i Public crimes may be punished, be- cause it is the common interest not to cause it is here a common concern; but punish them.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS n Now such a body as this can restrain itself only in two ways; either by a very eminent virtue, which puts the nobility in some measure on a level with the people, and may be the means of forming a great republic; or by an inferior virtue, which puts them at least upon a level with one another, and upon this their preservation depends.
Moderation is therefore the very soul of this government; a moderation, I mean, founded on virtue, not that which pro- ceeds from indolence and pusillanimity.
5. — That Virtue is not the Principle of a Monarchical Goverrmient In monarchies policy effects great things with as little virtue as possible. Thus in the nicest machines, art has reduced the number of movements, springs, and wheels.
The state subsists independently of the love of our country, of the thirst of true glory, of self-denial, of the sacrifice of our dearest interests, and of all those heroic virtues which we ad- mire in the ancients, and to us are known only by tradition.
The laws supply here the place of those virtues; they are by no means wanted, and the state dispenses with them: an ac- tion performed here in secret is in some measure of no conse- quence.
Though all crimes be in their own nature public, yet there is a distinction between crimes really pubHc and those that are private, which are so called because they are more injurious to individuals than to the community.
Now in republics private crimes are more public, that is, they attack the constitution more than they do individuals; and in monarchies, public crimes are more private, that is, they are more prejudicial to private people than to the constitution.
I beg that no one will be offended with what I have been say- ing; my observations are founded on the unanimous testi- mony of historians. I am not ignorant that virtuous princes are so very rare; but I venture to affirm, that in a monarchy it is extremely difficult for the people to be virtuous.; Let us compare what the historians of all ages have asserted ; I speak here of political virtue, that virtue which relates to revealed which is also moral virtue as it is di- truths. This will appear better, book rected to the public good; very little of V., chap. 2. private moral virtue, and not at all of 24 MONTESQUIEU concerning the courts of monarchs; let us recollect the con- versations and sentiments of people of all countries, in respect to the wretched character of courtiers, and we shall find that these are not airy speculations, but truths confirmed by a sad and melancholy experience.
Ambition in idleness; meanness mixed with pride; a desire of riches without industry; aversion to truth; flattery, perfidy, violation of engagements, contempt of civil duties, fear of the prince's virtue, hope from his weakness, but, above all, a per- petual ridicule cast upon virtue, are, I think, the characteris- tics by which most courtiers in all ages and countries have been constantly distinguished. Now, it is exceedingly difficult for the leading men of the nation to be knaves, and the inferior sort to be honest; for the former to be cheats, and the latter to rest satisfied with being only dupes.
But if there should chance to be some unlucky honest man^ among the people. Cardinal Richelieu, in his political testa- ment, seems to hint that a prince should take care not to employ him./ So true is it that virtue is not the spring of this govern- ment! It is not indeed excluded, but it is not the spring of government.
6. — In zvhat Manner Virtue is Supplied in a Monarchical Government But it is high time for me to have done with this subject, lest I should be suspected of writing a satire against mon- archical government. Far be it from me; if monarchy wants one spring, it is provided with another. Honor, that is, the prejudice of every person and rank, supplies the place of the political virtue of which I have been speaking, and is every- where her representative: here it is capable of inspiring the most glorious actions, and, joined with the force of laws, may lead us to the end of government as well as virtue itself.
Hence, in well-regulated monarchies, they are almost all good subjects, and very few good men; for to be a good man,w a good intention is necessary,w and we should love our counk This is to be understood in the sense m This word " good man " is underof the preceding note. stood here in a political sense only.
/ We must not, says he, employ peo- n See note;, page 23.
pie of mean extraction; they are too rigid and morose.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 25 try, not so much on our own account, as out of regard to the community.
7. — Of the Principle of Monarchy A monarchical government supposes, as we have already ob- served, pre-eminences and ranks, as likewise a noble descent. Now, since it is the nature of honor to aspire to preferments and titles,^ it is properly placed in this government.
Ambition is pernicious in a republic. But in a monarchy it has some good effects; it gives life to the government, and is attended with this advantage, that it is in no way dangerous, because it may be continually checked.
It is with this kind of government as with the system of the universe, in which there is a power that constantly repels all bodies from the centre, and a power of gravitation that attracts them to it. Honor sets all the parts of the body politic in mo- tion, and by its very action connects them; thus each indi- vidual advances the public good, while he only thinks of pro- moting his own interest.
True it is, that philosophically speaking it is a false honor which moves all the parts of the government; but even this false honor is as useful to the public as true honor could pos- sibly be to private persons.
Is it not very exacting to oblige men to perform the most difficult actions, such as require an extraordinary exertion of fortitude and resolution, without other recompense than that of glory and applause?
8. — That Honor is not the Principle of Despotic Government Honor is far from being the principle of despotic govern- ment: mankind being here all upon a level, no one person can prefer himself to another; and as on the other hand they are all slaves, they can give themselves no sort of preference.
Besides, as honor has its laws and rules; as it knows not how to submit; as it depends in a great measure on a man's own caprice, and not on that of another person: it can be found only a These preferments, distinctions, and dom of to-day. Prefectures, consulates, honors, in the days of the Roman re- axes, fasces, and triumphs were valued public, were worth quite as much as the at the price of so many colored ribbons, debris which goes to constitute a king- —Voltaire.
26 MONTESQUIEU in countries in which the constitution is fixed, and where they are governed by settled laws.
How can despotism abide with honor? The one glories in the contempt of life; and the other is founded on the power of taking it away. How can honor, on the other hand, bear with despotism? The former has its fixed rules, and peculiar caprices; but the latter is directed by no rule, and its own caprices are subversive of all others.
Honor, therefore, a thing unknown in arbitrary govern- ments, some of which have not even a proper word to express it,^ is the prevailing principle in monarchies; here it gives life to the whole body politic, to the laws, and even to the virtues themselves.
9. — Of the Principle of Despotic Government As virtue is necessary in a republic, and in a monarchy honor, so fear is necessary in a despotic government: with regard to virtue, there is no occasion for it, and honor would be ex- tremely dangerous.^ Here the immense power of the prince devolves entirely upon those whom he is pleased to intrust with the administra- tion. Persons capable of setting a value upon themselves would be likely to create disturbances. Fear must therefore depress their spirits, and extinguish even the least sense of ambition.
A moderate government may, whenever it pleases, and with- out the least danger, relax its springs. It supports itself by the laws, and by its own internal strength. But when a despotic prince ceases for one single moment to uplift his arm, when he cannot instantly demolish those whom he has intrusted with the first employments,c? all is over: for as fear, the spring of this government, no longer subsists, the people are left with- out a protector.
It is probably in this sense the Cadis maintained that the Grand Seignior was not obliged to keep his word or oath, when he limited thereby his authority.^ h See Perry, p. 447. construct a series of his ideas, and that c It has been thought that Montes- his motives should be conceived.
quieu anticipated innumerable difificul- d As it often happens in a military ties, if he entered upon his plan, and in aristocracy. — Ed.
his own style began to refute objections. e Ricaut on the Ottoman Empire.
It is evident that his only desire was to THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 27 It is necessary that the people should be judged by laws, and the great men by the caprice of the prince, that the lives of the lowest subject should be safe, and the pasha's head ever in danger. We cannot mention these monstrous governments without horror. The Sophi of Persia, dethroned in our days by Mahomet, the son of Miriveis, saw the constitution sub- verted before this resolution, because he had been too sparing of blood.^ History informs us that the horrid cruelties of Domitian struck such a terror into the governors, that the people re- covered themselves a little during his reign.g Thus a torrent overflows one side of a country, and on the other leaves fields untouched, where the eye is refreshed by the prospect of fine meadows.
10. — Difference of Obedience in Moderate and Despotic Governments In despotic states, the nature of government requires the most passive obedience; and when once the prince's will is made known, it ought infallibly to produce its effect.
Here they have no Hmitations or restrictions, no mediums, terms, equivalents, or remonstrances; no change to propose: man is a creature that blindly submits to the absolute will of the sovereign.
In a country like this they are no more allowed to represent their apprehensions of a future danger than to impute their miscarriage to the capriciousness of fortune. Man's portion here, like that of beasts, is instinct, compliance, and punish- ment.
Little does it then avail to plead the sentiments of nature, filial respect, conjugal or parental tenderness, the laws of honor, or want of health; the order is given, and that is sufficient.
In Persia, when the king has condemned a person, it is no longer lawful to mention his name, or to intercede in his favor. Even if the prince were intoxicated, or nan compos, the decree must be executed;/i otherwise he would contradict himself, and the law admits of no contradiction. This has been the way of thinking in that country in all ages; as the order which f See the history of this revolution by which is one of the species of despotic Father Ducerceau. government.
g His was a military constitution, h See Sir John Chardin.
28 MONTESQUIEU Ahasuerus gave, to exterminate the Jews, could not be re- voked,^ they were allowed the liberty of defending themselves.;" One thing, however, may be sometimes opposed to the prince's will,^ namely, reHgion. They will abandon, nay they will slay a parent, if the prince so commands; but he cannot oblige them to drink wine. The laws of religion are of a superior nature, because they bind the sovereign as well as the subject. But with respect to the law of nature, it is otherwise; the prince is no longer supposed to be a man.
In monarchical and moderate states, the power is limited by its very spring, I mean by honor, which, Hke a monarch, reigns over the prince and his people. They will not allege to their sovereign the laws of religion; a courtier would be apprehen- sive of rendering himself ridiculous. But the laws of honor will be appealed to on all occasions. Hence arise the restric- tions necessary to obedience; honor is naturally subject to whims, by which the subject's submission will be ever directed.
Though the manner of obeying be different in these two kinds of government, the power is the same. On which side soever the monarch turns, he inclines the scale, and is obeyed. The whole difference is, that in a monarchy the prince receives instruction, at the same time that his ministers have greater abilities, and are more versed in pubHc affairs, than the minis- ters of a despotic government.
II. — Reflections on the preceding Chapters Such are the principles of the three sorts of government: which does not imply that in a particular republic they actually are, but that they ought to be, virtuous; nor does it prove that in a particular monarchy they are actuated by honor, or in a particular despotic government by fear; but that they ought to be directed by these principles, otherwise the government is imperfect.
tThis order was revoked by a new minate them. So terrible was the sucedict. See Esther, xvi., 7.— Ed. cess of the Jews that it was in memory ;■ The Jews were not allowed to defend of the event that the feast of Purim was themselves, as the author avers, but to instituted. — De Dupin.
exterminate their enemies, as it had k See Sir John Chardin. been permitted their enemies to exter- BOOK IV THAT THE LAWS OF EDUCATION OUGHT TO BE IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF GOV- ERNMENT I. — Of the Laws of Education THE laws of education are the first impressions we re- ceive; and as they prepare us for civil life, every private family ought to be governed by the plan of that great household which comprehends them all.
If the people in general have a principle, their constituent parts, that is, the several families, will have one also. The laws of education will be therefore dififerent in each species of gov- ernment: in monarchies they will have honor for their object; in republics, virtue; in despotic governments, fear.
2. — Of Education in Monarchies In monarchies the principal branch of education is not taught in colleges or academies. It commences, in some meas- ure, at our setting out in the world; for this is the school of what we call honor, that universal preceptor which ought everywhere to be our guide.
Here it is that we constantly hear three rules or maxims, viz., that we should have a certain nobleness in our virtues, a kind of frankness in our morals, and a particular politeness in our behavior.
The virtues we are here taught are less what we owe to others than to ourselves; they are not so much what draws us towards society, as what distinguishes us from our fellow-citizens.
Here the actions of men are judged, not as virtuous, but as shining; not as just, but as great; not as reasonable, but as extraordinary.
29 30 MONTESQUIEU When honor here meets with anything noble in our actions, it is either a judge that approves them, or a sophist by whom they are excused.
It allows of gallantry when united with the idea of sensible affection, or with that of conquest; this is the reason why we never meet with so strict a purity of morals in monarchies as in republican governments.
It allows of cunning and craft, when joined with the notion of greatness of soul or importance of affairs; as, for instance, in politics, with finesses of which it is far from being offended.
It does not forbid adulation, save when separated from the idea of a large fortune, and connected only with the sense of our mean condition.
With regard to morals, I have observed that the education of monarchies ought to admit of a certain frankness and open carriage. Truth, therefore, in conversation is here a necessary point. But is it for the sake of truth? By no means. Truth is requisite only because a person habituated to veracity has an air of boldness and freedom. And indeed a man of this stamp seems to lay a stress only on the things themselves, not on the manner in which they are received.
Hence it is that in proportion as this kind of frankness is commended, that of the common people is despised, which has nothing but truth and simplicity for its object.
In fine, the education of monarchies requires a certain polite- ness of behavior. Man, a sociable animal, is formed to please in society; and a person that would break through the rules of decency, so as to shock those he conversed with, would lose the public esteem, and become incapable of doing any good.
But politeness, generally speaking, does not derive its origin from so pure a source. It arises from a desire of distinguish- ing ourselves. It is pride that renders us polite; we are flat- tered with being taken notice of for behavior that shows we are not of a mean condition, and that we have not been bred with those who in all ages are considered the scum of the people.
Politeness, in monarchies, is naturalized at court. One man excessively great renders everybody else little. Hence that regard which is paid to our fellow-subjects; hence that polite- ness, equally pleasing to those by whom, as to those towards whom, it is practised, because it gives people to understand THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 31 that a person actually belongs, or at least deserves to belong, to the court.
A courtly air consists in quitting a real for a borrowed great- ness. The latter pleases the courtier more than the former. It inspires him with a certain disdainful modesty, which shows itself externally, but whose pride insensibly diminishes in pro- portion to its distance from the source of this greatness.
At court we find a delicacy of taste in everything — a delicacy arising from the constant use of the superfluities of life, from the variety, and' especially the satiety, of pleasures, from the mul- tiplicity and even confusion of fancies, which, if they are but agreeable, are sure of being well received.
These are the things which properly fall within the province of education, in order to form what we call a man of honor, a man possessed of all the qualities and virtues requisite in this kind of government.
Here it is that honor interferes with everything, mixing even with people's manner of thinking, and directing their very prin- ciples.
To this whimsical honor it is owing that the virtues are only just what it pleases; it adds rules of its own invention to every- thing prescribed to us; it extends or limits our duties according to its own fancy, whether they proceed from religion, politics, or morality.
There is nothing so strongly inculcated in monarchies, by the laws, by religion and honor, as submission to the prince's will; but this very honor tells us that the prince never ought to command a dishonorable action, because this would render us incapable of serving him.
Crillon refused to assassinate the Duke of Guise, but offered to fight him. After the massacre of St. Bartholomew, Charles IX, having sent orders to the governors in the several provinces for the Huguenots to be murdered, Viscount Dorte, who com- manded at Bayonne, wrote thus to the king:a " Sire, among the inhabitants of this town, and your majesty's troops, I could not find so much as one executioner; they are honest citizens and brave soldiers. We jointly, therefore, beseech your majesty to command our arms and lives in things that are practicable." This great and generous soul looked upon a base action as a thing impossible.
32 MONTESQUIEU There is nothing that honor more strongly recommends to the nobility than to serve their prince in a military capacity. And, indeed, this is their favorite profession, because its dangers, its success, and even its miscarriages are the road to grandeur. Yet this very law of its own making honor chooses to explain: and in case of any affront, it requires or permits us to retire.
It insists also that we should be at liberty either to seek or to reject employments, a liberty which it prefers even to an ample fortune.
Honor, therefore, has its supreme laws, to which education is obliged to conform.^ The chief of these are, that we are per- mitted to set a value upon our fortune, but are absolutely for- bidden to set any upon our lives.
The second is, that when we are raised to a post or prefer- ment, we should never do or permit anything which may seem to imply that we look upon ourselves as inferior to the rank we hold.
The third is, that those things which honor forbids are more rigorously forbidden, when the laws do not concur in the pro- hibition; and those it commands are more strongly insisted upon, when they happen not to be commanded by law.
3. — Of Education in a Despotic Government As education in monarchies tends to raise and ennoble the mind, in despotic governments its only aim is to debase it. Here it must necessarily be servile; even in power such an edu- cation will be an advantage, because every tyrant is at the same time a slave.
Excessive obedience supposes ignorance in the person that obeys:c the same it supposes in him that commands, for he has no occasion to deliberate, to doubt, to reason; he has only to will.
In despotic states, each house is a separate government. As education, therefore, consists chiefly in social converse, it must be here very much limited; all it does is to strike the heart with h We mention here what actually is, c By excessive obedience, Montesand not what ought to be; honor is a quieu intends blind obedience.— De Du- prejudice, which religion sometimes en- pin. r deavors to remove, and at other times to regulate.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 33 fear, and to imprint on the understanding a very simple notion of a few principles of religion. Learning here proves danger- ous, emulation fatal; and as to virtue, Aristotle^ cannot think that there is any one virtue belonging to slaves;^ if so, educa- tion in despotic countries is confined within a very narrow com- pass.
Here, therefore, education is in some measure needless: to give something, one must take away every thing, and begin with making a bad subject in order to make a good slave.
For why should education take pains in forming a good citi- zen, only to make him share in the public misery? If he loves his country, he will strive to relax the springs of government; if he miscarries he will be undone; if he succeeds, he must ex- pose himself, the prince, and his country to ruin.
4. — Difference between the Effects of Ancient and Modern Education Most of the ancients lived under governments that had vir- tue for their principle; and when this was in full vigor they performed actions unusual in our times, and at which our nar- row minds are astonished.
Another advantage their education possessed over ours was that it never could be effaced by contrary impressions. Epam- inondas, the last year of his life, said, heard, beheld, and per- formed the very same things as at the age in which he received the first principles of his education.
In our days we receive three different or contrary educa- tions, namely, of our parents, of our masters, and of the world. What we learn in the latter effaces all the ideas of the former. This, in some measure, arises from the contrast we experience between our religious and worldly engagements,/^ a thing un- known to the ancients.
d " Polit." lib. I. not made of Europe a world of pole How can this be, asks one, when troons. It is well known that officers slaves have no will? — Ed. most attached to the laws of this religion f The Christian religion forbids ven- are commonly the most exact in fulfillgeance and prescribes humility; this is ing the duties of their state, and the perhaps the point of contrast which the most intrepid in danger. — D.
author notes. But these precepts have Vol. I.-3 34 MONTESQUIEU 5. — Of Education in a Republican Government It is in a republican government that the whole power of education is required. The fear of despotic governments naturally arises of itself amidst threats and punishments; the honor of monarchies is favored by the passions, and favors them in its turn; but virtue is a self-renunciation,g which is ever arduous and painful.
This virtue may be defined as the love of the laws and of our country. As such love requires a constant preference of public to private interest, it is the source of all private virtues; for they are nothing more than this very preference itself.
This love is peculiar to democracies. In these alone the government is intrusted to private citizens. Now, a govern- ment is like every thing else: to preserve it we must love it.
Has it ever been known that kings were not fond of mon- archy, or that despotic princes hated arbitrary power?
Every thing, therefore, depends on estabHshing this love in a republic; and to inspire it ought to be the principal business of education: but the surest way of instilling it into children is for parents to set them an example.
People have it generally in their power to communicate their ideas to their children; but they are still better able to trans- fuse their passions.
If it happens otherwise, it is because the impressions made at home are efiFaced by those they have received abroad.
It is not the young people that degenerate; they are not spoiled till those of maturer age are already sunk into corrup- tion.
6. — Of some Institutions among the Greeks The ancient Greeks, convinced of the necessity that people who live under a popular government should be trained up to virtue, made yjery singular institutions in order to inspire it. Upon seeing in the life ol~Lycurgus the laws that legislator gave to the Lacedaemonians, I imagine I am reading the hisg This virtue, which Montesquieu de- citizen often finds his own peace of mind fines as " love of country," is not self- and independence, the peaceable posrcnunciation; far from urging man to session and enjoyment of his property, abnegation of his interests, it permits the hope of increasing it by liberty of him to see the state flourishing and commerce, and of being raised to posts tranquil. In this public prosperity the of dignity.— D.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 35 tory of the Sevarambes> The laws of Crete were the model of those of Sparta; and those of Plato reformed them.
Let us reflect here a little on the extensive genius with which those legislators must have been endowed, to perceive that by striking at received customs, and by confounding all manner of virtues,* they should display their wisdom to the universe. Lycurgus, by blending theft with the spirit of justice, the hard- est servitude with excess of liberty, the most rigid sentiments with the greatest moderation, gave stability to his city. He seemed to deprive her of all resources, such as arts, commerce, money, and walls; ambition prevailed among the citizens with- out hopes of improving their fortune; they had natural senti- ments without the tie of a son, husband, or father; and chastity was stripped even of modesty and shame. This was the road that led Sparta to grandeur and glory; and so infallible were these institutions, that it signified nothing to gain a victory over that republic without subverting her polity.; By these laws Crete and Laconia were governed. Sparta was the last that fell a prey to the Macedonians, and Crete to the Romans.^ The Samnites had the same institutions, which furnished those very Romans with the subject of four-and- twenty triumphs.^ A character so extraordinary m the institutions of Greece has shown itself lately in the dregs and corruptions of modern times.wt A very honest legislator has formed a people to whom probity seems as natural as bravery to the Spartans. Mr. Penn is a real Lycurgus: and though the former made peace his principal aim, as the latter did war, yet they resemble one an- other in the singular way of living to which they reduced their people, in the ascendant they had over free men, in the preju- dices they overcame, and in the passions which they subdued.
Another example we have from Paraguay. This has been the subject of an invidious charge against a society that con- siders the pleasure of commanding as the only happiness in life: h See Vairasse d'Allais in his " Voy- nanimity. — Plutarch, " Life of the Philoages Imaginaires," vol. v. — Ed. pcemen." See Livy, book XXXVIII.
t The author intends that the Lacedae- k She defended her laws and liberty monians confounded their virtues and for the space of three years. See the vices.— D. qSth, 99th, and looth books of Livy, in j Philopoemen obliged the Lacedae- Florus's epitome. She made a braver monians to change their manner of edu- resistance than the greatest kings, eating their children, being convinced / Florus, lib. I., cap. xvi.
that if he did not take this measure they m In " fsece Romuli." — CicerO. would always be noted for their mag- 36 MONTESQUIEU but it will be ever a glorious undertaking to render a govern- ment subservient to human happiness.^ It is glorious indeed for this society to have been the first in pointing out to those countries the idea of religion joined with that of humanity. By repairing the devastations of the Span- iards, she has begun to heal one of the most dangerous wounds that the human species ever received.
An exquisite sensibility to whatever she distinguishes by the name of honor, joined to her zeal for a religion which is far more humbling in respect to those who receive than to those who preach its doctrines, has set her upon vast undertakings, which she has accomplished with success. She has drawn wild people from their woods, secured them a maintenance, and clothed their nakedness; and had she only by this step im- proved the industry of mankind, it would have been sufficient to eternize her fame.
They who shall attempt hereafter to introduce like institu- tions must establish the community of goods as prescribed in Plato's republic; that high respect he required for the gods; that separation from strangers, for the preservation of morals; and an extensive commerce carried on by the community, and not by private citizens: they must give our arts without our luxury, and our wants without our desires.
They must proscribe money, the effects of which are to swell people's fortunes beyond the bounds prescribed by nature; to learn to preserve for no purpose what has been idly hoarded up; to multiply without end our desires; and to supply the sterility of nature, from whom we have received very scanty means of inflaming our passions, and of corrupting each other.
" The Epidamnians,o perceiving their morals depraved by conversing with barbarians, chose a magistrate for making all contracts and sales in the name and behalf of the city." Com- merce then does not corrupt the constitution, and the constitu- tion does not deprive society of the advantages of commerce./* n The Indians of Paraguay do not de- ans were the inhabitants of Dyrrachium, pend on any particular lord; they pay now Durazzo. — Ed.
only a fifth of the taxes, and are allowed p But it does away with competition, the use of firearms to defend themselves. and thus ruins commerce. — Anon. Ed.
o Plutarch in his " Questions concern- 1764. ing the Greek affairs. The Epidamni- THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 37 7. — In what Cases these singular Institutions may he of Service Institutions of this kind may be proper in republics, because they have virtue for their principle; but to excite men to honor in monarchies, or to inspire fear in despotic governments, less trouble is necessary.
Besides, they can take place but in a small state,? in which there is a possibility of general education, and of training up the body of the people like a single family.