Hifiories that are the moft Rare and Ancient, they glory to know: and whilft they are igno- rant of the Genealogy of Princes that at prefent Reign, are diligent in fearching for the Pedigree* of thofe who died four thoufand Years ago. They fcorn to learn the moft common Hifiories of their own Times, yet endeavour to be critically skill'd in the fables and Fitfions of the Poets. They know not fo much as their own Relations -, yet will, if you defire it, cite feveral Authorities to prove that a Citizen of Rome was allied to an Emperour: and a great many other fuch things.
Hardly can they tell the Names of the common Garments in prefent life, yet bufie their Heads to know what were in wear with the old Greeks and Romans. Their own Country Animals they are ignorant of; while they grudge not to fpend feveral Years in cofnpofing huge Volumes on the Creatures of Scripture -, that they may feem to have a better guefs than others at the Signification of unknown Terms: Such a Book is the Hearts-delight of its Author, and of its learn'd Readers 5 for being patch'd up of Greek, Hebrew, and Arabick Paffages, &c. of Rabbinical and fuch like dark and extraordinary Citations; itfatisfies the Vanity of its Author, and the ridiculous Curio- fity of thofe that read it, who fancy themfelves learneder than others, when they can confidently affirm there are fix different Words in Holy Writ fignifying a Lion, or the like.
They commonly underftand not the Map of their own Country, or even the Model of their Town, whilft they ftudy the Geography of Ancient Greece, Italy, of the Gauls in Julius C<efar''s Time, or of the Streets and publick Places of old Rome. Labor fiidtorum, fays the Wife-man, affligct eos qui nefciunt in urbem pergere. They know not the way to their City, yet are foolifh- ly fatigu'd with fruitlefs Enquiries: They know not the Laws or Cuftoms of the Places where they live, yet carefully ftudy the Ancient Right, the Laws of the Twelve 'Tables, the Cuftoms of the Lacedemonians, or of the Chinefe, or the Ordinances of the Great Mogul. Laftly, they would know whatever's Rare, Extraordinary, and Remote, and unknown by others, having by an Over- throw of Reafon affix'dthe Idea of Learning to thefe things: whilft to be efteem'd Learned, 'tis enough to know what others know not, and yet be ignorant of the belt and moft neceifary Truths. True, the Knowledge of all thefe things, and the like, is call'd Science, Erudition, Dottrine; Ufe will have it fo: But there is a Science which the Scripture ftiles Folly: Doffrina fiultorum fatui* tas. I never yet obferv'd that the Holy Spirit, which beftows fo many Elogies on Science, in Sacred Writ fays any thing in Commendation of that falfe Science I have been fpeaking of CHAP.
Chap.VIIf.. The Search after Truth. t$$ GHAP. VIII.
I. Of the Defire of feeming Learned. II. Of the Cotwerfation of the Faljly Learned. III. Of their Works.
IF the immoderate Defire of Growing Learned makes Men oftentimes more ignorant, the De- L fire of being thought fo, not only renders them more ignorant, but feems to give a total Subver«0f '*fD^ fion to their Reafon. For the World abounds with fuch as lofe common Senfe, becaufe they wi\U'ref^,' out-Jhoot it^ and (peak nothing but filly things, becaufe they will fpeak only in Paradox. They'"5 mn " deviate fo far from, the common Thoughts of Mankind, whilft they purpofe the acquiring the Character of Rare and Extraordinary Wits, that they effectively gain their point, and are never confider'd without much Admiration or Contempt.
They are regarded with Admiration, when being rais'd to fome Preferment or Honour, which conceals them, we fancy them as much above others in their Parts and Learning, as they are by their Vitality and Birth. But we frequently make a very different Eftimate, when viewing them near at hand, and drawing the Curtain of their furrounding Grandeur, we find them contempti- ble, or even Fools and Changelings.
The Falfly Learn'd (hew themfelves manifeftly in the Books they write, asalfo in their ordina- ry Converfation. It will not, perhaps, be amifs to give a proof of it.
As it is Vanity, and Defire of Oftentation, which engages them in their Studies •, fo when they tt find themfelves in Company, the Paflion and Defire of Preheminency. re-kindles and tranfports °ffe. Conf them. They are inftantly fo high upon the Wing, that we lofe fight of them; nor can they ol^jfjff ten themfelves tell where they are. They.are fo fearful of not being above all their Auditors^ that Learn d. they are yex'd to think any one can teach them: they" will ftomach the Demand of an Explica- tion, and upon the leaft oppofition put on the Look of Scorn and Arrogance. In brief, The things they lay are fo novel, and extraordinary, and fo remote from common Senfe, that. the Wife have much ado to hold from laughing, while the Ignorant are ftunh'd and thunder-ftruck.
The firft Heat being over, if any Man of an Head ftrong, and fettl'd enough not to be over-. turn'd, (hews that they are out, they will however ftick obftinately to their Errours: the very Look of their confused and giddied Hearers, turns their own Head round, and the fight of fo ma- ny Approvers, which they have convinc'd by the Imprefnon, convinces, them by rebound $ at leaft, if it does not convince them, it flumes them with. Courage to maintain their falfe Opinions. Their Vanity will not fuffer them to make any Retraction: they conftantly invent fome Reafon for their Defence. They never fpeak with greater. Fervency and Zeal, than when they have no- thing to fay. They fancy it an Affront, and a Defign to make them delpicable, to offer any Rea- fon againft them: and the ftronger and more judicious it is, the more it provokes their Pride and Averfion.
The bed way to defend Truth againft them, is, not to difpute it: for, 'tis bette? both for theni and. us to leave them to their Errours than provoke their Hatred. We muft take care not to wound their Heart, when we would heal their Mind; the Wounds of the former being more dangerous than thofe of the latter: befide that, we fometimes fortune to have to do with a Perfon trulv Learned, whom 'tis poffible we may deipife, for want of rightly taking his Conceptions. We muft therefore requeft of thofe who talk in fo decifive a Strain, to explain themfelves as diftincl:- ly as they can, without fuffering them to change the Subject, or make ufe of obfcure and equi- vocal Terms: and if they be truly Learned, fomething may be got by their Difcourfe. But if they be falily Learned, they will quickly be entangled and confounded by their own Words, and can thank no body for it but themfelves. And even from hence we may, perhaps, receive fome Inftruft ion or Diverfion, if we may be allow'd to divert our felves with others Infirmities, wheri we try to cure them. But what is more confiderable, we (hall prevent the weaker fort, who hear them with Admiration, frorh engaging in Errour, by following their Decifions.
For it muft be obferv'd, that Fools, or fuch as are Machinally manag'd, and follow fenfible Im- preffions, being far more numerous than Men of an enlarg'd Thought, artd governable by Reafon; one of thefe Pretenders cannot dictate and determine upon a Point, but there always are more who believe him on his Word, than others who diftruft him. But becaufe thefe falily Learn'd recede as far as poffible from common Thoughts: either out of a defire of finding an Opponent, whom they roughly handle, to elevate and (hew themfelves -, or a Subverfion of Mind, and Spirit of Contradiction: their Decifions are, for the moft part, falfe or obfcure, and they are feldom at- tended to, without drawing the Contagion of Errour.
Now the Method of diicovering the Corruptnefs or Solidity of others Opinions, is very diffi- cultly put in practice. The Reafon whereof is, That thefe Pretenders to Science are not the on- ly Perfons who would be thought to know every thing:;Tis a Failing almolt univerfal;. but more efpecially incident to Men of fome Reading and Study: which makes them always forward td talk, and explain their own Notions; but negligent and inadvertent as to other mens. Such as arg moft Complaifant and Rational, inwardly delpifing another's Opinion, make (hew only of an' Attentive Meen, whilft their Eyes betray their Thoughts, and (hew that they are bufied upon a R x quite.
quite contrary thing •> not on anfwering what is faid to them, but on what they defire to prove: which is the thing that frequently renders Converfation fo difagreeable. For as there is nothing more grateful, or wherein a Man could honour us more, than the comprehending our Reafons and approving our Opinions; fo there is nothing fo offenfive as to fee others not take, nor care to take our Meaning. For 'tis no pleafure to talk and converfe with Statues; efpecially Statues that are only fo to us, becaufe they have little Efteem for us, are carelefs to pleaie us, and follicitous only to content themfelves, by recommending their own Abilities. But if Men could hear, and anfwer well at once, Difcourfe would be molt ufeful, as well as pleafant: whereas whilft every one endeavours to be reputed Learned, all that's got by it is Conceitednefs, and unintelligible Dif- putes. Charity is fometimes wounded, and Truth feldom diicovered.
But the Ramblings which the Faljly Learned, are in their Converfation fubjett to, are in fome meafure excufable. It may be faid in their behalf, that in thefe Difcourfes Men ufe not much Caution and Advertency ^ and that the niceft and moft judicious fall frequently into Trifles and Impertinencies: and that they don't intend a Collect ion mould be made of their Sayings, as was piScalige^s and Cardinal du Perrons.
There is Reafon in thefe Excufes, and we are eafie to believe thefe Faults deferve fome fort of Indulgence. We are indeed willing to talk in Company •, but there are fome unfortunate Seafons, in which we but ill fucceed. We are not always in temper to think, or to fpeak juftly: and the time is fo fhort in fome Conjunctures, that the Mind never fo little clouded or abfent, mife- rably falls into extravagant Abfurdities, even in PerfOns moft accurate and piercing.
But though the Faults which the Fallly Learned are guilty of in Converfation, are excufable -y yet thofe they commit in their Books, after due Thinking and Confederation, are unpardonable 5 efpecially if frequent, and not.compenfated by fome good things: For by writing an ill Book, a Man occafions lofs of time to a multitude of Readers^ lubjetts them to the fame Errours he him- felf is guilty of, and caufes them to deduce ftill many others from them: which is not a little Evil.
But though it be a greater Crime than is imagined, to compofe an Evil, or only an Vfelefs Book; yet the Author is oftner rewarded than punijh'd for it. For fome Crimes there are which efcape the Lam, either becaufe they are the Fafhion, or becaufe the Judges are not courageous enough to condemn fuch Criminals as they think more Ingenious than themfelves.
For Authors are commonly look'd on as rare and extraordinary Perfons, above the ordinary fize of Men; and therefore are reverenc'd inftead of being defpis'd and punifh'd. So that there is little hopes of having a Tribunal erected for the trying and condemning all the Books that tend only to 'debauch and corrupt Reafon.
And for this Reafon, we muft never expect to have the Republick of Learning better govern'd than any other; as confifting of Men no lefs than the reft. But in order to free our felves from Errour, 'tis fit that even greater Liberty be permitted in this than other Republicks, where Novel- ty is always dangerous. For it would be a means to confirm us in our prefent Errours, to rob the Literate World of its Liberty, and indifferently to condemn all forts of Novelties.
'Tis hop'd then, I fhall not be blam'd for fpeaking againft the Government of the Learned Com- monwealth, and endeavouring to mew, that frequently the Great Men of it, who for their pro- found Learning are the Admiration of the reft, are at bottom but haughty and vain Creatures, void of Judgment, and all true Science. I am oblig'd to ufe this freedom of Speech, to prevent a blindfold Submiflion to their Decifions, and engaging in their Errours. ill. The Proofs of their Vanity, their want of Judgment, and of their Ignorance, are evidently de- °ft}* duc'd from their own Works: For if a Man would take the pains to examine them with purpofe the Fatly t0 JU(*Se °f tnem ty the Light of common Senfe, un-foreftalFd with an Efteem for thefe Authors, Leaned, he might find that the Defigns of their Studies are moftly fuch as an injudicious Vanity has for- med, and their principal End, not the perfecting their Reafon j and much lefs the regulating the Motions of their Heart -, but only the puzzling others, and feeming Wifer Men than they.
From this Profpect it is (as has been faid before) that they treat but of rare and unufual Sub- jects, and explain themfelves in as rare and unufual Terms, and quote only rare and extraordi- nary Authors. They difdain to write in their own Language, as being too common; or in plain, perfpicuous, and eafie Latin, fince their Defign is, not to be Underftood, but only to Write, and to be Admir'd. They feldom apply themfelves to Subjects that are ferviceable to the manage- ment of Life •, that's too trite and vulgar: it not being their purpofe to be ufeful to others, or themfelves, but only to be reputed Learned.
They either alledge no Reafons of things which they advance \ or if they do, they are fo my- fterious and incomprehenfible, as neither themfelves, nor any body elfe, can evidently conceive. Clear Reafons they have none •, but if they had, they would not ufe them: becaufe they fur- prize not the Mind, are thought too fimple and common, and fuited to the Abilities of all Man- kind. They rather bring Authorities to prove, or with pretence to prove their Notions: for the Authorities employ'd feldom prove any thing by the Senfe they contain, but only by being Greek and Arab'ich But perhaps it will be pertinent to fpeak fomething of their Quotations, which will, acquaint us in part with the difpofition of their Mind.
It is, methinKs, manif eft "that nothing but a falily-term'd Learning, and a Spirit of Pol\mathyy could bring thefe Citations into fafhion, as they have formerly been, and are Itill at this day with fome of the Learned. For 'tis ufual with fome Authors to be perpetually quoting long Senten- ces, without any Reafon for it; whether becaufe the things they advance are too clear to be doubted Chap. IX. The Search after Truth.. i ei doubted of; or that they are too intricate and obfeure to be made out by the Authority of their Authors-, fince they could know nothing of them: or laftly, becaufe the Citations inferted are in- ferviceable to adorn and beautifie their Difcourfe.
'Tis repugnant to common Sehfe, to bring a Greek Pafjage to prove the Air tranfparent, becaufe 'tis evident to all the World •, to employ the Authority of Ariftotle to perfilade us that Intelli- gences move the Heavens, becaufe we are certain Ariftotle could not know it; and laftly, to min- gle ftrange Languages, Arabian and Ferfian Proverbs with French, Englijh, or Latin Books, writ- ten for every body: iorafmuch as thefe Citations cannot be ornamental; at leaft, 'are fuch fanta- Iticai Ornaments as difguft rnoft Perfons, and can fatisfie but very few.
Neverthelefs, the greateft part of thole who would fain be thought Learned, are fo extream- ly pleased with this kind of GibbriJJ), that they blufli not to quote in ftrange Tongues which they do not underitand; and tug might and main to draw into their Books an Arabick PaiTage, which they cannot fo much as read. Thus they puzzle themfelves ftrangely, to effect a thing repugnant to good Senfe; but that facrifices to their Vanity, and makes them efteem'd by Sots.
One very confiderable Fault is ftill behind $ which is, that they are but in little care to feem to have read with Choice and Judgment: all they defire being, to be reckon'd great Readers, efpe- cially of obfeure Books, that they may feem more Learned; of Books that are fcarce and dear, that they may be thought to have every thing; of wicked and impious Books ( which honeft Men are afraid to read ) with much the fame Spirit as fome boaft to have afred Crimes, which" others dare not. Hence they rather cite very Dear, very Rare, very Ancient and Obfeure Books, than other more Common and Intelligible: Aftrological, Cabaliflical, and Magical, Books, than fuch as are good and wholefome: as if they did not fee, that Reading being a kind of Con- verjing, they mould rather defire to feem induftrioufly to have fought the Acquaintance of Good and Intelligible, than Wicked and Obfeure Authors.
For, as no Man in his Senfes would chufe out for ordinary Converfe People that want an Inter- preter, when the fame things that are to be learn'd of them might be known another way; fo 'tis ridiculous to read Books not to be underftood without a Di&ionary, when the fame things may- be had in thofe that are more intelligible. And, as it is a fign of a deprav'd Nature, to affect the Company and Converfation of the Impious-, fo 'tis the Criterion of a corrupt Heart, to delight in reading Wicked Books. But 'tis an extravagant Pride, for a Man to pretend to have read thofe which he has not: which yet is a thing of very common occurrence. For we find Men of Thirty Years (landing, quote more ill Books in their Works, than they could have read in many Ages: whilft they would have others believe, they have very exa&ly read them. But rnoft of the Books of fome of thefe Learned Gentlemen, owe their Birth to the kind Dictionary, and all their Read- ing may be redue'd to the Indexes of the Books they quote, and lome Common Places heap'd to- gether from out of different Authors.
I venture not to enter into the Particulars of thefe things, nor to give Inftances to prove them; for fear of provoking Perfons fo fierce and cholerick as thefe Learned Pretenders, as not caring to be revil'd in Greek and Arabick. Befides that, 'tis needlefs more fenfibly to evince what I have faid by 'particular Allegations, the Mind of Man being ready enough to tax the Management of others, and make particular Application of this Difcourfe. In the meantime, let them hug themfelves, and feed upon this vain Fantom of Greatnefs; and give one another the Applaufes which we deny them. For we have been, perhaps, already too troublefome, by rnolefting them in their fo feemingly fweet and grateful Enjoyments.
CHAP. IX.
How the Inclination for Honours and Riches conduces to Errour.
HOnours and Riches, no lefs than Vertue and Science, which we have already fpoke of, are principal Acquirements to give us the Attendant over other Men. For there feems to ac- crue to our Being a Growth and Enlargement, and kind of Independency from the PofTeffion of thefe Advantages. So that the Love we have for our felves, naturally ftreaming out to Honours and Riches, every body may be faid to have fome fort of Inclination for them. We will explain in brief, how thefe Inclinations obviate the Difcovery of Truth, and engage us in Falftiood and Errour; It has been ffiewn in feveral places, that much Time and Labour, Afiiduity and Contention of Mind, muft go to the clearing up Compound Truths, furrounded with Difficulties, and depend- ing on many Principles. Whence it is eafie to conclude, that Men ofpublick Characters, of great Employments, who have large Eftates. to look after, and great Affairs to manage, and whofe Hearts "are fix'd upon Riches and Honours, are not the fitteft Enquirers after Truth; and that they commonly err in point of all things, difficultly known whenever they pretend to judge of them; And that becaufe, Firft, They have little time to lay out in the Search of Truth* Secondly, Thev take but little Pleafure in this Search* • J Thirdly, 1^6 F. M A LEER AN CHE ConUtning Book IV.
Thirdly, They are very incapable of Attention, becaufe the Capacity of their Mind is divided by the multitude of the Ideas of the things they wifti for j which take up their Thoughts whether they will or no.
In the fourth place, They fancy they know every thing, andean hardly be indue'd to believe their Inferiours have more Reafon than themfelves: fome Matters of Faclt they may vouchfafe to learn of them, but ate above being taught by them folid and neceffary Truths: contradict them, or difabufe them, and they fly but in a Paffion.
In the fifth. place, Becaufe much Incenfe of Applaufe is ufually given them in all their Imagi- nations, though never fo falfe and remote.from common Senfe-, and fiich as differ from their* Opinion, though only to defend undeniable Truths, are rally'd and ridicul'd: And 'tis the fulfome Flatteries of thofe about them, that ftrengthen them in their Errours, encourage that illegitimate Efteem of themfelves, and fet them up for unappealable Judges of all things.
In the fixth place, They dwell only upon Serifible Notions, as fitter for common Converfation, and to keep up the Efteem of Men, than the pure and abftraft Ideas of the Mind, which we employ in the finding out of Truth...Laftly, Thofe Who afpire to any Dignity, ftrive, as much as poffible, to accommodate and de- mean themfelves to the Meafure and Capacity of others j becaufe nothing provokes Mens Envy and Averfion like the pretending to uncommon Notions. Rare it is for Men, whofe Minds and Hearts are taken up with the Thoughts and Defires of making their Fortunes, to be able to difco- ver hidden Truths: but when they do, they abdicate them out of Intereft, and becaufe theDefence of them will not accord with their Arhbition. A Man muft fide commonly with Injujiice to be- come a Magifirate: Solid and uncommon Piety is a frequent Bar to a Benefice ^ and the generous Love of Truth, often deprives Men of the Pulpit it mould be taught in.
All thefe Reafons in conjunction, extremely fubjecl: Men to Errour ■„ and incapacitate, for the Difcovery of occult Truths, fuch as are exalted above others by their Honours, Birth, and For- tune, or who are only intent upon making Eftablifhments, and railing Eftates. For among the things that are requifite to the avoiding Errour^ in Queftions any Whit ahftrufe, there are two especially not eafie to be met with in the Perfons foremention'd •, viz. Attention of Mind, to go to the bottom of Things-, and Retention, not to judge of them with too much Precipitation* Thofe very Men who are Ele&ed for the Inftrufting others, and who mould have no other Aim or Intereft, than the qualifying themfelves for that purpofe, commonly grow Erroneous as foon as they take Publick Employments: either becaufe having but little time to themfelves, they cannot give Attention and Application to things that require much; or, that being ftrangely ambitious of being thought Learned, they confidently pronounce of all things without Referve, and are impa- tient either of Oppofition or Inftru&ion.
CHAP. X.
Of the Love of Pleafure, with regard to Morality. I. That Pleafure is to be fhunrid, though it mahg us happy. II. It ought not to carry us to the loving Senfible Goods.
WE have treated in the three laft Chapters, of the Inclination we have for the Prefervation of our Being -, and fhewn how it occafions us to fall into feveral Errours. We (hall now fpeak to That we have for our Well-being; that is, for Pleafures, and whatever makes us more happy or content, or is thought capable of doing it: And we will attempt to difcover the Errors that lpring from this Inclination.
There is a Tribe of Philofopbers, that endeavour to perfuade the World, That Pleafure is no Good, nor Pain an Evil; that 'tis poffible to be happy in the midft of moft violent Pains, and mi- ferable in the midft of the greateft Pleafures. As thefe Philofopbers are very Pathetical and Ima- ginative, they carry away weak Minds which give way to the Impreffion their Difcourfe produces in them: For the Stoicks are fomewhat Vifionar y, and Vifionifts are vehement; and fo eafily im- print on others the falfe Sentiments they are themfelves prepoffefs'd with. But becaufe there is no Conviilion againft Experience, and internal Confidence, or Senfation; all thefe pompous and magnificent Reafons, which dazle and ftagger the Imaginations of Men, vanifh with all their Gaudery and Luftre, as foon as the Soul is touch'd with any fenfible Pleafure and Pain. And thofe who have plac'd all their Confidence in this falfe Perfuafion of their Mind, find themfelves, up- on the leaff Aflault of Vice, deftitute of Wifdom, forcelefs, and unnerv'd: they are fenfible they were deceiv'd, and find they are vanquifh'd. L If the Philofopbers cannot give their Difciples Strength to Conquer their PaJJjons, they fhould pleafure at leaft forbear to feduce them, and make them fancy they have no Enemies to Afj'ault. Things "omnJdty ^10ulci b.e *P°ken as they are: Pleafure is always a Good, and Pain always an Evil: But it is not it mutes w always for our Good, to enjoy Pleafure ^ and 'tis fometimes advantageous to fufter Pain. haw. But to make my Meaning more intelligible, we muft know, Firft, Chap. X. the Search after Truth, i^j Firft, That none but GOD is powerful enough to act upon us, and to produce in us the Senfe of Pleafure and Pain. For 'tis manifeft to every Man that confults his Reafon, and defpifes the Reports of Senfe, that 'tis not the Senfible Objects that really act upon us, nor is it any more the Soul that produces in her felf her Pain and Pleafure occafwnally from them.,., Secondly, That in ordinary Procedure no Good is to be given, but to encourage us to, or rer compence us for fome good Action; nor any Evil to be afflicted, but either to prevent a wicked Action, or to punifh it-, and therefore fince GOD always acts with Order, and by the Rules of Jultice, every Pleafure rauft incline us to fome Good. Attion, or Reward us for it, and every Pain avert us from fome bad Atfion, or punifh us for it.,.
Thirdly, There are Alliens which are good in one fenfe, and evil in another. 'Tis, for inftanceV ' an evil Action to expofe ones felf to Death when GOD forbids it; but a good, when, he com- mands it. For all our Actions are good or bad, becaufe GOD has commanded or forbidden them by his firft General Will, which is the Order and Injlitution of Nature; or by his other Wills or particular Commandments, which are neceiTary to its re-eftablifhment.
I affirm then, That Pleafure is always good, but that it is not always advantageous to enjoy it5 and that firit, Becaufe initead of engaging us to him, who alone is capable of caufing it; it dif- engages us from him, to unite us to the falfly feeming Caufe of it: it loofens us from GOD, to unite us to a vile Creature. For though thofe whom true Philofopby has enlightned, think fome- times that Pleafure is not caus'd by External Objects, which may in fome meafure incline them to the acknowledging and loving GOD in all things; yet fince the Sin, the Reafon of Man is fo feeble, and his Senfes and Imagination fo prevalent over his Mind that they fpeedily corrupt his Heart, whilft he deprives not himfelf, according to the Advice of the Gofpel, of whatever leads not of it felf to GOD. For the bell Philofopby is unable to cure the Mind, and withftand the Corruptions of Pleafure.