I. Tta lafl general Caufe of our Errors. II. TW ffc* Tfa'j of things are not always prefent to the Mind^ when we would have them. III. 77wf <?wry finite Mind is fubjeSi to Error ^ and why. IV. That we ought not to judge that there Is nothing but Body and Spirit: Nor that GOT) is a Spirit, according to our conception of Spirits.
j. "17C7Ehave hitherto treated of fuch Errors, as may have fome occafional Caufe affigned Tbehn VV in the Nature of the pure Intellect, or of the Mind, confider'das acting by itfelf: general and in the nature of Idea's j that is to fay, in the manner of the Mind's perceiving exter- Caufe of naj objects. There remains only one Caufe now to be explain'd, which may be term'd the w Errors. unjverfaj an^ general Caufe of our Errors •, becaufe we can conceive no Error, that has not fome fort of dependance on it. The Caufe is this: That Nothing having no Idea to reprefent it, the Mind is carried to believe that the things whereof it has no Idea, have no Exiftence.
'Tis certain that the general Source of our Errors, as we have often faid, is our Judg- ment's having greater extent and latitude, than our Perceptions. For when we confider any Object, we commonly take the profpect but on one fide of it \ but we are not content to judge only of that fide we have confider'd, but we pronounce of it all entire: And fo it often for- tunes that we are-deceiv'd; for though the thing be true on the part we have Examin'd, it is commonly falfe on the other we have not; and what we believe true, is no more than pro- bable. Now 'tis manifeft that we fhould not judge thus abfolutely on things as we do, did we not think we had confider'd all the parts of them, or fuppofe them all like that which we have examin'd. So the general Caufe of our Errors lies in this, that having no Idea of the other Faces of the Object, or of their difference with that which is prefent to our Thoughts, we believe thofe other Faces don't exift j or at leaffc we fuppofe they have no particular dif- ference.
This manner of adding we think reafonable enough: For fince Nothing cannot form any Idea in the Mind, we have fome pretence to believe that the things, that form no Idea in the Mind, at the time of our Examining them, refemble Nothing: And that which confirms us in this Opinion, is our being perfwaded by a fort of Inftind, that the Idea's of things are due to our Nature, and are in fuch wife fubje&ed to the Mind, that they are oblig'd to pay their attendance, when the Mind commands them. II. However, if we would make a little Reflection upon the prefent ftate of our Nature, we that the fhould hardly be fo ftrongly bent upon believing all the Idea's of things, fo much at our idea's of |,eck an(j command. Man, as I may fay, is only Flefh and Blood, fince Adam's Tranfgref- liotfiways *i°n *• Tne *eaft impreffion of his Senfes and his Paffions interrupts the ftrongeft Appli- frefem to cation of his Mind: and the current of the Spirits and Blood, hurry it along with them, and the Mind, drive it continually upon fenfible Objects. In vain it ftrives to withftand the Torrent it is car- v,hen we ried by, and rarely it is, that it thinks of refilling it 5 fo pleafant it finds it to follow, and fo 7km troublefome to ftruggle againft the flream. The Mind therefore is difcourag'd and dejected as foon as it has made an attempt to hold, and fix it felf upon a Truth } and 'tis abfolutely falfe in the ftate we are in, that the Idea's of things are prefent to the Mind, as often as we would confider them: And therefore we ought not to judge that things are not in being, up- on the only fcore of our having no Idea's of them.
But though we fhould fuppofe Man abfolute Mafter of his Mind, and its Idea's, yet he would JP?", ftill be fubjed to Error, by the neceflity of his Nature. For the Mind of Man is limited, and riiuMwd every limited Mind is by Nature liable to Error. The reafon.w hereof is this, that the leaft it fuh)e£t things have Infinite Relations betwixt them, and require an Infinite Mind to comprehend to Error, them. And therefore a limited Mind being unable to embrace, and comprehend all thefe Re- lations, after all that ever it can do, a Man's inclin'd to believe, that thofe which he does not perceive, don't exift:, efpecially when he does not confider the Weaknefsand Limitation of his Mind, as 'tis cuftomary for him not to do. And thus the Finitenefs of the Mind alone* brings along with it the Capacity of falling into Error.
Notwithftanding, if Men even in this their ftate of Infirmity and Corruption, made always good ufe of their Liberty, they would never bedeceiv'd. And for this reafon, every one, that falls into Error, is juftly blameable, and defervedly obnoxious to punifhment: For no more is requifite for the avoiding Error, than to judge only of what a Man fees, and not to form compleat judgments on things, before he is afTur'd he has examin'd them in all their parts: and this is poffible for Men to do. But they had rather fubjugate themfelves to Error, than conform to the Rule of Truth •, and love to arbitrate without the trouble of Enquiry.- And fo we need not wonder if they are guilty of infinite Errors, and frequently Hand chargeable • with uncertain and unwarrantable Judgments.
All Chap. IX. The Search after Truth. 139 All the Idea's, for inftance, that Men have of Subftance, are thofe of Spirit and of Body, Iv- that is of a thinking, and extended Su bftance: and thereupon they take upon them to deter- ^ ™jhtg mine, that whatever exifts, is either of Body or Spirit. This is not faid, as if Iprefum'd to t[,J$erf affirm there were any Subftance, neither Body nor Spirit: it being too hazardous to main- ^ no crea. tain thofe things exift whereof we have no Idea \ fince 'tis fuppos'd that GOD, who conceals ted Being not his Works from us, would have given us fome Idea of them. Yet I think we ought to de- bfldes, Bo° terminc nothing concerning the number of the kinds of Beings which GOD has created, fit: nor from the Idea's we have of them: Since abfolutely fpeaking, there may be Reafons why GOD that GOD mould conceal them from us, if it were only that thefe Beings having no Relation to us, the U a. spirit. Knowledge of them would be of little ufe to us: as he has not given us Eyes acute enough to according reckon the Teeth of an Hand- worm, fince 'twould be ufelefs to the Prefervation of our Body, l°eI^oncg0f' to have fo penetrating an Eye-fight. L • spirits/ But though we do not think it fit to judge haftilyand raflily, that all Being is divided into Spirit and Body j yet we think it iuconfiftent with Reafbn for Philofbphers, in explaining Natural Efrefts, to ufe other Idea's than thofe that depend on Thought and Ext enfwn: thefe in Effect, being the only diftinct or particular that we have.
There is nothing more Unphilofophical and Irrational, than to imagine vaft numbers of Beings from fimple Logical Idea's; to bellow on them infinite properties •, and fo to go about explaining things, which no body underftands, by things which not only no body conceives, but which indeed are impoffible to be conceived. This is to take the fame courfe that Blind Men would do, when intending to difcourfe of Colours, and maintain the Thefes that concern them, they fhould make ufe of the Definitions they receive from the Philofophers, and thence make their Inferences and Gonclufions. For as thefe blind Men's Arguings and Difputes about Colours, muft needs be pleafant and ridiculous enough, fince they could have no di- ftinct Idea's of the Subjects in Queftion, and would only argue from general and Logical Idea's. So the Philofophers can never reafon juflly andfolidly upon the Effeds of Nature, when they only employ general and Logical Idea's, as of Aft, Power, Being, Caufe, Prin- ciple, Form, Quality, and others of like Nature, It is abfolutely neceffary for them to ground their Difputes and Reafonings only upon thediftinft and particular Idea's of Thought and Extenfion, and thofe which arecontain'd in them, as Figure, Motion, &c. For we can never expect to arrive to the Knowledge of Nature, but by the Confideration of the diftindt Idea's we have of it: and 'tis better not to meditate at all, than to throw our Meditation away upon Whim Hes and Chimera's.
We ought not however to affert that there is nothing but Spirit and Body, Thinking and Extended Beings in Nature, fince 'tis impoffible for us to be miftaken. For though thefe are fufficient tor the Explication of Nature, and confequently we may conclude without danger of erring, That all Natural things, as far as our Knowledge goes, depend upon Extenfion and Thought j yet abfolutely fpeaking, its not impoffible but there may be others, whereof we have no Idea, nor fee any Effect.
Men are therefore too rafh and precipitate in judging, as an indifputable Principle, that all Subftance is diftinguiftVd into Body and Spirit. But they thence infer a rafh and unadvis'd conclufion, when they determine by thefole light of Reafon, that GQD is a Spirit, 'tis true, that fince we are created after His Image and Similitude, and we are taught from feveral pla- ces of the Holy Scripture,, that GOD is a Spirit^ we ought to believe and call Him fo: But Reafon all alone can never teach us fo much. It only tells us that GOD is a Being infinitely perfect; and that he ought rather to be a Spirit than a Body, fince our Soul is more per- fect than our Body 5, but it cannot allure us, there are not ftill other Beings more perfect than thofe Spirits within us, and rang'd in an higher order above them, than our Minds are above our Bodies.
But fuppofing there were fuch Beings as thefe, (as Reafon makes it unqueftionable that GOD was able to create them) 'tis evident they would have a nearer refemblance to their Maker than our felves: And fo the fame Reafon informs us, that GOD would rather have their Perfections than ours -0 which would be reckon'd but imperfections in comparifon with them. We ought not therefore precipitately to imagine that the word S^wVzV, which we indiffe- rently ufe to fignifie what GOD is, and what we are our felves, is an univocal Term, ex- preffing the fame things, or very like. G O D is farther exalted above Created Spirits, than thefe Spirits are elevated above Bodies; and we ought not to term GOD a Spirit fo much for a pofitive Declaration of what He is, as to fignifie He is not material. He is an infinitely perfect Being, no Man can doubt of it: But as we are not to imagine with the An- thropomorphitss, that he ought to have an Humane fhape; becaufe that Figure feems the moft perfect, though we fhould fuppofe Him Corporeal, fo we ought not to think that the Spirit of G O D has Humane Thoughts, and that his mind is like our own, becaufe we know no- thing perfe&er than our own Mind. 'Tis rather to be believ'd, that as he includes in Himfelf the Perfections of Matter, without being material: (for 'tis certain that Matter has a Relation to fome Perfection that is in God) fo He comprehends the Perfections of created Spi- rits, without being a Spirit, after our manner of conceiving Spirits -0 that his true Name is HE THAT IS; that is, being without reftriction, all Being, being Infinite and Univer- fal LI CHAP, i go F. Ma^e bran Che Concerning Book III.
CHAP. I a So/fle Inftahces of Errors in Phyficks, wherein Men are engagd by fup- pofing that the things which differ in their Nature^ their Qualities^ Ex- tenfion, Vuration^and Proportion^ are alike in thtfe things.
IT has been fhewn in the Fore-going Chapter, That Men make a rafh Judgment in con- cluding all Beings tinder two Heads, either of Body or Spirit; we will make it appear in the fucceeding Chapters, that they not only make rafli Judgments, but falfe too; and which are the fruitful Principles of innumerable Errors, when they judge that Beings are not different in their Relations and Modes, becaufe they have no Idea of thefe Differences.
'Tis certain that the Mind of Man fearches only after the Relations of things: Firfl thofe which the Objeds, it confiders, have to it felf, and then thofe which they have with one an- other. For Man's Mind is inquifitive only after its Good and Truth. For the finding out its Good, it confiders carefully by Reafon, and by Tafte or Senfation, whether the Objects have any Relation of Agreement with it felf. For the difcovering Truth, it confiders whe- ther the Objeds have any Relation of Equality or Similitude, to each other, or what precifely is the Quantity that is equal to their Inequality. For as Good is not the Good of the Mind any farther than it is agreeable to it: fo Truth is not Truth, but by the Relation of Equality or Refemblance, which is found betwixt two things, or more: whether this Relation be between two or more Objeds \ as between an Ell, and a Piece of Cloth: For 'tis true that this is an Etl of Cloth, becaufe of the Equality between the Ell and the Cloth: whether it be between two or more Idea's, as between the two Idea's of Three and Three, and that of Six: for 'tis true that Three and Three are Six, becaufe of the Equality between the two Idea's of Three and Three, and the Idea of Six: Or whether laftly, it be between Idea's and Things, when the Idea's reprefent what the Things are. For when I fay, There is a Sun, my Propofition is true, becaufe the Idea's I have of Exiftence, and of the San, reprefent that the Sun exifts, and that*1 it truly exifts. Every Adion of the Mind about, and every Attention to Objeds, is only then to try to difcover their Relations, fince we apply our felves to the confideration fllttngs, only for the finding out the Truth or Goodnefs of them.
But as we have faid before in the preceding Chapter, Attention tires and difpirits the MinU;, fo that it fpeedily defifts to oppugn and bear againft the 'Impreffion of the Senfes, that throws it off* its Objed, and hurries it towards others, which the love it has to its Body, render grateful and agreeable. It has but a ftraitned Capacity, and fo the differences which are be- tween the Subjects it examines being infinite, or almoft fo, it is incapable of diftinguifhing them. Wherefore the Mind fuppofes imaginary Refemblances, where it obferves no Posi- tive and Real Differences; the Idea's of Refemblance being more prefent to it, more fami- liar and more fimple than the other. For 'tis manifeft that Similitude includes only one Relation, and there is need only of one Idea, to judge that a thoufand things are like; whereas to judge without fear of being miftaken, that a thoufand Objeds differ with one an- other, there is an abfolute Neceffity of having a thoufand different Idea's prefent to the Mind.
Men therefore imagine things of a different Nature, to be of the fame, and that all things of the fame Species, hardly differ from one another. They judge that unequal things, are equal; that thofe which are inconftant, are conftant; that fuch as are without Order or Pro- portion, are beft order'd, and molt proportionate. In a word, they believe often that things different in Nature, in Quality, Extenfion, Duration, and Proportion, are alike in all thefe particulars: But this deferves to be explain'd more at large by fome Examples, as being the the Caufe of an infinite number of Errors.
Spirit and Body, a Subftance that Thinks, and a Subftance that's Extended, are two kinds of Being altogether different, and intirely oppofite: what belongs to one, can't appertain to the other: Yet Men for the raoft part but little heeding the Idea they have of Thought, and being continually mov'd and affeded with Bodies, have look'd upon the Soul and Body, as only one and the fame thing; have imagin'd a Similitude between things, fo unlike in every refped. They would have the Soul to be material •, that is to fay, extended over all the Body, and figur'd as the Body. And thus have attributed to the Mind, what can belong to nothing but the Body.
Again, Men having the Senfation of Pleafure, Pain, Smells, Tafts, &c. and their Body be- ing more prefent to them, than their Soul; (that is, they ealily imagine their Body, but are «ot able to imagine the Soul,) they attribute to it the Faculties of Senfation, Imagination, and Chap. X. The Search after Truth., j 3 and fometimes give it that of Conception too:, which can belong to nothing but the Soul., But the following Examples will be more fenfible and manifeft.
Tis certain that all Natural Bodies, even thofe that are rank'd under the fame Species, difrct from one another: that one piece of Gold is not altogether like another piece, that one drop of Water is different from another drop. 'Tis with all Bodies of the fame Species, as 'tis with Faces: All Faces have two Eyes, a Nfofe, a Mouth, &c. they are all Faces, and Hu- mane Faces; yet it may be affirm'd there never were two perfectly fimilar. So one piece of Gold has parts extreamly like another piece ^ and one drop of Water has undoubtedly a near refemblance to another, yet we may be certify'd that two drops of Water cannot be given though taken from the fame River, in an exaa refemblance. Neverthelefs, the Philofophers. inconliderately fuppofe Eflential Likeneffes between Bodies of the fame Species, or Likeneffes that confift in IndivifibUi: For the Elfences of things center in an indivillble Point, "according to their falfe Opinion.
The Reafon of their lapfing into fo grofs and palpable an Error, is becaufe they will not with any care confider thofe very things, on wich thy compofe huge and mighty Volumes. ~ For as we don't fancy a perfect Similitude in Faces, becaufe we fcrupuloufly behold them, and furvey them clofely; and the cuftom we have taken of diftinguifhing them, makes us obferve the leaft differences.• So if the Philofophers confider'd Nature with attention, they would acknowledge fufficient caufes of diverfities, even in thofe things which produce the fame Sen- fetions, and which for that Reafon we afcribe to the fame Species; and would not fo credu- loufly fuppofe Eflential Refemblances. Blind Men would be to blame to fuppofe Eflential Similitudes confiding in IndivifibUi between Faces, becaufe they did not fenflbly perceive the differences: And Philofophers have no more reafon to fuppofe fuch Similitudes in Bo- dies of the fame Species, becaufe they difcover no differences in them by the Senfations they have of them.
The Inclination we have for fuppofing a Likenefs in things inclines us farther to believe there is a fet and determinate number of Differences, and Forms; and that thefe Forms are fix'd to a Point, and incapable of Latitude, more or left. We think that all Bodies differ from each other as in Degrees and that thefe Degrees, alfo retain certain Proportions together. In a word, we judge of Material things as of Numbers.
Tis' clearly manifeft, that this proceeds from the Mind's lofing it felfin the Relations of things incommenfurable, as are the infinite Differences to be met with in Natural Bodies, and its folacing it felf with the Imagination of any Refemblance or Proportion it can find be- tween them; becaufe then it can reprefent many things at once with much readinefs, and eafe. For, as I have already faid, there needs no more than one Idea to judge that many things are like, but there muft be many to judge they are unlike each other. If a Man knew, for inftance, the number of Angels; and that for each Angel there were ten Arch- Angels; and for every Arch- Angel ten Thrones -, andfo on, obferving the fame Proportion in the pro- greflionupto the higheft Order of Intelligences: the Mind might know when it pleas'd the number of all thefe Bleffed Spirits, and even by a good ftrong reflection, determine of them almoft at a fingle view^ which is infinitely delightful to it. And this is what may have in- duc'd fome Perfons to judge thus of Celeftial Spirits; as fome Philofophers have done in an- other cafe, of the Gravitation and Levitation of the Elements, making a Decuple Propor- tion between them, fuppofing Fire ten times lighter than Air; and fo of the reft.
When the Mind finds a neceflity of admitting Differences between Bodies, by the diffe- rent Senfations it has of them, and for fome other particular Reafons; itisfureto allow as little as poflibly it can. 'Tis upon this account it is eafily perfwaded, that the Eflences of things are in IndivifibUi, and that they are like Numbers, as we have faid before; for that then it requires only one Idea to reprefent all the Bodies that go under- the name of the fame Species.
If you put, for example, a Glafs of Water into an Hoglhead of Wine, the Philofophers will tell you, the Ellence of Wine ftill remains the fame, and the Water is converted into Wine. That as no number can intervene between three and four, fince a true Unity is indivifible, fo 'tis neceffary the Water fhould be converted into the Effence or Nature of the Wine, or that the Wine fhould lofe its own: That as all Numbers of Four are perfectly alike, fo the Effence of Water is exadly the fame in all Waters. That as the Number Three Eflentially differs from the Number Two, and cannot have the fame Properties; fo two Bodies differ- ing in Specie, differ Eflentially, and in fuch wife, as they can never have the fame Properties which flow from the Effence; and fuch like things as thefe: Whereas if Men confider'd the true Idea's of things any thing attentively, they would not be long a difcovering, that all Bodies being extended; their Nature or EfTence has nothing in't like Numbers, and that 'tis impoflible for it to confift in IndivifibUi.
But Men not only fuppofe Identity, Similitude, or Proportion in the Nature, the Number, and eflential Differences of Subftances, but in every thing that comes under their Perception. Moft Men conclude that all the fix'd Stars, are faftned as fo many Nails in the mighty Vault of Heaven, in an equal diftance and convexity from the Earth. The Afironomers have for a long time given out, that the Plants rowl in exact Circles 3 whereof they haye invented a plentia plentiful number, as Concentric, Excmtric, Epicycles, Deferent; and Equant, to explain the Phenomena that contradict their Prejudice.
'Tis true, in the laft Ages, the more Ingenious have corrected the Errors of the Ancients, and believe that the Planets defcribe Ellipfes, by their Motion. But if they would have us be- lieve that thefe Ellipfes are regular, as we are eafily inclin'd to do; (becaufe the Mind fuppofes Regularity, where it perceives no Irregularity) they fall into an Error fo much harder to be corrected, as the Obfervations that can be made upon the Courfe of the Planets, want ExadV nefs and Juftnefs, to fhew the Irregularity of their Motions: which Error nothing but Phyfi&h can remedy •, as being infinitely lefs obfervable, than that which occurs in the Syfteme of exact Circles.
But theje is one thing of more particular occurrence, relating to the Diftance and Motion of the Planets; which is, that the Afircnomers not being able to difcover an Arithmetical or Geometrical Proportion, that being manifeftly repugnant to their Obfervations, fome of them have imagin'd they obferv'd a kind of Proportion, which they term Harmcnical, in their Diftances and Motions. Hence it was that an Aftronomer of this Age, in his New Almagiftus, Iticcioli begins a Section intitul'd, De_Syftemate Mundi Barmonico, with thefe words-, There is no Man 2. Vol. that's never fo little -versed in Aftronomy, but must acknowledge a kind of Hai mony in the motion Nemo eft m^ intervals of the Planets, if he attentively confiders the Order of the Heavens. Not that paulo eru- ^ was Qf ^^ Qpjnion. for fhe Obfervations that have been made, gave him fu/ficiently to jiftrono- underftand the extravagance of that imaginary Harmony, which has yet been the Admiramicinqai tion of many Authors Ancient and Modern; whofe Opinions are related and refuted by Fa- Ccelorum ther Riccioli. It is attributed likewife to Pythagoras and his Followers, to have believ'd, That ordmem ^q Heavens by their Regular Motions, made a wonderful Melody, which Men could not platuTnon near-» ^Y rea*°n of their being us'd to it: As thofe, fays he, that dwell near the Catara&s of agnofc'at the Waters of Nile, hear not the noife of them. But I only bring this particular Opi- Harmoni- nion of the Harmonical Proportion between the Diftances and Motions of the Planets, to am quan- fnew that the Mind is fond of Proportions, and that it often imagines them where they are dam in.
Planeta- **^* mm inter- The Mind alfo fuppofes Uniformity in the Duration of things, and imagines they are not vallis & liable to Change, and Inftability; when it is not as.it were forc'd by the Teftimonies and re- motibus. port of Sence, to judge otherwise.
All Material things being extended, are capable of Divifion, and confequently of Corru- ption. And every one that makes never fo little reflection on the Natui'e of Bodies, muft fen- fibly perceive their Corruptibility. And yet there have been a multitude of Philofophers who believ'd the Heavens, though Material, were Incorruptible.