But I would have thofe Men ferioully examine, whether one of thefe two Things is not ab- folutely NecefTary, either to fall into Error, or never to give an entire Confent, except to things entirely Evident; Whether the Reafon that Geometry is ever attended with Truth, may not be afcrib'd to the Geometricians Obfervation of that Rule: And whether the Errors fome have fallen into touching the Quadrature of the Circle, the Duplication of the Cube, and fome other very difficult Problems, have not proceeded from an heady and conceited rafhnefs which has pof- fefs'd them with Likelihoods, and made them pafs for Truths.
Let them confider likewife on another hand, whether the Caufe of Error and Confufion's reigning fo much in the Ordinary Philofophy, may not be imputed to the Philofophers content- ing themfelves with Probability, very eafie and obvious to be met with, and highly advantagious to their Vain Humour and their Interefls? Do not we almoft every where find an infinite Diver- fity of Opinions upon the fame Subjects, and confequently infinite Errors? Notwithstanding a prodigious number of Difciples give way to their own Seducements, and fubmit themfelves blind-fold to the Authority of thefe Philofophers, without fo much as Underftanding what their Opinions are.
It is true there are fome of them that after twenty or thirty Years time loft, confefs they have learnt nothing by their Reading; but yet this their Confeffion is not fo Ingenuous as it fhould be. They think it requifite firft to prove after their falhion,that nothing can be known-, and after that they will make Confeffion of their Ignorance, as Believing then they have the Privilege of doing it without being laught at for their Pains.
Yet were a Man difpos'd to entertain himfelf, he would not want a proper Subject for his Laughter and Diverfion, fhould he handfomely Interrogate them, concerning the Progrefs of their Learned Acquifitions: and were they in Humour to declare in particular all the Fatigues they have undergone in the Study and Purchace of Nothing.
But though this their Learn'd and Profound Ignorance deferves to be well rally'd, yet it feems not amifs to fpare them at prefent, and to commiferate thofe who have fpent fo many Years in Learning nothing but that falfe Propofition, the irreconcileable Enemy to all Science and to all Truth, That nothing can be known.
Since then the Rule I have eftablifh'd is fo neceflary as has been feen, in the Search after Truth^ let no Man Cavil at the propofing it. And let not thofe, who will not be at the pains of obferving it themfelves, be forward to condemn fo celebrated an Author as Des-Cartes for following it, or according to their Notion, for indeavouring fo zeajoufly to follow it.,.
They would not be fo peremptory to condemn him, did they know the Man ori whom they pafs fo rafh and unadvis'd a Sentence, and did they not read his Works as they do Fables and Romances, which they take up to entertain their idle Minutes, but never to Study or be Inflru- dted in. Would they Meditate with that Author,they might probably ftill find in themfelves fome Notions and Scatter'd Seeds of Truth, which he teaches, that would grow up, and unfold themfelves in fpight of fo difadvantagious a Load of miftaken Learning which oppreffes them." The Matter that fpeaks and teaches us within; challenges our Submiffion to him rather than to the Authority of the greateft Philofophers; He takes pleafure in intruding us, provided we apw & F. Malebranche Concerning Book L ply our Minds to what he fays. 'Tis by Meditation and a very exaft Attention we Inquire of him •, and 'tis by a certain internal Convidion and the fecret Lafhes and Reproaches felt upon our Non-fubmiffion that he anfwers us.
We ought in fuch wife to read the Works of Men, as not to expeft to receive Inftrudion from Men: We mult confult Him who Enlightens the World, that with the Reft of the World he may Enlighten us. And if he fails to Enlighten us, after we have cbnfulted him, 'tis dOubtlefs, becaufe we have ill confulted him.
Whether then we read Anftotle or whether we read Des-Cartes, we muft not inftantly believe either Ariftotle or Des-Cartes: But we mould only Meditate as they have done, or as they ought to have done, with all the Earneftnefs and Attention we are capable of, and thereupon Obey the" Voice of our common Mafter, and honeftly yield up our Gonfent to that Internal Convidion, and thofe Motions we find in us upon our Meditation.
This'bcing done, it may be allow'd a Man to pals a Judgment for or againft an Author. But he muft firft have digefted the Principles of Des-Cartes and Ariftotle's Philofophy before he can rejed the one, and approve the other; before he can maintain concerning the Latter, that no one Phenomenon of Nature can eVer be explain'd by the Principles peculiar to him, as they have been of no nfe for this two thoufand Years, though his Philofophy hath been the Study of the molt In- genious Men in moft parts of the World: And on the contrary, before he can boldly pronounce of the Other, that he hath penetrated thofe recefles of Nature that lay deepeft conceal'd from the Eyes of Men, and hath open'd to them a moft certain and infallible way of Difcovering all the Truths 'tis poflible for a limited understanding to Comprehend.
But not to dwell upon the Notion we may conceive of thefe two Philofophers, and of all others j let us ever look upon them as Men: And let not thofe of Arift ode's Party take it ill, if after they have travell'd fo many Ages in the Dark without finding themfelves one ftep farther advanced than at their fetting out; there are fome at laft that have a Mind to fee clearly what they do: And if after the former have fuffer'd themfelves to be led like the blind, there are thofe who remember they have Eyes with which they will attempt to condud themfelves.
Let us then be fully perfuaded that this Rule, viz. That an entire Confent ftwuld never be given, but to things evidently perceived, is the molt necefiary of all others in the Search after Truth; and let not our Mind embrace any thing as True, which is not accompany'd with all the Evidence it de- mands. 'Tis requilite we fhould be perfuaded of this to disburthen us of our Prejudices; And 'tis abfolutely necefiary we fhould entirely quit our Prejudices, to enter into the Knowledge of Truth, for as much as there is an abfolute Neceffity that our Mind be purify'd before it be inlight- ned. Sap entia prima Stultitia caruiffe. **■ But Before I conclude this Chapter, 'tis necefiary to obferve three Things. The Firft is, That xiomoT' 1 fPeak not here of things of Faith, which have no Evidence attending them, as have Natural Sci- wbat has ences: The Reafon of which feems to be this, That we can have no Perception of Things but been fdi from the Idea's we have of them. Now the Idea's we have, are only given us by God, according concerning t0 our Exigencies and the need we have of them to conduct us in the Natural Order of Things, trJFSwt accordmS t0 which he has Created us. So that the Myfteries of Faith being of a Supernatural Or- denL. *'' der, we need not wonder if we want that Evidence, fince we want the Idea's of them; becaufe our Souls were Created by vertue of a General Decree, through which we have all the Notions see then- that are necefiary for us, but the Myfteries of Faith have receiv'd their Eftablifhment only from luflrations. an Qr^er Qf Grace. wnjcrij in our ordinary way of Conception, is a Decree pofteriour to this Or- der of Nature, Myfteries then of Faith muft be diftinguifiVd from things of Nature.- We ought equally to fub- mit to Faith and to Evidence; but in the concernments of Faith, we muft not look for Evidence; as in thofe of Nature, we ought not to take up with Faith: That is, with the Authority of Philo- fophers. In a word, to be a Believer, 'tis requir'd to Afent blindly, but to be a Philofopher, it is necefiary to See plainly.
'Tis not however to be deny'd but there are^ fome Truths befides thofe of Faith, for which it would be unreafonable to demand indifputable Demonftrations, as are thofe which relate to Mat- ter of Fact in Hiftory, and other things which have their dependence on the Will of Men. For there are two kinds of Truth; the one Necejfary, the other Contingent. I call Nccefary Truths thofe which are immutable by their Nature, and thole which have been fix'd and determin'd by the Will of God, which is not.fubjed to Change. All other forts of Truth are Contingent. Ma- thc.naticks, Phyficks, Metaphyfuks, as alfo a great part of Morality contain Necejfary Truths: Hi- ftory, Grammar, Private Right, or Cuftoms, and fuch other things as depend on the changeable Will of Man, contain only Contingent Truths.
We demand therefore an exad Obfervation of the Rule we have been eftablifhing, in the Search of Necejfary Truths, the Knowledge of which may be calfd Science -, and we muft be content with the greateft Probability in Hiftory, which includes the Knowledge of things Contingent. For under the general Name of Hiftory may be concluded the Knowledge of Languages, Cuftoms, as alfo of the different Opinions of Philofophers; when Men have only learnt them by Memory, without having either Evidence or Certainty concerning them.
The Second thing to be Obferv'd, is that in Morality, Politicks and Medic'me, and in all Pratti- c'al Scienter, we are obliged to be content with Probability; Not Univerfally, but upon occalion -, not becaufe it fatisfies the Mind, but becaufe the Inftance is preffing: And if a Man fhould al- ways delay Actine ti'1 *e had nerfefl: Allurance of Succefs, the Opportunity would be often loit.
Chap. IV. The Search after Truth. $ infl- Rut thourfi it falls out that a Man muft inevitably aft, yet he, fhould in afting doubt of the iiirrrfsof what he does: A"d he fhould indeavour to make foch Advances in Sciences, as to be able on Emergencies to aft with greater Certainty $ For this fhould be the conftarit end of all Mens Stndv and Employment, who make any ufe of Thought. >. J - - ■■>.-■ The Third and laft thing is this, That we fhould not abfolutely defpife Probabilities, fince it often happens that many of them in Conjunction, have as convincing a force, as nloft evident Deraonftrations. Of which Nature there are infinite Examples to be found in Phyfich and Mo- rality ' So that 'tis often expedient to amafs together a fufflcient number ot them in fubje&s not otherwife Demonftrable, in order' to come to the Knowledge of Truth, impoffible to be found ^Aiidnov/ 1 muft needs confefs that the Law I impofe is very Rigorous" and Severe; That there are abundance of Thofe who had rather renounce Reafoning at all, than Reafon on fuch Condi- tions • That 'tis impoffible to run fo faff, with fuch retarding Circumfpedions. However, it muft be granted me, that a Man (hall walk with greater Security in obferving it, and that hither- to thofe who have march'd fo haftily, have been oblig'd to return upon the fame Ground l Befides^ there are a great number of Men who will agree with me inthis,That fince Monfieur Des-Cartes has difcover'd more Truths in Thirty Years, than all the Phibfophers that preceded him, meerlyforhis Submiffion to that Law; if many others would ftudy Philofophy as he has done, we fhould in time be acquainted with the greateft part of thofe things which are necelfary to make Life as happy s§ is poffible, upon an Earth which God has Curs'd.
CHAR IV.
I. Of the Occafional Caufes of Error y whereof there are Five Principal II. The general Defign of the whole Work. III. The particular Defign of the Fir% Book.
WE have feen from what has been faid, that a Man falls not into Error, but for want of making a due ufe of his Liberty; that 'tis for want of curbing that eagernefs of the Will, and moderating its Paffion for the bare appearances of Truth, that he is cte- ceiv'd: And that Error confifts only in the Confem of the Will, which has a greater Latitude than the Perception of the Underftanding, fince we fhould never err if we only fimply jadgd according as we perceived.
But though, to fpeak properly, there is no other caufe of Error, than the ill ufe of our Li- L berty, it may notwithstanding be faid, we have feveral Faculties that are the Caufes of our ~&r-0fthe0e- rorsi not Real Caufes, biit fuch as may be term'd - Occafional: All the ways of our Perceiving are caZfof fo many occafions of Deceiving us.. For fince our falfe judgments include two things, namely the 0nYBriots\ Confent of the Will, and the Perception of the Vnder funding, it is manifeft that all the ways of our and that Perception, may afford us fome occafion or other of falling into Error, forafmuch as they may in- there f* cline us to rafli and. precipitate Confents.. ciwl™' But becaufe it is neceffary firft to make the Soul fenfible of her WeaknefTes and Wandrings, in "p order to poffefs Her with juft Defires of a Deliverance from them, and that fhe may with grea- ter eafe fhake off her Prejudices; We will endeavour to make an exaft Divifion of her Mariners of Perception; which may ferve as fo many Heads, to one or other of which, may be referr'd as we proceed, the different Errors whereunto we are obnoxious.
The Soul has three feveral ways of Perception: By Pare Intelletl, by Imagination, and by the Senfes.
By Pare Intellects, fhe perceives things Spiritual, Univerfals, Common Notions, The Idea of Perfe&ion, that of a Being infinitely perfed, and in general ^11 her own thoughts, when fhe knows them by a Reflexion made upon her felf: 'Tis likewife by Pare Intelletl fhe perceives Ma- terial things, Exteniion with its Properties. For 'tis the pure Underftanding only which is capa- ble of Perceiving a Circle, and a perfect Square, a Figure of a thoufand fides, and fuch like things. Such fort of Perceptions bear the name of Pare Intellections or Pare Perceptions, fince there is no neceffity of the Mind's forming Corporeal Images in the Brain to reprefent them by.
By Imagination, the Soul only perceives things Material, when being Abfent (he makes thent prefent to her, by forming the Images of them in the Brain. This is the way whereby a Man Imagines all forts of Figures, a Circle, a Triangle, a Face, an Horfe, Towns and Fields,' whe- ther he has already feen them or not. This fort of Perceptions, we may call Imaginations^ be- caufe the Soul reprefents to her felf thefe things, by framing Images of them in the Brain. And for as much as Spiritual things canrtot be reprefented by any Image, it follows, the Soul cannot imagine them \ which is a thing worthy to be remember'd.
Laftly, By Senfc, the Soul perceives only Senfible, grofs, and ruder Objects, when being prefent- they caufe. an Impreffion on the external Organs of her Body.' Thus it is the Soul fees things' E> plait* 10 K Malebranche Concerning Book I.
plain and rugged prefent to her Eyes-- thus me knows the Hardnefs of the Iron, the point of a Sword, and the like; and this kind of Perceptions one may call Sentiments or Senfations.
The Soul then has no more than thefe three ways of Perceiving; which will eafily be granted if we confider that the things we perceive are either Spiritual or Material. If they be Spiritual they are perceptable only by the Pure Vnderfianding: If they be Material, they are either Pre- fent or Abfent. If they be Abfent, the ordinary way of the Soul's reprefenting them is by the Imagination i But if they be Prefent, the Soul can perceive them by the Impreffions they make upon her Senfes. And thus Our Souls are not capable of more than a three-fold Perception, by Pure Intellect, by Imagination, and by Senfe.
Thefe three Faculties therefore may be lookt upon as fo many certain Heads, to which we may reduce the Errors of Men, and the Caufes of their Errors, and fo avoid the confufion into which the multitude of them would infallibly call us, mould we talk of them without Order or Method.
But moreover, our Inclinations and our Paflions aft very ftrongly upon us: They dazzle our Mind with their falfe Lights, and overcafl and fill it with Clouds and Darknefs. Thus Our In- clinations and our Paflions engage us in an infinite number of Errors, when we fuffer our felves to be guided by that falfe Light, and abufive Glare which they produce within us. We muft then, together with the three Faculties of the Mind, confider them as the Sources of our Devia- tions and Delinquencies, and add to the Errors of Senfe, Imagination, and Pure Intellect, thofe which may be charg'd upon the Paflions and Natural Inclinations. And fo all the Errors of Men and the Caufes of them, may be reduc'd to five Heads, and we fhall treat of them according to that Order. 5 II. Firft, We fhall fpeak of the Errors of the Senfes; Secondly, Of the Error? of Imagination • lie Gent- Thirdly, Of the Errors of the Pure IntelkEl; Fourthly, Of the Errors of our Inclinations; and r*r jfe{g? Fifthly, Of the Errors of the Paflions. And thus, having made an Eflay to rid the Soul of the Errors Work. ° C which flie's fubJea to, we hztt-) Laflly, lay down a General Method to Conduct her in the Search cf Truth. HI. We will begin with an Explication of the Errors of our Senfes, or rather, of the Errors into the pani- which We fall for want of making the due ufe, we fhould do of our Senfes: And here we fhall mlar pe- not f0 much defcend to our Particular Errors, which are almoft infinite, as fix upon the general S Y00j; Caufes of thefe Errors, and fuch things as feem moft neceffary to inform us of the Nature of the ' Humane Mind.
CHAP. V.
. e Senses.
I. Two ways of explaining bow they were corrupted by Sin. IT. That yth our Liberty, and not our Senfes^ which u the true Caufe of our Errors. III. A Rule for avoiding Error in the ufe of our Senfes.
U P O N an attentive Confideration of the Senfes and Paflions of Man, we find them fo well proportioned to the End for which they were given us, that we can by no means agree with thofe who fay, they are to all intents and purpofes debauch'd and fpoil'd by Original Sin. But that it may appear it is not without Reafon we are of a different Opinion, it is neceflary to Explain, in what manner we may conceive the Order and Regularity which was to be feen in the Faculties and Paflions of our Firft Parent in his State of Righteoufnefs, and the Chan- ges, and Diforders that were confequent to his Fall. Now there are Two ways of Conceiving thefe things; of which this is the Firft. I, That it feems to be a common Notion, That it is neceffary to the right ordering of Affairs, that Two ways the Soul fhould perceive lefTer or greater Pleafures, according to the proportion of the Littlenefs of explain- or Greatnefs of the Goods which fhe enjoys. Pleafure is an Inftinct of Nature, or to fpeak clea- oht senfes rer' '^ an ImPreu^on °f G°d himfelf, who inclines us towards fome Good; which Impreffion were cor- fhould be fo much ftronger, by how much that Good is greater. According to which Principle, rupted by it feems not to be contefted that our firft Parent before his Sin, coming frefh out of the Hands *'»• of his Maker, found greater Pleafures in the moft folid Goods, than in thofe that were not fo. Wherefore fince he was created in order to Love God who created him, and that God was his true Good; it may be faid, God gave him a Tafte and Relifh of himfelf} That heinclin'd him to the Love of the Divine Perfection, by a Scnfe of Pleafure, and that he poffefs'dhim with thofe Internal Satisfactions in his Duty that counter- balanc'd the greateft Pleafures of the Senfes, whereof Chap. V. * he Search after Truth. \ j whereof fince the State of Sin, Man is altogether infenfible, without a Supernatural Ajfifiance and particular gift of Grace.,,...
Notwithftanding, fince he had a Body which God d.efign'd he fhould take care of, and look upon as a Part of himfelf, he gave him to Perceive by the Mediation of his Senfes, Plea- fures like thofe we our felves are fenfible of, in the ufe of things which are proper for, and adap- ted to the Prefervation of our Life and Being., We prefume not here to determine whether the Firft Man before his Fall, had a Power to hin- der agreeable or difagreeable Senfations, in the inftant that the principal part of his Brain was agitated by the Aftual Impreffion of Senfible ObjeCts: Poffibly he had that Sovereignty over him- felf became of his Subjection to the Will of God, though the contrary Opinion feems more pro- bable. For though Adam might ftop the Commotions of the Blood and Spirits, and the Vibra- tions of the Fibres of his Brain, which Obje&s excited irt it, becaufe being in a Regular State, his Body muft needs fiibmit to his Mind \ yet it is not probable, he was able to prevent the Senfa- tions of Objedts at the time he had not ftopt the Motions they produe'd in that part of his Body, to which his Soul was immediately united. For the Union of the Soul and Body confuting prin- cipally in the mutual Relation there is betwixt Senfations, and the Motions of the Organs, this Union would rather feem Arbitrary than Natural, if Ada m had been capable of hind ring Senfa- tion when the Principal Part of his Body receiv'd.an Impreffion from thofe round about it. How- ever I declare for neither of the two Opinions.
The Firft Man therefore felt Pleafure irt that which was Perfective of his Body, as he felt it in that which was Perfeftive of his Soul; And becaufe he was conftituted in a Perfect State, he found that of the Soul far greater than that of the Body. Thus it was infinitely eafier for him to pre- ferve his Righteoufnefs, than for Us without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST-^ fince without this we have no Delight or Satisfaction in our Duty. Albeit, he misfortunately fuffer'd himfelf to be fedue'd: He loll that Uprightnefs by his Difobedience 5 and the Principal Change he un- j.Gregoro derwent, and which was the caufe of all the Confufion of his Senfes and his Paffions was,that GOD, homii. 3/0 by way of punitive Juftice, withdrew himfelf from him, and would no longer be his Good-, or upon the' rather Ceas'd to make him fenfible of that Pleafure, Which pointed out GOD, as his Sovereign GofPsls° Good. So that Senfible Pleafures, which only earry'd him to the Injoyment of the Goods of the Body, being left alone and no longer counterpois'd by thofe, which drew him before to his True and Proper Good; the clofe Union that he had with GOD was wonderfully loofen'd, and that which he had with his Body, as much ftrengthned or increas'd. Senfible Pleafure, having got the Dominion, debauch'd his * Moral Powers, by fattening them upon all Senfible ObjeCts, and * Vr. Son this Corruption of his Morals darkned his -f- Intellectual Parts, by turning him from that Light tfur- which Enlightned him, and inducing him to form his Judgments on things, only from the Rela- jZ^v Son tion or Analogy they could have to his Body.
But as to the Nature of the thing it felf, it cannot be laid, That the Change which happen'd on Part of the Senfes was very confiderable. For as when two Weights are plac'd iri 'Equilibrium in a Balance, if you take away one of them, the oppofite Scale will be weigh*d down by the other, without any alteration on part of the former weight, fince that itill remains the fame: So after Sin, the Pleafures of Senfe bow'd and weigh'd down the Soul towards Senfible Objects, for want of thofe Internal Delectations which, before Sin, 'countei'pois'd that Inclination unto Sen- fible Good j but without any fo Siibftantial a Change in point of the Senfes, as is generally Imagin'd.
I come now to the Second Way of accounting for the Diforders introdue'd by Sin, which is certainly more Reafonahle than that we have been explaining. It is very different from it, be- caufe it is founjied on a different Principle; yet both thefe ways are very confiftent and agreeable, as to what refpects the Senfes.
Being we are made up of a Body and a Mind, there are two forts of Goods to imploy our Refearches about; the Goods of the Body, and the Goods of the Mind. We have likewife two means of Difcovering whether a thing be good or ill for us, either by ufing the Mind alone, or by the ufe of the Mind in Conjunction with the Body. We can difcover our Good by a clear and evident Knowledge; we can difcover it likewife. by a dark and confus'd Senfation. Reafon teaches me that Righteoufnefs is Amiable 5 My Tafte informs me that fuch a Fruit is Good. The Beauty of Righteoufnefs is not Senfible, nor the Goodnefs of a Fruit Intelligible. The Goods of the Body deferve not the application of the Mind, which GOD has created only for himfelf: It mult needs be then, That the Mind difcovers fuch kind of Goods without Examination, and by the Ihort and incontroverted Proof of Senfation. Stones are not fit for Nourifhment, the Tryal is a convincing Argument, and the Tafte alone has made all Mankind agree to it.
Pleafure then and Pain are the Natural and undoubted Characters of Good and Evil; I con- fefs it: But 'tis only fo in refpect of thofe things, which, having no Power of being Good and Evil in themfelves, cannot be known for fuch by a Knowledge clear and evident; 'tis fo in re- gard of thofe things only, which, being inferiour to the Mind, can neither Punifh nor Reward it, In fine, 'tis only fo in point of fuch things and Objelts as are undeferving of the Soul's Applica- cation, and concern about them; fuch things as GOD, not willing we fhould be taken up with, inclines us to only by Jnftintl, that is, by Agreeable or Difagreeable Senfations.
But as for GOD, who is the True and only Good of the Mind, who is alone above it, who alone can Reward it in a thou fand different ways j- who is only worthy of its Application, and who is under no Fear of not being found Amiable by thofe that know him j he is not con- tent 12 F. Malebranche Concerning Book I.
tent to be belov'd by a blind and InftinBive Love, he will be lov'd by a Rational Love, and a Love of Choice.
If the Mind law only in Bodies what was really in them, without being fenfible of what was not therein, it could hot poflibly Love them, nor make ufe of them without great Pain and Re- .htttancy; fo that it is as it were necettary they fhould appear Agreeable, by producing Senfations, of which themfelves are Dettitute. But 'tis far from being fo with GOD. 'Tis fufficient to fee him fuch as he is, to be inclin'd to love him as we ought: Nor is there any Neceffity he fhould imploy that Inflintl of Pleafure as a kind of Bait and Artifice to allure our Love, without de- ferving it: The Pleafiire which the Blefled enjoy in the Potteflion of G O D, is not fo much an Jnfiintl which inclines them to the Love of Him, as the Recommence of their Love. For it is not .for the fake of that Pleafure that they Love GOD, but becaufe they manifeftly know Him to be their True, their Only Good. see ibe ii- This being the Cafe, it ought to be concluded, That Adam was not invited to the Love of ivMrmons. q q j) inc\ t^e reft 0f his Duty by a Preventing Pleafure; forafmuch as the Knowledge which he had of G O D, as of his Good, and the Joy he was continually pottefs'd with, neceflarily confequent to the View of his Felicity, in his Uniting himfelf with GOV, were fufficient Motives to recommend his Duty to him, and to make his Actions more Meritorious, than if he had been, as it were, determin'd by a Preventing Pleafure: In this manner he was in perfect. Liberty. And 'tis poflibly in this Capacity the Scripture means to reprefent Him to us in thefe words,- — - He Deus ab h'mfetf wade Man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his Counfel, to keep the Command- \n\i\o con- me nts, &c. Ecclef 15.14. That is, kept him clofely united to Himfelf, only through the clear ftituit ho- View he gave him of his Happinefs and his Duty, without alluring him to it by any Tafte of a minem, & Preventing Pleafure. But Experience has convine'd us, to the Eternal Reproach of Free Will, and [u • lt * tne Glory of G O D alone, of the Frailty Adam was obnoxious to, even in a State of fuch Perfect nuConfilii Order and Sublime Happinefs, as was that, he was poflefs'd of, before his Difobedience.