n6 MONTESQUIEU from the climate, religion, situation, or genius of the people, oblige it to conform to order, and to admit of some rule. By these things its nature is forced without being changed; its ferocity remains; and it is made tame and tractable only for a time.
II. — Natural Effects of the Goodness and Corruption of the Principles of Government When once the principles of government are corrupted, the very best laws become bad, and turn against the state: but when the principles are sound, even bad laws have the same efifect as good; the force of the principle draws everything to it.
The inhabitants of Crete used a very singular method to keep the principal magistrates dependent on the laws, which was that of " Insurrection." Part of the citizens rose up in arms,w put the magistrates to flight, and obliged them to return to a private life. This was supposed to be done in consequence of the law. One would have imagined that an institution of this nature, which established sedition to hinder the abuse of power, would have subverted any republic whatsoever; and yet it did not subvert that of Crete. The reason is this.w When the ancients would cite a people that had the strong- est affection for their country, they were sure to mention the inhabitants of Crete: " Our Country," said Plato,o " a name so dear to the Cretans." They called it by a name which signifies the love of a mother for her children.^ Now the love of our country sets everything right.
The laws of Poland have Hkewise their Insurrection: but the inconveniences thence arising plainly show that the people of Crete alone were capable of using such a remedy with suc- cess.
The gymnic exercises established among the Greeks had the same dependence on the goodness of the principle of govern- ment. " It was the Lacedaemonians and Cretans," said Plato,^ " that opened those celebrated academies which gave them so eminent a rank in the world. Modesty at first was alarmed; w Aristot. " PoHt." book II, chap, lo. o " Repub." lib, IX.
n They always united immediately a Plutarch's " Morals," treatise against foreign enemies, which was " whether a man advanced in years called " Syncretism."— Plut. " Mor." p, ought to meddle with public affairs."
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 117 but it yielded to the public utility." In Plato's time these insti- tutions were admirable s as they bore a relation to a very im- portant object, which was the military art. But when virtue fled from Greece, the military art was destroyed by these insti- tutions; people appeared then on the arena, not for improve- ment, but for debauch.d Plutarch informs us^ that the Romans in his time were of opinion that those games had been the principal cause of the slavery into which the Greeks had fallen. On the contrary, it was the slavery of the Greeks that corrupted those exercises. In Plutarch's time,/" their fighting naked in the parks, and their wrestling, infected the young people with a spirit of cowardice, inclined them to infamous passions, and made them mere dan- cers. But under Epaminondas the exercise of wrestling made the Thebans win the famous battle of Leuctra.g There are very few laws which are not good, while the state retains its principles: here I may apply what Epicurus said of riches. *' It is not the liquor, but the vessel that is corrupted."
12. — The same Subject continued In Rome the judges were chosen at first from the order of senators. This privilege the Gracchi transferred to the knights; Drusus gave it to the senators and knights; Sylla to the sena- tors only: Gotta to the senators, knights, and public treas- urers; Caesar excluded the latter; Antony made decuries of senators, knights, and centurions.
When once a republic is corrupted, there is no possibility of remedying any of the growing evils, but by removing the cor- ruption and restoring its lost principles; every other correction is either useless or a new evil. While Rome preserved her principles entire, the judicial power might without any abuse be lodged in the hands of senators; but as soon as this city be- came corrupt, to whatsoever body that power was transferred, c Thfe Gymnic art was divided into the pacific and the Pyrrhic. See how two parts, dancing and wrestling. In the latter dance was applied to the mili- Crete they had the armed dances of the tary art, Plato, ibid.
Curetes; at Sparta they had those of d " Aut libidinosse."
Castor and Pollux; at Athens the armed Ladaeas Lacedaemonis palsestras."
dances of Pallas, which were extremely —Mart. lib. IV. ep. 55.
proper for those that were not yet of e Plutarch's " Morals," in the treatise age for military service. " Wrestling is entitled " Questions concerning the afthe image of war," said Plato (" Laws," fairs of the Romans."
book vll.). He commends antiquity f Ibid.
for having established only two dances, g Ibid., Table propositions, book II.
ii8 MONTESQUIEU whether to the senate, to the knights, to the treasurers, to two of those bodies, to all three together, or to any other, matters still went wrong. The knights had no more virtue than the sewate, the treasurers no more than the knights, and these as little as the centurions.
After the people of Rome had obtained the privilege of shar- ing the magistracy with the patricians, it was natural to think that their flatterers would immediately become arbiters of the government. But no such thing ever happened. — It was ob- servable that the very people who had rendered the plebeians capable of public offices ever fixed their choice upon the patri- cians. Because they were virtuous, they were magnanimous; and because they were free, they had a contempt of power. But when their morals were corrupted, the more power they were possessed of, the less prudent was their conduct, till at length, upon becoming their own tyrants and slaves, they lost the strength of liberty to fall into the weakness and impotency of licentiousness.
13. — The effect of an Oath among virtuous People There is no nation, says Livy,/^ that has been longer uncor- rupted than the Romans; no nation where moderation and poverty have been longer respected.
Such was the influence of an oath among those people, that nothing bound them more strongly to the laws. They often did more for the observance of an oath than they would ever have performed for the thirst of glory or for the love of their country.
When Quintus Cincinnatus the consul wanted to raise an army in the city against the ^qui and the Volsci, the tribunes opposed him. " Well," said he, '' let all those who have taken an oath to the consul of the preceding year march under my banner." * In vain did the tribunes cry out that this oath was no longer binding, and that when they took it Quintus was but a private person: the people were more religious than those who pretended to direct them; they would not listen to the distinctions or equivocations of the tribunes.
When the same people thought of retiring to the Sacred Mount, they felt some remorse from the oath they had taken THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 119 to the consuls, that they would follow them into the field.; They entered then into a design of killing the consuls; but dropped it when they were given to understand that their oath would still be binding. Now it is easy to judge of the no- tion they entertained of the violation of an oath from the crime they intended to commit.
After the battle of Cannae, the people were seized with such a panic that they would fain have retired to Sicily.^ But Scipio having prevailed upon them to swear they would not stir from Rome, the fear of violating this oath surpassed all other appre- hensions. Rome was a ship held by two anchors, religion and morality, in the midst of a furious tempest.
14. — How the smallest Change of the Constitution is attended with the Ruin of its Principles Aristotle mentions the city of Carthage as a well-regulated republic. Polybius tells us^ that there was this inconvenience at Carthage in the second Punic war, that the senate had lost almost all its authority. We are informed by Livy that when Hannibal returned to Carthage he found that the magistrates and the principal citizens had abused their power, and con- verted the public revenues to their private emolument. The virtue, therefore, of the magistrates, and the authority of the senate, both fell at the same time; and all was owing to the same cause.
Every one knows the wonderful effects of the censorship among the Romans. There was a time when it grew burden- some; but still it was supported because there was more luxury than corruption. Claudius^ weakened its authority, by which means the corruption became greater than the luxury, and the censorship dwindled away of itself.w After various interrup- tions and resumptions, it was entirely laid aside, till it became altogether useless — that is, till the reigns of Augustus and Claudius.
j " Livy," book III. m See Book XI. chap. xii.
k " The people here referred to were n See " Dio," book XXXVII.
several young officers, who, in despair, Cicero's life in Plutarch, Cicero to proposed to retire, but were restrained Atticus, book IV. letters lo and 15.
by Scipio."— Crevier. Asconius on Cicero, de divinatione.
i About a hundred years after.
I20 MONTESQUIEU 15. — Sure Methods of preserving the three Principles I shall not be able to make myself rightly understood till the reader has perused the four following chapters.
16. — Distinctive Properties of a Republic It is natural for a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist. In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single subject; he has interests of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious, by oppressing his fellow-citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country.
In an extensive repubHc the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the pub- lic is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have less extent, and, of course, are less protected.
The long duration of the republic of Sparta was owing to her having continued in the same extent of territory after all her wars. The sole aim of Sparta was liberty; and the sole ad- vantage of her liberty, glory.
It was the spirit of the Greek republics to be as contented with their territories as with their laws. Athens was first fired with ambition and gave it to Lacedaemon; but it was an ambi- tion rather of commanding a free people than of governing slaves; rather of directing than of breaking the union. All was lost upon the starting up of monarchy — a government whose spirit is more turned to increase of dominion.
Excepting particular circumstances,^ it is difficult for any other than a republican government to subsist longer in a single town. A prince of so petty a state would naturally endeavor to oppress his subjects, because his power would be great, while the means of enjoying it or of causing it to be respected would be inconsiderable. The consequence is, he would tram- ple upon his people. On the other hand, such a prince might 0 As when a petty sovereign supports means of their mutual jealousy; but himself between two great powers by then he has only a precarious existence.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 121 be easily crushed by a foreign or even a domestic force; the people might any instant unite and rise up against him. Now as soon as the sovereign of a single town is expelled, the quarrel is over; but if he has many towns, it only begins.
17. — Distinctive Properties of a Monarchy A monarchical state ought to be of moderate extent. Were it small, it would form itself into a republic; were it very large, the nobility, possessed of great estates, far from the eye of the prince, with a private court of their own, and secure, moreover, from sudden executions by the laws and manners of the country — such a nobility, I say, might throw off their allegiance, having nothing to fear from too slow and too dis- tant a punishment.
Thus Charlemagne had scarcely founded his empire when he was obliged to divide it; whether the governors of the prov- inces refused to obey; or whether, in order to keep them more under subjection, there was a necessity of parcelling the empire into several kingdoms.
After the decease of Alexander his empire was divided. How was it possible for those Greek and Macedonian chiefs, who were each of them free and independent, or commanders at least of the victorious bands dispersed throughout that vast ex- tent of conquered land — how was it possible, I say, for them to obey?
Attila's empire was dissolved soon after his death; such a number of kings, who were no longer under restraint, could not resume their fetters.
» The sudden establishment of unlimited power is a remedy which in those cases may prevent a dissolution: but how dread- ful the remedy, which after the enlargement of dominion opens a new scene of misery! * The rivers hasten to mingle their waters with the sea; and monarchies lose themselves in despotic power.
18. — Particular Case of the Spanish Monarchy Let not the example of Spain be produced against me; it rather proves what I affirm. To preserve America she did what even despotic power itself does not attempt: she de- 122 MONTESQUIEU stroyed the inhabitants. To preserve her colony, she was obUged to keep it dependent even for its subsistence.
In the Netherlands, she essayed to render herself arbitrary; and as soon as she abandoned the attempt, her perplexity in- creased. On the one hand the Walloons would not be governed by Spaniards; and on the other, the Spanish soldiers refused to submit to Walloon officers./' In Italy she maintained her ground, merely by exhausting herself and by enriching that country. For those who would have been pleased to have got rid of the King of Spain were not in a humor to refuse his gold.
19. — Distinctive Properties of a despotic Government A large empire supposes a despotic authority in the person who governs. It is necessary that the quickness of the prince's resolutions should supply the distance of the places they are sent to; that fear should prevent the remissness of the distant governor or magistrate; that the law should be derived from a single person, and should shift continually, according to the accidents which incessantly multiply in a state in proportion to its extent.
20. — Consequence of the preceding Chapters If it be, therefore, the natural property of small states to be governed as a republic, of middling ones to be subject to a monarch, and of large empires to be swayed by a despotic prince; the consequence is, that in order to preserve the prin- ciples of the established government, the state must be sup- ported in the extent it has acquired, and that the spirit of this state will alter in proportion as it contracts or extends its limits.
21. — Of the Empire of China Before I conclude this book, I shall answer an objection that may be made to the foregoing doctrine.
Our missionaries inform us that the government of the vast Empire of China is admirable, and that it has a proper mixture of fear, honor, and virtue. Consequently I must have given an idle distinction in establishing the principles of the three governments.
p See the " History of the United Provinces," by M. Le Clerc.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWs 123 But I cannot conceive what this honor can be among a peo- ple who act only through fear of being bastinadoed.3 Again, our merchants are far from giving us any such ac- counts of the virtue so much talked of by the missionaries; we need only consult them in relation to the robberies and ex- tortions of the mandarins.^ I likewise appeal to another un- exceptionable witness, the great Lord Anson.
Besides, Father Perennin's letters concerning the emperor's proceedings against some of the princes of the blood-y who had incurred his displeasure by their conversion, plainly show us a settled plan of tyranny, and barbarities committed by rule, that is, in cold blood.
We have likewise Monsieur de Mairan's, and the same Father Perennin's, letters on the government of China. I find, therefore, that after a few proper questions and answers the whole mystery is unfolded.
Might not our missionaries have been deceived by an appear- ance of order? Might not they have been struck with that con- stant exercise of a single person's will — an exercise by which they themselves are governed, and which they are so pleased to find in the courts of the Indian princes; because as they go thither only in order to introduce great changes, it is much easier to persuade those princes that there are no bounds to their power, than to convince the people that there are none to their submission.* In fine, there is frequently some kind of truth even in errors themselves. It may be owing to particular and, perhaps, very extraordinary circumstances that the Chinese government is not so corrupt as one might naturally expect. The climate and some other physical causes may, in that country, have had so strong an influence on their morals as in some measure to pro- duce wonders.
The climate of China is surprisingly favorable to the propa- gation of the human species.w The women are the most pro- lific in the whole world. The most barbarous tyranny can put no stop to the progress of propagation. The prince cannot say q" It is the cudgel that governs missionaries availed themselves of the China," says Father Du Halde. ^ authority of Canhi to silence the manr Among others, De Lange's relation. darins, who constantly declared that by s Of the family of Sourmama, " Edi- the laws of the country no foreign worfying Letters," i8th conection. ship could be established in the empire.
t See in Father Du Halde how the u See " Lettres Persanes," cxx.
124 MONTESQUIEU there like Pharoah, " Let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply." He would be rather reduced to Nero's wish, that mankind had all but one head. In spite of tyranny, China by the force of its climate will be ever populous, and triumph over the tyrannical oppressor.
China, like all other countries that live chiefly upon rice, is subject to frequent famines. When the people are ready to starve, they disperse in order to seek for nourishment; in consequence of which, gangs of robbers are formed on every side. Most of them are extirpated in their very infancy; others swell, and are likewise suppressed. And yet in so great a num- ber of such distant provinces, some band or other may happen to meet with success. In that case they maintain their ground, strengthen their party, form themselves into a military body, march up to the capital, and place their leader on the throne.
From the very nature of things, a bad administration is here immediately punished. The want of subsistence in so popu- lous a country produces sudden disorders. The reason why the redress of abuses in other countries is attended with such difficulty is, because their efforts are not immediately felt; the prince is not informed in so sudden and sensible a manner as in China.
The Emperor of China is not taught like our princes, that if he governs ill he will be less happy in the other life, less powerful and less opulent in this. He knows that if his gov- ernment be not just he will be stripped both of empire and life.
As China grows every day more populous, notwithstanding the exposing of children,^ the inhabitants are incessantly em- ployed in tilling the lands for their subsistence. This requires a very extraordinary attention in the government. It is their perpetual concern that every man should have it in his power to work, without the apprehension of being deprived of the fruits of his labor. Consequently this is not so much a civil as a do- mestic government.
Such has been the origin of those regulations which have been so greatly extolled. They wanted to make the laws reign in conjunction with despotic power; but whatever is joined to the latter loses all its force. In vain did this arbitrary sway, V See the order of Tsongtou for tilling the land, in the " Edifying Letters," 2ist collection.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 125 laboring under its own inconveniences, desire to be fettered; it armed itself with its chains, and has become still more ter- rible.
China is, therefore, a despotic state, whose principle is fear. Perhaps in the earliest dynasties, when the empire had not so large an extent, the government might have deviated a little from this spirit; but the case is otherwise at present.
BOOK IX OF LAWS IN THE RELATION THEY BEAR TO A DEFENSIVE FORCE I. — In what Manner Republics provide for their Safety IF a republic be small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be large, it is ruined by an internal imperfection. To this twofold inconvenience democracies and aris- tocracies are equally liable, whether they be good or bad. The evil is in the very thing itself, and no form can redress it.
It is, therefore, very probable that mankind would have been, at length, obliged to live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical, government. I mean a confederate republic.
This form of government is a convention by which several petty states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to establish. It is a kind of assemblage of socie- ties, that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means of further associations, till they arrive at such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the whole body.
It was these associations that so long contributed to the prosperity of Greece. By these the Romans attacked the whole globe, and by these alone the whole globe withstood them; for when Rome had arrived at her highest pitch of grandeur, it was the associations beyond the Danube and the Rhine — associa- tions formed by the terror of her arms — ^that enabled the bar- barians to resist her.
Hence it proceeds that Holland,^ Germany, and the Swiss cantons are considered in Europe as perpetual republics.
a It is composed of about fifty differ- upon this remark that Montesquieu has ent republics, all different from one an- taken each of the independent cities as other.—" State of the United Prov- a republic— Ed. inces," by M. Janisson. Voltaire notes THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 127 The associations of cities were formerly more necessary than in our times. A weak, defenceless town was exposed to greater danger. By conquest it was deprived not only of the executive and legislative power, as at present, but, moreover, of all human property.^ A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruption; the form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme power, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great an influence over one, this would alarm the rest; were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.
Should, a popular insurrection happen in one of the confed- erate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates pre- serve their sovereignty.
As this government is composed of petty republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with regard to its external situation, by means of the association, it possesses all the ad- vantages of large monarchies.
2. — That a confederate Government ought to be composed of States of the same Nature, especially of the republican Kind The Canaanites were destroyed by reason that they were petty monarchies that had no union or confederacy for their common defence; and, indeed, a confederacy is not agreeable to the nature of petty monarchies.
As the confederate republic of Germany consists of free cities, and of petty states subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is much more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland.
The spirit of monarchy is war and enlargement of dominion: 6 Civil liberty, goods, wives, children, temples, and even burying-places.
128 MONTESQUIEU peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic. These two kinds of government cannot naturally subsist in a confederate republic.
Thus we observe, in the Roman history, that when the Veien- tes had chosen a king, they were immediately abandoned by all the other petty republics of Tuscany. Greece was undone as soon as the kings of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons.
The confederate republic of Germany, composed of princes and free towns, subsists by means of a chief, who is, in some respects, the magistrate of the union, in others the monarch.
2,.— Other Requisites in a confederate Republic In the republic of Holland one province cannot conclude an alliance without the consent of the others. This law, which is an excellent one, and even necessary in a confederate republic, is wanting in the Germanic constitution, where it would pre- vent the misfortunes that may happen to the whole confederacy, through the imprudence, ambition, or avarice of a single mem- ber. A republic united by a political confederacy has given itself entirely up, and has nothing more to resign.
It is difficult for the united states to be all of equal power and extent. The Lycian c republic was an association of twen- ty-three towns; the large ones had three votes in the common council, the middling ones two, and the small towns one. The Dutch republic consists of seven provinces of different extent of territory, which have each one voice.
The cities of Lycia d contributed to the expenses of the state, according to the proportion of suffrages. The provinces of the United Netherlands cannot follow this proportion; they must be directed by that of their power.
In Lycia ^ the judges and town magistrates were elected by the common council, and according to the proportion already mentioned. In the republic of Holland they are not chosen by the common council, but each town names its magistrates. Were I to give a model of an excellent confederate republic, I should pitch upon that of Lycia.
c Strabo, lib. XIV. d Ibid. e Ibid.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 129 4. — In what Manner despotic Governments provide for their Security As republics provide for their security by uniting, despotic governments do it by separating, and by keeping themselves, as it were, single. They sacrifice a part of the country; and by ravaging and desolating the frontiers they render the heart of the empire inaccessible.
It is a received axiom in geometry that the greater the ex- tent of bodies, the more their circumference is relatively small. This practice, therefore, of laying the frontiers waste is more tolerable in large than in middling states.
A despotic government does all the mischief to itself that could be committed by a cruel enemy, whose arms it were un- able to resist.
It preserves itself likewise by another kind of separation, which is by putting the most distant provinces into the hands of a great vassal. The Mogul, the King of Persia, and the em- perors of China have their feudatories; and the Turks have found their account in putting the Tartars, the Moldavians, the Wallachians, and formerly the Transylvanians between themselves and their enemies.
5. — In what Manner a Monarchical Government provides for its Security A monarchy never destroys itself like a despotic government. But a kingdom of a moderate extent is liable to sudden inva- sions: it must, therefore, have fortresses to defend its frontiers; and troops to garrison those fortresses. The least spot of ground is disputed with military skill and resolution. Despotic states make incursions against one another; it is monarchies only that wage war.
Fortresses are proper for monarchies; despotic governments are afraid of them. They dare not intrust their officers with such a command, as none of them have any affection for the prince or his government.
6. — Of the defensive Force of States in general To preserve a state in its due force, it must have such an extent as to admit of a proportion between the celerity with which it may be invaded, and that with which it may defeat the I30 MONTESQUIEU invasion. As an invader may appear on every side, it is requi- site that the state should be able to make on every side its de- fence; consequently it should be of a moderate extent, propor- tioned to the degree of velocity that nature has given to man, to enable him to move from one place to another.
France and Spain are exactly of a proper extent. They have so easy a communication for their forces as to be able to con- vey them immediately to what part they have a mind; the armies unite and pass with rapidity from one frontier to an- I other, without any apprehension of such difficulties as require ^ time to remove.
It is extremely happy for France that the capital stands near to the different frontiers in proportion to their weakness; and the prince has a better view of each part of his country accord- ing as it is more exposed.
But when a vast empire, like Persia, is attacked, it is several months before the troops are assembled in a body; and then they are not able to make such forced marches, for that space of time, as they could for fifteen days. Should the army on the frontiers be defeated, it is soon dispersed, because there is no neighboring place of retreat. The victor, meeting with no resistance, advances with all expedition, sits down before the capital and lays siege to it, when there is scarcely time suffi- cient to summon the governors of the provinces to its relief. Those who foresee an approaching revolution hasten it by their disobedience. For men whose fidelity is entirely owing to the danger of punishment are easily corrupted as soon as it becomes distant; their aim is their own private interest. The empire is subverted, the capital taken, and the conqueror dis- putes the several provinces with the governors.