conspiracy against the republic to as- important, and those which are less so: semblies in which the morals of women mores, graviores, leviores. and young people were debauched.)
I04 MONTESQUIEU II. — In what Manner the Institutions changed at Rome, together with the Government As manners were supported by the domestic tribunal, they were also supported by the public accusation; and hence it is that these two things fell together with the public manners, and ended with the republic.^ The establishing of perpetual questions, that is, the division of jurisdiction among the praetors, and the custom gradually introduced of the praetors determining all causes them- selves,^ weakened the use of the domestic tribunal. This ap- pears by the surprise of historians, who look upon the decisions which Tiberius caused to be given by this tribunal as singular facts, and as a renewal of the ancient course of pleading.
The establishment of monarchy and the change of manners put likewise an end to public accusations. It mi^ht be appre- hended lest a dishonest man, afifronted at the slight shown him by a woman, vexed at her refusal, and irritated even by her virtue, should form a design to destroy her. The Julian law ordained that a woman should not be accused of adultery till after her husband had been charged with favoring her irregu- larities; which limited greatly, and annihilated, as it were, this sort of accusation./^ Sextus Quintus seemed to have been desirous of reviving the public accusation.* But there needs very little reflection to see that this law would be more improper in such a monarchy as his than in any other.
12. — Of the Guardianship of Women among the Romans The Roman laws subjected women to a perpetual guardian- ship, except they were under cover and subject to the author- ity of a husband./ This guardianship was given to the nearest of the male relatives; and by a vulgar expression k it appears they were very much confined. This was proper for a republic, but not at all necessary in a monarchy./ f " Judicio de moribus (quod antea i Sextus Quintus ordained that, if a quidem in antiquis leqribus positum erat, husband did not come and make his non autem frequentabatur) penitus abo- complaint to him of his wife's infidelity, Hto."— Leg. II, " Cod. de repud." he should be put to death. See Leti.
g Judicia extraordinaria.;' Nisi convenissent in manum viri.
h It was entirely abolished by Con- k Ne sis mihi patruus oro.
stantine: "It is a shame," said he, /The Papian law ordained, under Au- " that settled marriages should be dis- gustus, that women who had borne three turbed by the presumption of strangers." children should be exempt from this tutelage.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS That the women among the ancient Germans were likewise under a perpetual tutelage appears from the different codes of the Laws of the Barbarians.^ This custom was communicated to the monarchies founded by those people; but was not of long duration.
13. — Of the Punishments decreed by the Emperors against . the Incontinence of Women The Julian law ordained a punishment against adultery. But so far was this law, any more than those afterwards made on the same account, from being a mark of regularity of manners, that on the contrary it was a proof of their depravity.
The whole political system in respect to women received a change in the monarchical state. The question was no longer to oblige them to a regularity of manners, but to punish their crimes. That new laws were made to punish their crimes was owing to their leaving those transgressions unpunished which were not of so criminal a nature.
The frightful dissolution of manners obliged indeed the em- perors to enact laws in order to put some stop to lewdness; but it was not their intention to establish a general reformation. Of this the positive facts related by historians are a much stronger proof than all these laws can be of the contrary. We may see in Dio the conduct of Augustus on this occasion, and in what manner he eluded, both in his praetorian and censorian office, the repeated instances that were made him n for that purpose.
It is true that we find in historians very rigid sentences, passed in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, against the lewdness of some Roman ladies: but by showing us the spirit of those reigns, at the same time they demonstrate the spirit of those decisions.
The principal design of Augustus and Tiberius was to pun- ish the dissoluteness of their relatives. It was not their imfnThis tutelage was by the Germans evils? let us forget them." Dio, book called Mundeburdium. LIV, The Senate having desired him n Upon their bringing before him a to give them some regulations in re- young man who had married a woman spect to women's morals, he evaded with whom he had before carried on an their petition by telling them that they illicit commerce, he hesitated a long should chastise their wives in the same while, not daring to approve or to pun- manner as he did his; upon which they ish these things. At length recollect- desired him to tell them how he be- ing himself, " Seditions," says he, haved to his wife^ (I think a very in- " have been the cause of very great discreet question.)
io6 MONTESQUIEU io6 MONTESQUIEU morality they punished, but a particular crime of impiety or high treason o of their own invention, which served to promote a respect for majesty, and answered their private revenge. Hence it is that the Roman historians inveigh so bitterly against this tyranny.
The penalty of the Julian law was small./' The emperors in- sisted that in passing sentence the judges should increase the penalty of the law. This was the subject of the invectives of historians. They did not examine whether the women were deserving of punishment, but whether they had violated the law, in order to punish them.
One of the most tyrannical proceedings of Tiberius q was the abuse he made of the ancient laws. When he wanted to extend the punishment of a Roman lady beyond that inflicted by the Julian law, he revived the domestic tribunal.^ These regulations in respect to women concerned only sena- torial families, not the common people. Pretences were wanted to accuse the great, which were constantly furnished by the dissolute behavior of the ladies.
In fine, what I have above observed, namely, that regularity of manners is not the principle of monarchy, was never better verified than under those first emperors; and whoever doubts it need only read Tacitus, Suetonius, Juvenal, or Martial.
14. — Sumptuary Laws among the Romans We have spoken of pubHc incontinence because it is the in- separable companion of luxury. If we leave the motions of the heart at liberty, how shall we be able to restrain the weaknesses of the mind?
At Rome, besides the general institutions, the censors pre- vailed on the magistrates to enact several particular laws for maintaining the frugality of women. This was the design of the Fannian, Licinian, and Oppian laws. We may see in Livy ^ 0 " Culpam inter viros et foeminas q " Proprium id Tiberio fuit scelera vulgatum gravi nomine laesarum re- nuper reperta priscis verbis obtegere."— ligionum appellando, clementiam ma- Tacit.
jorum^ suasque ipse leges egrediebatur." a " Adulterii graviorem poenam depre- — Tacit. " Annal." lib. III. catus, ut exemplo majorum propinquis p This law is given in the Digest, but suis ultra ducentesimum lapidem rewithout mentioning the penalty. It is moveretur, suasit. Adultero Manlio supposed it was only relegatio, because Italia atque Africa interdictum est."— that of incest was only deportatio. Leg. Tacit. " Annal." lib. II.
eI quis viduam, fif. de quaest. b Dec. 4, lib. IV.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 107 the great ferment the senate was in when the women insisted upon the revocation of the Oppian law. The abrogation of this law is fixed upon by Valerius Maximus as the period whence we may date the luxury of the Romans.
15. — Of Dowries and Nuptial Advantages in different Constitutions Dowries ought to be considerable in monarchies, in order to enable husbands to support their rank and the estabHshed luxury. In repubHcs, where luxury should never reign,c they ought to be moderate; but there should be hardly any at all in despotic governments, where women are in some measure slaves.
The community of goods introduced by the French laws be- tween man and wife is extremely well adapted to a monarchical government; because the women are thereby interested in domestic affairs, and compelled, as it were, to take care of their family. It is less so in a republic, where women are possessed of more virtue. But it would be quite absurd in despotic gov- ernments, where the women themselves generally constitute a part of the master's property.
As women are in a state that furnishes sufficient induce- ments to marriage, the advantages which the law gives them over the husband's property are of no service to society. But in a republic they would be extremely prejudicial, because riches are productive of luxury. In despotic governments the profits accruing from marriage ought to be mere subsistence, and no more.
16. — An excellent Custom of the Samnites The Samnites had a custom which in so small a republic, and especially in their situation, must have been productive of admirable effects. The young people were all convened in one place, and their conduct was examined. He that was de- clared the best of the whole assembly had leave given him to take which girl he pleased for his wife; the second best chose r Marseilles was the wisest of all the in clothes, as Strabo observes, lib. IV. republics in its time; here it was or- Strabo further allows a small sum in darned that dowries should not exceed gold ornaments to serve in the decora- one hundred crowns in money, and five tion of a bride.
io8 MONTESQUIEU after him; and so on.d Admirable institution! The only rec- ommendation that young men could have on this occasion was their virtue and the services done their country. He who had the greatest share of these endowments chose which girl he liked out of the whole nation. Love, beauty, chastity, virtue, birth, and even wealth itself, were all, in some measure, the dowry of virtue. A nobler and grander recompense, less chargeable to a petty state, and more capable of influencing both sexes, could scarcely be imagined.
The Samnites were descended from the Lacedaemonians; and Plato, whose institutes are only an improvement of those of Lycurgus, enacted nearly the same law.^ 17. — Of Female Administration It is contrary to reason and nature that women should reign in families, as was customary among the Egyptians; but not that they should govern an empire. In the former case the state of their natural weakness does not permit them to have the pre-eminence; in the latter their very weakness generally gives them more lenity and moderation, qualifications fitter for a good administration than roughness and severity.
In the Indies they are very easy under a female govern- ment; and it is settled that if the male issue be not of a mother of the same blood, the females born of a mother of the blood- royal must succeed./" And then they have a certain number of persons who assist them to bear the weight of the govern- ment. According to Mr. Smith,^ they are very easy in Africa under female administration. If to this we add the example of England and Russia, we shall find that they succeed alike both in moderate and despotic governments.
d Fragment of Nicolaus Damascenus, / " Edifying Letters," 14th collection, taken from Stobaeus in the collection of g " Voyage to Guinea," part the sec- Constantine Porphyrogenitus. ond, of the kingdom of Angola, on the e He even permits them to have a Golden Coast, more frequent interview with one an- other.
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Fac-similes from Rare and Curious Books.
A PAGE FROM THE MONTE SANTO D[ 1)10.
Bettini's Monte Santo di Dio was published in Florence in 1477, by Nicholas of Breslau, a German, who became by far the most celebrated of Florentine printers. This work exhibits the first example of illustrations by n^eans of engraved metal plates. The letter-press of the work as shown in thisfac-simile is extremely regular and effective.
i^i Inconttiinda cHibr o intitulato aionte laiKflo Adio Coi^pono dameffer Antonio da Siena Reuercndiffimo uc&Imduo difdbgno deUacongregaQonedepotterilefuad.Capiculo.Pn'mo* A incrcata ct inmenfa ma^a di dio/omnipotcntc et inmottalc crcatorc* bignore ct gouernato re delluniucrlb glalua ineffabilc fapicntialiaaeaco luomo/acao d^plo fuo modo/acquiftando et participando iadiuina iimilitu dinc/et riiplendcndoinim Label leza della luadolcifi'ima cariia • ueglia iddiopintd.lcdo&. gufti lo peraffedo Inde c c]>e lulumo Loffic^KliHonale crcatura JU e di uedcrc iddioficr intelledto 6c guftarlo paffcdo/ct per cfifedo inetcrno godcno % (Ognihuomoadunqucporiginal luftitia dcfidcra naturalmcntc diuedere i.dio.lmpcro die ucdcndolo ct cognofccndolo infinita mcntc buono fopf atude Iccofc 6c intude Iccofc lamainfinitamc te/ctlui foloamando6c fluendo c pcrfcdamente 6c in ctcmo bca fto* ( E aduoque alhuomo deco per lopeccato neceflario difapcrc dmodo/ct lauia/ct lauerita pcrlecjuali pofla uedcrc effo iddio co gnofccrlo 6c amarlo. cEt perd^ egli c minfibile ct incomprdxn fibilc'/et e cofa fbirituale dibi fogno e dicinnanzi atude Iccofe fap piamo 6cintendiamo cjuello die e ncceffario alio fpiritifal uederg AcGo diepotiamo altamcntcentrarecon tremore/deuotionect reucrentia acontemplare Iadiuina maieflade (Et non c quefto co fa inconucniente adcfiderare Impero cbelffgnore dice flopropl^ ta guftatc 6c uedete impero cbdfignore e luaue 6c dofce Et crifto dice inmadKO* Siate pfedi fi come e perfedo clpadrcceleftiale* Come fiperuiene alia uiGone didio. Capitolo fecondo* YW^ Recofe fono neceDTaric aucdere iddio. LalufBdcntia dduc ^ JL \^tore Ladifpofitione dcffo idio elcjuale Ujuomo defidcra BOOK VIII OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS T I. — General Idea of this Book HE corruption of every government generally begins with that of its principles.
2. — Of the Corruption of the Principles of Democracy.
The principle of democracy is corrupted not only when the spirit of equality is extinct, but likewise when they fall into a spirit of extreme equality, and when each citizen would fain be upon a level with those whom he has chosen to command him. Then the people, incapable of bearing the very power they have delegated, want to manage everything themselves, to debate for the senate, to execute for the magistrate, and to decide for the judges.
When this is the case, virtue can no longer subsist in the republic. The people are desirous of exercising the functions of the magistrates, who cease to be revered. The deliberations of the senate are slighted; all respect is then laid aside for the senators, and consequently for old age. If there is no more re- spect for old age, there will be none presently for parents; deference to husbands will be likewise thrown ofif, and submis- sion to masters. This license will soon become general, and the trouble of command be as fatiguing as that of obedience. Wives, children, slaves will shake ofif all subjection. No longer will there be any such thing as manners, order, or virtue.
We find in Xenophon's Banquet a very lively description of a republic in which the people abused their equality. Each guest gives in his turn the reason why he is satisfied. " Con- tent I am," says Chamides, " because of my poverty. When I no MONTESQUIEU was rich, I was obliged to pay my court to informers, knowing I was more liable to be hurt by them than capable of doing them harm. The republic constantly demanded some new tax of me; and I could not decline paying. Since I have grown poor, I have acquired authority; nobody threatens me; I rather threaten others. I can go or stay where I please. The rich already rise from their seats and give me the way. I am a king, I was before a slave: I paid taxes to the republic, now it maintains me: I am no longer afraid of losing: but I hope to acquire."
The people fall into this misfortune, when those in whom they confide, desirous of concealing their own corruption, en- deavor to corrupt them. To disguise their own ambition, they speak to them only of the grandeur of the state; to conceal their own avarice, they incessantly flatter theirs.
The corruption will increase among the corruptors, and like- wise among those who are already corrupted. The people will divide the pubHc money among themselves, and, having added the administration of affairs to their indolence, will be for blending their poverty with the amusements of luxury. But with their indolence and luxury, nothing but the public treasure will be able to satisfy their demands.
We must not be surprised to see their suffrages given for money. It is impossible to make great largesses to the peo- ple without great extortion: and to compass this, the state must be subverted. The greater the advantages they seem to derive from their liberty, the nearer they approach towards the crit- ical moment of losing it. Petty tyrants arise who have all the vices of a single tyrant. The small remains of liberty soon be- come insupportable; a single tyrant starts up, and the people are stripped of every thing, even of the profits of their corrup- tion.
Democracy has, therefore, two excesses to avoid — the spirit of inequality, which leads to aristocracy or monarchy, and the spirit of extreme equality, which leads to despotic power, as the latter is completed by conquest.
True it is, that those who corrupted the Greek republics did not always become tyrants. This was because they had a greater passion for eloquence than for the military art. Be- THE SPIRIT OF LAWS iii sides there reigned an implacable hatred in the breasts of tRe Greeks against those who subverted a republican government; and for this reason anarchy degenerated into annihilation, in- stead of being changed into tyranny.
But Syracuse being situated in the midst of a great number of petty states, whose government had been changed from oligarchy to tyranny,^ and being governed by a senate b scarce- ly ever mentioned in history, underwent such miseries as are the consequence of a more than ordinary corruption. This city, ever a prey to licentiousness,^ or oppression, equally laboring under the sudden and alternate succession of liberty and servi- tude, and notwithstanding her external strength, constantly determined to a revolution by the least foreign power — this city, I say, had in her bosom an immense multitude of people, whose fate it was to have always this cruel alternative, either of choosing a tyrant to govern them, or of acting the tyrant themselves.
3. — Of the Spirit of extreme Equality As distant as heaven is from earth, so is the true spirit of equality from that of extreme equality. The former does not imply that everybody should command, or that no one should be commanded, but that we obey or command our equals. It endeavors not to shake off the authority of a master, but that its masters should be none but its equals.
In the state of nature, indeed, all men are born equal, but they cannot continue in this equality. Society makes them lose it, and they recover it only by the protection of the laws.
Such is the difference between a well-regulated democracy and one that is not so, that in the former men are equal only as citizfens, but in the latter they are equal also as magistrates, as senators, as judges, as fathers, as husbands, or as masters.
The natural place of virtue is near to liberty; but it is not nearer to excessive liberty than to servitude.
a See Plutarch in the lives of Timoleoh The people having been the cause of the and Dio. victory over the Athenians, the republic b It was that of the Six hundred, of was changed. — Ibid. cap. iv. The paswhom mention is made by Diodorus. sion of two young magistrates, one of c Upon the expulsion of the tyrants, whom carried off the other's boy, and in they made citizens of strangers and mer- revenge the other debauched his wife, cenary troops, which gave rise to civil was attended with a change in the form wars.— Aristot. " Polit.^' lib. V. cap. iii. of this republic— Ibid. lib. VII. cap. iv.
112 MONTESQUIEU 4. — Particular Cause of the Corruption of the People Great success, especially when chiefly owing to the people, intoxicates them to such a degree that it is impossible to con- tain them within bounds. Jealous of their magistrates, they soon become jealous likewise of the magistracy; enemies to those who govern, they soon prove enemies also to the consti- tution. Thus it was that the victory over the Persians in the straits of Salamis corrupted the republic of Athens;d and thus the defeat of the Athenians ruined the republic of Syracuse.^ Marseilles never experienced those great transitions from lowness to grandeur; this was owing to the prudent conduct of that republic, which always preserved her principles.
5. — Of the Corruption of the Principle of Aristocracy Aristocracy is corrupted if the power of the nobles becomes arbitrary: when this is the case, there can no longer be any virtue either in the governors or the governed.
If the reigning families observe the laws, it is a monarchy with several monarchs, and in its own nature one of the most excellent; for almost all these monarchs are tied down by the laws. But when they do not observe them, it is a despotic state swayed by a great many despotic princes.
In the latter case, the republic consists only in the nobles. The body governing is the republic; and the body governed is the despotic state; which forms two of the most heteroge- neous bodies in the world.
The extremity of corruption is when the power of the nobles becomes hereditary •,f for then they can hardly have any mod- eration. If they are only a few, their power is greater, but their security less: if they are a larger number, their power is less, and their security greater, insomuch that power goes on in- creasing, and security diminishing, up to the very despotic prince who is encircled with excess of power and danger.
The great number, therefore, of nobles in an hereditary aris- tocracy renders the government less violent: but as there is less virtue, they fall into a spirit of supineness and negligence, by which the state loses all its strength and activity.^ d Aristot. " Polit." lib. V. cap. iv. g Venice is one of those republics e Ibid. that has enacted the best laws for corf The aristocracy is changed into an recting the inconveniences of an heredioligarchy. tary aristocracy.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 113 An aristocracy may maintain the full vigor of its constitution if the laws be such as are apt to render the nobles more sen- sible of the perils and fatigues than of the pleasure of command: and if the government be in such a situation as to have some- thing to dread, while security shelters under its protection, and uncertainty threatens from abroad.
As a certain kind of confidence forms the glory and stability of monarchies, republics, on the contrary, must have some- thing to apprehend./t A fear of the Persians supported the laws of Greece. Carthage and Rome were alarmed, and strength- ened by each other. Strange, that the greater security those states enjoyed, the more, like stagnated waters, they were sub- ject to corruption!
6. — Of the Corruption of the Principle of Monarchy As democracies are subverted when the people despoil the senate, the magistrates, the judges of their functions, so rnonr archies are corrupt^..wh^.n,jth£,princ€~4ns€^ibly deprives so- cieties or cities. oltheir..priYi!e^e_s_. In the former case the mul- titude usurp the power, in the latter it is usurped by a single person.
" The destruction of the dynasties of Tsin and Soui," says a Chinese author, " was owing to this: the princes, instead of confining themselves, like their ancestors, to a general inspec- tion, the only one worthy of a sovereign, wanted to govern every thing immediately by themselves." * The Chinese author gives us in this instance the cause of the corruption of almost all monarchies.
Monarchy is destroyed when a prince thinks he shows a greater exertion of power in changing than in conforming to the order of things; when he deprives some of his subjects of their hereditary employments to bestow them arbitrarily upon others; and when he is fonder of being guided by fancy than judgment.
Again, it is destroyed when the prince, directing everything entirely to himself, calls to the state his capital, the capital to his court, and the court to his own person.
h Justin attributes the extinction of tes. Then it was that the Macedonians Athenian virtue to the death of Epa- emerged from obscurity, 1. 6.
minondas. Having no further emula- t Compilation of works made under tion, they spent their revenues in feasts, the Mings, related by Father Du Halde. frequentms coenam, quam castra visen- 114 MONTESQUIEU It is destroyed, in fine, when the prince mistakes his au- thority, his situation and the love of his people, and when he is not fully pursuaded that a monarch ought to think himself se- cure, as a despotic prince ought to think himself in danger.
7. — The same Subject continued The principle of monarchy is corrupted when the first dig- nities are marks of the first servitude, when the great men are deprived of public respect, and rendered the low tools of ar- bitrary power.
It is still more corrupted when honor is set up in contradic- tion to honors, and when men are capable of being loaded at the very same time with infamy / and with dignities.
It is corrupted when the prince changes his justice into se- verity; when he puts, like the Roman emperors, a Medusa's head on his breast;^ and when he assumes that menacing and terrible air which Commodus ordered to be given to his stat- ues./ Again, it is corrupted when mean and abject souls grow vain of the pomp attending their servitude, and imagine that the motive which induces them to be entirely devoted to their prince exempts them from all duty to their country.
But if it be true (and, indeed, the experience of all ages has shown it) that in proportion as the power of the monarch be- comes boundless and immense, his security diminishes, is the corrupting of this power, and the altering of its very nature, a less crime than that of high treason against the prince?
8. — Danger of the Corruption of the Principle of monarchical Government The danger is not when the state passes from one moderate to another moderate government, as from a republic to a mon- ; During the reign of Tiberius statues on Petronius Turpilianus, Nerva, and were erected to, and triumphal orna- Tigellinus.— " Annal." book XIV. See ments conferred on, informers; which likewise how the generals refused to debased these honors to such a degree, serve, because they condemned the that those who had really merited them military honors: pervulgatis triumpki disdained to accept them. Frag, of Dio, insignibus. — Tacit. " Annal." book book LVIIL, taken from the Extract XIII.
of Virtues and Vices, by Constantine k In this state the prince knew ex- Porphyrogenitus. See in Tacitus in tremely well the principle of his govwhat manner Nero, on the discovery ernment.
and punishment of a pretended con- / Herodian. spiracy, bestowed triumphal ornaments THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 115 archy, or from a monarchy to a republic; but when it is pre- cipitated from a moderate to a despotic government.
Most of the European nations are still governed by the prin- ciples of morality. But if from a long abuse of power or the fury of conquest, despotic sway should prevail to a certain degree, neither morals nor climate would be able to withstand its baleful influence: and then human nature would be ex- posed, for some time at least, even in this beautiful part of the world, to the insults with which she has been abused in the other three.
9. — How ready the Nobility are to defend the Throne The English nobility buried themselves with Charles the First under the ruins of the throne; and before that time, when Philip II endeavored to tempt the French with the allurement of liberty, the crown was constantly supported by a nobility who think it an honor to obey a king, but consider it as the lowest disgrace to share the power with the people.
The house of Austria has ever used her endeavors to op- press the Hungarian nobility; little thinking how serviceable that very nobility would be one day to her. She would fain have drained their country of money, of which they had no plenty; but took no notice of the men, with whom it abounded. When princes combined to dismember her dominions, the sev- eral parts of that monarchy fell motionless, as it were one upon another. No life was then to be seen but in those very nobles, who, resenting the affronts offered to the sovereign, and for- getting the injuries done to themselves, took up arms to avenge her cause, and considered it the highest glory bravely to die and to forgive.
10,— Of the Corruption of the Principle of despotic Government The principle of despotic government is subject to a con- tinual corruption, because it is even in its nature corrupt. Other governments are destroyed by particular accidents, which do violence to the principles of each constitution; this is ruined by its own intrinsic imperfections, when some acci- dental causes do not prevent the corrupting of its principles. It maintains itself, therefore, only when circumstances, drawn n6 MONTESQUIEU