But 'tis not very eafie to imagine thefe To fubtile and refine! Bodies, and they are look'd upon as Chimeras, becaufe they cannot be feen. Com emplatio fere definit cum afpetlu; fays My Lord Bacon. And indeed the greatelt part of Philofophers had rather invent fome New Entity, than be filent about things they do not underftand. If it be objected to their falfe, and inconceivable Suppositions, that Fire muft neceffarily be compos'd of parts rapidly mov'd, becaufe of thofe violent Motions it produces; whilft nothing can communicate what it has, not: (which furely is a moft clear and folid Obje&ion ) they will be fare to confound all by fome childifh and imaginary Distinction^ filch as Caufes umvocal and equivocal, that they may feem to fay fomething, when indeed they fay nothing at all. For in fine, 'tis a receiv'd Maxim with all confidering Men, That there can be no equivocal Caufe in Nature, and Ignorance has only invented them.
Thofe then who are defirous of knowing Nature, fhould take care to fix more to clear and di- ftinct Notions. They fhould a little check and refill that Levity and Inconflancy of their Will, if they would penetrate to the bottom of things: for their Minds will ever be feeble, fuperfi- cial and defultory, whilft their Wills remain roving, fickle and inconftant.
It muft be confefs'd that 'tis a painful and tirefome thing, and full of conftraint, to become at- tentive, and go to the bottom of the things we have a mind to know. But nothing can be had without pains. Mean time, 'tis a reproach to Men of Senfe, and Philofophers, who are oblig'd by all manner of reafons to the Search and Defence of Truth, to talk they know not what, and to be fatisfied with what they do not underftand.
CHAP. III.
I. Curiofity is natural, and neceffary. II. Three Rules to moderate it. HI. An Explication of the frji of thefe Rules.
AS long as Men fhall have an Inclination for a Good that exceeds their Strength, and they i. fhall not enjoy it -, they will ever have a fecret Inclination for whatever carries the Cha-. Cwtftp rafter of New and Extraordinary. They will conftantly be perfuing after things, which rhey ts**tumJ; have not yet confider'd, with hopes of finding what they feek for: and whereas their Minds can fary" never be fully fatisfied, without the Intuition of him, for whom they are created; fb they will • always be reftlefs and tolling about, till He appears to them in His Glory., This Difpofition of Minds, is doubtlefs very confonant to their Condition; it being infinitely., better reftleily to feafch after Truth, and Happinefs which they do not pofiefs, than to fix on a falfe and ill-grounded fecurity, by taking up with Falfhood, and Seeming Goods, the ordinary DefTerts they feed on: Men ought not to be infenfible to Truth and Flapinefs, and what is New and Extraordinary ought to quicken them. For there is a Curiofity, which we may permit them, or rather which we ought to recommend to them. So then common and ordinary things con- taining not the true Good; and the Ancient Opinions of Philofophers, being moft uncertain; it is reafonable we fhould be Curious for New Difcoveries, and always unquiet in the Enjoyment of ordinary Goods.
Should a Geometrician go to give us New Propositions contrary to Euclide's; and pretend to prove that Science full of Errours, as Hobbs has eifay'd in a Book«he wrote againft the Pride of the Geometricians; I confefs we fhould" be to blame to be pleas'd with fuch forts of Novelties; fince Truth being found, we ought to be conftant in embracing it, our Curiofity being given us only to excite us to the Difcovery. And therefore 'tis no common fault with Geometric ~im s, tp have a Curiofity for new Opinions in their Science: They would quickly be difgufted with a Book, whofe Propositions -contradicted thofe of Euclid: for that, being infallibly afTufd ot the troJi 144 F. Malebranche Concerning Book IV.
truth of His Proportions, by inconteftable Demonftrations, their Curiofity' muft ceafe on that refpeO:: An infallible fign that our Inclination for Novelty, proceeds only from our want of Evi- dence, as to the Truth of things we defire naturally to know-, and our notpolTetTing the, Infinite Goods, which we naturally long to enjoy.
'Tis then juft and equitable, that men fhould be excited by Novelty, and fond of perfuing it: n« But however there are Exceptions to be made, and fome Rules to be obferv'dj which may eafily to moderate ^e ^educ'd ^rom our AiTertion, viz. That the Inclination for Novelty, is only given us to dij cover Curkfity. Truth, and our real Good.>\ Thefe Rules are three in number; the firft of which is, That Men muft not love Novelty in matters of Faith, which are not under the fur ifd ill ion of Re af on.
The fecond, That Novelty is no reafon to induce us to believe things to be true or good; that is, we muft not judge any Opinion true, becaufe tis Novel; nor any Good capable of contenting us, becaufe 'tis new and extraordinary, and we have never yet enpfdit.
The third, That when we are moreover ajjurd that fome Truths' lie fo deep, that 'tis Morally impojjible to difcover them: and that fome Goods are fo little, and fender, that they can never fa- tisfie us -, the Novelty ought not to raife our Curiofity, nor muft ice give way to be feducd by falfe Hopes. But we will explain thefe Rules more at large, and (hew that the want of pbferving them engages us in a vaft number of Errours.
We commonly meet with Men of two quite oppofite humours: fome that will always blindly ill. and implicitly believe; others, that will ever plainly and evidently perceive. The former having ■A parti-- fcarce ever made ufe of their Reafon, indifferently believe whatever they hear-, the' latter refolv- C(//5 E*?}!~ ing always to exercile their Mind, even in matters that are infinitely above ir, equally defpife all frit of thefe ^ons °f Authorities. Thofe are commonly of a ftupid or weak capacity, as Children and Women v Rules. thefe are Haughty and Libertine Wits, as Heretic ks and Pbilofopbers.
We very rarely meet with Men exaclly poiz'd in the midtt of thefe two Extremes, who leek not for Evidence in matters of Faith, by a vain and fruitlefs Agitation of Mind •, or that fome- times believe not without Evidence falfe Opinions about Natural things, by an indifcreet Defe- rence, and fervile Submiflion of Spirit. If they be Men of Religion, and defer greatly to the Authority of the Church, their Faith extends fometimes, if I may be allowed to fay fo, to Opini- ons purely Philofophical -, and they pay them the fame refpecl as the Truths of the Gofpel; whilft their illegitimate Zeal too readily prompts them to cenfure and condemn all of a different Sen- timent and Perfuafion. Hence they entertain injurious fufpicions againft Perfons that make New Difcoveries; and 'tis fufficient to pafs for a Libertine with them, to deny Subflantial Forms'; that the Creatures feel Fleafure and Fain, and other Philofophical Opinions,-, which they be- lieve true, without any evident Reafon; only becaufe they imagine fome necelTary Dependencies between thefe Opinions and. matters of Faith, But if Men are more bold and daring, the Spirit of Pride carries them to defpife the Au- thority of the Church •,. and they are hardly brought to fubmit to it. They delight in harffi and prefumptuous Opinions, and love to be thought Bold Wits-, and upon that prdipeft, talk of Divine things irreverently, and with a fort of domineering Arrogance; defpifing, as too cre- dulous, fuch as fpeak modeftly of fome receiv'd Opinions. Laftly, they are extremely dif- pes'd to doubt of every thing, and are quite oppofite to thofe, who too eafily fubmit to the Authority of Men.
'Tis manifeft, that thefe two Extremes have nothing laudable, and that thofe that require not Evidence in Natural Questions-, are no lefs culpable than others, who demand it in the Mylierws of Faith. But yet the former, who hazard the being miftaken in Philofophical Queftions, by too eafie a Belief, are doubtlefs more excufable than the latter, who run in danger oi tierefie, by a prefumptuous doubting. For 'tis lefs perillous to fall into infinite Errours of Philolophy, for want of examining them, than into one Herefie, for want of an humble Submiffion to the Authority of the Church.
The Mind repofes it felf upon finding Evidence, but 'tis tofs'd and difturb'd when it finds none; becaufe Evidence is the Character of Truth. And therefore the Errour of Libertines and Hereticks proceeds from their Doubting that Truth is to be met vvitli in the Deciflons of the Church -, becaufe they fee it not with Evidence, and hoping at the fame time, that the Points of Faith may be evidently known. Now their paffion for Novelty is corrupt and diforder'd, be- ■ caufe having already the Truth, in the Faith of the Church, they ought no longer to feek for it: befides that the Truths we are taught by Faith, being infinitely above our Reafon, they could not be difcover'd, fuppofing, according to their falfe Notion, thac the Church was guil- ty oj Errour.
But as many Err, by refufing to fubmit to the Authority of the Church •, fo there are no few- er that deceive themfelves, by fubmitting to the Authority of Men. The Authority of the Church muft always be yielded to, becaufe it can never err: but we mult never blindfoldly re- fign to the Authority of Men, becaufe they are always liable to miltake. The Do&rines of the Church infinitely tranfeend the powers of Reafon, but the Do&riries of Men are fubjeft to it: So that if it be an intolerable Vanity and Prefumption to follow the Guidance of our Mind, in feeking tor Truth in matters of Faith, without Refpect to the Authority of the Church; it is likewife a fordid Levity, and a delpicable Meanuefs of Spirit, blindly to believe upon the Au- thority of Men, in Subjects depending on Reafon, Not- Chap. lit. The Search after Thith. Ufa j Notwithftanding which, it may be faid, that molt of thofe who bear the Name of Leanied in the World;, have pufchas'd their Reputation merely by getting by rote the Opinions of Arifto- tie, Plato, Epicurus, and fome other Philofbphers, and by blindfoldly embracing, and wilfully maintaining their Opinions. An Acquaintance with the Sentiments of fome Philofbphers, is enough to entitle to Degrees, and exteriour Badges of Learning in the Univerfities: And provi- ded a Man fliall fwear in Verba Magiftri, he mail fpeedily commence a Doctor. Moft Com- munities have a Ped, and Learning peculiar to themfelves, which every private Perfon is oblig'd ro ftand and fall by. What is true in one Society is falfe in another. They fometimes take pride in maintaining the Doctrine of their Order againft Reafon and Experience; and think they are oblig'd»to warp and dittort the Truth, or make their Authors buckle, that they may be con- fident with it: Which has occafion'd an infinite multitude of trifling Diftinftions, which are ib many By-ways to lead infallibly to Errour.
If any Truth be now a-days difcover'd, Arifiotle muft have known it -, but \fArifotlc be againft it, the Difcovery is falfe. Some make that Philofopher fpeak one way, fome another 5 for all Pretenders to Learning teach him to fpeak in their own Dialect. There is no Impertinence but he is introduced as uttering -, nor any New Difcovery, but is found enigmatically treafur'd up in fome corner of his Books. In a word, he conftantly contradicts himfelf •, if not in his Works^ at leaft in the Mouths of his ProfeiTors. For though the Philbfophers declare, and indeed defign to teach his Doftrine, yet 'tis an hard thing to find two to meet upon his Opinions •, becaufeinef-, left his Books are fo obfeure, and abound with fo many loofe, indefinite, and general Terms, that even thole Mens Notions may with fome likelihood be afcrib'd to him, that are the moft op- pofite in the World. He may be made to fay any thing in fome of his Works, becaufe he fays juft nothing, whilft he makes much Noife •, as Children make the Bells found what they have a mind to, becaufe they are very noifie, but inarticulate.
'Tis true, it feems reafonable to fix and determine the Mind of Man to particular Opinions^ to keep it from rambling, and extravagance: But why muft it be done by Falfhood and Errour? Can Errour be thought capable of reuniting divided Minds } If we confider how rare it is to find Men of Senfe and Parts fatisfy'd with reading Arifiotle, and perfuaded they have acquir'd true Science, though grown old in poring on his Books, we lhall evidently perceive that nothing but Truth and Evidence can quiet the Agitation of the Mind; and that Difputes, Averfions,- Errours, and Herefies, are kept up and fortify'd by the Corrupt Courfe and Method of Mens Stu- dy. Truth confifts in indivifibili, is incapable of Variety, and nothing elfe can reunite Mens Minds: But Errour and Falfbood can only divide and difturb them.
I make no queftion but there are fuch as honeftly believe, that he, whom they ftyle the Prince of Phibfophers, is guilty of no Errour -, and that his Works are the Magazines of true and found Philofophy. There are Men who imagine, that in the fpace of two thoufand Years, the Time fince he wrote, no Man has been able to fay he has made a Blot, or been guilty of a Miftake -, and fo making him infallible in a manner, they can pin their Faith upon him, and quote him as infallible. But 'tis not worth while to ftand toanfwer fuch Gentlemen asthefe, becaufe their Ig- norance muft needs be exceeding grofs, and meriting more to be pitied than oppugn'd: I defire only of them, if they know that either Arifiotle, or any of his Followers, have dedue'd any Truth from the Principles peculiar to him; or if poffibly themfelves have done it, that they would de- clare it, explain it, and prove it -, and I promife them never more to fpeak but to Arjflctle's Praife and Commendation. His Principles lhall no longer be calumniated as ufelefs, fince they have at laft been ferviceable to prove one Truth. But we have no Reafon to hope this: For the Challenge has been long fince oftefd, and M. Des Cartes, among the reft, has done it in his Metaphyseal Meditations, almoft Forty Years ago, and oblig'd himlelf to demonftrate the Falfhood • of that pretended Truth. And there is great Probability no Man will ever venture to attempt what M. Des Cartes's -greateft Enemies, and the moft zealous Defenders of Arijlotle's Philofophy never yet durft undertake.
I beg leave then, after this, to fay, That it is Blindnefs, Shwifbnefs of Spirit, and Stupidity^ thus to betray Reafon to the Authority of Arifiotle, Plato, or whatever other Philofopher: That 'tis Lofs of Time to read them, out of no other Defign than to remember their Opinions; and 'tis to ioajie that of others too,, to teach them in that manner. And 1 may fay with St. Auguftin, £UK tanl That a Alan muft befottijhly curious, who fends his Son to the College td learn the Opinions of his J^^^i Tutour. That the Philofophers cannot inftruft us by their Authority-, and to pretend to it is a filium fu- piece of Injuftice: That 'tis a kind of Madnefs and Impiety to take a folemn Oath of Allegi- um mictac ance to them.- And, Laftly, that 'tis to detain Truth in an unjuft Bondage, from Intereff, and inSch.^*P? Partiality, to oppofe the New Opinions of Philofophy, that may be true;, to keep up the credit g[^eur ^ogi- of fuch as are known to be either falfe or ufelefs. tec difcat > p CttA P.
CHAP. IV.
A Continuation of the fame SubjeSi. I. An 'Explication of the Second Rule concerning Curiojity. II. An Explication of the Third.
l-,'T^ H E Second Rule to be obferv'd is, That Novelty flmtll never pafs with us as a Reafon to RuieScon- -*- believe things to be true. We have often faid, That a Man ought not to acquiefce in Er- cemhgcu- rour, and the feeming Goods which he enjoys: That 'tis juft he fhould feek for the Evidence of riojity. Truth, and the True Good, which he does not pofTefs, and confequently have an Inclination for things, that are New and Extraordinary: Yet he is not, for all that, to cleave to them, or to be- lieve, out of a Levity of Humour, that Opinions are true, becaufe novel j and that Goods are real, becaufe they have not been experienced. Novelty fhould only put hirri upon examining New things carefully •, which he ought not to defpife, becaufe he does not know them -, nor rafhly to believe, to contain what his Hopes and Wifh.es aim at.
But here follows a thing of common Obfervation: When Men have examin'd Ancient and Received Opinions, without perceiving the bright Light of Truth; when they have tailed Com- mon Goods, without rinding the folid Pleafure that fhould attend the Poffeflion of Good -, and when their Defires and Longings are not abated by ordinary Goods and Opinions: If then they hear of any thing new and unexperienc'd, the Idea of Novelty gives them Grounds of hoping that this is the very thing they fearch for. And becaufe they commonly Hatter themfelves, and willingly believe things are as they wifh them to be, their Hopes ftrengthen as fall as their De- fires increafe, till at laft they infenfibly grow into imaginary Affurances: Hereupon they fo infe- parably annex the Idea of Novelty to the Idea of Truth, that the one is never excited without the other •, and that which is neweft, feems always truer and better than what is more ordinary and common. Wherein they widely differ from fome others, who from an Abhorrence of Here- fie, having join'd the Idea of Novelty with that of Falfity, imagine all New Opinions falfe, and including fomething of dangerous Importance. - Thence it may be concluded, That this cuftomary Difpofition of the Mind and Heart of Man, in refpecl of all that bears the Chara&er of Novelty, is one of the moft general Cauies of their Errours: It hardly ever conduQs them to the Truth •, but when it does, 'tis purely by Chance, and good Luck; and it conftantly obviates their PofTeflion of their True Good, by engaging them in that Multiplicity of Divertifements, and faljly feeming Goods, the World is fill'd with; which is the moft dangerous Errour Man can fall into.
ii. The Third Rule againft the excefiive Defires of Novelty, is, That when we are otherwife a£ The Third fur'd that fome Truths lie fo deep, that 'tis morally impoffible to difcover them > and that fome Rule con- Goods are fo little and flender, that they cannot make us happy, the Novelty of them ought 2SJ Cu' not to excite our Curiofity.
Every one may know by Faith, Reafon, and Experience, That all created Goods are notable to fill the infinite Capacity of the Will. We are taught by Faith, that all worldly things are Va- nity; and that our Uappinefs confifts neither in Riches nor Honours. Reafon affures us, that fince it is not in our Power to bound our Defires, and that we are carried by a Natural Inclination to the loving all Goods •, that we cannot become Happy, but by poffefTing H I M who contains them all. Our own Experience makes us fenfible, that we are not Happy in the Poffeflion of the Goods we enjoy, becaufe we are ftill defirous of others. Laftly, We daily fee that the mighty Goods which Princes, and the moft Potent Kings enjoy on Earth, are incapable of filling their Defires: That they have even more Difturbances and Troubles than other Men •, and that being on the higheft Point of Fortune's Wheel, they muft be infinitely more fhaken and agitated by its Motion than thofe which fit lower and nearer its Axis: For in fhort, they neverfall, but 'tis from a Precipice •, they receive no little Wounds, and all that Grandeur which attends them, and which they incorporate with their own Being, only enlarges and extends them, that they may receive a greater Number of Wounds, and be more expos'd to the Infults and Blows of Fortune.
Faith, Reafon, and Experience thus alluring us, that earthly Goods and Pleafures, which we have never tafted, could not make us Happy, rhough we fhould enjoy them •, fpecial Care ought to be taken, according to the Third Rule, to fuperlede being fhttei'd with the vain Hope of Fe- licity, which Hope infenfibly increafing, proportionably to our Paflions and Defires, will at laft end in a falfe Confidence, and an ill-grounded Aflurance. For when we are extreamly paflionate for any Good, we always imagine it excelhvely great; and by degrees perf uade our felves we ihall be happy in the Enjoyment.
Thefe vain Defires then muft be refitted, fince to try to latisfie them would be a fruitlefs At- tempt: But efpecially for this Reafon, that when we give way to our Paffions, and fpend our Time to afford them Satisfa£lion, we lofe GOD, and all things with him; we only run from one feeming Good to another, live always in falfe Hopes, diftrafit and agitate our felves a thou- land ways, and meet with perpetual Oppofitions and frultrations, becaufe the defired Goods are fought, but can't be poflefs'd by many at once; and at laft we die, and can enjoy nothing more: For Chap. V. The Search after Truth. ixj aTii of For, as we are taught by St. Paul, They that will be rich, fall into temptation and a fnare, and 2 Tim. 6.9, into many foolifh and hurtful lufts, which drown men in dejirutfion and perdition: for the love of money w the root of all evil.
But if we ought not to be follicitous for the Goods of the Earth, which are new to us, as be- ing certain that the Happinefs we are in fearch of, is not to be found in them 3 much Ids ought we to defire to know the new Opinions about a vaft many difficult Queftions: as being otherwife convinc'd, that an humane Mind can never difcover the truth of them. Moll of the Queftions treated of in Morals and Phyficks, are of that nature-, which may afford us Reafon to fuipeft the generality of thofe Books we fee daily compos'd upon very obfcure and moft perplexing Subjects. For though, abfolutely fpeaking, the Queftions they contain are foivable-, yet, fo few Truths be- ing hitherto difcover'd, and fo many to be known before we can come to thofe that are handled in thefe Books •, they cannot be read without hazarding to lofe much by them.
But yet this is not the Method that is taken, but the quite contrary: Men examine not whe- ther what is faid be poffible. Promife them only extraordinary things, as, the Reftitution of Na- tural Heat, Radical Moifture, Vital Spirits, or other Unintelligible Matters h and you excite their vain Curiofity, and prepolTefs them. 'Tis enough to dazle them, and win their AlTent, to offer them Paradoxes; to make ufe of obfcure Words, Terms of Influence, or the Authority of fome unknown Authors; or to make fome very fenfible and unufual Experiment, though it have no reference to the thing advanc'd. For Confufion is Conviction to fome forts of People.
If a Phyfician, a Chirurgeon, or an Empirick, quote but fome Greek and Latin Sentences, and talk to their Hearers in new and extraordinary Terms, they take them for Great Men =, Ihey give them the Prerogative of Life and Death, and believe them as they would an Oracle: They imagine themfelves too, that they are elevated to a pitch above the common fize, and pierce to the bottom of things. And if one happen to be fo indifcreet, as to teftifie, that five or fix infignificative Words that prove nothing, will not go down for Reafon •, they think a Man void of Common-fenfe, and that he denies Firft Principles: And indeed, thefe Gentlemen's Firft Principles are five or fix Latin Words of an Author,* or fome Greek Paffage, if they have greater Abilities.
It is even neceffary for skilful Phy/icians to talk fbmetimes in an unknown Tongue to their Pa- tients, to purchafe Reputation, and. to make themfelves attended to.
A Phyfician who can go no farther than Latin, may pafs well enough in a Country Parifti, be- caufe Latin is Greek and Arabick to the Illiterate. But if a Phyfician cannot at leaft read Greeks to learn fome Aphorifm of Hypocrates, he muft not expect to pafs for a Scholar with the Inhabi- tants of a City, who commonly underftand Latin. And fo the moft Learned amongft them, knowing this Humour of the World, are fbrc'd to talk like Cheats and Quacks; and we are not always to take an Eftimate of their Parts and Learning from the Difcourfe they have in their Vifits.
I. Of the Second Natural Inclination^ or' of Self-love. II. The Divifion of it into Love of Beingy and of Well-being \ ory of Greatnefs and Pleajure.
THE Second Inclination which the Author of Nature conftantly impreffes on our Will, is, The Love of our felves, and Our own Prefervdtion.
We have already faid, That GOD loves all his Works; and that it is only his Love which L preferves them in their Being; and that 'tis his Will, that all Created Spirits mould have the °fthe Se- fame Inclination with his own. 'Tis his Will therefore, that they all have a natural Inclination £T/"*/f\ for their own Prefervation, and that they love themfelves. So that Self-love is reafonable, be- t-m ncor'"f caufeMan is really amiable^ in as much as GOD loves us, and would have us love our felves: self hue; but it is not reafonable to love our felves better than GOD; fince GOD is infinitely more lovely than we are. It is injuft for us to place our ultimate End in our felves, and to centre our Love there, without reference to GOD; fince having no real Goodnefs, or Suhfiftence" of our felves, but only by the participation of the Goodnefs and Being of GOD, we are no farther amiable than we ftand related to him.
Nevertheless, the Inclination we mould have for GV D, is loft by the Fall -, and our Will now has only an infinite Capacity for all Goods, or Good in general •, and a ftrong Inclination to pofiels them, which can never be deftroy'd. But the Inclination which we ought to have for our own Prefervation, or our Self-love, is fo mightily increas'd, that 'tis at laft become the abfolute Mafter of our Will: It has evenchang'd and converted the Love of GOD, or the Inclination we have for Good in general, and that due to other Men, into its own nature. For it may be faid, that the Love of our felves at prefent ingroiTes all, becaufe we love all things but with relation to our ielves; whereas we fhould love GOD only firft, and all things after as related to him.
When Faith and Reafon certifie us, that GOD is the fbvereign Good, and, that he alone carf fill us with Pleafures, we eafily conceive it our Duty to love him, and readily afford him our Af» fe&ions; but, unaffifted by Grace, Self-love always is the firft Mover. All pure and defecate Cha- rity is above the ftrength of our corrupt Nature; and fo far are we from loving GOD for himfelfy that Humane Reafon cannot comprehend how 'tis poffible to love him, without Reference to our felves, felves, . i aS ' F. Malebranche Concerning Book IV felves, and making our ultimate End our own Satisfa&ion. Self-love therefore is the only Matter of our Will, ever iince the Diforders of Sin: and the Love of GOD, and our Neighbour,- are only Confequences of it -, iince we love nothing at prefent, hut with the hopes of fome Advantage, or •becaufe we actually receive fome P leaf /ere therein.
Ir: This Self-love branches into two forts; viz. Into the Love of Greatnefs, and the Love of Plea- Tbe Diw/I-fure 5 or into the Love of ones Being, and the Perfection of it, and into the Love of Well-being m of Self- or Felicity.