happens to be in its decline, the former ought to take particular care not to precipitate the ruin of the latter, because this is the happiest situation imaginable; nothing being so convenient as for one prince to be near another, who receives for him all the rebuffs and insults of fortune. And it seldom happens that by subdu- ing such a state the real power of the conqueror is as much increased as the relative is diminished.
BOOK X OF LAWS IN THE RELATION THEY BEAR TO OFFENSIVE FORCE o I. — Of offensive Force FFENSIVE force is regulated by the law of nations, which is the political law of each country considered in its relation to every other.
2.— Of War The life of governments is like that of man. The latter has a right to kill in case of natural defence: the former have a right to wage war for their own preservation.
In the case of natural defence I have a right to kill, because my life is in respect to me what the life of my antagonist is to him: in the same manner a state wages war because its preser- vation is like that of any other being.
With individuals the right of natural defence does not imply a necessity of attacking. Instead of attacking they need only have recourse to proper tribunals. They cannot, therefore, ex- ercise this right of defence but in sudden cases, when imme- diate death would be the consequence of waiting for the as- sistance of the law. But with states the right of natural defence carries along with it sometimes the necessity of attacking; as, for instance, when one nation sees that a continuance of peace will enable another to destroy her, and that to attack that nation instantly is the only way to prevent her own destruction.
Thence it follows that petty states have oftener a right to de- clare war than great ones, because they are oftener in the case of being afraid of destruction.
The right, therefore, of war is derived from necessity and strict justice. If those who direct the conscience or councils of princes do not abide by this maxim, the consequence is 134 MONTESQUIEU dreadful: when they proceed on arbitrary principles of glory, convenience, and utility, torrents of blood must overspread the earth.
But, above all, let them not plead such an idle pretext as the glory of the prince: his glory is nothing but pride; it is a passion, and not a legitimate right.
It is true the fame of his power might increase the strength of his government; but it might be equally increased by the reputation of his justice.
3. — Of the Right of Conquest From the right of war comes that of conquest; which is the consequence of that right, and ought therefore to follow its spirit.
The right the conqueror has over a conquered people is di- rected by four sorts of laws: the law of nature, which makes everything tend to the preservation of the species; the law of natural reason, which teaches us to do to others what we would have done to ourselves; the law that forms political societies, whose duration nature has not limited; and, in fine, the law derived from the nature of the thing itself. Conquest is an acquisition, and carries with it the spirit of preservation and use, not of destruction.
The inhabitants of a conquered country are treated by the conqueror in one of the four following ways: Either he con- tinues to rule them according to their own laws, and assumes to himself only the exercise of the political and civil govern- ment, or he gives them new political and civil government; or he destroys and disperses the society; or, in fine, he ex- terminates the people.
The first way is conformable to the law of nations now fol- lowed; the fourth is more agreeable to the law of nations fol- lowed by the Romans: in respect to which I leave the reader to judge how far we have improved upon the ancients. We must give due commendations to our modern refinements in reason, religion, philosophy, and manners.
The authors of our public law, guided by ancient histories, without confining themselves to cases of strict necessity, have fallen into very great errors. They have adopted tyrannical THE SPIRIT OF LAWS i^S and arbitrary principles, by supposing the conquerors to be in- vested with I know not what right to kill: thence they have drawn consequences as terrible as the very principle, and es- tablished maxims which the conquerors themselves, when pos- sessed of the least grain of sense, never presumed to follow. It is a plain case, that when the conquest is completed, the con- queror has no longer a right to kill, because he has no longer the plea of natural defence and self-preservation.
What has led them into this mistake is, that they imagined a conqueror had a right to destroy the state; whence they in- ferred that he had a right to destroy the men that compose it: a wrong consequence from a false principle. For from the destruction of the state it does not at all follow that the people who compose it ought to be also destroyed. The state is the association of men, and not the men themselves; the citizen may perish, and the man remain.
From the right of killing in the case of conquest, politicians have drawn that of reducing to slavery — a consequence as ill grounded as the principle.
There is no such thing as a right of reducing people to slavery, save when it becomes necessary for the preservation of the conquest. Preservation, and not servitude, is the end of conquest; though servitude may happen sometimes to be a necessary means of preservation.
Even in that case it is contrary to the nature of things that the slavery should be perpetual. The people enslaved ought to be rendered capable of becoming subjects. Slavery in con- quests is an accidental thing. When after the expiration of a certain space of time all the parts of the conquering state are connected with the conquered nation, by custom, marriages, laws, associations, and by a certain conformity of disposition, there ought to be an end of the slavery. For the rights of the conqueror are founded entirely on the opposition between the two nations in those very articles, whence prejudices arise, and the want of mutual confidence.
A conqueror, therefore, who reduces the conquered people to slavery, ought always to reserve to himself the means (for means there are without number) of restoring them to their liberty.
These are far from being vague and uncertain notions. Thus 136 MONTESQUIEU our ancestors acted, those ancestors who conquered the Roman Empire. The laws they made in the heat and transport of pas- sion and in the insolence of victory were gradually softened; those laws were at first severe, but were afterwards rendered impartial. The Burgundians, Goths, and Lombards would have the Romans continue a conquered people; but the laws of Euric, Gundebald, and Rotharis made the Romans and bar- barians fellow-citizens.c^ Charlemagne, to tame the Saxons, deprived them of their liberty and property. Louis the Debonnaire made them a free people,^ and this was one of the most prudent regulations dur- ing his whole reign. Time and servitude had softened their manners, and they ever after adhered to him with the greatest fidelity.
4. — Some Advantages of a conquered People Instead of inferring such destructive consequences from the right of conquest, much better would it have been for politicians to mention the advantages which this very right may sometimes give to a conquered people — advantages which would be more sensibly and more universally experienced were our law of nations exactly followed, and established in every part of the globe.
Conquered countries are, generally speaking, degenerated from their original institution. Corruption has crept in, the execution of the laws has been neglected, and the government has grown oppressive. Who can question but such a state would be a gainer, and derive some advantages, from the very conquest itself, if it did not prove destructive? When a gov- ernment has arrived at that degree of corruption as to be in- capable of reforming itself, it would not lose much by being newly moulded. A conqueror who enters triumphant into a country where the moneyed men have, by a variety of artifices, insensibly arrived at innumerable ways of encroaching on the public, where the miserable people, who see abuses grown into laws, are ready to sink under the weight of oppression, yet think they have no right to apply for redress — a conqueror, I say, may make a total change, and then the tyranny of those wretches will be the first thing exposed to his resentment.
a See the Code of Barbarian laws. " Life of Louis the Debonnaire," in b See the anonymous author of the Duchesne's collection, torn. ii. p. 296.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS We have beheld, for instance, countries oppressed by the farmers of the revenues, and eased afterwards by the conqueror, who had neither the engagements nor wants of the legitimate prince. Even the abuses have been often redressed without any interposition of the conqueror.
Sometimes the frugality of a conquering nation has enabled them to allow the conquered those necessaries of which they had been deprived under a lawful prince.
A conquest may destroy pernicious prejudices, and lay, if I may presume to use the expression, the nation under a better genius.
What good might not the Spaniards have done to the Mexi- cans? They had a mild religion to impart to them; but they filled their heads with a frantic superstition. They might have set slaves at liberty; they made freemen slaves. They might have undeceived them with regard to the abuse of human sac- rifices; instead of that they destroyed them. Never should I have finished, were I to recount all the good they might have done, and all the mischief they committed.
It is a conqueror's business to repair a part of the mischief he has occasioned. The right, therefore, of conquest I define thus: a necessary, lawful, but unhappy power, which leaves the conqueror under a heavy obligation of repairing the injuries done to humanity.
5. — Gelon, King of Syracuse The noblest treaty of peace ever mentioned in history is, in my opinion, that which Gelon made with the Carthaginians. He insisted upon their abolishing the custom of sacrificing their children. c Glorious, indeed! After having defeated three hun- dred thousand Carthaginians, he required a condition that was advantageous only to themselves, or rather he stipulated in favor of human nature.
The Bactrians exposed their aged fathers to be devoured by large mastiffs — a custom suppressed by Alexander,^ whereby he obtained a signal triumph over superstition.
d Strabo, lib. XL 13S MONTESQUIEU 6. — Of Conquest made by a Republic It is contrary to the nature of things that in a confederate government one state should make any conquest over another, as in our days we have seen in Switzerland.^ In mixed con- federate republics, where the association is between petty re- publics and monarchies, of a small extent, this is not so ab- surd.
Contrary is it also to the nature of things that a democratic republic should conquer towns which cannot enter into the sphere of its democracy. It is necessary that the conquered people should be capable of enjoying the privileges of sover- eignty as was settled in the very beginning among the Romans. The conquest ought to be limited to the number of citizens fixed for the democracy.
If a democratic republic subdues a nation in order to govern them as subjects, it exposes its own liberty; because it in- trusts too great a power to those who are appointed to the com- mand of the conquered provinces.
How dangerous would have been the situation of the re- public of Carthage had Hannibal made himself master of Rome? What would he not have done in his own country, had he been victorious, he who caused so many revolutions in it after his defeat?f Hanno could never have dissuaded the Senate from sending succor to Hannibal, had he used no other argument than his own jealousy. The Carthaginian Senate, whose wisdom is so highly extolled by Aristotle (and which has been evidently proved by the prosperity of that republic), could never have been determined by other than solid reasons. They must have been stupid not to see that an army at the distance of three hundred leagues would necessarily be exposed to losses which required reparation.
Hanno's party insisted that Hannibal should be delivered up to the Romans.^ They could not at that time be afraid of the Romans; they were, therefore, apprehensive of Hannibal.
It was impossible, some will say, for them to imagine that Hannibal had been so successful. But how was it possible for e With regard to Tockenburg. g Hanno wanted to deliver Hannibal / He was at the head of a faction. up to the Romans, as Cato would fain have delivered up Caesar to the Gauls.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS them to doubt it? Could the Carthaginians, a people spread over all the earth, be ignorant of what was transacting in Italy? No: they were sufficiently acquainted with it, and for that rea- son they did not care to send supplies to Hannibal.
Hanno became more resolute after the battle of Trebia, after the battle of Thrasimenus, after that of Cannae; it was not his incredulity that increased, but his fear.
7. — The same Subject continued There is still another inconvenience in conquests made by democracies: their government is ever odious to the conquered states. It is apparently monarchical: but in reality it is much more oppressive than monarchy, as the experience of all ages and countries evinces.
The conquered people are in a melancholy situation; they neither enjoy the advantages of a republic, nor those of a mon- archy.
What has been here said of a popular state is applicable to aristocracy.
8. — The same Subject continued When a republic, therefore, keeps another nation in subjec- tion, it should endeavor to repair the inconveniences arising from the nature of its situation by giving it good laws both for the political and civil government of the people.
We have an instance of an island in the Mediterranean, sub- ject to an Italian republic, whose political and civil laws with regard to the inhabitants of that island were extremely de- fective. The act of indemnity,^ by which it ordained that no one should be condemned to bodily punishment in consequence of the private knowledge of the governor, ex informata con- scientia, is still recent in everybody's memory. There have been frequent instances of the people's petitioning for privileges; here the sovereign grants only the common right of all na- tions.
h Of October 18, 1738, printed at Genoa by Franchelli: "Vietiamo al nos- tro general goyernatore in detta Isola di condannare in avvenire solamente ex informata conscientia persona alcuna nazionale in pena afflittiva; potra bensl arrestare ed incarcerare le persone che gli saranno sospette, salvo di renderne poi a noi conto sollecitamente." — Art. 6.
140 MONTESQUIEU 9. — Of Conquests made by a Monarchy If a monarchy can long subsist before it is weakened by its increase, it will become formidable; and its strength will re- main entire, while pent up by the neighboring monarchies.
It ought not, therefore, to aim at conquests beyond the natural limits of its government. So soon as it has passed these limits, it is prudence to stop.
In this kind of conquest things must be left as they were found — the same courts of judicature, the same laws, the same customs, the same privileges: there ought to be no other al- teration than that of the army and of the name of the sovereign.
When a monarchy has extended its limits by the conquest of neighboring provinces, it should treat those provinces with great lenity.
If a monarchy has been long endeavoring at conquest, the provinces of its ancient demesne are generally ill used. They are obliged to submit both to the new and to the ancient abuses; and to be depopulated by a vast metropolis, that swallows up the whole. Now if, after having made conquests round this demesne, the conquered people were treated like the ancient subjects, the state would be undone; the taxes sent by the conquered provinces to the capital would never return; the inhabitants of the frontiers would be ruined, and consequently the frontiers would be weaker; the people would be disaf- fected; and the subsistence of the armies designed to act and remain there would become more precarious.
Such is the necessary state of a conquering monarchy: a shocking luxury in the capital; misery in the provinces some- what distant; and plenty in the most remote. It is the same with such a monarchy as with our planet: fire at the centre, verdure on the surface, and between both a dry, cold, and bar- ren earth.
10. — Of one Monarchy that subdues another Sometimes one monarchy subdues another. The smaller the latter, the better it is over-awed by fortresses; and the larger it is, the better will it be preserved by colonies.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 141 II. — Of the Manners of a conquered People It is not sufficient in those conquests to let the conquered nation enjoy their own laws; it is, perhaps, more necessary to leave them also their manners, because people in general have a stronger attachment to these than to their laws.
The French have been driven nine times out of Italy, because, as historians say,* of their insolent familiarities with the fair sex. It is too much for a nation to be obliged to bear not only with the pride of conquerors, but with their incontinence and indiscretion; these are, without doubt, most grievous and in- tolerable, as they are the source of infinite outrages.
12. — Of a Law of Cyrus Far am I from thinking that a good law which Cyrus made to oblige the Lydians to practise none but mean or infamous professions. It is true he directed his attention to an object of the greatest importance: he thought of guarding against revolts, and not invasions; but invasions will soon come, when the Persians and Lydians unite and corrupt each other. I would, therefore, much rather support by laws the simplicity and rudeness of the conquering nation than the effeminacy of the conquered.
Aristodemus, tyrant of Cumae,/ used all his endeavors to banish courage, and to enervate the minds of youth. He or- dered that boys should let their hair grow in the same manner as girls, that they should deck it with flowers, and wear long robes of different colors down to their heels; that when they went to their masters of music and dancing, they should have women with them to carry their umbrellas, perfumes, and fans, and to present them with combs and looking-glasses whenever they bathed. This education lasted till the age of twenty — an education that could be agreeable to none but to a petty tyrant, who exposes his sovereignty to defend his Hfe.
13. — Charles XII This prince, who depended entirely on his own strength, hastened his ruin by forming designs that could never be exe- cuted but by a long war — a thing which his kingdom was unable to support.
i See Puffendorf's " Universal History."; Dionys. Halicar. lib. VII.
142 MONTESQUIEU It was not a declining state he undertook to subvert, but a rising empire. The Russians made use of the war he waged against them as of a miUtary school. Every defeat brought them nearer to victory; and, losing abroad, they learned to defend themselves at home.
Charles, in the deserts of Poland, imagined himself sovereign of the whold world: here he wandered, and with him in some measure wandered Sweden; while his capital enemy acquired new strength against him, locked him up, made settlements along the Baltic, destroyed or subdued Livonia.
Sweden was like a river whose waters are cut off at the foun- tain-head in order to change its course.
It was not the affair of Pultowa that ruined Charles. Had he not been destroyed at that place, he would have been in an- other. The casualties of fortune are easily repaired; but who can be guarded against events that incessantly arise from the nature of things?
But neither nature nor fortune were ever so much against him as he himself.
He was not directed by the present situation of things, but by a kind of plan of his forming; and even this he followed very ill. He was not an Alexander; but he would have made an excellent soldier under that monarch.
Alexander's project succeeded because it was prudently con- certed.^ The bad success of the Persians in their several in- vasions of Greece, the conquests of Agesilaus, and the retreat of the ten thousand had shown to demonstration the superiority of the Greeks in their manner of fighting and in their arms; and it was well known that the Persians were too proud to be corrected.
It was no longer possible for them to weaken Greece by di- visions: Greece was then united under one head, which could not pitch upon a better method of rendering her insensible to her servitude than by flattering her vanity with the destruction of her hereditary enemy, and with the hopes of the conquest of Asia.
An empire cultivated by the most industrious nation in the world, that followed agriculture from a principle of religion — k Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Robert- the first historians to render justice to pon (in his History of America") were this extraordinary general. — Servan, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS an empire abounding with every convenience of life — furnished the enemy with all necessary means of subsisting.
It was easy to judge by the pride of those kings, who in vain were mortified by their numerous defeats, that they would pre- cipitate their ruin by their forwardness in venturing battles; and that the flattery of their courtiers would never permit them to doubt of their grandeur.
The project was not only wise, but wisely executed. Alex- ander, in the rapidity of his conquests, even in the impetuosity of his passion, had, if I may so express myself, a flash of reason by which he was directed, and which those who would fain have made a romance of his history, and whose minds were more corrupt than his, could not conceal from our view. Let us descend more minutely into his history.
14. — Alexander 14. — Alexander He did not set out upon his expedition till he had secured Macedonia against the neighboring barbarians, and completed the reduction of Greece; he availed himself of this conquest for no other end than for the execution of his grand enterprise; he rendered the jealousy of the Lacedaemonians of no effect; he attacked the maritime provinces; he caused his land forces to keep close to the sea-coast, that they might not be separated from his fleet; he made an admirable use of discipline against numbers; he never wanted provisions; and if it be true that victory gave him everything, he, in his turn, did everything to obtain it.
In the beginning of his enterprise^ — a time when the least check might have proved his destruction — he trusted very lit- tle to fortune; but when his reputation was established by a series of prosperous events, he sometimes had recourse to temerity. When before his departure for Asia he marched against the Triballians and lUyrians, you find he waged waW against those people in the very same manner as Csesar after- wards conducted that against the Gauls. Upon his return to Greece,w^ it was in some measure against his will that he took and destroyed Thebes. When he invested that city, he wanted the inhabitants to come into terms of peace; but they hastened their own ruin. When it was debated, whether he should at- / See Arrian, " De Expedit. Alexandri," lib. I. m Ibid.
144 MONTESQUIEU tack the Persian fleet,w it is Parmenio who shows his presump- tion, Alexander his wisdom. His aim was, to draw the Persians from the sea-coast, and to lay them under a necessity of aban- doning their marine, in which they had a manifest superiority. Tyre being from principle attached to the Persians, who could not subsist without the commerce and navigation of that city, Alexander destroyed it. He subdued Egypt, which Darius had left bare of troops while he was assembling immense armies in another world.
To the passage of the Granicus, Alexander owed the con- quest of the Greek colonies; to the battle of Issus, the reduction of Tyre and Egypt; to the battle of Arbela, the empire of the world.
After the battle of Issus, he suffered Darius to escape, and employed his time in securing and regulating his conquests: after the battle of Arbela, he pursued him so closer as to leave him no place of refuge in his empire. Darius enters his towns, his provinces, to quit them the next moment; and Alexander marches with such rapidity that the empire of the world seems to be rather the prize of an Olympian race than the fruit of a great victory.
In this manner he carried on his conquests: let us now see how he preserved them.
He opposed those who would have had him treat the Greeks as masters/' and the Persians as slaves. He thought only of uniting the two nations, and of abolishing the distinctions of a conquering and a conquered people. After he had completed his victories, he relinquished all those prejudices that had helped him to obtain them. He assumed the manners of the Persians, that he might not chagrin them too much by obliging them to conform to those of the Greeks. It was this humanity which made him show so great a respect for the wife and mother of Darius; and this that made him so continent. What a con- queror! He is lamented by all the nations he has subdued! What a usurper! At his death the very family he has cast from the throne is all in tears. These were the most glorious pas- sages in his life, and such as history cannot produce an instance of in any other conqueror.
n See Arrian, " De Expedit. Alexan- p This was Aristotle's advice. Pludri," lib. I. larch's " Morals," of the fortune and o Ibid. lib. III. virtue of Alexander, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 145