Solon divided the people of Athens into four classes. In this he was directed by the spirit of democracy, his intention not being to fix those who were to choose, but such as were eligible: therefore, leaving to every citizen the right of elec- tion, he made* the judges eligible from each of those four classes; but the magistrates he ordered to be chosen only out of the first three, consisting of persons of easy fortunes./ As the division of those who have a right of suffrage is a fundamental law in republics, so the manner of giving this suffrage is another fundamental.
The suffrage by lot is natural to democracy; as that by choice is to aristocracy.^ The suffrage by lot is a method of electing that offends no one, but animates each citizen with the pleasing hope of serving his country.^ Yet as this method is in itself defective, it has been the en- deavor of the most eminent legislators to regulate and amend it.
Solon made a law at Athens that military employments should be conferred by choice; but that senators and judges should be elected by lot.
The same legislator ordained that civil magistracies, attended with great expense, should be given by choice, and the others by lot.
In order, however, to amend the suffrage by lot, he made a rule that none but those who presented themselves should be g Lib. IV. art. 15 et seq. k Ibid. lib. IV. cap. ix.
h See in the " Considerations on the / The mere suffrage might occasion Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of mortification to those who were exthe Romans," chap, ix., how this spirit eluded, and undue pride to the favored of Servius Tullius was preserved in the ones. It was in order to avoid this republic. contingency that they had recourse to I Dionysius Halicarn., " Eulogium of lot, and thus chance precluded this dan- Isocrates," p. 97, torn. ii. Edit. Wechel. ger, for it does not deal in humiliation " Pollux," VIII. cap. X. art, 130. or inflation.— Servan.
/ See Aristotle's " Polit." lib. II. cap.
12 MONTESQUIEU elected; that the person elected should be examined by judges,w and that every one should have a right to accuse him if he were unworthy of the office;w this participated at the same time of the suffrage by lot and of that by choice. When the time of their magistracy had expired, they were obliged to submit to another judgment in regard to their conduct. Persons ut- terly unqualified must have been extremely backward in giv- ing in their names to be drawn by lot.
The law which determines the manner of giving suffrage is likewise fundamental in a democracy. It is a question of some importance whether the suffrages ought to be public or secret. Cicero observes^ that the laws/' which rendered them secret towards the close of the republic were the cause of its decline. But as this is differently practised in different republics, I shall offer here my thoughts concerning this subject.
The people's suffrages ought doubtless to be public;o and this should be considered as a fundamental law of democracy. The lower class ought to be directed by those of higher rank, and restrained within bounds by the gravity of eminent per- sonages. Hence, by rendering the suffrages secret in the Roman republic, all was lost; it was no longer possible to di- rect a populace that sought its own destruction. But when the body of the nobles are to vote in an aristocracy,& or in a de- mocracy the senate,^ as the business is then only to prevent intrigues, the suffrages cannot be too secret.
Intriguing in a senate is dangerous; it is dangerous also in a body of nobles; but not so among the people, whose nature is to act through passion. In countries where they have no share in the government, we often see them as much inflamed on account of an actor as ever they could be for the welfare of the state. The misfortune of a republic is when intrigues are at an end; which happens when the people are gained by m See the oration of Demosthenes de a At Athens the people used to lift up falsa legat. and the oration against their hands.
Timarchus. b As at Venice.
n They used even to draw two tickets c The thirty tyrants at Athens ordered for each place, one which gave the the suffrages of the Areopagites to be place, and the other which named the public, in order to manage them as they Eerson who was to succeed, in case the pleased. — Lysias, " Orat. contra Agorst was rejected.* rat.," cap. viii.
0 Lib. I. and III. " de Leg."
pThey were called Leges Tabulares; * These two tickets sufficed when the two tablets were presented to each citi- people were called upon to deliberate in zen, the first marked with an A, for a question of law; but in the election of " Antiquo," or "I forbid it"; and the magistrates, each citizen received as other with a U and an R, for " Uti many tickets as there were candidates. — Rogas," or " Be it as you desire." Crevier.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 13 bribery and corruption: in this case they grow indifferent to pubHc affairs, and avarice becomes their predominant passion. Unconcerned about the government and everything belonging to it, they quietly wait for their hire.
It is likewise a fundamental law in democracies, that the people should have the sole power to enact laws. And yet there are a thousand occasions on which it is necessary the senate should have the power of decreeing; nay, it is frequently proper to make some trial of a law before it is established. The constitutions of Rome and Athens were excellent — the de- crees of the senates? had the force of laws for the space of a year, but did not become perpetual till they were ratified by the consent of the people.
3. — Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of Aristocracy In an aristocracy the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a certain number of persons. These are invested both with the legislative and executive authority; and the rest of the people are, in respect to them, the same as the subjects of a monarchy in regard to the sovereign.
They do not vote here by lot, for this would be productive of inconveniences only. And indeed, in a government where the most mortifying distinctions are already established, though they were to be chosen by lot, still they would not cease to be odious; it is the nobleman they envy, and not the magistrate.
When the nobility are numerous, there must be a senate to regulate the affairs which the body of the nobles are incapable of deciding, and to prepare others for their decision. In this case it may be said that the aristocracy is in some measure in the senate, the democracy in the body of the nobles, and the people are a cipher.
It would be a very happy thing in an aristocracy if the peo- ple, in some measure, could be raised from their state of anni- hilation. Thus at Genoa, the bank of St. George being ad- ministered by the people^ gives them a certain influence in the government, whence their whole prosperity is derived.
The senators ought by no means to have the right of naming their own members; for this would be the only way to perd See Dionys. Halicarn. lib. IV and a See Mr. Addison's " Travels to 14 MONTESQUIEU petuate abuses. At Rome, which in its early years was a kind of aristocracy, the senate did not fill up the vacant places in their own body; the new members were nominated by the censors.^ In a republic, the sudden rise of a private citizen to exor- bitant power produces monarchy, or something more than monarchy. In the latter the laws have provided for, or in some measure adapted themselves to, the constitution; and the prin- ciple of government checks the monarch: but in a republic, where a private citizen has obtained an exorbitant power,c the abuse of this power is much greater, because the laws foresaw it not, and consequently made no provision against it.
There is an exception to this rule, when the constitution is such as to have immediate need of a magistrate invested with extraordinary power. Such was Rome with her dictators, such is Venice with her state inquisitors; these are formidable magis- trates, who restore, as it were by violence, the state to its liberty. But how comes it that these magistracies are so very different in these two republics? It is because Rome supported the re- mains of her aristocracy against the people; whereas Venice employs her state inquisitors to maintain her aristocracy against the nobles. The consequence was, that at Rome the dictatorship could be only of short duration, as the people acted through passion and not with design. It was necessary that a magistracy of this kind should be exercised with lustre and pomp, the business being to intimidate, and not to punish, the multitude. It was also proper that the dictator should be created only for some particular affair, and for this only should have an unlimited authority, as he was always created upon some sudden emergency. On the contrary, at Venice they have occasion for a permanent magistracy; for here it is that schemes may be set on foot, continued, suspended, and re- sumed; that the ambition of a single person becomes that of a family, and the ambition of one family that of many. They have occasion for a secret magistracy, the crimes they punish being hatched in secrecy and silence. This magistracy must have a general inquisition, for their business is not to remedy known disorders, but to prevent the unknown. In a word, the b They were named at first by the con- Rome. See " Considerations on the suls. Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of f This is what ruined the republic of the Romans."
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 15 latter is designed to punish suspected crimes; whereas the former used rather menaces than punishment even for crimes that were openly avowed.
In all magistracies, the greatness of the power must be com- pensated by the brevity of the duration. This most legislators have fixed to a year; a longer space would be dangerous, and a shorter would be contrary to the nature of government. For who is it that in the management even of his domestic affairs would be thus confined? At Ragusa^^ the chief magistrate of the republic is changed every month, the other officers every week, and the governor of the castle every day. But this can take place only in a small republic environed^ by formidable powers, who might easily corrupt such petty and insignificant magistrates.
The best aristocracy is that in which those who have no share in the legislature are so few and inconsiderable that the governing party have no interest in oppressing them. Thus whenf Antipater made a law at Athens, that whosoever was not worth two thousand drachms should have no power to vote, he formed by this method the best aristocracy possible; because this was so small a sum as to exclude very few, and not one of any rank or consideration in the city.
Aristocratic families ought, therefore, as much as possible, to level themselves in appearance with the people. The more an aristocracy borders on democracy, the nearer it approaches perfection: and, in proportion as it draws towards monarchy, the more is it imperfect.
But the most imperfect of all is that in which the part of the people that obeys is in a state of civil servitude to those who command, as the aristocracy of Poland, where the peas- ants are slaves to the nobility.
4. — Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government The intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers con- stitute the nature of monarchical government; I mean of that in which a single person governs by fundamental laws. I said the intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers. And, e At Lucca the magistrates are chosen Oman's edition, only for two months.
i6 MONTESQUIEU indeed, in monarchies the prince is the source of all power, political and civil. These fundamental laws necessarily sup- pose the intermediate channels through which the power flows: for if there be only the momentary and capricious will of a sin- gle person to govern the state, nothing can be fixed, and, of course, there is no fundamental law.
The most natural, intermediate, and subordinate power is that of the nobihty. This in some measure seems to be essen- tial to a monarchy, whose fundamental maxim is, no monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no monarch; but there may be a despotic princes' There are men who have endeavored in some countries in Europe to suppress the jurisdiction of the nobility, not per- ceiving that they were driving at the very thing that was done by the Parliament of England. Abolish the privileges of the lords, the clergy and cities in a monarchy, and you will soon have a popular state, or else a despotic government.
The courts of a considerable kingdom in Europe have, for many ages, been striking at the patrimonial jurisdiction of the lords and clergy. We do not pretend to censure these sage magistrates; but we leave it to the public to judge how far this may alter the constitution.
Far am I from being prejudiced in favor of the privileges of the clergy; however, I should be glad if their jurisdiction were once fixed. The question is not, whether their jurisdic- tion was justly established; but whether it be really estab- lished; whether it constitutes a part of the laws of the country, and is in every respect in relation to those laws: whether be- tween two powers acknowledged independent, the conditions ought not to be reciprocal; and whether it be not equally the duty of a good subject to defend the prerogative of the prince, and to maintain the limits which from time immemorial have been prescribed to his authority.
Though the ecclesiastic power be so dangerous in a republic, yet it is extremely proper in a monarchy, especially of the absolute kind. What would become of Spain and Portugal, since the subversion of their laws, were it not for this only bar- rier against the incursions of arbitrary power? a barrier ever useful when there is no other: for since a despotic government gTh\s maxim brings to mind the un- IV of France declared to the Seize, fortunate Charles I, who said, "No " No nobility, no monarch! "—Voltaire, bishop, no monarchy"; while Henry THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 17 is productive of the most dreadful calamities to human nature, the very evil that restrains it is beneficial to the subject.
In the same manner as the ocean, threatening to overflow the whole earth, is stopped by weeds and pebbles that lie scat- tered along the shore,^ so monarchs, whose power seems un- bounded, are restrained by the smallest obstacles, and suffer their natural pride to be subdued by supplication and prayer.
The English, to favor their liberty, have abolished all the intermediate powers of which their monarchy was composed.! They have a great deal of reason to be jealous of this liberty; were they ever to be so unhappy as to lose it, they would be one of the most servile nations upon earth.
Mr. Law, through ignorance both of a republican and mon- archical constitution, was one of the greatest promoters of ab- solute power ever known in Europe. Besides the violent and extraordinary changes owing to his direction, he would fain suppress all the intermediate ranks, and abolish the political communities. He was dissolving; the monarchy by his chi- merical reimbursements, and seemed as if he even wanted to redeem the constitution.
It is not enough to have intermediate powers in a monarchy; there must be also a depositary of the laws. This depositary can only be the judges of the supreme courts of justice, who promulgate the new laws, and revive the obsolete. The natural ignorance of the nobility, their indolence and contempt of civil government, require that there should be a body invested with the power of reviving and executing the laws, which would be otherwise buried in oblivion. The prince's council are not a proper depositary. They are naturally the depositary of the momentary will of the prince, and not of the fundamental laws. Besides, the prince's council is continually changing; it is neither perrrianent nor numerous; neither has it a sufficient share of the confidence of the people; consequently it is incapa- ble of setting them right in difficult conjunctures, or of reduc- ing them to proper obedience.
Despotic governments, where there are no fundamental laws, have no such kind of depositary. Hence it is that religion has generally so much influence in those countries, because it h Voltaire is inclined to doubt the jus- augmented that of the Commons. — tice of this comparison. — Ed. Voltaire.
i On the contrary, the English have; Ferdinand, King of Aragon, made rendered the power of their spiritual and himself grand-master of the orders, and temporal lords more legal, and have that alone changed the constitution.
i8 MONTESQUIEU forms a kind of permanent depositary; and if this cannot be said of religion, it may of the customs that are respected instead of laws.
5. — Of the Lazus in relation to the Nature of a despotic Government From the nature of despotic power it follows that the single person, invested with this power, commits the execution of it also to a single person. A man whom his senses continually inform that he himself is everything and that his subjects are nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant. In conse- quence of this, he neglects the management of public affairs. But were he to commit the administration to many, there would be continual disputes among them; each would form intrigues to be his first slave; and he would be obliged to take the reins into his own hands. It is, therefore, more natural for him to resign it to a vizier,^ and to invest him with the same power as himself. The creation of a vizier is a fundamental law of this government.
It is related of a pope, that he had started an infinite num- ber of difficulties against his election, from a thorough con- viction of his incapacity. At length he was prevailed on to ac- cept of the pontificate, and resigned the administration entirely to his nephew. He was soon struck with surprise, and said, " I should never have thought that these things were so easy." The same may be said of the princes of the East, who, being educated in a prison where eunuchs corrupt their hearts and debase their understandings, and where they are frequently kept ignorant even of their high rank, when drawn forth in order to be placed on the throne, are at first confounded: but as soon as they have chosen a vizier, and abandoned them- selves in their seraglio to the most brutal passions, pursuing, in the midst of a prostituted court, every capricious extrava- gance, they would never have dreamed that they could find matters so easy.
The more extensive the empire, the larger the seraglio; and consequently the more voluptuous the prince. Hence the more nations such a sovereign has to rule, the less he attends to the cares of government; the more important his affairs, the less he makes them the subject of his deliberations.
k The Eastern kings are never without viziers, says Sir John Chardin.
BOOK III OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT I. — Difference between the Nature and Principle of Government HAVING examined the laws in relation to the nature of each government, we must investigate those which re- late to its principle. There is this difference between the nature and principle^ of government, that the former is that by which it is consti- tuted, the latter that by which it is made to act. One is its par- ticular structure, and the other the human passions which set it in motion.
Now, laws ought no less to relate to the principle than to the nature of each government. We must, therefore, inquire into this principle, which shall be the subject of this third book.
2. — Of the Principle of different Governments I have already observed that it is the nature of a republican government, that either the collective body of the people, or particular families, should be possessed of the supreme power; of a monarchy that the prince should have this power, but in the execution of it should be directed by established laws; of a despotic government, that a single person should rule accord- ing to his own will and caprice. This enables me to discover their three principles; which are thence naturally derived. I shall begin with a republican government, and in particular with that of democracy.
a This is a very important distinction, for it is the key of an infinite number •whence I shall draw many consequences; of laws.
19 20 MONTESQUIEU 3. — Of the Principle of Democracy There is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government. The force of laws in one, and the prince's arm in the other, are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole. But in a popular state, one spring more is necessary, namely, virtue.
What I have here advanced is confirmed by the unanimous testimony of historians, and is extremely agreeable to the nature of things.^ For it is clear that in a monarchy, where he who commands the execution of the laws generally thinks himself above them, there is less need of virtue than in a pop- ular government, where the person intrusted with the execu- tion of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their direc- tion.
Clear is it also that a monarch who, through bad advice or indolence, ceases to enforce the execution of the laws, may easily repair the evil; he has only to follow other advice, or to shake off this indolence. But when, in a popular govern- ment, there is a suspension of the laws, as this can proceed only from the corruption of the republic, the state is certainly un- done.
A very droll spectacle it was in the last century to behold the impotent efforts of the English towards the establishment of democracy. As they who had a share in the direction of public affairs were void of virtue; as their ambition was in- flamed by the success of the most daring of their members;c as the prevailing parties were successively animated by the spirit of faction, the government was continually changing: the people, amazed at so many revolutions, in vain attempted to erect a commonwealth. At length, when the country had undergone the most violent shocks, they were obliged to have recourse to the very government which they had so wantonly proscribed.
When Sylla thought of restoring Rome to her liberty, this unhappy city was incapable of receiving that blessing. She had only the feeble remains of virtue, which were continually h It has always been argued against whereas he has said nothing of the sort, Montesquieu that he has said that there and to allege it even is to suppose him can only be virtue in republics, and capable of a great absurdity. — La Harpe.
honor in monarchies, or vice versa: c Cromwell.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 21 diminishing. Instead of being roused from her lethargy by Caesar, Tiberius, Caius Claudius, Nero, and Domitian, she riveted every day her chains; if she struck some blows, her aim was at the tyrant, not at the tyranny.
The politic Greeks, who lived under a popular government, knew no other support than virtue. The modern inhabitants of that country are entirely taken up with manufacture, com- merce, finances, opulence, and luxury.
When virtue is banished, ambition invades the minds of those who are disposed to receive it, and avarice possesses the whole community. The objects of their desires are changed; what they were fond of before has become indifferent; they were free while under the restraint of laws, but they would fain now be free to act against law; and as each citizen is like a slave who has run away from his master, that which was a maxim of equity he calls rigor; that which was a rule of action he styles constraint; and to precaution he gives the name of fear. Frugality, and not the thirst of gain, now passes for avarice. Formerly the wealth of individuals constituted the public treasure; but now this has become the patrimony of private persons. The members of the commonwealth riot on the pub- lic spoils, and its strength is only the power of a few, and the license of many.
Athens was possessed of the same number of forces when she triumphed so gloriously as when with such infamy she was enslaved. She had twenty thousand citizens,^ when she de- fended the Greeks against the Persians, when she contended for empire with Sparta, and invaded Sicily. She had twenty thousand when Demetrius Phalereus numbered them,^ as slaves are told by the head in a market-place. When Philip attempted to lord it over Greece, and appeared at the gates of Athens/ she had even then lost nothing but time. We may see in Demosthenes how difficult it was to awaken her; she dreaded Philip, not as the enemy of her liberty, but of her pleas- ures.g This famous city, which had withstood so many de- feats, and having been so often destroyed had as often risen out d Plutarch, "Life of Pericles"; Plato, f She had then twenty thousand citiin " Critia." zens. See Demosthenes in " Aristog."
e She had at that time twenty-one g They had passed a law, which renthousand citizens, ten thousand stran- dered it a capital crime for any one to fers, and four hundred thousand slaves. propose applying the money designed ee Athenaeus, book VI. for the theatres to military service.
22 MONTESQUIEU of her ashes, was overthrown at Chaeronea, and at one blow deprived of all hopes of resource. What does it avail her that Philip sends back her prisoners, if he does not return her men? It was ever after as easy to triumph over the forces of Athens as it had been difficult to subdue her virtue.
How was it possible for Carthage to maintain her ground? When Hannibal, upon his being made prsetor, endeavored to hinder the magistrates from plundering the republic, did not they complain of him to the Romans? Wretches, who would fain be citizens without a city, and be beholden for their riches to their very destroyers! Rome soon insisted upon having three hundred of their principal citizens as hostages; she obliged them next to surrender their arms and ships; and then she declared war.^^ From the desperate efforts of this defence- less city, one may judge of what she might have performed in her full vigor, and assisted by virtue 4. — Of the Principle of Aristocracy As virtue is necessary in a popular government, it is requisite also in an aristocracy. True it is that in the latter it is not so absolutely requisite.
The people, who in respect to the nobility are the same as the subjects with regard to a monarch, are restrained by their laws. They have, therefore, less occasion for virtue than the people in a democracy. But how are the nobility to be restrained? They who are to execute the laws against their colleagues will immediately perceive that they are acting against themselves. Virtue is therefore necessary in this body, from the very nature of the constitution.
An aristocratic government has an inherent vigor, unknown to democracy. The nobles form a body, who by their preroga- tive, and for their own particular interest, restrain the people; it is sufficient that there are laws in being to see them executed.
But easy as it may be for the body of the nobles to restrain the people, it is difficult to restrain themselves.* Such is the nature of this constitution, that it seems to subject the very same persons to the power of the laws, and at the same time to exempt them.
h This lasted three years. private crimes will go unpunished, be-