I am farther perfwaded, it is impoffible to conceive a Mind, without Thought; though 'tis eafie 2,»<Sfr enough to conceive one without A&aalSenfation, Imagination, and even without Volition; in like m which' manner as 'tis impoffible to conceive any Matter without Extenfion, though it be eafie to conceive depend all one that's neither Earth nor Mettle, neither (quart nor round, and which likewife is not in Motion. tbeModifi- Hence we ought to conclude, that as there may be a Portion of Matter; that is neither Earth nor rf™™^' Mettal neither fquare nor round, nor yet in Motion; fo there may be a Mind, that neither feels7 ™ second Heat nor Cold, neither Joy nor Sorrow •, that Imagines nothing, and even Wills nothing •, fo that pan of the all thefe Modifications are not effential to it. Thought therefore is only the Effence of the Mind, Pure Mind as Extenfion only is the Effence of Matter. <*«$> 7* But as Matter or Extenfion, were it without Motion, would be altogether ufelefs, and incapa- ble of that variety of Forms, for which it is created; and 'tis not conceivable that an Intelligent Being defiCTn'd to produce it in that manner; fo were a Mind or Thought without Volition, it is plairTit would be wholly ufelefs, fince that Mind would have no tendency towards the Objects of its Perceptions; nor would it love Good, for which it was created; So that, 'tis impoffible to be conceiv'd that 'an Intelligent Being fhould have prod ue'd it in fuch a condition. Notwithflan- din°- as Motion is not the Effence of Matter, fince it fuppofes Extenfion; fo Volition is not the Effence of the Mind, fince Volition fuppofes Perception.
Thomht therefore all alone, is what conftitutes the Effence of the Mind, and the different manners of Thinking, as Stnfation and Imagination, are only the Modifications it is capable of, but wherewith it is not always modify'd: But Volition is a Property that always accompanies it, whether in Conjunction with, or Separation from the Body; which yet is not Elfential to it, fince it fuppofes Thought, and 'tis poffible to conceive a Mind without Will, as a Body without However the Power of Willing is infeparable from the Mind, though it be not elfential to it; as the Capacity of being mov'd is infeparable from Matter, though it be not included in its Effence. For as it is impoffibie to conceive any Matter that cannot be mov'd, fo 'tis impoffible to conceive any Mind, that has not the Power of Willing, or is incapable of any Natural Inclination. But again, as Matter may be conceiv'd to exift without any Motion, fo the Mind may be conceiv'd to exift without any Impreffion of the Author of Nature towards Good, and confequently withr out Will. For the Will is nothing but the Imfreffion of the Author of Nature, which carries us to- wards Good in general; as we have explain'd more at large, in the firft. Chapter of the Firft °What has been faid in that Treatife of the Senfes, and what we have now laid, of the Nature TL of the Mind,does not fuppofe we know all the Modifications it is capableof: We are far from mak- ™ °»™ ing fuch like Suppofitions; believing on the contrary, that the Mind has a Capacity of receiving Modifica. an infinite fucceffion of diverfe Modifications, which the fame Mind knows nothing of. tions our The leaft portion of Matter is capable of receiving a Figure of three, fix, ten, or of ten thou- ^«f " "- faod Sides, alfo a Circular, or Elliptic Figure, which may be confider d as Figures of infinite ^ »/• Sides and Angles The different Species of each of thefe Figures are innumerable; Infinite are Triansl-s of a different Species, and more ftill are the Figures of four, fix, ten, or ten thoufand Sides, and of infinite Polyenes. ' For a Circle, an Ellipfis, and in general every regular or irre- gular Curvilhid Figure, may be confider'd as an infinite Polygene: AnElhpfis, for inftance, as an infinite Polyene, but whofe Sides or Angles are unequal, being greater towards the little Diame- ter than the great; and fo of other infinite Polygenes, more compound and irregular.
A plain piece of Wax therefore is capable of infinite, or rather infinitely infinite different Modifications, which no Mind can comprehend. What reafon is there then to imagine that the Soul, which is far more noble than the Body, fhould be capable only of thofe Modifications ihe has already receiv'd?
Had 10 a JF. Malebranche Concerning Book III.
Had we never Felt Pleafure or Pain, had we never Seen Light nor Colour; or had we been with refped to all things, as the Blind and Deaf are, in regard to Sounds and Colours •, fhould we have had Reafon to conclude we were incapable of all the Senfations we have of Objects? For thefe Senfations are only the Modifications of our Soul, as has been prov'd in the Book concer- ning the Senfes.
It mufl be granted then, that the Capacity the Soul has of Receiving different Modifications, is probably greater than the Capacity it has of Conceiving. I would fay, that as the Mind can- not exhauft, or comprehend all the Figures Matter can be fafhion'd in, fb it can't comprehend all the different Modifications poflible for the Almighty Hand of C O D to Mint the Soul into, though it knew as diftindtly the Capacity of the Soul, as it knows that of Mattery which yet it cannot do, for the Reafons I fhall bring in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of this Book.
If the Soul, whillt we are on Earth, receives but few Modifications, 'tis becaufe it is united to the Body, and depends upon it. All her Senfations have reference to her Body, and as fhe has not the Fruition of GOD, fo fhe has none of thofe Modifications this Fruition mould produce. The Matter whereof our Body is compos'd, is capable but of very few Modifications in our Life- time ^ it cannot be refolv'd into Earth and Vapour, till after our Death: It cannot at prefent be- come Air, Fire, Diamond, or Mettal; it cannot grow round, fquare, or triangular; it mufl: neceflarily be Flefh, and have the Figure of a Man, to the end the Soul may be united to it. 'Tis the fame cafe with our Soul: She mufl neceflarily have the Senfations of Heat, Cold, Co- lour, Light, Sounds, Odors, Tails, and many other Modifications, to the end fhe may continue united to her Body. All her Senfations are fubfervient to the Prefervation of her Machine. They trouble her, and difmay her, if but the leafl inward Spring chance to break or flaken; which neceflarily fubje&s the Soul to her Body, as long as her Body is fubjeft to Corruption. But when the Body fhall becloath'd with Immortality, and we fhall no longer fear the Diflblution of it parts; 'tis reafonable to believe the Soul fhall be no longer touch'd With thofe incommo- dious Senfations, which we feel againfl our Will; but with infinite others of a different kind, whereof we have at prefent no Idea; which will exceed all that we can think, and will be worthy the Greatnefs and Goodnefs of the GO D we fhall enjoy.
'Tis therefore unreafonable for any one to think he fo throughly comprehends the Nature of the Soul, as to be able to pronounce it incapable of any thing more than Knowledge, and Love. This indeed might be maintain'd by thofe who attribute their Senfations to external Obje&s, or to their Body; and who would have their Paflions to be in their Hearts. For indeed if we rob the Soul of all her Paflions and Senfations, all that we leave difcoverable in her' is, no more than a confequence of Knowledge, or of Love. But I cannot conceive how thofe who are retriev'd from thofe Delufions of the Senfes, can perfwade themfelves, that all our Senfations and our Paflions, are nothing but knowledge and Love •, I would fay, Specie s of confus'd Judgments the Soul pafles upon Objects, with reference to the Body which fhe Animates. I cannot conceive, how a Man can affirm Light, Colours, Odors, and the like, to be Judgments of the Soul; for it feems to me on the contrary, that I diftin&ly perceive Light, Colours, Smells, and the other Sen- . fations, to be Modifications quite different from Judgments.
But let us make choice of more lively Senfations, and fuch as the Mind is mofl taken up with; and fee what thefe Perfons fay of Pain and Pleafure. They will have thefe Senfations, with feve- * S. Aug. rai mofl confiderable * Authors, to be only the confequences or dependences of the Faculties we 1^' J5' de we have of Knowing and Willing; and that Pain, for inflance, is only the Regret, the Oppofition, jPesclnes and Averfion the Will has, to what fhe knows hurtful to the Body which fhe loves. Now to me inhisMan, this feems evidently to confound Pain with Sorrow; but fo far is Pain from being a Confequence &c. of the Knowledge of the Mind, and the Action of the Will, that on the contrary it precedes them both.
If you put, for example, a burning Coal in the Hand of a Man afleep, or that was warming his Hands behind him; I know not how it can be with any probability affirm'd, that this Man firftknew there happen'd in his Hand fome Motions contrary to the good Conllitution of his Body; that hereupon his Will oppos'd them; and that his Pain was the Confequence of that Knowledge of his Mind, and Oppolition of his Will. On the contrary, it is in my Opinion un- doubtedly certain, that the firfl thing this Man perceiv'd as foon as the Coal touch'd his Hand, was Pain; and that the Knowledge of the Mind, and Oppofition of the Will, were only the Confequences of it, though they were truly the Caufe of the Sorrow which fucceeded the Pain.
But there's a vafl difference between this Pain and the Sorrow it produces. Pain is the fu-fl thing the Soul is fenfible of; it is not preceded by any Knowledge, nor can ever be agreeable and welcome of itfelf. Whereas Sorrow is thelaft thing the Soul feels; it is ever preceded with Knowledge, and is always pleafant of it felf. This is evidently manifeft from the Pleafure that attends the Sorrow a Man's affected with, at the direful Reprefentations of the Theatre; for this Pleafure increafes with the Sorrow; but Pleafure never increafes with- Pain. The Come- dians, who ftudy the Art of Pleafing, know well that they mufl never lay the Stage in Blood j becaufe the fight, though of a fictitious Murder, would be too Terrible to be Pleafant: But they are not afraid of touching the Spectators with a deep Sorrow; becaufe Sorrow is ever agreea- ble, when there's occafion to be mov'd with it. There is then an EfTential difference between Sorrow Chap. II. The Search after Truth. to 5 Sorrow and Pain; and it can no wife be faid, that Pain is nothing but the Knowledge of the Mind, together with an Oppofition of the Will.
As to all the other Senfations, fuch as are Smells, Tails, Sounds, Colours, the generality of Men do not think they are the Modifications of their Soul. Bat on the contrary, judge they are diffus'd upon the Objefts; or at leaft that they are only in the Soul, as an Idea of a Square or a Circle; that is, are united to the Soul, but are not the Modifications of it \ and the Reafon of their judging thus is, that this kind of Senfations do not much affect them •, as I have Ih&wn hi the Explication of the Errors of the Senfes.
It ought then, I think, to be concluded, That we know not all the Modifications incident to our Soul; and that, befides thofe which Ihe has by the Organs of Senfes, it is impoffible for her to have infinite others, which Ihe has never experimented, nor ever Ihall, till deliver'd from the cap- tivity of her Body.
And yet it mult be confefs'd,that as Matter is not capable of infinite different Configurations,but becaufe of its Extenfion; fo the Soul is not capable of different Modifications but on the account of Thought:, it being manifeft that the Soul would be incapable of the Modifications of Pleafure, Pain, and even of thofe that are indifferent to her, were it not for her being capable of Perception or Thought.
It is fufficient then to know, that Thought is the Principle of all thefe Modifications: If any one will have fomething in the Soul previous to Thought, I fhall not difpute it with him: But as I am affur'd that no One has any Knowledge of his Soul, but by Thought, or by being inward- ly confcious of what paffes in his Mind j fo I am certain that if any One would reafon about the Nature of the Soul, he ought only to confult that Internal Senfation, which conftantly repre- fents her to himfelf fuch as ihe is, and not to imagine againft the conviction of his own Confcience, that Ihe is an invifihle Fire, a fubtile Air, Harmony, or the like.
CHAP. II.
CHAP. II.
I. The Mind being limited^ cannot comprehend any thing of an infinite Nature. II. Its Limitation is the Origine of a great many Errors: III. And efpecially of Herejies. IV. The Mind muft be fubmitted unto Faith.
SO then, that which we immediately difcover in the Thought of Man, is its being li- I. mited to a very narrow compafs \ from which confideration may be drawn two very im- the Mind portant Conclufions: As firft, that the Soul cannot perfectly know Infinity. Secondly, MH Umi' that (he can have no diftindt Knowledge of many things at once. For as a piece of Wax is inca- H^l"^ pable of admitting at the fame time a great number of different Figures •, fo the Soul is incapable anything of of knowing at the fame time a multitude of things. And as again a piece of Wax cannot be fquare an infinite and round at the fame time, but only femi-fquare and femi-circular \ and the more different Kaure. Figures it has, the lefs perfect and diftinct they will be •, fo the Soul cannot perceive many things at once •■, and her Thoughts will be fo much more confus'd, as they are more numerous.
Laft of all, as a piece of Wax, which had a thoufand Faces, and on each Face a different Fi- gure, would be neither fquare, nor round, nor oval, nor could a Man lay what Figure it was of: So it fometimes happens that a Man has fuch a multitude of different Thoughts, that he fancies he thinks of nothing at all \ which is exemplify'd in thofe that fall into a Trance. The Animal Spirits irregularly turning in- their Brain,excite fuch a multitude of Traces, as not to open any one ftrongly enough, to produce any particular Senfation, or diftinct Idea in the Mind } fo that thefe Perfons perceive fo many things at once, that they have no diftinct Perception of any, and this makes them conclude they have perceiv'd nothing.
Not but that fometimes Men fwoon away for want of Animal Spirits: But at that time the Soul having only Thoughts of Pure Intellection, which leave no Traces in the Brain, we never remem- ber them when we come to our felves -, and that makes us believe we have thought of Nothing. This I have faid by the way, to fhew it is a miftake to believe the Soul does not always think, be- caufe Men fancy fometimes they think not of any thing.
Every one that reflects but a little upon his own Thoughts, is experimentally convinced that the ti. Mind cannot apply it felf to the confideration of many things at once, and a. fortiori is unable to The Umm< comprehend what's infinite. And yet out of an unaccountable Capricioy fuch as are not ignorant */«* W tie of this, apply themfelves rather to the Contemplation of infinite Objeds, and of Queftions that |J" »r % demand an infinite capacity of Mind, than to fuch as are fuited to the Reach and Abilities of Agreax1Mr their mind. And a great many others, who would fain know all things, ftudy fo many Sciences vy Errors. at once, as only confound the Underftanding and incapacitate it for any true Science at all.
How many do we fee defirousof comprehending the Divifibility of Matter ad infinitum, and of knowing how 'tis poffible for a grain of Sand to contain fo many parts in it, as this Earth, tho' proportionably leffer. What a multitude of Queftions are form'd, never to be refolv'd upon thatfubject; and many others which include any thing of Infinity in them; the Refolution of . E e which, F Malm*ancke Concerning Book III.
106..,, c', in their own Mind? When yet, though they ftudy them till they t^Xt^^ i^^to b^ opinionated with feme Error, or Extravagance or.
<% certainly a very Pleafant **j^^ meevly becaufe they cannot S#|^ S^^' "Lfef kimpoffible for the Mind of Man ons that prove it ■ and this at toe fame jme tntt tn y ^ ^ ^.^ ^fi to comprehend Infinity. For theflArg°™f ^^ "Jkaowledge it when they confider them with demon?fcrative,if there ^vvere ever any '^^V^J Q^^^o^d, which they cannot An- Attention. Notwithftandmg which, if they y^^TO tPhey fegfo to boggle at them, fwer, their Mind recbi s Irora th J Evi^ce^ ^ffmfet cannot Anfwer ^ they invent fome They are earncftly taken up ^Mfflfflfei and conclude at laft they were frivolous Dillinaion to the Dem°iiftrations o ^initS^they embrace the contrary Opinion, deceiv'd: and that all the World is in an Error Hoiccttej em ^ ^ I inaticm and defend it by Turgid Points C^^-^t^ Delufions, is theW* being inwardly is fure to furnilh them withal. Now the leaion 1 or iwai. v n0'neceffity of comprehending the convinced, that the Mind of Man is |gy ^ ***** * g °£J[ all the objeaions that H^^ f* ^ * * t-pdOblctold be ref°1VWdouldMen only flick to fnch Qpdto. |^j^^ cern'd at it: For though there may become tha t are gepa i e ^" Pfll ethcr loft their time, are Errors of little confequence. And as for the reir, tney conv£c>d of the Weaknefs in thinkmg o^things they cannot co-prehend? Fm -t^they « ^ Mind * ^ o/of their Mind "Tis good (Jays a very umciou,.. ^ rf ever tQ oppofe Ito*/* kind of Subtilties, «or^h?^^rto7t b7 the Gofpel, under pretence it cannot com- « its feeble Lights to the Truths propos d to it oy 1, 1 ^^ thg w ht « pretend them. For fince all the ftrength of the Mind or Men is op ig wkh_ tof the leaft Atom of Matter and \^^^C^m^^ gainft Reafon, to refufe ^S Keafon that our *^~lg^ or rather Inadvertency to the ££ f bending what any ways belongs,to ^^ ^^ ^ra^culiar TW-to themfelves-, fife«ji«. in thefe days above any other, a great many men, Natural Weaknefs of their Reaces not only to their dif-believing it but alfo to the r |^§|t^ ^ conceive how Arrogant and a Libertine ^ay, that Aey^re torn t^SlavCTy £ ^ 'tispoffible for the Body of JESVS CHRIS 1 to ^^'^j as fufficient Reafon to conclude ^ir, at the fame time he is in Heaven-, and hence ™ g^^f ^ r, could go. itimpoffible, asifhe perfeftly wmprehended ^ ^faHs to work and heats his Head in endea- So a Man that's convinced of his own Li^» "eaXhfe Dwr«s with Liberty, will poflibly vouring to reconcile the Fore-knowledge of G OD a^ ™s H^ 0^t. For being unable on fall into the Error of thofe who do.not beheve that Man a ee A ent t ^^ ^ one hand to conceive how the p"^wcM^S7dSo forbidding him to deny a Pro- the Liberty of Man -and ^^i^^t^th^i^om \ oiMiot making fufficient has of reconciling his Decrees with our Liberty. to confider the Weaknefs of their But Hereticks arc not the only Men who.^Attention to Co^ct canQOt attaili Mind, and that give it too much Scope and Liberty or Judging or tningb The Working and Agitation of the Mind, and the Subtil ties *ft%^^rS^^S to make Men fenfible of their own Weaknefs, and to mfpire them with W^W requifite to make them humbly refign to the Decihons of the Church. On SS'SgW'jW Subtil and Humane Reafonings, may kindle a fecret Pride in their %^#g ^ ploy their Mind to evil purpofe, by framing a Religion fuitable to its Capuaty Andfe t-i a.c we from feeing Heretic h convine'd by Philofophic Arguments, and the Reading ol Book, piuc- li ScholafticalT fo as to acknowledge and condemn their Errors; that on the contrary, we find them daUy taking conftantoccafion from the Weaknefs or fome School-men's Argiungs, to tur* the moft Sacred wyfteries of our Religion into Jeft and Raillery S which indeed are not eitab.
Chap. III. The Search after Truth, I0* on any Reafon, and Explications of Humane Derivation, but only on Authority of the Word of G O D, written or unwritten, that is tranfmitted down to us by way of Tradition.
And indeed 'tis impoflible for Humane Reafon to make us comprehend, how one GOD is 'm Three Perfons: How the Body of our L O R D can be really prefent in the EnchtriSt i and how tis confiftent for Man to be free, whilft GOD knows from all Eternity all that Man fhall do The Reafons that are brought to prove and explain thefe things are fuch for the Generality as convince none but thofe who are willing to admit them without Examination i but look ridicu- lous and extravagant to Men minded to oppugn them, and that are not fettled in the Belief of the Foundation of thefe myftenes. Nay, it may be faid, that the Objections that are form'd againft the Principal Articles of our Faith, and efpecially againft themyfteries of the TRINITY are fo ftrong, as cannot poffiby admit of any clear, evident, and fatisfaaory Solution 5 fuch I mean, as one way or other does not fhock our weak and daggering Reafon: Thefe myfteries be- ing, in truth, incomprehenfible.
The belt way of converting Heretich, is not then to accuftom therri to the Exercife of Reafon" by urging to them only uncertain Arguments, dedue'd from Philofiphy; becaufe the Truths we would inftruft them in, come not under the Scrutinity of Reafon. Nor is it always convenient to ufe Argument in Truths, that can be made out by Reafon, as well as Tradition, as the Immorta- lity of the Soul, Original Sin, the neceffity of Grace, the corruption of Nature, and fome others; for fear leaft the Mind having once tailed the Evidence of Argument, upon thefe Queftions, will not acquiefce in thofe which are only prov'd by Tradition. Oh the other hand, they mould be taught to quit their own Reafon, by making them fenfible of its Weaknefs, its Limitation, and its Difproportion to our myfteries; and when the Pride of their mind fhall be humbled and brought down, it will be eafie to introduce them into the Sentiments of the Church; by repre- fenting to them her Authority, or explaining to them the Tradition of all Ages, if they are ca- pable of underftanding it.
But whilft men are continually calling of their Sight, from the Weaknefs and Limitation of their Mind, their Courage will be puffed up with an indifcreet Preemption; they will bedazled by an abufive Light, and blinded with the love of Glory, andfo Heretkh will be continually Heretich: Phihfopherf obftinate and opinionated: And Men will never leave difputing on all things they can difpute on, as long as Difputation pleafes them.
CHAP. III.
I. The Philofophers dijfipate or dijfohe the force of their Mind, by applying it to Subje&s, including too many Relations, and depending on too many things; and by obferving no Method in their Studies. II. An Inftance taken from Ariftotle. III. That Geometricians on the contrary take a good Method in the Search of Truth: Efpecially thofe who make ufe 0/ Algebra., and Analyticks. IV. That their Method increafes the flrength of the Mind, and that AriftotleV Logick lejfens it. V. Another Fault of Lear- ned Men.
MEN not only involve themfelves in a multitude of Errors, by being bulled with Que- t. ftions, partaking of Infinity, whilft their Mind is Finite; but by over-matching their Tl^t the Mind which is but of a narrow Reach, with thofe of a vaft Comprehenfion. Thiofa- It has been already faid, That as a piece of Wax was incapable of receiving many perfeft and^rT^ very diftinct Figures, fo the Mind was incapable of receiving many diltincl Idea's-, that is, of*/;«v sm* perceiving many things diftindtly at the fame time. Whence 'tis eafie to conclude, that we dies. fhould not apply our felves at firft to the finding out occult Truths, the Knowledge whereof de- pends on too many things, fbme of which are unknown to us, or not fo familiar as they mould be: For we ought to ftudy with order, and make what we know diftin&ly, ferviceable to the Learning we know not, or what we know but confufedly. And yet the moft part of thofe, who take to any Study, trouble not themfelves fb much: They never make trial of their forces, nor enter into themfelves to try how far the reach of their Mind will go: 'Tis a fecret Vanity, and a diforderly Defireof Knowledge, and not Reafon, which regulates their Studies: For without confulting their Reafon, they undertake the fathoming the molt hidden and infcrntable Truths, and the refolving Queftions, which depend on fuch a multitude Relations, that the moft quick and piercing Mind would, to the difcovering their Truth with an abfblute Certainty, require leveral Ages, and infinite Experiments to build upon.
In Medicine and Morality, there are a vaft many Queftions of this nature; all the Sciences of Bodies and their Qualities; as of Animals, Plants, Mettals, and their Properties, are fuch Scien- ces as can never be made fufficiently evident, or certain; efpecially unlefs they are cultivated in in another manner, than has been done; and the moft fimple and leaft compos'd, are began with, on i o 8 K Malebranche Concerning Book III.
on which thofe other depend. But Men of ftudy care not to be at the pains of a methodical Philofophy: They are not agreed about the certainty of the Principles of Phyfics: They frank- ly confefs they know not the Nature of ■ Bodies in general, nor their Quaikies. And yet they fancy themfelves able, for inftance, to account for Old Men's Hairs growing White, and their Teeth becoming Black, and fuch like Queftions, which depend on fo many Caufes, as 'tis impofli- ble to give any infallible Reafon of them. For to this, 'tis neceflary to know, wherein truly confifts the Whitenefs of Hairs in particular; the Humours they are fed with; the Strainers which are in the Body, to let thefe Humours through; the Conformation of the Root of the Hairs, or of.the Skin they pafs through •, and the difference of all thefe things, in a Young Man, and an Old; which is abfolutely impoflible, or at leaft extreamly difficult to be known. X. Jttriftotle, for inftance, has pretended not to be ignorant of that adventitious Whitenefs in the Aninjlance'&a.iYs of Old Mgn; and has given feveral Reafons for it *in feveral places of his Books. But be- of the want [ag the Genius ofWature, he has not ftopt there; but penetrated much farther. He has moreover of order m difcover'd, that the Caufe which turn' d Old Men's Hairs white, was the felf-fame with that which . ri ° • ' made fome Men, and fome Horfes, have one Eye Blue, and the other of another Colour. Thefe Lib. <. de are his Words: 'Ejt&KXcujKai $ tJjihisa. yv«0-, «5 ei d.v%?a>mt,itj ol i-b-sidi J>* # {wrlw atria* JVwiip o «* £v^fwir@- generati- mMx?) (mvoV. This is very furprizing, but there is nothing un-intelligible to this Great Man j- oneAnim. wh0 g{ves Reafons for fuch a vaft number of things, in almoft all parts of his Phyfics, as the molt enlightned Men of this Age believe impenetrable; which mult needs give good grounds for an Author's faying, He was given us by GOD, that we might be ignorant of nothing poffible to be known: Ariftotelis eft SV MM A VE RITAS,, quoniam ejus Intellelttu fait finis, humani intelletlm. Quare bene dicitur de illo,.quod ipfe fait creatus, & datus nobis divina Providentia, ut non ignoremus foffibiliafciri. Averroes ought too to have laid, That Ariftotle was given us by Divine Providence, for the underflanding what was impoflible to be understood. For certainly, that Philofbpher teaches us, not only the things that may be known, but (fince we mult believe him on his word, his Doctrine being the Soveraign Truth, SV MM AVE RITAS) he teaches us likewife thofe things, which 'tis impoflible to know.
Undoubtedly a Man muft have a ftrong Faith, thus to believe Ariftotle, when he only gives us Logical Reafons; and explains the Effects of Nature, by the confus'd Notions of theSenfes; efpecially when he pofitively determines upon Queftions, which we cannot fee poffible for Men ever to refolve. Yet Ariftotle takes particular care of admonifhing us to believe him on his word: it being an uncontroverted Axiom, with this Author, That a Difciple k to believe: /« mdltw £ fMUtSdvovia,.
True; fometimes Difciples are oblig'd to believe their Matters: But their Faith fhould reach no farther than to Experiments, and matters of Fact. For, would they become true Philofophers, they ought to examine their Matter's Reafons, and never receive them till they had difcover'd their Evidence by their own. But to become a Peripatetic Philofopher, there is no more requi* fite, than to believe, and to remember: The fame Difpofition of Mind going to the reading that Philofophy, as to the reading of an Hiftory. For fhould a Man take the freedom of ufing his Mind and his Reafbn, he muft not expect to grow any conllderable Philofbpher. /« $ *»$-<(&«* #