As the Idea's of things which are in GOD, include all their Properties; in feeing their Idea's we can fee fuccefiively all the Properties of them: for in feeing things as they are in GOD, we conftantly fee them in the moft perfect manner, and the knowledge of them would be infi- nitely Perfect, if the Mind that perceives them in him were infinite. What is wanting to our knowledge of Extenfion, its Figures, and Motions, is not the defedtivenefs of the Idea that reprefents it, but of our Mind that confiders it.
But 'tis not fo in point of the Soul; we know her not by her Idea; we fee her not in GOD j we iv. know her only by Conference.- and for that reafon the knowledge we have of her is imperfect. Homwe We know nothing of our Soul, but what we feel pafs within Us. If we never had had the knom **e fenfation of Pain, Pleafure, Light, &c, it were impoffible for us to know whether the Soul SouU was capable of them, becaufe we know her not by her Idea. ' But if we faw in GOD the Idea See the 1U that anfwers to our Soul, we fhould at the fame time know, or at leaft, might know all juftrations. the Properties file is capable of; as we know all the Properties Extenfion is capable of, becaufe we know Extenfion by its Idea.
It is true we know well enough by our Gonfcience, or by the internal fentiment we have of our felves, that our Soul is fomething great and excellent: But 'tis poflible that what we know of her, is the leaft part of what fhe is in her felf. If all we knew of Matter, were only Twenty or Thirty Figures, wherewith it had been modify'd, certainly our know- ledge of it had been very inconliderable, in comparifon of what we know by the Idea that reprefents it. To underftand then the Soul perfectly, it is not fufficient to know that only, which we receive by internal Sentiment, fince our Self-Confcioufnefs difcovers to us, it may be but the leaft part of our Being.
It may be concluded from what has beenfaid, that though we know the exiftence of our Soul better than the exiftence of our Body, or than of the things about us, yet we have not fo perfect knowledge of the Nature of our Soul, as of the Nature of our Body; which may ferve to reconcile the different Sentiments of thofe who fay there is nothing better known than the Soul, and of others that affirm we underftand nothing lefs.
This too may be of life to prove that the Idea's, which reprefent fomething to us that's External, are not Modifications of our Soul. For if the Soul faw all things by confidering her own Modifications, fiie ought to have a more clear and perfpicuous knowledge of her own Eflence or Nature, than of that of Bodies; and of the Senfations or Modifications fiie is capable of, than of all the Figures or Modifications incident to Bodies. Mean while, fhe knows not that fhe is capable of this or that Senfation, by any View fiie takes of her felf, but by Experience; whereas fiie knows Extenfion to be capable of an infinite -number of Figures by the Idea which reprefents Extenfion. There are morover certain Senfations as Colours and founds, which the generality of Men cannot difcover to be Modifications of the Soul; but there are no Figures which every one does not know by the Idea he has of Extenfion, to be the Modifications of Bodies.
What I have been faying, fhews likewife the reafon why we cannot give a Definition ex- planatory of the Modifications of the Soul. For fince we know neither the Soul, nor its Mo- difications by Idea's, but only by Senfations; and fuch Senfations of Pleafure, for inftance, Pain, Heat, or the like, have no Connexion with Words; It is plain that had a Man never feen Colour, nor felt Heat, he could not be made to underftand thefe Senfations by all the Definitions in the World. Now Men having their Senfations occafionally from the Body, and all Men's Bodies being not difpos'd alike, it often happens, that thefe words are Equivocal: and that thofe which are employ'd to exprefs the Modifications of our Soul, fignify quite contrary to what they defign: fo that thay often, for inftance, make a Man think of Bitter, when 'tis fuppos'd they make him think of Sweet.
But though we have not an entire knowledge of our Soul, we are fufficiently inftru&ed by Confcience, for demonftrating her Immortality, Spirituality, Liberty, and fome other Attributes which it is necefiary for us to know; and for that reafon GOD manifefts her not to us by her Idea, in the way that he gives us to know Bodies. True, the knowledge we have of our Soul by Confcience is imperfect, but it is not falfe: the knowledge on the contrary we have of Bodies, by Senfation or Confcience, if we may term Confcience that Senfation we have of what occurrs in our Bodies, is not only imperfect, but alfo falfe. Wherefore the Idea of Bodies was necefiary to correct the Senfations we had of them. But we have no need of the Idea of the Soul, fince the Confcioufnefs we have of her, engages us not in Error; and there is no fear of miftaking in the Knowledge of her, if we be carcfull not to confound her with the Body; which may be done-by Reafon. Laftly, if we had had a clear Idea of the Soul, as we have of the Body, that Idea had made us confider her as too feparate from it, and fo it had weakned the union of our Soul with our Body, by hindring us from regarding our Soul, as expanded through all our Members: which I explain not more at large.
There remains now no other Obje&s of our Knowledge to be fpoke to, than the Souls of v other Men, and pure Intelligences, and 'tis manifeft we know them only by Conjecture. We Ho^ we know them not at prefent, either in themselves, or by their Idea's: and whereas they are different know the from us, it is not poflible to know them by Confcience. We conjecture that the Souls of souls of other men are of the fame Species with our own. What we feel in our felves, we prefume otha Mea' that t o 4- F. Malebranche Concerning Book III.
that they feel too: and when thefe Sentiments have no Relation to our Body, we are fure we are not deceiv'd; becaufe we fee certain Idea's and immutable Laws in GOD, according to which we are certainly affur'd that GOD ads equally on all Spirits.
I know, that twice two are four; that it is better to be Righteous than Rich: and I am not deceiv'd in believing others know thefe Truths, as well as I. I love Good and Pleafure, I hate Evil and Pain: I am willing to be happy, and I am not deceiv'd in thinking all' Men, and A«geh, and even Devils, have the fame Inclinations. I know likewife that GOD will never make Spirits uildelirous of Happinefs, or that can be defirous of being Miferable. But I know it with evidence and certainty, fince'tis GOD that teaches me: for who could in- form me of the Deflgns and Wills of GOD, but GOD Himfelf. But when the Body is a partner in that which occurrs within me, I am almolt ever deceiv'd, if I meafure others by my felf. I feel Heat, I fee a thing of fuch a Size, or fuch a Colour; I have fuch or fuch a Taft, upon the application of certain Bodies to my Palate: and I am deceiv'd, if I judge of others by my felf: I ana fubjed to particular Paffions, I have a kindnefs or averfion to this or that thing, and I judge that others have the like: but my Conjedure is often falfe. Thus the Knowledge we have of other Men is very obnoxious to Error, if we judge of them only from the Senfations we have of our felves.
Whether there are any Beings different from G O D,' our felves, Bodies, and Pure Spirits, is unknown to. us. We can hardly perfwade our felves there are; and after we have examin'd the Reafons of fome Philofophers, who pretend the contrary, we have found them falfe: Which . has con fir m'd us in the Notion we had taken up, that all Men being of the fame Nature, we have all the fame Idea's, as having all need of the Knowledge of the fame things.
CHAP. VIII.
I. The intimate Prefence of the indefinite Idea of Being in general^ is the caufe of all the diforderly Abftraclions of the Mind: and the moft part of the Chimera's of the Vulgar Philofephy, which hinder many Philofofhers from acknowledging the folidity of true Principles of Phyficks. II. An In- flame concerning the Ejfence of Matter.
I. Y ■ 1HAT clear, intimate, and neceffary Prefence of GOD: I mean that prefence of Being the 'mi- without any particular Limitation •, of Being infinite, and in general, to the Mind, 7"e Pfth a<^s ^ronS^er uPon ftj tuan the prefence of all finite Objects. It is impoflible indefinite* *° diveft it felf abfolutely of this general Idea of Being; fince 'tis impoflible to fubfift out of idea of Be- GOD. Perhaps it may be faid, that the Mind can feparate it felf from him, becaufe it can big in ge- think on particular Beings. But this is a miftake. For the Mind in confidering any Being wdivtke [n particular, does not fo much feparate and recede from GOD, as approach nearer fome of ttedifor* His Perfections, if I may be permitted fo to fpeak, by removing farther off from others.
deny Ab- However, it doth not diflance it felf in that manner, as quite to lofe fight of them} but is ftraBions ever in a Capacity of feeking them out, and approaching near them. They are ever prefent °f. %te.to the Mind, yet the Mind perceives them not but in an unexplicable confufion, by reafon of its themon1 Littleneis, and the Greatnefs of the Idea of Being: A Man may indeed be fome time without pan of the thinking on himfelf; but he cannot, as I think, fubfift a moment without thinking on Being; Chimera's and even at the time a Man believes he thinks of nothing, he is neceffarily full of the indetermicf **«7«/" nate and general Idea of Being. But becauie the things which are cuftomary to us, and which phy which don't affed us, alarum not the Mind with any vehemence, nor oblige it to make refkdion on hinder ma- them: this Idea of being fo great, fo vaft, fo real, and politive as it is, is fo familiar to us, and ny Phiiofo- makes fb little impreffion, that we fancy that we hardly fee it; that we make no refiedion on it •, phers ffom anci confequently judge there is little reality in it: and that 'tis only form'd from a confus'd colkdeingtbe kdion of all particular Idea's; though on the contrary it is in this, and fy this only, we perceive folidity of all Beings in particular., - true Tr'm- Though that Idea which we receive through our immediate union with the W O R D of cities of COD, never deceives us of it felf, as do thofe we derive from the union we have with our Phyfick. g0(jy^ which reprefents things to us otherwife than they are; yet I fcruple not to fay, That we make fo bad ufe of the belt things, that the indelible prefence of this Idea, is one of the prin- cipal Caufes of all the diforderly Abftradions of the Mind; and confequently of all that Ablhad and Chimerical Philofophy, which explains all Natural Eileds, by the general terms of Ad, Power, Caufe, Effed, Subftantial Forms, Faculties, Occult Qualities, Sympathy, Antipathy, &c. For 'tis certain thefe Terms, and a great many others, excite no other Idea's in the Mind, than indeterminate and general Idea's; that is, Idea's which readily offer themfelves to the Mind, with- out any trouble, and application on our own part.
Let a Man read with all Attention poffible, all the Definitions and Explications given of Sub- ftantial Forms; let him do his belt to fearch wherein cpnfifts the Effence of all thefe Entities, which Chap. VIII. The Search after Truth. 1 3 tt which the fraitful Imagination of Philofophers produces in fuch multitudes at pleafure, that they are forc'd to divide tTiem, and fubdivide them over and over again; and I dare engage, that he fhall never excite in his Mind, any other Idea of all thefe things, than that of Being' and of Caufe in general.
For let us take a view of the cuftomary proceedings of Philofophers. They obferve fome * new Effect, and prefently imagine fome new Entity mull produce it. The Fire heats; there is then in the Fire fome Entity to produce this Effect, which differs from the Matter the Fire is compos'd of: And becaufe Fire is capable of many different Effects, as of feparating Bo- dies, Pulverizing Vitrifying, Drying, Hardning, Softning, Dilating, Purifying, and En- lightning them, &c therefore they liberally bellow on Fire fo many Faculties, or real Quali- ties, as it is capable of producing different Effects.
But if we reflect on all the Definitions they give of thefe Faculties, we (hall find they are nothing elfe but Logical Definitions, [which raife no other Idea's, than that of Being and Caufe in general, which the Mind refers to the Effect that is produe'd. So that a Man is nothing the wifer when he has lludied them never fo long: For all that is got by this fort of Study, is the imagining we know better than others, what indeed we know much worfe; not only becaufe we admit many Entities that never were j but alfo in being prepoffefs'd, we make our felves incapable of conceiving how 'tis poflible for Matter all alone, as that of Fire, in being mov'd againft Bodies differently difpos'd, to produce all the different Effects we fee Fire produce.
It is manifefl to all thofe who have read any thing, That almoil all the Books of Science, and especially thofe which treat of Phyficks, Medicine, and Chymifiry, and of all particular things of Nature, are full of nothing but Argumentations, founded on the Elementary and Secondary Qualities, as Attractive, Retentive, Comoilive, Expulfive, and fuch like; upon others Mthich they term Occult; upon fpecifick Vef tues; and many other Entities, which Men frame and make np out of the general Idea of Being, and out of the Caufe of the Effect which they fee; which methinks could not happen, were it not for the facility they have at confidering the Idea of Being in general, which is always prefent to their Mind, through the intimate prefence of Hini who includes all Beings.
If the vulgar Philofophers would be content to let their Phyficks go for firople Logich; which furnifh'd out Terms for the Difcourfing of Natural things, and if they would give thofe Men leave to be quiet, who affix to thefe Terms diftinct and particular Idea^to make themfelves in- telligible, we fhould have nothing to reprehend in their Conduct: But they fet up themfelves for the explaining Nature, by general and abftract Idea's, as if Nature were her felf abftract 5, and will abfolutely have the Phyficks of their Mailer Arifiotle, to be real Phyficks, which fearches to the bottom of things, and not a fimple Logick only •, though it has nothing fufferable in it, except it be fome Definitions, fb loofe and indefinite, and fome fo general Terms, as may be employ'd in all forts of Philofophy. In fine,their Heads are fo full of thefe imaginary Entities,and thefe loofe and indeterminate Idea's, which fpring up naturally in their Minds, that they are too incapable of fixing their Thoughts for any time upon the real Idea's of things, to difcover their folidity and evidence. And this is the Caufe of that their extream ignorance of the true Principles of Natural Philofophy. 'Tis neceffary to give a proof of it.
The Philofophers are fufficiently agreed, That that ought to be look'd upon as the Eflence of jjj. a thing} which is acknowledg'd the Firft in that thing, which is infeparable from it, arid on of the Ef~ which all the Properties which belong to it, depend: So that to difcover wherein confifts the \ fence of Effence of Matter, we mull confider all the Properties that comport with it, or are included Matter' in the Idea we have of it: as Hardnefs, Softnefs, Fluidnefs, Motion, Reft, Figure, Divifibi- jf ^.w-^r lity, Impenetrability, and Extenfion} and enquire immediately which of thefe Attributes is ^"^^ infeparable from it. Thus Fluidity, Hardnefs, Softnefs, Motion, and Reft, being to be fe- Effence be parated from Matter, fince there are many Bodies without Hardnefs, Fluidity, or Softnefs, admitted, which are not in Motion, or laflly which are not at reft, it clearly follows that none of thefe iU the reft Attributes are eflential to it. f Wj™r And now there remain only four, which we conceive infeparable from Matter; namely ftrJ^°.n';f Figure, Divifibility, Impenetrability, and Extenfion; wherefore in order to underftand which u he not Attribute is to be taken for its Effence, we mull no longer think of feparating them, but only admitted, examine which is the Primary, and that fuppofes none before it. Now we eafily difcover that [m onlJ * Figure, Divifibility, and Impenetrability, fuppofe Extenfion; and that Extenfion prefuppofes ^^ nothing: But this being given, Divifibility, Impenetrability, and Figure, necelfarily follow, wherein Extenfion then ought to be concluded the Effence of Matter, on Suppofition it has no other confifts the Attributes than thofe beforemention'd, and fuch as are like them: and I am perfwaded no Man Effence of in the World can doubt of it, when he has ferioufly confider'd it. ' Jjjg' \°r But all the difficulty is to know, Whether Matter has not fome other Attributes, different cmnol be from Extenfion, and its Dependants; fo that Extenfion it felf may not be elfential to it, but may the fubjett fuppofe fome other thing, both as its Subject, and its Principle. of «■ 0"'' Many Men, after having moll attentively confider'd the Idea, which they have of Matter, by-'"0'2" all the Attributes that are known of it } after having meditated likewife on the Effects of Na- ture, as much as their Strength and Capacity of Mind would permit them, have been ftrongly convine'd, that Extenfion fuppofes not any thing in Matter, whether becaufe they have had no Kk aifttact is6 F. Male branch e Concerning Book III.
diftinft and particular Idea of that thing pretended, precedaneous to Extenfion, or becaufe they have found no vifible Effe& to prove it.
For even as to our being perfwaded that a Watch hath no Entity, different from the Matter, it is compos'd of:, it fuffices to know, how the different Difpofition of the Wheels is able to effeft all the Movements of a Watch, without having any other diftindfc Idea of what might poilibly be the Caufe of thefe Motions, though there be many Logical to had. So becaufe thefe Perfons have no diftinct Idea of what could be in Matter, were Extenfion taken away, and fee no Attribute that can explicate its Nature, and becaufe Extenfion being granted, all the Attributes conceiv'd to belong toMatter,areatthefame time granted: and becaufe Matter is the Caufe of no Effe&iWhich may not be conceiv'd producible by Extenfion, diverfly configur'd, and diverfly mov'd \ therefore they are perfwaded, that Extenfion is the Eflence of Matter.
But as no Man can infallibly demonftrate there is not fome Intelligence, or New-created En- tity in the Wheels of a Watch •, fo no Man can, without a particular Revelation, beaffur'das of a Geometrical Demonstration, that there is nothing but Extenfion diverfly configur'd in a Stone. For 'tis abfolutely poffible for Extention to be joyn'd with fomething which we don't conceive, becaufe we have no Idea of it: though it feems very unreafonable to believe and aflert it, it being contrary to Reafon, to aflert what we neither know, nor have any con- ception of.
Yet though we fhould fuppofe, That there were fomething befides Extenfion in Matter, yet that would be no Impediment, if we well obferve it, why Extenfion fhould not be its Eflence, according to the Definition we have given of theWord. For, in fhort, 'tis abfolutely necef- fary that every thing in the World,fhould be either a Being,or a Mode of being; and no Think- ing and Attentive Man can deny it. But Extenfion is no} the Mode of a Being •, therefore it is a Being. But becaufe Matter is not constituted of feveral Beings, as Man, who is compos'd of a Body and Mind j Matter being one fimple Being, it is manifest that Matter is nothing but Extenfion.
Now to prove that Extenfion is not a Mode of Being, but a real Being; it rauft be obferv'd, That a Mode of Being cannot be conceiv'd, but the Being muft at the fame time be conceiv'd whereof it is the Mode: We cannot conceive Rotundity, for Instance, but we muft: conceive Extenfion, becaufe the Mode of Being or Exiftence, being only the Being it felf in fuch a fort of ftate, (the Roundnefs of tbe Wax, for Inftance, being^ but the Wax it felf, in fuch a fort or fafhion ); it is plain that we cannot conceive the Mode without the Being. If then Ex- tenfion were a Mode of Being, we could not conceive Extenfion without the Being, whereof Extenfion was the Mode: whereas we eafily conceive Extenfion all alone. Wherefore it is not a Mode of Being: but confequently a Being of it felf. And fo it is the Eflence of Matter, iince Matter is but a fimple Being, and not compos'd of many Beings: as I have already faid.
But many Philofophers have fo accuftom'd themfelves to general Idea's, and Logical Entities as to have their Mind more poflefs'd with them, than thofe that are distinct, particular, and Thyfical. Which is evident enough from hence, that their Argumentations upon Natural things, are founded merely on Logical Notions j fuch as Ad, Power, and an infinite number of Imaginary Entities, which they take no care to diftinguifh, from fuch as are Real. Thefe Gentlemen therefore finding it wonderful eafie, to fee after their manner what they have a Mind to fee, imagine they have better Eyes than other Men, and that they perceive diftinftly Extenfion fuppofes fomething elfe j and that 'tis only a Property of Matter, which Matter may be diverted of, as of the reft.
Yet if you make a Demand of them, that they would pleafe to explain that thing which they pretend to perceive in Matter, befides Extenfion -0 they offer to do it feveral ways, every of which makes it apparent, that they have no other Idea of it than that of Being, or of Subftance in general. This is extreamly evident, if we take notice, That this their Idea in- cludes no particular Attributes, which agree to Matter. For whilst we take Extenfion from Matter, we rob it of all the Attributes and Properties, which we diftin&ly conceive do belong to it} and though we leave that imaginary thing, which they fuppofe the Eflence of it; it being manifest, that neither Earth nor Heaven, nor any thing we fee in Nature, could be made of it. Whereas on the contrary, if we take away what they fancy, the Effence of Matter, pro- vided we leave Extenfion, and we leave all the Attributes and Properties we dilliudly con- ceive, included in the Idea of Matter: For it is certain, that out of Extenfion all alone might be fram'd an Heaven, an Earth, and all the Vifible World, and infinite others. So this Some- thing which they fuppofe over and above Extenfion, having no Attributes difiinftly to be conceiv'd belonging to it, and clearly included in the Idea we have of it, can have nothing real in it, if we will credit our Reafon; nor can be of. any ufe in explaining Natural Effe&s. And that which is faid of its being the Subjeft and Principle of Extenfion, is faid gratis^ and without any distinct Conception in them that fay it; that is, they have no other than a Ge- neral and Logical Idea of it, as of Subjetl and Principle: In fo much that we may further ima- gine anew Subject, and a new Principle of this Subject of Extenfion; and fo in infinitum, the Mind having the Power of reprefenting the General Idea's of Subject and Principle, as long as it pleafes.
'Tfs Chap. VIII. The Search after Truth. ta7 'Tis true there is a great probability, that Men had not fo puzzl'd and obfeur'd the Idea that ' they have of Matter, had they not fome Reafons for it; and that there are many who main- tain contrary Conclufions to thefe of ours, upon Theological Principles. Doubtlefs Extenfion is not the EfTence of Matter, if that be contrary to our Faith: And we willingly acknowledge it. We are, thank GOD, very well perfwaded of the Feeblenefs, and Limitednefs of an Hu- mane Mind. We know it is of too little Extent to meafure an Infinite Power j that GOti can do in finitely more than we can conceive; that he communicates only thofe Idea's, which reprefentto us the things that arrive by the order of Nature, and hides the reft from us. Wherefore we are always ready to fubmit our Reafon unto Faith; but there is need of better proofs than are generally urg'd, to ruin the Reafons we have eftablilh'd: Becaufe the man- ner of explaining the Myfteries of Faith, are not of Faith, and we believe thefe Myfteries, without conceiving how the manner of them can bediftindtly explaind.
We believe, for inftarice, theMyftery of the T R INITY, though £the Humane Mind is unable to conceive it; and yet we ceafe not to believe, that the things that differ not in any third, differ not in themfelves: though this Propofition feems to overthrow it. For we are convine'd, that Reafon is not to be madeufeof, except in Subjects proportion^ to its Capa- city; and that we ought not to look fteadfaftly on our Myfteries, for fear of being dazel'd by them, according that Admonition of the Holy Spirit, Qui femtator eft Majeftatisopprimettir a rrloria.
However, if we thought it convenient for the fatisfadtion of fome Men's Minds to explain how our Notion upon this matter may be reconcifd, with what we are taught by Faith con- cerning Tranfubfiantiation; we probably could do it in a way very diftinft, and perfpicuous and could no ways offend again ft the Decifions of the Church: But we think this Explication may be difpens'd with, efpecially in this Work.
For it ought to beobferv'd, That the Holy Fathers have almoft always look'd upon it as an incomprehenfible Myftery:, and that they never play'd the Philofophers to explain it: but con- tented themfelves for the moft part with unexaft Comparifons, fitter to make known the Do- ctrine than to give a Satisfaftory Explication to the Mind: Therefore Tradition is forfuch as Philofophize not on this Myftery, and who fumit their Reafon to the Rule of Faith, with- out diftra&ing their Brain to no purpofe, about moft abftrufe and difficult Queftions.
We lhould be to blame, Ihould we require the Philofophers, to give us clear and eafie Explications of the manner of our LO R JD's Body being in the Eucharifi; for this would be to demand of them novelties in Divinity. And in cafe the Philofophers mould make an im- pudent Anfwer to the Demand, they muft be necelfarily obnoxious either to the having their Philofophy or Divinity condemn'd. For if their Explications were obfeure, they would give reafon to defpife the Principles of their Philofophy; if their Anfwer were eafie and appa- rent we fhould have reafon to be apprehenfive of Novelty in their Divinity.
Since then Novelty in point of Divinity, bears thelmprefs and Chara&er of Error, and the World has a right and priviledge of defpifing Opinions merely on the Account of their being Novel, and having no foundation in Tradition; we ought not to undertake to give eafie and intelligible Explications of thofe things, which the Fathers andCouncels, have not perfectly explain'd: and 'tis fufheient to hold the Doftrine of Tranfibftamiation, without offering to make out the manner of it. For otherwife we might low the feeds for frefh Difputes, and Quarrels, whereof there are too many already; and the Enemies of the Truth would not fail to ufe them to malicious purpofe, and for theoppreffmg of their Ad verfaries.
Difputes in point of Theological Explications, feem to be the moft ufelefs and moft dange- rous of any; and they are with greater reafon to be fear'd •, for that even Religious Perions often fancy they have aright of breaking theirCharity withfuch as break with their Opinions. We have but too common Experience of this Practice; and the caufe of it lies not very deep. Wherefore 'tis always the belt and fureft way, not to be eager to fpeak of things whereof we have no Evidence, and which others are not difpos'd to conceive.
Nor ought obfeure and uncertain Explications of Myfteries of Faith, which we are under no obligation to believe, to ferve for a Rule and Principle for the guiding our Reafonings in Philofophy, where nothing but Evidence ought to perfwade us. We are not to change the clear and diftinft Idea's of Extenfion, figure, and Local Motion, for the general and con- fus'd Idea's of Principle, or of fubjedt of Extenfion, of Form of Quiddities, and Real Qua- lities, and of all thofe Motions of Generation, Corruption, and Alteration, and others which differ from Local Motion. Real Idea's will produce real Science: but from general and Logical Idea's, can proceed nothing, but a random fuperficial and a barren Science. Wherefore we ought with ferious Refieftion to attend to the diftinft and particular Idea's of things, for the difcovering the Properties they contain •, and thereby ftudy Nature inftead of lofmg our felves in theie Chimera's, which are only the litter or off-fpring of fome Philofo- pher's Brains.