manner; fo that they are properly Modifications of the Soul. Let me then take leave to name them fo, in order to explain my felf.
Thefirft, and principal Agreement, or Refemblance, that is found betwixt the Faculty which Matter has of receiving different Figures, and different Configurations; and that which the Soul has of receiving different Idea's, and different Modifications is this, That as the Faculty of re- ceiving different Figures, and different Configurations in Bodies, is intirely paffive, and contains nothing at all of Aftion, fo the Faculty of receiving different Idea's, and different Modifications in the Mind, is altogether paffive and includes no A&ion at all. I call that Faculty or Capacity, the Soul has of receiving all thefe things, the UNDERSTANDING.
Whence we ought to conclude, That 'tis the Vnderfianding which perceives; fince'tis only its. bufinefs to receive the Idea's of Objefts: For, for the Soul to perceive an Object, and to receive the Idea which reprefents it, is one and the fame thing: 'Tis alfo the Vnderfianding which per- ceives the Modifications of the Soul, fince I mean by this word Vnderfianding, that paffive Faculty of the Soul, by means of which it receives all the different Modifications it is capable of. For it is the fame thing for the Soul to receive a mode of exiftence, which we call fain, as to perceive Pain, fince it has no other way of receiving Pain, than by the Perception of it; whence it may be mferr'd, that 'tis the Vnderfianding that imagines the Objedts that are abfent, and is fenfible of thofe that are prefent; and that the Senfes and Imagination, are nothing but the Vnderfianding, perceiving Ob- jects by the Organs of the Body, as fhall be explain'd hereafter.
But becaufe in the Senfation of Pain, or any thing elfe, Men generally perceive it by the media- tion of the Organs of Senfe; they cuftomarily fay they are the Senfes which perceive it, without knowing diftin&ly what it is they mean by the word Senfe: They fancy there is fome Faculty di- itinct from the Soul, which renders It, or the Body capable of Senfation, as believing the Organs of Senfe do really participate of our Perceptions. They imagine the Body is fo affiftant to the Mind, in its Senfations, that if the Mind was feparate from the Body, it could have no Senfation at all. But thefe thoughts are the effefts of Prejudice; and becaufe in the State we are in, we are fenfible of nothing but through the ufe of the Inftruments of Senfe, as fhall be lhewn elfewhere more at large. 'Tis by way of accommodating my felf to the ordinary way of Speaking that I fay, in the Procefs of my Difcourfe, the Senfes perceive; but by the word Senfe I mean nothing but that paffive Faculty of the Soul before-mention'd, that is, the Underftanding perceiving any thing, Chap. I. The Search after Truths 3 thing, onoccafion of what happens in the Organs of her Body, according to the Inftitution of Ma- ture, as (hall be explain'd in another place.
The other Refemblance between the paflive Faculty of the Soul, and that of Matter, is this* That as Matter receives no real alteration by the change which happens in its Figure; I mean, for inftance, that as Wax receives no confiderable change by becoming Round or Square; fo the Mind receives no change by the diverfity of Idea's it contains-, I would fay, the Mind receives no confi- derable change though it receives the Idea of a Square, or a Circle, in perceiving a Square, or a Circle.
Again, As it may be faid that Matter receives confiderable Changes, when it lofes the Configu- ration, peculiar to the parts of Wax, to take that which is proper to thofe of Fire and Smoak, when the Wax is chang'd into Fire and Smoak; fo it may be faid that the Soul undergoes very confide- rable Changes, when it alters its Modifications, and fuffers Pain after it has felt Pleafure. Whence we ought to conclude, That Idea's are to the Soul, in a manner what Figures are to Matter, and that Configurations are to Matter, almoft what Senfations are to the Soul.
There are ftill other Corrfepondencies betwixt the Figures and Configurations of Matter, and the Idea's and Modifications of the Mind; for Matter feems to be an Image, or Reprefentative of the Mind, I mean only that there are Properties in Matter which have fome mutual Refpe&s between them, not unlike thofe which we find between the Properties belonging to the Mind; though the Nature of the Mind is very different from that of Matter, as we fhall clearly fee in that which follows.
From what I have faid I would have it well remember'd, That byVnderfianding I mean that pajfive Faculty the Soul has of Perceiving, that is of receiving not only different Idea's, bat alfo an abundance of different Senfations, as Matter has a capacity of receiving all forts of external Figures, and internal Configurations.
The other Faculty of Matter is that of its being capable of receiving many Motions, and the Tj# other Faculty of the Soul is that Power it has of receiving many Inclinations. Let us make the Com- of the' m- parifon between them. ture and.
As the Author of Nature is the Univerfal Caufe of all thofe Motions which we find in Mat- F£ fe^Le-J, ter, fo alfo he is the general Caufe of all thofe natural Inclinations which are found in the Mind: andlfits* And as all Motions proceed in a right line, unlefs otherwife determin'd by the Rencounter, of Liberty* fome foreign and particular Caufes, which by their Oppofition, put them into a Circular courfe; fo all the Inclinations we receive from God, have a dired tendency, and could only aim at the pofleffion of Good and Truth, were there not fome extraneous caufe, which biafs'd that natural Imprejfion towards corrupt and mifchievous Ends: Now 'tis that foreign Caufe which is the caufe of all our Evils, and depraves all our Inclinations.
To underftand this rightly, we muff; know, there's a very confiderable difference, between the Imprejfion or Motion the Author of Nature produces in Matter, and the Imprejfion or Motion to- wards Good in general, wherewith the fame Author of Nature continually influences our Soul: For Matter is wholly inactive; it has no power of retarding, or flopping its Motion, or determining and turning it one way rather than another. Its Motion, as I have faid, proceeds always in a right line, and if at any time it is hindred, from continuing it in that manner, it defcribes the greateft circular Line it can, and confequently that which comes nearefl to a right, becaufe 'tis God that imprefTes its Motion, and rules its Determination. But 'tis not fo with the Will, which may in one fenfe be faid * to be A&ive, and to have a Power in it felf of giving a different Determination *seeth6 to the Inclination, or Impreffion it receives from God; for though it cannot flop this Impreflion, iUujirm-^ it may in one fenfe caufe a Deviation to what fide it pleafes, and thereby produce all thofe Difbr- ons. ders, which happen in its Inclinations, and all the Miferies which are the certain and neceflary Consequents of Sin.
So that by the Word WILL, I would be conceiv'd to defign, That natural Motion or Im- preffion which carries us towards Good univerfal, and undetermined. And by that of LIBERT Y, I mean nothing more than The Power the Mind has of turning that Imprejfion towards agreeable ObjeEls j and terminating our natural Inclinations upon fome particular ObjeEh, which before were loofe and undeter- mined, except towards general or univerfal Good; that is to fay, towards God, who is alone univerfal Good, fince 'tis he alone who comprehends in himfelf all Goods.
Whence it is eafie to difcover, That though our natural Inclinations are Voluntary, yet they are not Free with that Freedom of Indifference I am fpeaking of; which contains a Power of wil- ling or not willing, or rather of willing the contrary to what our natural Inclinations carry us. For though it is Voluntarily and Fi-eely that a Man loves Good in general; fince there is no Love but proceeds from the Will, and 'tis a contradi&ion, for the Will to fuffer violence or conftraint: However 'tis impoffible to Love it with that Freedom I have jufr. explain'd, fince 'tis not in the Power of. the Will not to wiffi to be Happy.
But it muff: be obferv'd, that the Mind confider'd under fb ftrong a bent towards Good in ge- neral, cannot determine its Motion towards a particular Good, unlefs the fame Mind, confider'd as fufceptible of Idea's, has knowledge of that particular Good -, I would fay, to make ufe of the ordinary terms, that the Will is a blind Power, that can make no advances to things but what are reprefented to it by the Vnderfianding; fo that the Will can not diverfly determine its Propenfity to Good, or over-rule the direct Bent of his natural Inclinations, but by * commanding the Vnder- 4 Sg& ^ ftanding to reprefent it to fome particular Objeft. The power then that the Will has of determi- lUuftra- ning its Inclinations, neceffarily contains an ability of applying the Uderftanding to the Objefts tions* which it likes. That F. Malebranche Concerning Book I.
That what I have faid concerning the Will, and Liberty maybe better underftood, I will make it familiar by an Inftance: A Man reprefents to himfelf an Honour or Preferment under the Notion or a Good, which he may hope for, and immediately his Will wills this Good: that is, the ImprefTion which is continually carrying the Soul towards Univerfal and undetermin'd Good, inclines it to- wards this Honour; But whereas this Honour is not the Univerfal Good, nor is confider'd by a clear anddiftinft view of the Mind, as Univerfal Good, ffbr the Mind can never fee clearly That which is not) thelmpreffion we have towards Univerfal Good is not ftoptby this particular- Good: The Mind has a tendency to go farther; it is not necelfarily and invincibly in Love with this Honour,but lsmtirely at its Choice and Liberty in this refpeft.Now its Liberty confifts in this that being not fully convmc'd that this Honour comprehends all the Good it is capable of Lovine' it may fufpend both its Judgment and its Love; and thereupon, as (hall be (hewn in the Third Book* may,through the Union it has with the Univerfal Being,or that Being which contains all Good think of other things, and eonfequently Love other Goods: Finally, it may compare all Goods' together, and love them according to that order, in the Proportion they are lovely, and refer them all to that one which contains all, and which alone is fit to fix bounds to our Love, as being the only one, that is capable of filling all the Capacity we have of Loving.
Almoft the fame thing may be faid of the Knowledge of Truth, as of the Love of Good. We Love the Knowledge of Truth, as the Injoyment of Good, through a natural Impreffion; and that Impreffion is no more invincible, than that which carries us towards Good; that which makes it fo, is only Evidence, or a perfed and intire Knowledge of the Object. And we have equal Liberty in our falfe Judgments as in our inordinate Afetlions, as (hall be made to appear in the next Chapter.
CHAP. II.
I. Of our Judgments, and Reafonings. IT. That they depend upon the Will. III. The Vfe which fiiould be made of its Liberty on their account. YV.Two general Rules for the avoiding Error and Sin. V. Some general Refle- ctions upon thofe Rules.
i.
i T might be readily inferred from what has been faid in the precedent Chapter, that the of our Underftanding never judges, (ince it goes no farther than Perception; or that the Judgment s Judgments an(l Reafonings which the Underftanding makes, are nothing but pure Perceptions: That '•ivd^ea- 'tis the Will alone which 'really judges, by acquiefcing in, and voluntarily refting upon, what j'onings. xh^ Underftanding reprefents: And thus it is the Will alone which leads us into Error: But this requires a larger Explication.
I fay then, there is no other difference on the part of the Underftanding, between a (imple Perception, a judgment, and a Reafoning, than that the Underftanding perceives a fimple thing, with- out relation to any thing whatfoever, by a fimple Perception; that it perceives the Relations be- tween two things or more, in its Judgments: And laftly, that it perceives the Relations, which are betwixt the Relations of things, in its Reafonings; wherefore all the Operations of the Under- ftanding, are nothing but pure Perceptions.
In Perceiving, for Example, twice 2, or 4, there is only a fimple Perception. In Judging that twice 2 are 4, or that twice 2 make not 5, the Underftanding only perceives the Relation of Equality found between twice 2 and 4; or the Relation of Inequality between twice 2 and 5- Thus the judgment, in point of the Underftanding, is only the Preception of the Relation which is found between mo things or more. But Reafoning is the Perception, not of the Relation which is found between two things or more, for that would be a Judgment; but, of the Relation which is found between two or more Relations of two or more Things. Thus when I infer that 4 being lefs than 5, twice 2 being equal to 4, are eonfequently lefs than 6, I not only Perceive the Relation of Ine- quality between 1 and 2, and 6, for that would be only a Judgment-, butthe Relation of Inequa- lity which is between the Relation of twice 2 and 4, and that Relation between 4 and 6, which is a Reafoning: The Underftanding then does only perceive, and 'tis the Will alone which judges and reafonshy voluntary refting upon what the Underftanding reprefents to it; as has been already faid. II. Notwithstanding, when things which come under our Confideration, are palpably Evident, our Tl.ii fitig- Confent feems to be no longer Voluntary, whence we are ready to believe that 'tis not our Will but TTaSm mx Vnderflanding that.judges thereof.
h'/end. up- But that we may be fenlible of our Error, we muft know that the things we confider never 01. ihiWill appear with that Convincing Evidence, till the Underftanding has throughly examin'd all their Parts and Relations neceffary to form a Judgment of them; whereupon it happens that the Will, which can will nothing without knowledge, can act no longeron the Underftanding; that is, cannot defire the Underftanding to reprefent fomething new in its Object, (ince it has already confider'd all the parts of it any ways relating to the queftion to be decided, it is therefore oblig'd Chap. II. The Search after Truth. 5 lig'd to reft upon what has been already reprefented, and ceafe from its Agitation and Calling about; 'tis this Acquiefcence of the Will which is properly i judgment or Reafoning. Thus be- caufe this Acquiefcence or Judgment is not left Free, when things ftrike us with that Evident Con- viction, we fanlie likewife that it is not Voluntary.
But as long as there is any Obfcurity in the Subject we confider, and we are not perfectly afflir'd, we have difcover'd all that's neceflaryto the Refolution of the Queftion, as it moft commonly happens in thofe which are abftrufe -and difficult, and include many Relations; we are free to deny our Confent, and the Will may ftill command the Vnderftanding, to apply it felf tpfomething ' new: Which makes us not fo averfe to believe that the Judgments we form on fuch kind of Subjects are Voluntary.
Howbeit, the generality of Philofophers fuppofe that even the Judgments we form upon things obfcure, are no ways Voluntary, and will have the Confent to Truth in general, to bean Action, of the Vnderftanding, which they call Affenfus, to diftinguilh it from the Confent to Good, which they attribute to the Will, and term Confenfus; but fee the caufe of their Diftindtion and Miftake.
Which is, That in this irate of Life, we often evidently perceive fonie Truths, without any realbn to Doubt of them •, and fo the Will remains not indifferent in the Confent it gives to Truths lb manifeft, as has been juft explain'd: But 'tis not fo in point of Good, there being no Particu- lar Good we know, but we have reafon to doubt, whether we ought to Love it. Our Paflions and Inclinations, which we naturally have for Senfible Pleafures, are, though confus'd, yet, through the Corruption of our Nature, very ftrong Reafons, which render us cold and indifferent even in the Love of God himfelf: And fo we are manifeftly fenfible of our Indifference, and are inward- ly convinc'd, we make ufe of our Liberty in our Loving GOD.
But we do not in like manner apprehend that we imploy our Liberty in Confenting to 'Truth, efpecially when accompanied with full Evidence and Convitlion; which induces us to believe our Confem to Truth is not Voluntary: As if it was neceflary our Actions fhould be indifferent to be* come Voluntary, and that the BlefTed did not love God molt Willingly, without being diverted from it by fomething or other; in like manner as we Confent to that evident Proportion that mice 2 are 4, without being diverted from the Belief of it by any (hew of a contrary Reafon.
But to the end we may diftindtly difcover, what the difference is between the Confent of the Will to Truth, and its Confent to Goodnef, it is requifiteto know the difference which is found between Truth and Goodnefs, taken in the ordinary acceptation, and with reference to us. That difference confifts in this, That we have an Intereft and Concern in Goodnefs, but Truth does not at all affect, us: For Truth confifts only in the Relation which two things or more have between them* but Goodnefs confifts in the Relation of agreement which things have with our felves, Gcometri- which is the reafon that the Will has but One Action in refpect of Truth, which is its Acquie- «<*»* love icence in, or Confent to, the Reprefentation of the Relation which is betwixt things; and that n.ot Truth> it hasraw in refpect of Goodnef, namely, its Acquiefcence in, or Confent to, the Relation of agree- ^llwkdg ment the thing has with our felves, and its Love or Tendency towards that thing, which actions of Truth, are extreamly different, though they are ufually confounded: For there is a great deal of diffe- tbo it be rence betwixt limply Acquiefcing, and being carried to love the thing which the Mind repre- otberwife fents, fince we often Acquiefce in things we could gladly wifh were not, and which we have an^' averfion to.
Now upon a due confideration of things, it will vifibly appear; That 'tis ever the Will which Acquiefces, not only in things if they be agreeable to it, but the Reprefentation of things; and that the reafon of the Will's Acquiefcing always in the Reprefentation of things of the cleareft Evidence, is, as we have already faid, becaufe there is no farther Relation in them neceflary to be confider'd, which the Vnderftanding has not already throughly difcufs'd: Infottiuch that 'tis, as it were, neceffary for the Will to leave off difquieting and tireing it felf in vain, and to reft fatis- fy'd in a full aflurance, that it is not deceived, fince there is nothing left, to put the Vnderftdriek ing upon a frefh Inquiry.
This is efpecially to be obferv'd, that in the Circumftances we are under, we have but a very imperfect Knowledge of things, and confequently there is an abfolute neceflity we fhould have this Liberty of Indifference whereby we are impower'd to withold our felVeS from giving our Confent.
For the better difcovering this Neceflity, it muft be confider'd, that we are carry'd by our Natural Inclinations to the im bracing Truth and Goodnef; fo that the Will, never reaching after things, but what the Mind has fome notice and apprehenfion of, muft needs purfue that which has the Face and Abearance of Truth arid Goodnef. But becaufe all that has the look of Truth and Good, is not always what it appears to be; it is plain that if the Will had not this Liberty, but muft infallibly and neceffarily have embrac'd every thing that came cloath'd with an Abea- rance of Truth and Goodnef, it would have almoft ever been Deceived. Whence probably it might be concluded, That the Author of its Being, was the Author of its Errors and Seducements. in.
We have therefore a Liberty given us by God, that we might avoid falling into Ejror, and all tvbat ufe the Evils confequent upon Errors, by not refting with a full Aflurance upon Probabilities, but-^°"w is only upon Truth; that is, by commanding the Mind, with an indefatigable Application, to Mrlihem examine every thing till it has fully enlightned and unravell'd all that comes under its Examina- tbatwene- tions. ' For Truth generally comes attended with Evidence, and Evidence confifts in a clear vermayte 6 K Male bran ch-e Concerning Book I; and diflinft View of all the Parts and Relations of the Object which are neceflary to give a cer- tain and well-grounded Judgment.
The ufe then we fhould make of our Liberty is to I M PLOY IT AS FAR AS IT WILL GO. That is, never to confent to any thing whatever until we are, as it were, forc'd ^o't, by the fecret Reproaches of our Reafon.
To lttbmit our felves to the falfe Appearance of Truth, is to inflave our felves contrary to the Will of God} but honeflly to yield to the inward Reproaches of our Reafon, which accom- pany the Denial of our Submiffion unto Evidence, is to obey the Voice of Eternal Truth, which fpeaks within us. Here then are Two Rules founded upon what I have been faying, which are the moll neceflary of all others, both for Speculative Sciences and Morality, and which may be look'd on as the Foundation of all Humane Sciences. IV* The First which refpecls the Sciences is this: A Manfiiould never give an entire Confent, but only General f0 propfttions which appear fo evidently true, that he cannot deny it them without feeling an internal Painy *E"voL-and the fecret Vpbraidings of his Reafon: that is, without being plainly convinc'd, he would make ing Error an ill life of his Liberty^ in cafe he mould refufe to give his Confent, or would extend its Power and. sin. over things where it has no Right, or Jurifdi&ion.
The Second relating to Morality is this* A Man ought never to fix his Love abfolutely on any Good, if he can without Remorfe refufe to Love it. From whence it follows, That nothing but God ought to be Loved abfolutely, and independently. For He alone it is, that we cannot forbear Loving in that Nature without an inward Remorfe,that is,without evident Convi&ion of doing Ill,upon Suppofition we have arriv'd to the Knowledge of Him, through the means of- Reafon or of Faith.
A necepry But it muft here be obferv'd, That when things which we perceive come recommended with inflexion ftrong Probability, we are extreamly ready to Believe them. We feel our felves in Pain, when °Fu!es tW° vve w*^ not fu^r Perfuafion to Break in upon us; infomuch that were we not very cautious,, we mould be in danger of Confenting to them, confequently of being Deceiv'd •, for 'tis a great Chance, whether Truth be found entirely to agree with the Probability. And for this Reafon, I haveexprefly put in the two Rules; That nothing fiwuld be confented to, without palpable Convittion, that Evil ufe would be made of a Marfs Liberty in not Confenting.
But though we find our felves moll readily inclin'd to Confent to a Probability, or a likelihood, - yet if we would be at the pains of making Reflexion, whether we perceive our felves evidently oblig'd to confent to it, we fhould doubtlefs find we were not. For if this likelihood be founded upon the Impreflions of our Senfes, (a likelihood by the way that very ill deferves the Name) a Man finds himfelf readily difpos'd to yield confent to it. But no other Caufe can be aflign'd for this, but fome Paflion or general Affection he has for that which affects or concerns the Senfes, as fhall be fufficiently Ihewn in the following Difcourfe. _ But if the likelihood proceeds from fome Conformity with Truth, as ordinarily Probable No- tices are True, taken in a certain Senfe; then if a Man examines his own Breafl, he will find himfelf inclin'd to do two things; The one is to Believe, and the other to make farther Inquiry Hill: But he will never find himfelf fo fully perfuaded, as to think he does evidently ill, if he does not Confent at all.
Now thefe two Inclinations, a Man has in refpect of Things Probable, are very Good. For He may and ought to give his Confent to Things Probable or Verifimilar taken in a Senfe which de- notes the Image of Truth; but he ought not however to yield an entire Confent, as we have precaution'd in the Rule; and he mull examine all the latent lides, and faces yet undifcover'd; fo as to enter fully into the Nature of the thing, and to diflinguifh what is True from what is Falfe, and then to give an entire Confent if the Evidence oblige him to it.
He muft then be well accuftom'd to diflinguifh Truth from Probability, by examining himfelf inwardly, as I have been Explaining: For 'tis for want of this Care of Examining a Man's felf in this Nature, that he perceives himfelf Touch'd and Affected almofl in the fame manner, by two different things; For, in fine, 'tis of thegreatefl Confequence to make a good ufe of this Liberty by perpetually bridling in our Confent, and Affection to things, till we find our felves, as it were, forc'd to let them go, by the Commanding Voice of the Author of Nature, which I call'd before the Reproaches of our Reafon, and the Remorfe of our Confciences.
All the Duties of Spiritual Beings, as well Angels as Men, confift principally in the good ufe of this Liberty; and we may fay, without any fcruple, That if they carefully Imploy their Li- berty, and not prepofleroufly render themfelves Haves to Lyes and Vanity, they are in the ready way to the greatefl Perfection they are naturally capable of; Provided, in the mean time, their Vnderftanding Hands not idle, and that they are careful continually to excite it to new Difcove- ries, and that they render themfelves difpos'd for the Reception of greater Truths, by perpetu- ally Meditating on Subjects worthy of their Attention.
For that the Mind may advance to its Perfe&ion, it will not fuffice a Man conflantly to make ufe of its Liberty, by Confenting to nothing at all; like thofe Men who take Pride in knowing nothing, in doubting and boggling at every thing in Nature: Nor on the other hand muft he Confent to all things like many Others, who fear nothing fo much as to be Ignorant of any thing, and pre- tend to Univerfal Knowledge. But he muft make fo good ufe of his Vnderftanding, by continual Meditations, as to find himfelf in a Capacity of being able to Confent to what it reprefents, with- out Fear or Danger of being Deceiv'd.
CHAP.
Chap. III. The Search after Truth j CHAP. IIL I; The Anfwers to feme Obje&ions. II. Objervations upon what has been faid concerning the Necejfity of Evidence* V"~ ""l I S no hard thing to forefee that the Pra&ice of the Firft Rule, which I have been treating of in the foregoing Chapter, will not go very well down with a great part M of Mankind; But efpecially with thofe Imaginary Philofophers, who pretend to the Knowledge of every thing, but really know nothing at all: Who pleafe themfelves in talking Pofitively upon the moft difficult Subje&s, and yet are certainly at the fame time Ignorant of the more Ordinary and Eafie.
I queftion not but they would be ready to fay with Ariflotle, That Abfblute Certainty is no It where to be fought for, but in the Ma.therha.tich; That Phyficks and Moral Philofophy are fuch Sci- The An* ences as take up with meer Probability. That Des-Cartes was very much out in his Delign dffeer to handling Phyficks like Geometry; and that for that Reafonhehad no better Succefs. That 'tis^^'e° not poffible for Men to arrive to the Knowledge of Nature, that her Secret Springs and Move- ments lie too deep to be pierc'd by an Humane Mind j with a great deal more of fuch fine Things as thefe, which they put off with Pomp and Oftentation, and which they fupport with the Au- thority of a vaft Flight of Authors, whofe Names they can repeat, and out of which they can quote a PafTage on Occaflon^ and this is fuificient for them to plume themfelves and look big upon.
I would heartily beg of thefe Gentlemen, they would leave off talking of thofe things which they themfelves acknowledge they do not Underftand, and would put a flop to the ridiculous Motives of their Vanity, by ceafing to compofe large Volumes on thofe Subje&s which-, by their own Confeffion, they Know nothing of