But the Reafon why Ariftotle, and a great many other Philofophers have pretended to know, What can never be known, is their not well diftinguifhing the difference betwixt knowing, and knowing; betwixt having a Certain and Evident Knowledge, and only a Probable and Obfcure: And the Reafon of their not having obferv'd that Diftin&ion, is their being taken up always with fubjects of a greater Reach and Comprehenfion, than their own Mind; fo that they have ufually feen only fome parts thereof, without being able to take them all in together; which fuffices to the Difcovery of many Probabilities, but not for the evident Difcovery of Truth. Befides which, Vanity, being the Motive to their feeking Science, and Probabilities making more for their Efteem among Men, than Truth it felf, as being more proportion'd to the ordinary feature and ability of the Mind; they neglected to fearch for the neceflary means of augmenting its Capacity, and gi- ving it a greater Growth and Comprehenfion; for which reafon they have not been able to go to the bottom of Truths that lay any thing deep and conceaPd. III. The Geometricians only have well difcover'd the narrow Capacity of the Mind; at leaft have that Geo- taken fuch a Method in their Studies, as fhewsthey have a perfect Knowledge 0f it; efpecially ^"'2 thofe who ufe Algebra and Analytics; which Viet a and Des-Cartes have re-eftabliftfd and perfe- Method in &ed in this Age. Which is herein apparent, that thefe Men never attempted the Refolution of feanb of Difficulties very Compound, till after having moft clearly known the more Simple, which they Tmh. depend on; they never fix'd to the confideration of Crooked Lines, as of Conick Sections, 'till they we perfect Mafters of common Geometry. But what is peculiar to the Analyfts, is that, fee- ding their Mind incapable of Attention to many Figures at once, and unable to imagine Solids of Method in- more t^ian tloree ^imenfions, though there were frequent neceflity of conceiving fuch as had more; treafes ^ they made ufe of common Letters, that are very familiar to us, to exprefs and abridge their ftrength of Idea's. And thus the Mind being not confounded, or taken up with the Reprefentation, it would the Mind, be oblig'd to make, of a great many Figures, and an infinite number of Lines, can furvey at a lin- AriftotievSle view» whatotherwife was impoflible to be feen: Forafmuch as the Mind can launch out far- Logkk di-tiier-> and penetrate into a great many more things, when its Capacity is raanag'd to the belt ad- ninijhesit, vantage.
So Chap. IV. The Search after Truth* 109 So that all the Skill and Artifice there is in making the Mind deeper-fighted, and more com- prehenfive, confifts, as fhall be explain'd in andther place, in a dexterous management of its Book 6, in. Strength and Capacity; and in not laying it out impertinently on things not nccefTary to the dif- the ifl Pan covery of the Truth it is in fearch of: Which is a thing well worthy to be obferv'd. For this concerning one thing makes it evident, that the ordinary Logicks are more proper, to ftraiten the Capacity mtM* of the Mind, than enlarge it; it being vifible, that by imploying the Rules they give in the finding out any Truth, the Capacity of the Mind muff be taken up with them; and fo it muft have the lefs Liberty for attending to, and comprehending the whole extent of the fubjed it exa- mines.
'Tis manifeft enough then, from what hath been faid, that moft Men have made but little Re- flection on the Nature of the Mind, when they would imploy it in The Search of Truth •, that they have not been throughly convinc'd of its little Extent, and the neceffity there is of Husbanding it well, and increafing it, and that this is one of the molt confiderable Caufes of their Errors, and of their fo ill fuccefs in their Studies.
This is not faid with Prefumption, that there were ever any who knew not their Mind was li- mited, and ftraitned in its Capacity and Comprehenflon. This doubtlefs has been known, and is ftill confefVd by all the World. But the generality know it only confufedly, and confefs it no farther than Teeth-outwards: For the condud they take in their Studies, gives the Lye to their Confeffion > fince they ad as if they truly believ'd their Mind was Infinite; and are defirous of diving into things which depend on a great many Caufes, whereof they commonly know not any one.
There is ftill another Failing, very cuftomary with Studious Men; and that is their applying v# to too many Sciences at once; fo that if they ftudy fix hours a day, they fometimes ftudy fix dif- Another ferent things, 'Tis vifible, that this fault proceeds from the fame Caufe as the others I have been Fault of fpeaking of. For there is great probability, that if thofe, who ftudied in this manner, knew ^arne<l evidently how difproportion'd it was to the Capacity of their Mind \ and that it was more apt to fill it with Error and Confufion, than with true Science; they would not let themfelves be transported with the diforderly motives of their Paffion and Vanity: For indeed this is not the way to be fatisfy'd in our purfuits, but the moft ready means to know nothing at all.
CHAP. IV.
I. The Mind cannot dwell long upon Obje&s that have no Relation to it, or that include not fimething of Infinity in them. II. The Inconflancy of the Witt, is the Caufe of that want of Application, and confequently of Error, III. Our Senfations take us up more, than the Pure Idea's of the Mind: IV. Which is the Source of the Corruption of our Morals: V. And of the Ignorance of the Vulgar fort of Men.
TH E Mind of Man is not only fubject. to Error, for want of being Infinite, or for being p of lefs Extent than the Obje&s of its Confideration •, as has been explain'd in the two rf,e Nl!flli lafl Chapters: But becaufe it is Inconftant, and nothing Refolute in its Aclion, and ™™y x lm unable to keep the View fixt and fteady on the Object, long enough to examine all the parts u?on 0b- 0f it< jetts that The better to conceive the Caufe of this Inconftancy and Levity of the Mind, we mult knowklveno1^.' that the Will is the Dire&refs of its Action; that the Will applies it to the Obje&s which it |£^_or loves; and that the fame Will is itielf in perpetual fluctuation and difquietude, whereof I affign CM° not this to be the Caufe. fomphing 'Tis not to be doubted but GOD is the Author of all things, and has made them only for*/ fg/jfr"-* Himfelf, and that he draws the Heart of Man towards him, by a Natural and Invincible lm- " preffion, which he perpetually influences him withal.
'Tis impoffible for GOD to have wiWd that there fhould be any Will that did not love Him j or*that lov'd Him lefs than any other Good, if there could be any other befides Himfelf; it being impoffible for Him to ordain, that a Will fhould not love that which was fupreamly Amiable, or fhould love that rmore which was lefs lovely. And thus Natural Love muft needs carry us to GOD, as proceeding from GOD, and nothing being able to flop the motions thereof, unleft GOD Himfelf that impreffes them. There is then no Will whatever, but necefTarily follows the motions of this Love. The Righteous and the Wicked, the BlefTed and the Damned, love GOD with this Love} and 'tis this Love, in one fenfe, that is the Caufe of the Mifery of the latter. For this Natural Love we have for GOD, being the fame thing with the Natural -Impreflion* which carries us towards Good in general, towards Infinite Soveraign Good; 'tis manifeit that all Minds love GOD with this Love, fince there is no other that is the Univerfal, the Infinite, the Soveraign Good. For, laftly, All Spirits, and even the DivcU, paffionately defire to be Hap- F f py, in them.
py, and to poflefs the Soveraign Good \ and they defire.it without Choice, Deliberation, and Liberty, by the bent and necefllty of their Nature. Being therefore made for G O D, for an In- finite Good 5 for a Good that comprehends in Himfelf all Goods, the Natural -Motion of our Heart can never Hop, till we arrive to thepofTeffion of this Good. ■ft The Will then labouring thus with a perpetual thirft, being tofs'dand agitated with Defires, Tk;^w;-Eagernefs, and.Reftlefs longings for that Good it is not in PofTeffion of, cannot but with much ftaniy 4 Uneafinefsfuffer the Mind to dwell any time upon Abftradt Truths, which don't affect it, and the wm ».^hjch it judges incapable of -making it Happy. It therefore pufhes the Mind forward continu- ted»ta% t0 tne Refearch of other Objedts; and when in this hurry and agitation, communicated to it cfjpjlica- by the Will, it. meets with any "Object that carries the Mark of Good, I mean that by approach- tion, and jng.the Soul,makes it fenfible of fome internal Delight or Satisfadtion,then this Thirft of the Heart confequem- j-jfes anew j thefe Delires, Eagcrneffes, and Fervencies are re-Jdndled; and the Mind oblig'd to ^/i'w-waitoii them, fixes it felt only on, the Qbjedt that either is or feems to t>e the caufeof them, to approximate it to the Soul, that regales and feeds upon it for fome time. But the Emptinefs of the Creatures, being unable to fill the Infinite Capacity of the Heart of Man; thefe little Plea- fures, inflead of extinguishing its Thirft, only provoke and inflame it, and give the Soul a foo- lifh and vain Hope of being fatisfy'din the multiplicity of Earthly Pleafures} which produces a far greater Inconftancy, and an inconceivable Levity in the Mind, which ought to make the Difco- very to the Soul of all thefe Goads.
It's true, when the Mind falls by chance upon an -Object of an Infinite Nature, or which in- cludes fomething great and mighty in it, its unfettlednefs and calling about ceafes for fome time: For finding that this Objedt bears the badge and character of that which the Soul defires, it dwells upon it, and clofes in with it for a confiderable time: But this clofing and adhefaon, or rather ob- ftinacy of the Mindj to examine Subjedts infinite, ortoovaft and unweildy, is as ufelefs to it, as that Levity, wherewith it coniiders thofe that are proportion'd to its Capacity j fince'tis too weak to accomplish fo difficult an Enterprife, and in vain it endeavours to effedt it: That which rn uft render the Soul happy, is not, as J may fpeak, the Comprehenfion of an Infinite Objeft (this fhe is not capable of) but the Love and Fruition of an Infinite Good, whereof the Will is capable, through the Motion of Love, continually imprefs'd on it by G O D Himfelf.
Which being thus, we need not wonder at the Ignorance and Blindnefs of Mankind; becaule their Mind being fubjedted to the Inconftancy and Levity of their Heart, which incapacitate it from confidering any thing with a ferious Application, is unable to penetrate into a fubjedr. any whit perplex'd, and difficult. For, in fhort, the Attention of the Mind is to intelligible Objedts, what a fteady View of the Eyes is to thofe of Sight: And as a Man that can't fix his Eyes on the Bodies that are about him, can never fee them well enough to diftingnifh the differences of their leaft parts, and to difcover all the Relations thofe little parts have to one another: So a Man who cannot fix the Eye of his Mind upon the things defir'd to be known, can never have a fuffici- ent Knowledge to diftingnifh all the parts; and to obferve all the Relations that may poffibly be between themfelves, or themfelves and other fubjedts.
Yet it is certain that all our Knowledge conlifts in a clear View of the Relations things ftand in to one another. So that when it happens, as in difficult Queftions, that the Mind muft furvey at one fighta multiplicity of Relations, that are between two things or more, it is plain, that if it has not conlider'd thefe things very attentively, or if it has but a confus'd Knowledge of them, it can never have a diftindt Perception of their Relation, and confequently cannot make any folid Judgment of them.
HI. One of the main Caufes of our Mind's wanting Application for Abftradt Truths, is our feeing Our Senfa- t]iem as at a oiftance, whilft other things are continually offering themfelves to the Mind, that us'up fmore are neai'er at hand: The great Attention of the Mind, brings home, as I may fay, the remote than \k Idea's of the Objedts we confider. But it often falls out, that when a Man is very intent on Mc- PureiAea's taphyficd Speculation, he is eafily thrown off from them, by fome accidental Senfations breaking °J.:tlf in upon the Soul, which fit clofer to it than thofe Idea's: For there needs no more than a little Pleafure or Pain to do it. The. Reafon whereof is, that Pleafure and Pain, and all Senfations in See the jih general, are within the very Soul: They modifie her, and touch her more to the quick, than se?ond ^ie fimPle Idea's or" Objedts of Pure Intelledtion, which though prefent to the Mind, neither touch Partofthif nor niodifie it at all. And thus the Mind on one hand, being of a ftraitned and narrow reach,.
Book. and on the other, unable to prevent feeling Pain, and all its other Senfations, has its Capacity fill'd up with them; and fo cannot at one and the fame time, be fenfible of any thing, and think freely of other Objedts that are not fenfible: The Humming of a Fly, or of any other little Animal, fuppofing it communicated to the principal part of the Brain, and perceiv'd by the Soul, is capable (do what we can) of interrupting our Confideration of very Abftradt and Sublime Truths; becaufe no Abftradt Idea's modifie the Soul; whereas all Senfations do.
Which it From hence arifes ^at Stupidity and Droufinefs of the Mind, in regard of the molt Fundathe source mental Truths of Chriftian Morality; which Men know only in a Speculative and Fruitlefs manofthecor- ner, without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST. All the World knows there is a GO D, and rufttm of that this G O D is to be ferv'd and worfhipp'd. But who is it, that ferves and woi fhips him with- M'MoMs.ontlhc Divine Grace, which alone gives us a rclifh of Delight and Pleafure, in thefe Duties?
There are but very few that do not perceive the Emptinefs, and Inconftancy of Earthly Goods, and that are not convinc'd with an Abftradt, though moft certain and evident Conviction, that they are indeferving of our Cares and Application. But where are thofe, who defhifc thefe Goods Chap. IV. The Search after Truth. f\\ Goods in their Pradice, and deny their Pains and Application to acquire them? 'Tis only theV that perceive fome Bitternefs and Diftafte in the Injoyment of them, or that Grace has made fen- fibleto Spiritual Goods, by an inward Delegation, affix'd to them by GOD., 'tis thefe only who vanquifh the Imprefiions of Senfeand the Strugglings of Concupifcence: A View of the Mind alone can never make us rciift them as we fhould do; but befides that View, there muft be a certain Senfation of the Heart: That Intellectual Light all alone is, if you pleafe, the Sikei- tnt Grace, which makes only for our Condemnation, which acquaints us with our own Weaknefs and of our Duty of flying by Prayer to Him, who is our Strength: But the Senfation of the Heart, is a Lively and Operative Grace. 'Tis this which touches us inward, which fills us, and perfwades the Heart, ahd without it there is no body that confiders with the Heart: Nemo cB qui recogitct corde. All the moft certain Truths of Morality lye conceal'd in the folds and doubles and fecret corners of the Mind, and as long as they continue there, are barren and inactive ' fince the Soul has no relifh of them: But the Pleafures.of the Senfes dwell nearer to the Soul \ and fince fhe cannot be infenfible to, or out of love with * her Pleafure, 'tis impofiible to difen- * Namely gage her felf from the Earth, and to \ get rid of the Charms and Delufions of her Senfes, by her a Natural Own Strength and Abilities. Lov^; /<"• 1 deny not however but the Righteous, whofe Heart has been already vigoroufly turn'd to- tate^pul wards GOD, by a preventing Delegation, may without that particular Grace perform fome /ire by an Meritorious Actions, and refill: the Motions of Concupifcence. There are thofe who are coura- EleSive gious and conftant in the Law of GO D, by the ftrength of their Faith, by the care they have to H*trei- deprive themfelves of Senfible Goods • and by the contempt and diflike of every thing that can^jj^* give them any temptation: There are fuch as aft for the moft part without the tafte of Indeliberate Love c<m- or Preventing Pleafure: That fole Joy, they find in acting according to the Will of GOD, is not be long the only Pleafure they tafte; and that Pleafure fuffices to make them perfevere in their fbate, and wit^out to confirm the Difpofition of their Heart: Thofe who are Novice Converts, have generally need ■ Z^l of an Indeliberate, or Preventing Pleafure, to difintangle them from Senfible Goods, to which mal Love. they are fattened by other Preventing, and Indeliberate Pleafures. Sorrow and Remorfe of their Confidences, arc not fuificient for this purpofe; and as yet they tafte no Joy: But the Jult can live by Faith, and that in Indigence; and 'tis likewife in this Eftate they merit molt: Foraf- rnuch as Men being Reafonable Creatures, GOD will be lov'd by them with a Love of Choice, and not with a Love of Inftind, or an Indeliberate Love, like that wherewith we love Senfible things,without knowing they be Good, otherwife than from the Pleafure we receive in them. Not- withftanding, moft Men having but little Faith, and yet conftant opportunities of tailing Plea- fures, cannot long preferve their Elective Love for GOD, againft their Natural Love for fenfi- ble Goods, unlefs the Delegation of Grace fupport them againft the Efforts of Pleafure. For the Delectation of Grace produces, preferves, and augments Charity, as Senfible Pleafures Cupidity.
It is apparent enough from what has been faid, that Men being never free from fome Paflion, or fome pleafanr or troublefome Senfations, have their Capacity and Extent of Mind much taken up •, and when they would imploy the remainder of its Capacity in examining any Truth, they are frequently diverted by fome new Senfations; through the diflike they take to that Exercife, and the Inconftancy of the Will, which tofles and bandies the Mind from Object to Objed, with- out letting it ftand ftill. So that unlefs we have habituated our felves from our Youth to the con- quering all thefe Oppofitions, as I have explain'd in the Second Part, we find our felves at laft incapable of piercing into any thing that's fomewhat difficult, and demands fomething of Application.
Hence we are to conclude, That all Sciences, and efpecially fuch as include Queftions very hard to be clear'd up, and explain'd, abound with an infinite number of Errors: And that we ought to have in fufpicion thofe bulky Volumes we fee daily compos'd on Medicine, Phyfics, and Mora- lity; and efpecially on the particular Queftions of thofe Sciences, which are much more complex than the general. We Ihould judge too thefe Books to have fo much lefs worth in them, as they ai-e better entertain'd by the common fort of Men; I mean thofe, who are little capable of Ap- plication, and know not how to fet their Mind to work; becaufe when an Opinion is cry'd np, and applauded by the People, in a matter difficult to be made out, 'tis an infallible fign of its be- ing falfe, and founded only on the delufive Notions of Senfe, or fome falfe Lights of the Ima- gination.
Neverthelefs 'tis not impofiible for one Man to difcover a great number of Truths, that were conceal'd from Ages paft; fuppofing this Perfon to have no lack of Parts, and who being in Re- tirement} as remote as poffible from every thing that might diftrad his Thoughts, applies him- felf ferioufly to the feeking Truth: Which makes thofe appear none of the moft reafonable Men, who defpife Mr. Des-Cartes's Philofophy, without knowing it; for this only Reafon, that it feems next to impofiible for a fingle Man} to have found out Truth, in things fo deep and conceal'd as thofe of Nature. But did they know the way of Life, that Philofopher chofe; the means he ' imploy'd in his Studies to prevent the Capacity his Mind's being fhar'd by other Objeds, than thofe he meant to difcover the Truth of: The diftindnefs of his Idea's on which he eftablilh'd his Philofophy.- And generally all the advantages he had above the Ancients, by the New Difco- veries; they would certainly receive a more ftrong and reafonable Prejudice on his behalf, thaa that of Antiquity, which gives Tlatoy Ariftotle, and diverfe others their Authority, And U3 F. Malebranche Concerning Book III.
And yet I would not advlfe them to ground only on this Prejudice,.and to believe Mr. Des- Cartes a Great Man, and his Philofopby good, becaure of thofe advantagious things that may be faid for it. Monfuur Des-Cartes was a Man like us, fubje& to Error and Illufion, no kfs than others. Not anyone of his Works, without even excepting his Geometry, but bears the Chara- cter and Earneft of the weaknefs of an Humane Mind. Wherefore we ought not to take his word for what he teaches; but read him according to his own Advice, with Precaution, by examining whether he is not deceiv'd, and believing nothing that he fays, without being oblig'd to it by its own Evidence, and the fecret Reproofs of our Reafon. For, in a word, the Mind knows nothing truly, but what it evidently perceives.
We have fhewn in the preceding Chapters that our Mind is not infinite, that it is, on the con- trary, of but a very indifferent Capacity; and has that Capacity ufually fill'd with the Senfa- tions of the Soul: AndJaft ly, that the Mind receiving its direction from the Will,cannot fteadily fix its view upon any Objecl, without being fuddenly thrown off by the Will's Fluctuation and Inconftancy. 'Tis moft certain that thefe things are the molt general Caufes of our Errors; and I might ftay here to make them more evident in particular: But what has been already faid, will be enough, with fuch as are capable of Attention, to give them to underftand the weaknefs of the Humane Mind; I fhall treat more at large in the Fourth and Fifth Book, of the Errors that are owing to our Natural Inclinations, and our Paffions •, of which we have now faid fomething in this Chapter.
The SECOND PART: Concerning The Pure UNDERSTANDING.
Of the Nature of Idea' s.
CHAP. I.
What is meant by Idea's. That they really exitt^ and are neceffary to our Perceiving all material Objeffs. II. A T * articular ization of all the ways pojfible for ua> to perceive External Obje&s.
i.
I Suppofe that every one will grant, that we perceive not the ObjecTts that are without us fm- witt U I mediately, and of themfelves. We fee the Sun, the Stars, and infinite other Obje&s without meant by JL us} and it is not probable that the Soul goes out of the Body, and fetches a walk, as I may jdeas.That £y, about the Heavens to contemplate all the Obje&s therein.
they really jt ^es them not therefore by themfelves; and the immediate Object of the Mind, when it bear'e neceffa- holds the Sun, for example, is not the Sua, but fomething intimately united to the Soul; and the ry to our fame thing which I call an Idea. So that by the Term Idea, I mean nothing but that Objed which Perceiving is immediate, or next to the Soul in its Perception of any thing.
ob%aer'ai It: ou&ht to be well obferv'd, That in order to the Mind's perceiving any Object, it is abfolute- ie s' ly neceffary the Idea of that Objecl: be actually prefent to it; which is fo certain as not poffibie to be doubted of. But it is not necefTary there fhould be any thing without like to that Idea: For it often happens that we perceive things which don't exift, and which never were in Nature. And fo a Man has frequently in his Mind real Idea's of things that never were. When a Man, for In- ftance, imagines a golden Mountain, it is indifpenfibly necefTary the Idea of that Mountain fhould be really prefent to his Mind. When a Frantick, or a Man in a Fever, or Afleep, fees fome ter- rible Animal before his Eyes; it is certain that the Idea of that Animal really exifts. And yet that Mountain of Gold and this Animal, never were in Being.
Notwith Handing, Men being as it were naturally inclin'd to believe that none but Corporeal Obje&s exift, judge of the Reallity and Exiftence of things quite otherwife than they ought. For when they perceive an Object by way of Senfe, they would have it moft infallibly to exift, tho' it often happens, that there is nothing of it without; they will have moreover this Object to be juft the fame as they perceive it} which yet never happens. But as lor the Idea which necefTa- nly exifts, and cannot be otherwife than we fee it, they commonly judge without Refledion, that it is nothing at all; as if Idea's had not a vaft number of Properties (as that the Idea of a fquare, for inftance, were not very different from that of any Number) and did not reprefent quite different things. Which is not confiftent with Nothing, fmcc Nothing has no Property.
'Tis Chap. I. The Search after Truth. n* 5Tis therefore undoubtedly certain, that Idea's have a moft real Exiltence. But let us enquire into their Nature, and their Effence; and fee what there is in our Soul capable of making te> her the Reprefentations of all things.
Whatever things the Soul perceives, are only of two forts; and are either within or without the Soul. Thofe that are within the Soul, are her own proper Thoughts -, that is, all her diffe- rent Modifications: For by the words, Thought, Manner of Thinking or Modification of the Sout, I mean all thofe tilings in general, which cannot be in the Soul, without her perceiving them; fuch are her own Senfations, her Imaginations, her Pure Intellections^ or fimply her Conceptions, as alfo her Paffwns, and Natural Inclinations. Now our Soul has no need of Idea's to perceive all thefe things, becaufe they are within the Soul, or rather becaufe they are the very Soul it felf^ in fuch or fuch a manner •, juft as the real Rotundity of any Body artdits Motion^ are nothing but the Body figured and tranflated, after fuch or fuch a fort.
But as to the things without the Soul, we can have no perception of them, but by the means of Idea's, upon fuppofition that thefe things cannot be intimately united to it •, and they are of two forts, Spiritual and Material: As to the Spiritual* there is fome probability they may be difcover'd to the Soul without Idea's, immediately by themfelves. For though Experience certi- fies us, that we cannot by an immediate Communication declare our Thoughts to one another, but only by words, and other fenlible Signs, whereunto we have annex'd our Idea's; yet we may fay that G O D has ordain'd this kind of Oeconomy, only for the time of this Life, to pre- vent the Diforders that might at prefent happen, if Mert fhould Underftand one another as they pleas'd. But when Juftice arid Order fhall reign, and we fhall be delivered from the Captivity of our Body, we fhall poffibly communicate our Thoughts by the intimate union of our felves, as 'tis probable the Angels may do in Heaven. So that there feems to be no abfolute neceffity of Idea's, for the reprefenting things of a Spiritual Nature, fince 'tis poffiblefor them tobefeen by themfelves, though in a very dark, and imperfed\ manner*