/ enquire not here hoxo two Spirits can be united to one another ^ or whether by that means they can This Para- open inwards, and make a mutual Difcovery of their Thoughts. I believe however, there is no Sub fiance Sr^»'» purely Intell'wble, except tha: of G O D X and that nothing can be evidently difcovered but in his Light* Ital'c|c'*e" and that the Zmon of Spirits cannot make them vijwle. For though we be moft intimately united with beiaffeio- our felves, we both are, and Jhall be unintelligible to our felves^ until we fee our felves in GOD, and ver as be- lie fliall prefent to us, in our felves, the perfectly intelligible Idea, which he has of our Beings included in^g^S^^ bis own. And thus though I feem to grant that Angels may manifest to each other, both what they are,?? Z "7" tind what they think; I must advertife, that I do it only becaufe 1 have no mind to difpute it; provided miefs 'a it fhall be granted me, what can't be controverted, namely, That we cannot difcern material things by Man Inoro themfelves, and without Idea's. rvhatlthink I will explain in the Seventh Chapter, what my Notion is of the way whereby We know Spi- Oft^ou^ rits •, and I will make it appear, that we cannot at prefent entirely know them by themfelves, %atule * of though they may poffibly be united to us. But I difcourfe in this place chiefly of material Things, idea's. which certainly are incapable of fuch a manner of Union with our Soul, as is neceflary to make them perceiv'd; for that, they being extended, and the Soul not, there is no proportion be*- twixt them. And befides, our Souls never depart from our Bodies, to meafure the Greatnels of the Heavens, and confequently cannot fee the Bodies that are without, otherwife than by the Idea's that reprefent them. And this is what all the World mult agree to.
We affirm then, that it is abfolutely neceffary that the Idea's we have of Bodies, and of all n, other Objedfc we perceive not immediately by themfelves, proceed from thefe fame Bodies, or A Panicu- thefe Objeds, or elfe that our Soul has the power of producing thefe Idea's; or that GOD pro- Ration due'd them together with her in the Creation; or that he produces them as often as we think of "^^ *h* any Object; or that the Soul has in her felf all the Perfections which fhe difcovers in thefe Bodies; biTforu* or laftly, is united with an All-perfed Being, who comprehends univerfally in himfelf all the to perceive Perfections of Created Beings. External There is no perceiving of Objects, but by one of thefe ways: Let us examine without Pre-0^'- poffeffion which feems the probable'ft of all, and not be difheartned at the difficulty of the Que- ftion: It may be we fhall give a Refolution clear enough, though we pretend not to give incon- tefted Demonftrations for all forts of Perfons; but only moll convincing Proofs to fuch as with thoughtful Attention fhall confider them: For it probably would look like Rafhnefs and Prefump- tion, to talk in a more pofitive manner.
Gg CHAP- 1 14. E Malebranche Concerning Book III.'
That Material Ohje&s emit not Species which refemble them.
TH E mofl common Opinion is that of the Peripatetics, who pretend, That External Ob~ j efts fend forth Specie s,vohich are like them jand that thefe Species are convey'd by the Exter- nal Senfes as far as the Commune Senforium. They call thefe the Species Imprejfe, becaufe imprinted by Objects on the outward Senfes. Thefe Imprefs'd Species being Material and Senfible are made Intelligible by the Intellects Agens, and are fit to be receiv'd in the Intellettus Patiens.• Thefe Species thus Spiritualiz'd, are term'd Exprejfe, as being expr eft d from the imprefs'd: And by thefe it is that the Patient Intellect knows all Material things.
I fhall not ftand to finifh the Explication of thefe Notable things, and of the diverfe ways Phi- lofophers have of conceiving them. For though they be not agreed about the number of the Fa- culties which they attribute to the Internal Senfe and Underftanding, and there are alio many that are very dubious, whether they have any need of the Agent Intellect for the knowing Senfible Objects \ yet they almoft univerfally agree in the Emijfwn of the Species, or Images refembling the Objects they proceed from: And 'tis only on this Foundation they multiply their Faculties, and defend their Active Intellect. So that this Foundation, liaving no folidity, as will be feen by and by, there is no neceflity of Handing to overthrow all the Superstructures they have built upon it.
I maintain then, it is not probable that Objects fhould fend out Species or Images in their own likenefs; and thefe are my Reafons for it. The firffc is taken from the Impenetrability of Bodies. All Objecls, as the Sun, the Stars, as well as thofe that are near our Eyes, cannot emit Species of a different Nature from themfelves: and for this Reafon 'tis ufually faid by the Philofophers, that thefe Species are grofs and material, to diflinguifh them from the exprefs'd Species, which are fpiri- tualiz'd: Thefe Imprefs'd Species of Objects are therefore little Bodies. They cannot then pene- trate each other, nor all the fpaces betwixt heaven and Earth, which mull needs be fill'd with them. From whence 'tis eafie to conclude, that they rauft needs bruife, and batter one another, fome coming one way, and thwarting others coming another; and fo 'tis impoffible they fhould render Objects vifible.
Again, it is poffible for one ftanding on one Point, to fee a great number of Objects which are in the Heaven, and on the Earth. There is then a neceffity that the Species of all thefe Bodies be redue'd into a Point. But they are Impenetrable, fince they are extended, Ex- But we not only can fee from one end of the fame Point, abundance of mofl large, and even immenfe Objects: There is moreover not any Point in all thefe great Spaces of the World, from whence we cannot difcover an almofl inexhauftible number of Objects, and even Objedb as big as the Sun, the Moon, and Heavens. There is not then any Point in the great Circumference of the World, wherein the Species of all thefe things ought not to center, which is contradictory to all appearance of Truth. if a Mm The fecond Reafon is taken from the Change thefe Species undergo. It is certain the nearer an has a mind object is, the greater the Species ought to be, fince we fee the Objecl greater. Now we cannot 'how'aUtbe *"ee w^at '^s t'lat can ^en^en tn*s s?ecies-> and what become of the Parts that compos'd it, when it impreftons was greater. But that which is ftill more difficult to conceive, according to their Notion, is, of Vifible^ how in beholding an Object with Magnifying-glafTes, or a Microfcope, the Species grows on a fud- objefts,tbd' dainj five or fix hundred times bigger than it was before -, for 'tis ftill harder to be feen from ITcommu- what adventitious Pai"ts it can increafe fo mightily in an inflant.
nicated The third Reafon is, that in looking on a perfect Cube, all the Species of its faces are unequal, without and yet we fail not to fee all its faces-equally fquare: And fo in beholding in a Picture Ovals and voeaMng, Parallelograms, which can only fend forth S/ww of afimilar Figure; we fee notwithflanding Cir- Mr/loes- cles an<^ Seimres- For this makes it manifeflly clear, that there is no neceffity the Object we be- Cartes'* hold fhould produce Species like it felf, in order to our feeing it.
Dioptrics. Laflly, it is not conceivable, how it is poffible for a Body, that is not fenfibly exhaufted, to fend conflantly Species from out of it felf on every fide; how it can continually fill with them, fo very capacious Spaces all round about; and that with an incomprehenfible fwiftnefs. For an Objed that lay hid, in the very inflant of its Difcovery, may be feen many millions of Leagues on all fides. And what feems much flranger yet, is, that the Bodies which have a great deal of Action, as the Air, and fome others, have not force enough to extrude from them their repre- fentative Images -, which the groffefl and leailaftive Bodies can do, as Earth, Stones, and almoft all hard Bodies.
But I fhall not fpend more time in producing all the Reafons that oppugn this Opinion, becaufe that would be an end lefs work; the lead Eflay of Thought fumifhing out an inexhauftible num- ber of them. Thefe we have already urg'd, are enough, and even more than were necellary, after what has been faid relating to this Subjedt, in the firft Book, when we explain'd the Errors of the Senfes. But there being fuch a multitude of Philofophers devoted to this Opinion, I thought it neceffary to fay fomething of it, to put them upon reflecting on their own Thoughts.
CHAP, Chap. III. The Search after Truth, \f* CHAP. III.
That the Soul has no Power to produce Ideas. The Caufe of the Error Men are guilty of, upon this Subjecl.
TH E fecond Opinion is theirs, who believe that our Souls have the Power of producing the Ideas of the things they would contemplate -, and that they are mov'd to the producing them, by the impreffions Objeds make upon the Body; though thefe impreffions, are not Images reprefentative of the Objeds they are caufed by: They pretend it is in this that Man is made after the Image of GOD, and participates of his Power: That as G O D has'crea- ted all things out of nothing, and can annihilate them again; and thence create others wholly new ^ fo Man has the Power of Creating and Annihilating the Idea's of all things as he pleafes. But there's very good reafon to fufped all thefe Opinions, that elevate Man fo high; as being Notions which commonly derive from his vain and haughty Heart, and which the Father of Lights never vouchfafed to give him.
This Participation of the Power of G 0 D, which Men boaft of having, whereby to repre- fent Objeds, and to do many other particular Adions, is a Participation which feems to draw in fomething of Independency, as 'tis, ordinarily explain'd. But 'tis likewife a Chimerical Par- ticipation, which Men's Ignorance and Vanity have caus'd them to imagine: For they are under a greater Dependance on the Goodnefs and Mercy of G O Z>, than they fuppofe. But this is not the place to give an Explication of thefe things: Let us only try to make it vifible, that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of the things they perceive.
No Man can doubt but that Idea's are real Beings, feeing they have real Properties •, that they differ one from another -r and that they reprefent quite different things. Nor can it reafonably be doubted, but they are of a Spiritual Nature, and very different from the Bodies reprefented by them. All which feems ftrong enough to raife a doubt, whether the Idea's by means where- of we perceive Bodies, are not of a nobler extrad, than the Bodies themfelves. And in earneffr,' the Intelligible World ought to be perfeder than the Material and Terreftrial, as we fhall fee in the procefs of our Difcourfe, and then, in affirming that Men are impower'd to frame all Idea's as they pleafe, we incur the danger of maintaining that Men nave power of making Beings more noble and more perfed, than the World which GOD has created. But this refledion never enters our Heads, by reafon of our imagining an Idea to be nothing, becaufe not obvious to the Senfes; or if we look upon it as a Being, 'tis a Being fo {lender and contemptible, that we fancy it annihilated, as foon as abfent from the Mind.
But though it fhould be true, that Idea's were only little, pitiful, defpicable Beings } they are however Beings, and Beings Spiritual: And Men having not the Power of Creating, have not confequently the Power of Producing them. For the Produdion of Idea's in the manner they explain it, is a true Creation, and though they endeavour to palliate, and foften the Prefump- tion and Harfhnefs of this Opinion, in faying, that the Produdion of Idea's fuppofes fomething antecedent, and Creation fuppofes nothing •, yet they bring no Reafon to folve the Knot of the difficulty.
For it ought well to be heeded, That there is no greater difficulty in producing Something out of Nothing than in producing it, by prefuppofing another thing, out of which it could not be made, and which could contribute nothing to its Produdion. There is no greater difficulty, for inftance, in the Creation of an Angel, than in the Produdion of an Angel from a Stone: Be- caufe a Stone being a Being of a quite oppofite kind, cannot be any ways ferviceable to the Pro- dudion of an Angel. But it may contribute to the Produdion of Bread, of Gold, &c be- caufe Stone, Gold, and Bread, are only the fame Extenfion, of a diverfe Configuration, and all thefe are Material things.
Nay, it is even harder to produce an Angel out of a Stone, than to produce it out of Nothing; becaufe to the producing an Angel out of a Stone, fo far as that is poffible to be done, the Stone muft be firfl Annihilated, and afterwards the Angel Created; but firnply to Create an Angel, there needs no Annihilation at all. If then the Mind produces its Idea's from the Material Im- preffions the Brain receives from Objeds, it does ftill the fame thing, or a thing as difficult, or even difficulter, than if it Created them: Since Idea's being Spiritual, cannot be produc'd out of Material Images that are in the Brain, to which they have no Proportion or Analogy.
But fome will fay, That an Idea is not a Subftance: Be it fo; but ftill it is a Being, and a Be- ing of a Spiritual kind: And as it is impoffible to make a Square of a Spirit, though a Square be not a Subftance -, fo 'tis impoffible to frame a Spiritual Idea, out of a Material Subftance, tho' an Idea were not a Subftance..
But fuppofe we fhould allow the Mind of Man to have an abfolute Power of Creating, and An- nihilating the Idea's of things; yet after all} he would never imploy it to the producing them. For as a Painter, though never fo excellent at his Art, could not reprefent an Animal he had never feen, or had no Idea of; fo that the Pidure he was oblig'd to make of it, would not be like that unknown Animal; fo a Man could not form the Idea of an Objed, nnlefs he knew it before; that is, unlefs he had already the Idea of it, which has no dependance on his Will: 1 1 6 F. Malebranche Concerning Book UK But if he has the Idea of it already, he knows the Objed; and 'tis needlefs to form a new one of it. 'Tis therefore needlefs to attribute to the Mind of Man the power of producing its Idea's.
It may perhaps be faid, that the Mind has general and confus'd Idea's, which it does not pro- duce-, and that thofe which it produceth are particular, more clever and diftind; but it all comes to the fame thing. For as a Painter could not draw the Pidure of a particular Man, fb as to be certify'd he had hit it right, unlefs he had a diftind Idea of him, and even unlefs the Perfon him- felf fhould fit; fo the Mind that had only the Idea, for inftance, of Being, or of an Animal in general, could not reprefent to it felf an Horfe, nor form any very diftind Idea thereof, nor bfe aflur'd this Idea perfedly refembled an Horfe, unlefs it had a former Idea thereof, wherewith to collate this fecond. Now if it had a former, it is in vain to form a fecond: And the Qpeftion proceeds upon that.former. Therefore, &c, It is true, that whilft we conceive a Square by pure Intelledion, we may befides imagine it, that is, perceive it by drawing the Image of it in the Brain. But 'tis to be obferv'd in the firffe place, that we are not the real and principal Caufe of that Image \ but it would take up too much time to explain it: And again, that the fecond Idea, which accompanies that Image, isfofar from being more diftind and accurate than the others, that, on the contrary, it owes all its Ex- adnefs to its Refemblance with the firft, which ferves to regulate the fecond. For, in brief, it is not to be believ'd, that the Imagination, or even the Senfes, make us a more diftind Represen- tation of Objeds, than the Pure Intellect; but only that they make the Mind more concern'd, and applicative: For the Idea's of Senfe and Imagination, are not diftind any farther, than they are conformable with thofe of Pure Intelledion. The Image of a Square, for inftance, that the Imagination delineates in the Brain, is no otherwife juft and regular, than as it con- forms with the Idea of a Square, which we have by Pure Intelledion. 'Tis^that Idea which regulates the Image. 'Tis the Mind that conduds the Imagination, and obliges it, as I may fay, to look time after time, whether the Image painted by it, be a Figure of four right and equal Lines, whofe Angles are exadly right: In a word, if that which is imagined, be like that £natoeJ?ee- which is conceiv'd.
judicoquae After what has been faid, I fuppofe no body can doubt, but it is an Error, in thofe that affirm oculis cer- the Mind can form the Idea's of Objeds; fince they attribute to the Mind a Power of Creating, no,quanto an(i even of Creating with Wifdom and Order, though it has no Knowledge of what it does 5 Profui.n.^" a thing utterly inconceivable. But the Caufe of this their Error, is that cuftomary Judgment nk>rafunt Men ma^e °f one thing's being the Caufe of another, when they are found conjoin'd together; iis quae a-fuppofing that the true Caufe of this Effed be unknown to them. 'Tis for this Reafon, that every nimo in- one concludes, that a Bowl in motion, meeting with another, is the true and principal Caufe of telligo. tne motion it communicates to it; that the Will of the Soul, is the true and principal Caufe of liem'a*' the motion of the Arm, and fuch like Prejudices as thefe*, becaufe it always happens that a Bowl Xeiigione. is mov'd, when it lies in the way of another that knocks againft it, and we move our Arms al- moft as often as we mil it s and we do not fenfibly perceive what elfe could be the Caufe of thefe Motions.
But when an Effed is not fo conftant an attendant on any thing that's not the Caufe of it, there are ever very many who believe this thing to be the Caufe of the Effed that happens, though all Men fall not into this Error. A Comet, for inftance, appears, and prefently after a Prince goes of£ &c Stones are expos'd to the Moon, and are eaten with Worms: The Sun is in Conjunction with Mars, at the Nativity of a Child; and that Child has fome Fortune extraordinary: This is Argu- ment fufficient to perfwade a great many, that the Comet, the Moon, the Conjunction of the Sua with Mars, are the Caufes of the Effeds I haVe mention'd, and of others that are like them: And the Reafon why all the World is not of the fame Opinion, is their Obfervation that the like Ef- fects do not at all times attend thefe Caufes.
But all Men having commonly Idea's of Objeds prefent to their Mind, when they defire it; and this happening many times a day, very few of them but conclude, that the Will, which ac- companies the Produdion, or rather Pretence of Idea's, is the true Caufe of them; becaufe they fee nothing at the fame time to which they can attribute them: And they imagine that Idea's ceafe to exift, when out of the view of the Mind; and that they begin to exift again, when re-prefen- ted to it.
'Tis upon the fame account too, that fome judge that External Objeds fend forth Images that refemble them; fb as has been faid in the preceding Chapter. For it being impofiible to fee Ob- jeds by themfelves, or any otherwife than by their Idea's, they judge that the Objed produces the Idea; becaufe when 'tis prefent, they fee it, whenabfent, it disappears; and the prefence of the Objed, almoft always is found in company with the Idea that reprefents it to us.
However, if Men were not rafh and inconfiderate in their judgments, they ought only to con- clude from the Idea's of things being prefent to their Mind, whenever they will have them, that according to the order of Nature, their Will is for the moft part neceffary to their having thefe Idea's, but not that the Will is the True and Principal Caufe that exhibits them to the Mind, much lefs that the Will produces them out of nothing, or in the manner they explain it. Nor is there any more Reafon for concluding, that Objeds emit Specie s that refemble them; be- caufe the Soul has feldom any Perception of them, but when they are prefent; but only that the Objed is for the moft part necefTary to the Idea's being prefent to the Mind. Laftly, They ought not to conclude, that the Bowl in motion, is the principal and true Caufe of the motion of Chap. IV. The Search after Truth. nj of another, which it meets in its way; (nice the fifft has no power of moving it felf. They can only judge, that the Collilion of the two Bowls, is an occafion to the Author of the motion Seetbeld. of Matter, to execute the decree of his Will • which is the univerfal Caufe of all things, by com- chd° f tbe municating to the other Bowl a part Of the motion of the firft i that is, to fpeak more clearly, *mcmL* by willing that the latter mould acquire as much motion as the former loft; for the impellent force Method. of Bodies can be nothing but the Will of him that preferves them, as will be made appear in ano- ther place.
CHAP. IV.
That we perceive not Obje&s by means of Idea's Created with w. That GOD does not produce them in us^ every moment we have need of them.
T~ "1 HE third Opinion is of thofe who pretend, That all Idea 's are Created with m. For our better difcovering how little likelihood there is in this Opinion, we muft confider _JL. that there are in the World many quite different things, whereof we have Idea's. But to mention only fimple Figures, it is certain that the number of them is infinite ', and even if we fix only on an EMpfis, 'tis not to be doubted but the Mind can conceive an infinite number of Ellipfes of a different Species; inafrauch as it can conceive, that one of its Diameters maybe lengthened to Infinity, the other remaining conftantly the fame.
So fince the Height of a Triangle may be augmented or diminilh'd to infinity, the fide which ferves for the Bafe, being ftill the fame, we conceive there may be infinite Triangles upon the fame Bafe, of a different Species. And moreover, which I defire may be well confider'd here, the Mind in fome manner perceives that infinite number,though it can imagine but a very few, and a Man cannot, at one and the fame time, have particular and diftinc~t Idea's of many Triangles of a different Species. But that which mould be moft efpecially attended to, is, that this general Idea the Mind has of an infinite number of Triangles of a different Species^ is a fufficient proof, that if we cannot conceive by particular Idea's all thefe different Triangles ^ in a word, if we cannot comprehend Infinity, 'tis not for want of Idea's, or becaufe Infinity is not prefent to our Mind; but meerly for want of the Mind's Capacity and Comprehenfion. If a Man fhould apply himfelf to the coafidering the Properties of all the diverfe Species of Triangles, and even fhould eternally purfue this fort of Study, he would find new and particular Idea's, in an endlefs fucceffion: But his Mind would tire under the unprofitable Difquifitiori.
What I have now faid of Triangles^ may be apply'd to Figures of five, fix, an hundred, a thoufand, or ten thoufand fides, and fo up to infinity. And if the fides of a Triangle, being ca- pable of infinite Relations with each other, can make Triangles of infinite Species; it iseafie to be feen that the Figures of Four, Five, or of a Million of fides, are capable of much greater Diffe- rences, as being fubjed to a far greater number of Relations and Combinations of their fides than fimple Triangles.
The Mind then difeerns all thefe things, and has Idea's of them all. And 'tis certain thefe Idea's will never be exhaufted, though it fhould imploy »infinite Ages in the confideration of one Figure only \ and if it perceives not thefe infinite Figures all at once, or if it comprehend not infinity, 'tis only becaufe its Capacity is too fhort and limited. It has then an infinite number of Idea's: What faid I, an infinite number? It has fo many infinite numbers of Idea's, as there are different Figures: Inforauch that there being an infinite number of different Figures, the Mind muft have an infinity of infinite numbers of Idea's, for the Knowledge of Figures only.
Now I demand of them, Whether 'tis probable that G O D has created fo many things with the Mind of Man? For my own part it can never enter into my Head,efpecially fince it might be done in another moft fimple and eafie manner, as we fhall fee by and by. For whereas GOD acts al- ways by the moft fimple means, it feems unreafonable to explain our manner of knowing Obje&s, by admitting the Creation of an infinity of Beings, when the difficulty may be refolv'd in a way more eafie and natural.
But what if the Mind had a Magazine of all the Idea's neceffary to its Perception of things? It would be ftill extreamly difficult to explain, how the Soul could make choice of them, to re- prefent Obje&s to her felf \ how, for inftance, fhe could bring it about to perceive the 5«», when it were prefent to the Eyes of the Body. For fince the Image, the Sun imprints in the Brain, is nothing like the Idea we have of. it, as has been formerly prov'd \ and fince likewife the Soul per- ceives not the Motion the Sun produces in the Fund of the Eye, and in the Brain ♦, it is not con- ceivable, how among fuch an infinite number of Idea's which fhe had, fhe could exadtly divine which it was neceffary to reprefent, for the imagining or feeing of the Sun. It cannot then be faid, that the Idea's of things were created with us, and that this is fufficient for our perceiving the Objects that are round about us, - „. ■. ** Nor can it be faid, that GOD produces every moment fo many new Idea's, as we perceive dif- ferent things. This is fufficiently refuted, by what has been faid m this Chapter, Befides it fe H h necefferyf ng F* Malebranche Concerning Book III* neceflary, we mould attually have in our felves the Idea's of all things at all times, fince at all times we can W*7/ the conceiving all things. Which we could never do, unlefs we1 had already a eonfus'd Perception of them; that is, unlefs we had an infinite number of Idea's prefent to our Mind. For, to conclude, we cannot Will the Thinking on Objects, whereof we have no Idea.
CHAP. V.
That the Mind perceives neither the Ejfence nor the Exigence of Obje&s^ by confidering its own PerfeSions, That none but GOD fees them in that manner.
T H E fourth Opinion is, That the Afindfiands in need of nothing, but it [elf, to perceive Ob- jeEls \ and that it may by refietting on it felf and its own PerfeElions^ difcover all things that are External to it.
It is certain that the Soul perceives in her felf, and without Idea's, all the Senfations and Pafli- onsfhe is capable of: Pleafure, Pain, Cold, Heat, Colours, Sounds, Odours, Tails, her Love, her Hatred, her Joy, her Sorrow, and the reft: Becaufe all the Senfations, and Pafllons of the Soul, reprefent nothing out of her felf, which refembles them, and they are only the Modifica- tions the Mind is capable of. But the difficulty lies in knowing, whether the Idea's that re-» prefent things exteriour to the Soul, and referable them in one manner, as the Idea's of the Sim, of an Houfe, of an Horfe, of a River, are nothing but the Modifications of the Soul: So that the Mind has no need of any thing but it felf, to reprefent all thefe things that are with- out it.