The laws of Minos, of Lycurgus, and of Plato suppose a par- ticular attention and care, which the citizens ought to have over one another's conduct. But an attention of this kind cannot be expected in the confusion and multitude of affairs in which a large nation is entangled.
In institutions of this kind, money, as we have above ob- served, must be banished. But in great societies, the multi- plicity, variety, embarrassment, and importance of affairs, as well as the facility of purchasing, and the slowness of exchange, require a common measure. In order to support or extend our power, we must be possessed of the means to which, by the unanimous consent of mankind, this power is annexed.
8. — Explanation of a Paradox of the Ancients in respect to Manners That judicious writer, Polybius, informs us^ that music was necessary to soften the manners of the Arcadians, who lived in a cold, gloomy country; that the inhabitants of Cynete, who slighted music, were the cruellest of all the Greeks, and that no other town was so immersed in luxury and debauchery. Plato-y is not afraid to afBrm that there is no possibility of mak- ing a change in music without altering the frame of govern- ment. Aristotle, who seems to have written his " Politics " only in order to contradict Plato, agrees with him, notwithstanding, in regard to the power and influence of music over the manners of the people.^ This was also the opinion of Theophrastus, of Plutarch," and of all the ancients — an opinion grounded on mature reflection; being one of the principles of their polity.^ q Such as were formerly the cities of t Lib. VIII. cap. v.
Greece. m " Life of Pelopidas."
*".'.* JJ*^*V^" '^' ^° ^"^ ^'^- ^' Plato, in his fourth book of laws, i De Repub." hb. IV. says that the prefectures of music and 38 MONTESQUIEU Thus it was they enacted laws, and thus they required that cities should be governed.
This I fancy must be explained in the following manner. It is observable that in the cities of Greece, especially those whose principal object was war, all lucrative arts and professions were considered unworthy of a freeman. " Most arts," says Xeno- phon,w '* corrupt and enervate the bodies of those that exer- cise them; they oblige them to sit in the shade, or near the fire. They can find no leisure, either for their friends or for the republic." It was only by the corruption of some democra- cies that artisans became freemen. This we learn from Aris- totle,-^ who maintains that a well-regulated republic will never give them the right and freedom of the city.y Agriculture was likewise a servile profession, and generally practised by the inhabitants of conquered countries, such as the Helotes among the Lacedaemonians, the Periecians among the Cretans, the Penestes among the Thessalians, and other conquered^ people in other republics.
In fine, every kind of low commerce^ was infamous among the Greeks; as it obliged a citizen to serve and wait on a slave, on a lodger, or a stranger. This was a notion that clashed with the spirit of Greek liberty; hence Plato& in his laws orders a citizen to be punished if he attempts to concern himself with trade.
Thus in the Greek republics the magistrates were extremely embarrassed. They would not have the citizens apply them- selves to trade, to agriculture, or to the arts, and yet they would not have them idle.c They found, therefore, employment for them in gymnic and military exercises; and none else were allowed by their institution.^^ Hence the Greeks must be congymnic exercises are the most impor- exercised by slaves: on the contrary, tant einployments in the city; and, in Aristotle observes the best republics his " Republic," book III., Damon will were those in which the citizens themtell you, says he, what sounds are capa- selves tilled the land: but this was ble of corrupting the mind with base brought about by the corruption of the sentiments, or of inspiring the contrary ancient governments, which had become virtues. democratic: for in earlier times the w Book 5th of " Memorable Sayings." cities of Greece were subject to an aris- X " Polit." book III. chap. iv. tocratic government.
y Diophantes, says Aristotle, " Polit." a Cauponatio, chap, vii., made a law formerly at b Book XI.
Athens, that artisans should be slaves c Arist. "Polit." lib. X.
to the republic. d " Ars corporum exercendorum gyms Plato, likewise, and Aristotle require nastica, variis certaminibus terendoslaves to till the land. (" Laws," book rum poedotribica."— Arist. " Polit." lib.
v., " Polit." book VII., chap, x.) True VIII. cap. iii. it is that agriculture was not everywhere THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 39 sidered as a society of wrestlers and boxers. Now, these exer- cises having a natural tendency to render people hardy and fierce, there was a necessity for tempering them with others that might soften their manners.^ For this purpose, music, which influences the mind by means of the corporeal organs, was extremely proper. It is a kind of medium between manly exercises, which harden the body, and speculative sciences, which are apt to render us unsociable and sour. It cannot be said that music inspired virtue, for this would be inconceivable: but it prevented the effects of a savage institution, and enabled the soul to have such a share in the education as it could never have had without the assistance of harmony.
Let us suppose among ourselves a society of men so pas- sionately fond of hunting as to make it their sole employment; they would doubtless contract thereby a kind of rusticity and fierceness. But if they happen to imbibe a taste for music, we should quickly perceive a sensible difference in their customs and manners. In short, the exercises used by the Greeks could raise but one kind of passions, viz., fierceness, indignation, and cruelty. But music excites all these; and is likewise able to inspire the soul with a sense of pity, lenity, tenderness, and love. Our moral writers, who declaim so vehemently against the stage, sufficiently demonstrate the power of music over the mind.
If the society above mentioned were to have no other music than that of drums, and the sound of the trumpet, would it not be more difficult to accomplish this end than by the more melt- ing tones of softer harmony? The ancients were, therefore, in the right when, under particular circumstances, they preferred one mode to another in regard to manners.
But some will ask, why should music be pitched upon as preferable to any other entertainment? It is because of all sen- sible pleasures there is none that less corrupts the soul. We blush to read in Plutarch/' that the Thebans, in order to soften the manners of their youth, authorized by law a passion which ought to be proscribed by all nations.
e Aristotle observes that the children rudeness of behavior. — " Polit." lib.
of the Lacedaemonians, who began these VIII. cap. iv.
exercises at a very tender age, con- / " Life of Pelopidas." tracted thence too great a ferocity and BOOK V THAT THE LAWS GIVEN BY THE LEGISLATOR OUGHT TO BE IN RELATION TO THE PRIN- CIPLE OF GOVERNMENT I. — Idea of this Book THAT the laws of education should relate to the principle of each government has been shown in the preceding book. Now the same may be said of those which the legislator gives to the whole society. The relation of laws to this principle strengthens the several springs of government; and this principle derives thence, in its turn, a new degree of vigor. And thus it is in mechanics, that action is always fol- lowed by reaction.
Our design is, to examine this relation in each government, beginning with the republican state, the principle of which is virtue.
2. — What is meant by Virtue in a political State Virtue in a republic is a most simple thing; it is a love of the republic; it is a sensation, and not a consequence of ac- quired knowledge, a sensation that may be felt by the meanest as well as by the highest person in the state. When the com- mon people adopt good maxims, they adhere to them more steadily than those whom we call gentlemen. It is very rarely that corruption commences with the former: nay, they fre- quently derive from their imperfect light a stronger attach- ment to the established laws and customs.
The love of our country is conducive to a purity of morals, and the latter is again conducive to the former. The less we are able to satisfy our private passions, the more we abandon ourselves to those of a general nature. How comes it that monks are so fond of their order? It is owing to the very 40 THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 41 cause that renders the order insupportable. Their rule debars them from all those things by which the ordinary passions are fed; there remains therefore only this passion for the very rule that torments them. The more austere it is, that is, the more it curbs their inclinations, the more force it gives to the only pas- sion left them.
3. — What is meant by a Love of the Republic in a Democracy A love of the republic in a democracy is a love of the democ- racy; as the latter is that of equality.
A love of the democracy is likewise that of frugality. Since every individual ought here to enjoy the same happiness and the same advantages, they should consequently taste the same pleasures and form the same hopes, which cannot be expected but from a general frugality.
The love of equality in a democracy limits ambition to the sole desire, to the sole happiness, of doing greater services to our country than the rest of our fellow-citizens. They cannot all render her equal services, but they all ought to serve her with equal alacrity. At our coming into the world, we con- tract an immense debt to our country, which we can never dis- charge.
Hence distinctions here arise from the principle of equality, even when it seems to be removed by signal services or superior abilities.
The love of frugality limits the desire of having to the study of procuring necessaries to our family, and superfluities to our country. Riches give a power which a citizen cannot use for himself, for then he would be no longer equal. They likewise procure pleasures which he ought not to enjoy, because these would be also repugnant to the equality.
Thus well-regulated democracies, by establishing domestic frugality, made way at the same time for public expenses, as was the case at Rome and Athens, when magnificence and pro- fusion arose from the very fund of frugality. And as religion commands us to have pure and unspotted hands when we make our offerings to the gods, the laws required a frugality of life to enable them to be liberal to our country.
The good sense and happiness of individuals depend greatly upon the mediocrity of their abilities and fortunes. Therefore, 42 MONTESQUIEU as a republic, where the laws have placed many in a middling station, is composed of wise men, it will be wisely governed; as it is composed of happy men, it will be extremely happy.
4. — In what Manner the Love of Equality and Frugality is inspired The love of equality and of a frugal economy is greatly ex- cited by equality and frugality themselves, in societies where both these virtues are established by law.
In monarchies and despotic governments, nobody aims at equality; this does not so much as enter their thoughts; they all aspire to superiority. People of the very lowest condition desire to emerge from their obscurity, only to lord it over their fellow-subjects.
It is the same with respect to frugality. To love it, we must practise and enjoy it. It is not those who are enervated by pleasure that are fond of a frugal life; were this natural and common, Alcibiades would never have been the admiration of the universe.^ Neither is it those who envy or admire the lux- ury of the great; people that have present to their view none but rich men, or men miserable like themselves, detest their wretched condition, without loving or knowing the real term or point of misery.
A true maxim it is, therefore, that in order to love equality and frugality in a republic, these virtues must have been previ- ou,sly established by law.
5. — In what Manner the Lazvs establish Equality in a Democracy Some ancient legislators, as Lycurgus and Romulus, made an equal division of lands. A settlement of this kind can never take place except upon the foundation of a new republic; or when the old one is so corrupt, and the minds of the people are so disposed, that the poor think themselves obliged to demand, and the rich obliged to consent to, a remedy of this nature.
If the legislator, in making a division of this kind, does not enact laws at the same time to support it, he forms only a a Voltaire takes exception to this vail, since his standard of admiration is adulation of Alcibiades, and holds that filled by such men as Cato and Marcus Plutarch and Montesquieu do not pre- Aurelius. — Ed.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 43 temporary constitution; inequality will break in where the laws have not precluded it, and the republic will be utterly undone.
Hence for the preservation of this equality it is absolutely necessary there should be some regulation in respect to wom- en's dowries donations, successions, testamentary settlements, and all other forms of contracting. For were we once allowed to dispose of our property to whom and how we pleased, the will of each individual would disturb the order of the funda- mental law.
Solon, by permitting the Athenians, upon failure of issue,& to leave their estates to whom they pleased, acted contrary to the ancient laws, by which the estates were ordered to continue in the family of the testator;c and even contrary to his own laws, for by aboHshing debts he had aimed at equality.
The law which prohibited people having two inheritances^ was extremely well adapted for a democracy. It derived its origin from the equal distribution of lands and portions made to each citizen. The law would not permit a single man to possess more than a single portion.
From the same source arose those laws by which the next relative was ordered to marry the heiress. This law was given to the Jews after the like distribution. Plato,^ who grounds his laws on this division, made the same regulation which had been received as a law by the Athenians.
At Athens there was a law whose spirit, in my opinion, has not been hitherto rightly understood. It was lawful to marry a sister only by the father's side, but it was not permitted to espouse a sister by the same venter./^ This custom was orig- inally owing to republics, whose spirit would not permit that two portions of land, and consequently two inheritances, should devolve on the same person. A man who married his sister only by the father's side could inherit but one estate, namely, that of his father; but by espousing his sister by the same ven- ter, it might happen that this sister's father, having no male b Plutarch, " Life of Solon." custom began in the earliest times.
c Ibid. Thus Abrahami says of Sarah, "She is my d Philolaus of Corinth made a law at sister, my father's daughter, but not my Athens that the number of the portions mother's." The same reasons occasioned of land and that of inheritances should the establishing the same law among difbe always the same. — Arist. " Polit.," ferent nations.
lib. II. cap. xii.* e " Republic," book VIII. * Philolaus was legislator at Corinth, f Cornelius Nepos, in pra:fat. This and not at Athens. — Ed.
44 MONTESQUIEU issue, might leave her his estate, and consequently the brother who married her might be possessed of two.
Little will it avail to object to what Philo says,g that although the Athenians were allowed to marry a sister by the father's side, and not by the mother's, yet the contrary practice pre- vailed among the Lacedaemonians, who were permitted to espouse a sister by the mother's side, and not by the father's. For I find in Strabo^ that at Sparta, whenever a woman was married to her brother she had half his portion for her dowry. Plain is it that this second law was made in order to prevent the bad consequences of the former. That the estate belong- ing to the sister's family might not devolve on the brother's, they gave half the brother's estate to the sister for her dowry.
Seneca,* speaking of Silanus, who had married his sister,; says that the permission was limited at Athens, but general at Alexandria. In a monarchical government there was very little concern about any such thing as a division of estates.
Excellent was that law which, in order to maintain this divi- sion of lands in a democracy, ordained that a father who had several children should pitch upon one of them to inherit his portion,^ and leave the others to be adopted, to the end that the numbers of citizens might always be kept upon an equality with that of the divisions.
Phaleas of Chalcedon/ contrived a very extraordinary method of rendering all fortunes equal, in a republic where there was the greatest inequality. This was, that the rich should give fortunes with their daughters to the poor, but receive none themselves; and that the poor should receive money for their daughters, instead of giving them fortunes. But I do not re- member that a regulation of this kind ever took place in any republic. It lays the citizens under such hard and oppressive conditions as would make them detest the very equality which they designed to establish. It is proper sometimes that the laws should not seem to tend so directly to the end they propose.
Though real equality be the very soul of a democracy, it is g De specialibus legibus quae pertinent though not without indiscretion." — Cread praeceptor Decalogi. vier.
/t Lib. X.t k Plato has a law of this kind, lib. XL t Athenis dimidium licet, Alexandriae "Leg."
totum. — Seneca, '' de morte Claudii." / Aristot, lib. II. cap. vii.
y Montesquieu is here accused of an attempt at satire, since it is Tacitus who t Strabo speaks in this connection of says, " Silanus lived in great friendship the laws of Crete, and not of those of with his sister, though not criminally, al- the Lacedaemonians. — Barthelemy.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 45 so difficult to establish, that an extreme exactness in this re- spect would not be always convenient. Sufficient is it to es- tablish a census,^ which shall reduce or fix the differences to a certain point: it is afterwards the business of particular laws to level, as it were, the inequalities, by the duties laid upon the rich, and by the ease afforded to the poor. It is moderate riches alone that can give or suffer this sort of compensation; for as to men of overgrown estates, everything which does not contribute to advance their power and honor is considered by them as an injury.
All inequality in democracies ought to be derived from the nature of the government, and even from the principle of equal- ity. For example, it may be apprehended that people who are obliged to live by their labor would be too much impoverished by a public employment, or neglect the duties attending it; that artisans would grow insolent, and that too great a num- ber of freemen would overpower the ancient citizens. In this case the equality^ in a democracy may be suppressed for the good of the state. But this is only an apparent equality; for a man ruined by a public employment would be in a worse con- dition than his fellow-citizens; and this same man, being obliged to neglect his duty, would reduce the rest to a worse condition than himself, and so on.
6. — In what Manner the Laws ought to maintain Frugality m a Democracy It is not sufficient in a well-regulated democracy that the divisions of land be equal; they ought also to be small, as was customary among the Romans. " God forbid," said Curius to his soldiers,^ " that a citizen should look upon that as a small piece of land which is sufficient to maintain him."
As equality of fortunes supports frugality, so the latter main- tains the former. These things, though in themselves different, are of such a nature as to be unable to subsist separately; they m Solon made four classes: the first, of those who had an income of 500 minas either in corn or liquid fruits; the sec- ond, of those who had 300, and were able to keep a horse; the third, of such as had only 200; the fourth, of all those who lived by their manual labor. — Plut., " Life of Solon."
n Solon excludes from public employ- ments all those of the fourth class.
o They insisted upon a larger division of the conquered lands.— Plutarch's " Moral Works, Lives of the ancient Kings and Commanders."
46 MONTESQUIEU reciprocally act upon each other; if one withdraws itself from a democracy, the other surely follows it.
True is it that when a democracy is founded on commerce, private people may acquire vast riches without a corruption of morals. This is because the spirit of commerce is naturally at- tended with that of frugality, economy, moderation, labor, prudence, tranquillity, order, and rule. So long as this spirit subsists, the riches it produces have no bad effect. The mis- chief is, when excessive wealth destroys the spirit of commerce, then it is that the inconveniences of inequality begin to be felt.
In order to support this spirit, commerce should be carried on by the principal citizens; this should be their sole aim and study; this the chief object of the laws: and these very laws, by dividing the estates of individuals in proportion to the in- crease of commerce, should set every poor citizen so far at his ease as to be able to work like the rest, and every wealthy citi- zen in such a mediocrity as to be obliged to take some pains either in preserving or acquiring a fortune.
It is an excellent law in a trading republic to make an equal division of the paternal estate among the children. The conse- quence of this is, that how great soever a fortune the father has made, his children, being not so rich as he, are induced to avoid luxury, and to work as he has done. I speak here only of trading republics; as to those that have no commerce, the legislator must pursue quite different measures./' In Greece there were two sorts of republics: the one military, like Sparta; the other commercial, as Athens. In the former, the citizens were obHged to be idle; in the latter, endeavors were used to inspire them with the love of industry and labor. Solon made idleness a crime, and insisted that each citizen should give an account of his manner of getting a liveHhood. And, indeed, in a well-regulated democracy, where people's expenses should extend only to what is necessary, every one ought to have it; for how should their wants be otherwise sup- plied?
p In these, the portions or fortunes of women ought to be very much limited.
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 47 7. — Other Methods of favoring the Principle of Democracy An equal division of lands cannot be established in all democ- racies. There are some circumstances in which a regulation of this nature would be impracticable, dangerous, and even sub- versive of the constitution. We are not always obliged to pro- ceed to extremes. If it appears that this division of lands, which was designed to preserve the people's morals, does not suit the democracy, recourse must be had to other methods.
If a permanent body be established to serve as a rule and pat- tern of manners; a senate, to which years, virtue, gravity, and eminent services procure admittance; the senators, by being exposed to public view like the statues of the gods, must natu- rally inspire every family with sentiments of virtue.
Above all, this senate must steadily adhere to the ancient institutions, and mind that the people and the magistrates never swerve from them.
The preservation of the ancient customs is a very consider- able point in respect to manners. Since a corrupt people sel- dom perform any memorable actions, seldom establish socie- ties, build cities, or enact laws; on the contrary, since most in- stitutions are derived from people whose manners are plain and simple, to keep up the ancient customs is the way to preserve the original purity of morals.
Besides, if by some revolution the state has happened to as- sume a new form, this seldom can be efifected without infinite pains and labor, and hardly ever by idle and debauched per- sons. Even those who had been the instruments of the revolu- tion were desirous it should be relished, which is difficult to compass without good laws. Hence it is that ancient institu- tions generally tend to reform the people's manners, and those of modern date to corrupt them. In the course of a long ad- ministration, the descent to vice is insensible; but there is no reascending to virtue without making the most generous efforts.
It has been questioned whether the members of the senate we are speaking of ought to be for life or only chosen for a time. Doubtless they ought to be for life, as was the custom at Rome,? at Sparta,*" and even at Athens. For we must not conq The magistrates there were annual, r Lvcurgus, says Xenophon, " de Reand the senators for life. ' pub. Lacedaem.," ordained that the sena- 48 MONTESQUIEU found the senate at Athens, which was a body that changed every three months, with the Areopagus, whose members, as standing patterns, were established for Hfe.
Let this be, therefore, a general maxim; that in a senate de- signed to be a rule, and the depository, as it were, of manners, the members ought to be chosen for life: in a senate intended for the administration of afifairs, the members may be changed.
The spirit, said Aristotle, waxes old as well as the body. This reflection holds good only in regard to a single magistrate, but cannot be applied to a senatorial assembly.
At Athens, besides the Areopagus, there were guardians of the public morals, as well as of the laws.^ At Sparta, all the old men were censors. At Rome, the censorship was committed to two particular magistrates. As the senate watched over the people, the censors were to have an eye over the people and the senate. Their office was, to reform the corruptions of the republic, to stigmatize indolence, to censure neglects, and to correct mistakes; as to flagrant crimes, these were left to the punishment of the laws.
That Roman law which required the accusations in cases of adultery to be public was admirably well calculated for pre- serving the purity of morals; it intimidated married women, as well as those who were to watch over their conduct.
Nothing contributes more to the preservation of morals than an extreme subordination of the young to the old. Thus they are both restrained, the former by their respect for those of advanced age, and the latter by their regard for themselves.
Nothing gives a greater force to the laws than a perfect sub- ordination between the citizens and the magistrate. " The great difiference which Lycurgus established between Sparta and the other cities," says Xenophon,^ " consists chiefly in the obedience the citizens show to their laws; they run when the magistrate calls them. But at Athens a rich man would be highly displeased to be thought dependent on the magistrate."
Paternal authority is likewise of great use towards the preservation of morals. We have already observed, that in a republic there is not so coercive a force as in other governtors should be chosen from amongst the aere of the former more honorable than old men, to the end that they rnight not the strength and vigor of the latter.
be neglected in the decline of Hfe; thus, ^ Even the Areopagus itself was submaking them judges of the courage ject to their censure, young people, he rendered the old t " Republic of the Lacedsemonians."
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 49 ments. The laws must, therefore, endeavor to supply this de- fect by some means or other; and this is done by paternal authority.
Fathers at Rome had the power of life and death over their children w At Sparta, every father had a right to correct an- other man's child.
Paternal authority ended at Rome together with the republic. In monarchies, where such a purity of morals is not required, they are controlled by no other authority than that of the mag- istrates.
The Roman laws, which accustomed young people to de- pendence, established a long minority. Perhaps we are mis- taken in conforming to this custom; there is no necessity for so much constraint in monarchies.
This very subordination in a republic might make it neces- sary for the father to continue in the possession of his children's fortune during life, as was the custom at Rome. But this is not agreeable to the spirit of monarchy.
8. — In what Manner the Lazvs should relate to the Principle of Government in an Aristocracy If the people are virtuous in an aristocracy, they enjoy very nearly the same happiness as in a popular government, and the state grows powerful. But as a great share of virtue is very rare where men's fortunes are so unequal, the laws must tend as much as possible to infuse a spirit of moderation, and en- deavor to re-establish that equality which was necessarily re- moved by the constitution.
The spirit of moderation is what we call virtue in an aristoc- racy; it supplies the place of the spirit of equality in a popular state.
As the pomp and splendor with which kings are surrounded form a part of their power, so modesty and simplicity of man- ners constitute the strength of an aristocratic nobility.'^^ When u We may see in the Roman History very wise government, decided a dishow useful this power was to the re- pute between a noble Venetian and a public. I shall give an instance, even in gentleman of Terra Firma in respect to the time of its greatest corruption. Aulus precedency in a church, by declaring Fulvius was set out on his journey in that out of Venice a noble Venetian order to join Catiline; his father called had no pre-eminence over any other him back, and put him to death. — Sal- citizen, lust. " de bello Catil."* V In our days the Venetians, who in * The instance is by no means isolated, many respects may be said to have a See Dion. lib. XXXVII. 36.— Ed.
5© MONTESQUIEU they affect no distinction, when they mix with the people, dress like them, and with them share all their pleasures, the people are apt to forget their subjection and weakness.
Every government has its nature and principle. An aris- tocracy must not therefore assume the nature and principle of monarchy; which would be the case were the nobles to be in- vested with personal privileges distinct from those of their body; privileges ought to be for the senate, and simple respect for the senators.