Secondly, Becaufe Pleafure being a Reward, it is an Act of Injuftice for a Man to produce in his Body thofe Motions which oblige- GOD, purfuant to his firft Will, to give us the Senfation of Pleafure, when we don't deferve it; either becaufe the Action we do is unprofitable, or crimi- nal •, or that being full of Sin, we have no Right to demand a Recompence. The Enjoyment of Senfible Pleafures was juftly due to Man in his Regular Actions, whilft he remain'd Innocent. But fince the Fall, there are no Senfible Pleafures entirely innocent, or incapable of harming us when we tafte them. For it is commonly fufficient only to tafte them, to become their Slave.
Thirdly, GOD being Juft, cannot chufe but punifh one day the Violence that was done him, by obliging him to reward with Pleafure criminal Actions committed againft him. When our Soul fhall be dif-united from our Body, GOD will be difpens'd from the Obligation he has im- pos'd upon himfelf of giving Senfations anfwerable to the Motions of the Animal Spirits; but he will ftill be oblig'd to fatisfie his Juftice: and fo that will be the feafon of his Wrath and Venge- ance. Then though he change not the Order of Nature, but remain ever fix'd and immutable in his firft Will, he will punifh the unmerited Pleafures of the Voluptuous with Pains that will never have an end.
Fourthly, Becaufe the Certainty we have in this Life of the future Execution of that Juftice^ exagitates the Mind with dreadful Anxieties, and throws it into a fort of Defpair, which renders the Voluptuous miferable, even amidft the greateft Pleafures.
Fifthly, Becaufe of thofe difquieting Remorfes, which almoft ever attend the molt Innocent Pleafures, by reafon we are inwardly convinced we don't deferve them: which Remorfes rob us of a certain internal Joy that is found even in the Severities of Repentance.
And therefore though Pleafure be a Good, yet it muft be acknowledg'd, that the Enjoyment of it is not always to our Advantage, for the foregoing Reafons: And for others of like nature, molt requifite to be known, and eafily deducible from them-, it muft be granted, that it is molt com- monly highly advantageous to fuffer Pain, though really an Evil.
Neverthelefs, every Pleafure is a Good, and actually makes happy the Enjoyer at the time of Enjoyment, and fo long as he enjoys it i and every Pain is an Evil, and makes the Sufferer actually unhappy at the inftant of fuffering, and fo much as he fuffers it. The Righteous and Holy may- be faid to be the molt miferable of all Men in this Life, and molt worthy of Companion. Si in vita tantum in Cbrifio fperamus, miferabiliores fumus omnibus bominibus, fays St. Paul. For thofe i Cor. 155 that weep, andfuffer Per fecution for Rigbteoufnefs fake, are not bleffed for fuffering Perfecution^. for the fake of Rigbteoufnefs, but becaufe the Kingdom of Heaven is Theirs; and a great Reward is laid up for them in Heaven: that is, becaufe they fhall be happy. Such as are perfecuted for Righteoufnefs, are thereby Righteous,, Vertuous, and Perfect, as being in the Divine Order, and becaufe Perfection confifts in the obferving it. But they are not happy, becaufe they fuffer. There fliall be a time when they fhall fuffer no more, and then they fhall be happy, as well as righ- teous and perfect.
However, I deny not but the Righteous even in this Life may be in fome meafure happy, by the Strength of their Hope and Faith, which bring thofe future Goods as it were prefent to their Minds: For it is certain, that the vigorous and lively Hope of any Good brings it clofer to the Mind, and anticipates the Enjoyment: and thus makes a Man happy in part, fince 'tis the Tafle \ and the Poffeffion of Good, 'tis Pleafure, that?nakes us happy.
Therefore we ffiould not tell Men that Senfible Pleafures are not good, and that they render the Poifeffors never the Happier, fince this is falfe; and at rhe time of 'Temptation they find it fo to their Misfortune. They ought to be told, That thefe Pleafures are in their own nature good, Sf and and after a fort capable to make them happy; yet for all that to be avoided, for fuch like Rea- fons as the foremention'd:, but that they have riot ftrength enough to withftand them of them- felves, beeaufe they defire to be happy by an invincible Inclination, which thefe tranfitory Plea- fures, to be avoided by them, in fome mealure fatisfie: and therefore are under a fatal neceflity of being loft, unlefs refcued and alTifted. Thefe things are to be inculcated to them, to give them a diftin£t Knowledge of their own Imbecillities, and their need of a Redeemer.
We ought to fpeak to Men as our Lord, and not as the Stolcks do, who underftand neither the Nature nor Diftemper of an humane Mind. We muft continually tell them they are to Irate and defpife themfelves, and not look for a Settlement and Happinefs here below; that they mull con- tinually bear their Crofs, or the Inftrument of their Suffering, and lofe their Life at prefent, to fave it everlaftingly. Laftly, we mull mew them their Obligation to a£t quite contrary to their Defires, to make them fenfible of their Impotence to Good. For their Will is invincibly bent on Happinefs 5 which 'tis impoffible actually to obtain, without doing what they have a Mind to. Perhaps being fenfible of their prefent Evils, and knowing their future, they will humble them- ielves on Earth: poffibly they will cry to Heaven, will feek out a Mediator, Hand in fear of fen- fible Objefts, and conceive a falutary Abhorrence for whatever Hatters Concupiicence and their Senfes. Probably they may enter into that Spirit of Prayer and Repentance fo neceffary to the ob- taining Grace, without which no Strength, no Health, no Salvation can be expected. II. We are inwardly convinc'd, that Pleafure is good:, which inward Conviction is not faife: for it ought Pleafure is really To. We are naturally convinc'd, that Pleafure is the Character of Good, and that "wtot™7 na£ura^ Conviftion is certainly true: for whatever caufes Pleafure, is unqueftionably very good, loving Sen- and amiable^ But we are not affur'd that fenfible Objecls, or even our Soul it felf, are capable of fible Goods, producing Pleafure in us. For there is no reafon why we fhould believe it, but a thoufand why we mould not. Thus fenfible Objects are neither good nor amiable: they are to be employed, as lerviceable to the Prelervation of Life-, but we muft not love them, as being incapable of afting upon us. The Soul ought only to love what is good to her, and able to make. her happier and more perfect: and therefore^nothing but what's above her can be the Obje£t of her Love, fince 'tis evident her Perfection can derive from nothing that is not fo.
But beeaufe we judge that a Thing is the Caufe of fome Effe£t when it conftantiy attends it,.we imagine that fenfible Obje&s a£t on us, beeaufe at their approach we have frefh Senfations, and beeaufe we fee not him who caufes them really in us. In tailing a Fruit, we have a Senfation of ■Sweetnefs; and we attribute that Sweetnefs to the Fruit, which we judge both to caufe it and con- tain it. We fee not GOD, as we fee and touch this Fruit; nay, we do not fo much as think on him, nor perhaps on our felves. And fo we judge not that GOD is the true Caufe of that 'Sweetnefs -, nor that it is a Modification of our Soul: but impute both the Caufe and Effe£t to the Fruit we eat.
What I have faid of Senfations relating to the Body, may be underflood ofthofe which have no relation to it •, fuch are thole which are incident to pure Intelligences.
A Spirit contemplates it felf, and finds nothing wanting to its Happinefs or Perfection, or elfe fees that it is not in polTeffion of what it defires. Upon the View of its Happinefs it feels Joy; upon the fight of its Mifery it feels Sorrow. It immediately imagines, that 'tis the fight of its Happinefs which produces in it felf this Senfation of Joy •, beeaufe this Senfation ftill accompanies this Perception -, and fancies likewife that the fight of its Mifery is what produces in it the Senfa- tion of Sorrow: beeaufe the latter is a conftant Attendant of the former. The true Caufe of thefe Senfations, which is GOD alone, does not appear to it; nor does it, it may be, think on GOD. For GOD a£ts in us in an imperceptible manner.
GOD rewards us with a Senfe of Joy, when we find our felves in the ftate we ought to be in, to the intent we may continue in it, that our Anxiety may ceafe; and that we may fully enjoy our Happinefs without fuffering the Capacity of our Mind to be taken up with any thing elfe. But he produces in us a Senfation of Sorrow, when we know we are not in our cOnvenienr ftate, i to the end we may not flay in it •, but reftlelly feek out for the Perfection which we want. For GOD continually drives us towards Good, when we know that we do not polTefs it, but gives us a powerful Check when we fee we are fully poffefs'd of it. Wherefore 'tis evident to me, that the Senfations of Intellectual Joy and Sorrow, no lefs than Senfible, are not the voluntary Produ- ctions of the Mind.
Our Reafon then fhould conftantiy teach us to difcover that invifible Hand which fills us with. Good, and which lies difguis'd to our Mind under Senfible Appearances. This Hand we are to adore and to love, and alfo to fear -, fince though it loads us with Pleafures, it can likewife over- whelm us with Pains. We ought to love it with a Love of Choice, an enlightned Love, a Love worthy of GOD, and our felves. Our Love is worthy of GOD, when it proceeds from our Knowledge of his being Amiable: and this Love is worthy of our felves; for that being Rea- fonable Creatures, we ought to bellow our Love on that which Reafon teaches us is worthy of it. But we love fenfible Things with a Love unworthy our felves, and undeferv'd by them: whilft being reafonable, we love them without any Reafon for it-, as not clearly knowing them to be lovely: and on the contrary, knowing they are not. But we are betray'd by Pleafure to the Love of them -, the blind and irregular Love of Pleafure being the true Caufe of the falfe Judgments of Men in Subjects of Morality.
CHAP- Chap. XI. The Search after Truth, i £.
Of the Love of Pleafure, with Reference to Speculative Sciences. I. How it dijables us from dif covering Truth. II. Some Injiances.
OUR Inclination for Senfible Pleafures being mifgovern'd, is not only the Original of thoie dangerous Errours we are guilty of, in Subjects of Morality, and the general Caufe of the Corruption of our Manners -, but likewife one of the main Caufes of the Depravation of our Reafon: And it infenfibly engages us in moft grofs, but lefs dangerous Errours, in point of Sub- lefts purely Speculative-, becauie itdifables us from bringing a fufficient Attention to comprehend and judge well of things that do not affect us.
We have fpoken feveral times already of the Difficulty we find to apply our felves to Subjects fomewhat Abftratf, the Subject of our Difcourfe requiring it. As towards the End of the Firft Book, where "we fhew'd that Senfible Ideas more affecting the Soul, than Ideas purely Intellectual, ihe was more taken up with the out-fide manners than the Things themfelves. So again, in the Se- cond, where treating of the Tendernefs of the Fibres of the Brain, we fhew'd whence the Soft- ' nefs of certain Effeminate Minds proceeded. Laftly, in the Third, when {peaking of the Atteto-. iian of the Mind, it was neceffary to mew, that it was very carelefs of things Speculative •, but.. very attentive to fuch as affected her, and made her feci Pleafure or Pain.
Our Errours have moft c ommonly feveral Caufes contributing to their Rife •, fo that it ought not to be thought it is for want of Order, that we repeat almoft the fame things, and affign feveral Caufes of the fame Errours •, it is really becaufe they have fo many. I ftill fpeak of Occafional Caufes •, for we have often declar'd, they have no other true and real Caufe, than the wrong ufe of our Liberty -, which wrong ufe confilfs in our not ufing.it fo much as we might, as we have explain d at the beginning of this Treatife.
We are not therefore to be blam'd, if, in order to make it fully conceiv'd, how, for Inftance, the Senfible Manners Things are involv'd in, furprize and lead us into Errour, we were oblig'd, by way of Anticipation, to fpeak of our Inclination for Pleafures in the other Books, which feems fitter to have been referv'd for this, wherein we purpofely treat of the Natural Inclinations; (and the fame may be faid of other things in other places:) All the harm that will come of it, is this, that we may difpenfe with many things here, which we had been oblig'd to explain, if it had not been done elfewhere.
All things in the Humane Nature are fo link'd and twin'd to one another, that we find our felves often, as it were, over-whelnfd with the Number of things neceilary to be faid at the fame time, to fet our Conceptions in an open and clear Light. We are fometimes fore'd to let things go unfeparated, which Nature has join'd together; and to proceed againft our own pre- fcrib'd Method, when this Method throws us in Confufion, as it inevitably does on fome Occa- sions. And yet, after all, it is impoflible to make others take in all our Conceptions. All that can commonly be pretended to, is, to put others in a Capacity of difcovering with Pleafure and Etife what we have difcovef d our felves with great Pains and Patigation. And fince 'tis impo£ lible to make any Difcovery without Attention, our Studies mould be chiefly employ 'd on Means of making others Attentive. This is what we have eflay'd to do, though, we muft acknowledge, but weakly perform'd; and we are the willinger to confefs we have been defective, that the Con- feffion may provoke our Readers to fupply themfelves, what is wanting in us, to make them at- tentive, in order to penetrate the Bottom of Subjects., which deferve to be thorowly confider'd.
Infinite are the Errours wherein our Inclination for Pleafures, and in general for whatever affects us, engages us -, becaufe that Inclination diffipates the Sight of the Mind, and fixes it continually on the confus'd Ideas of theSenfes, and the Imagination; and inclines us to judge over-haftily of all things by the bare Relation which they have to us.
Truth never appears but when we fee things as they are in themfelves; which we never do, I. unlefs we fee them in him who contains them, in an intelligible manner. When we perceive,.fHb0^ lt them within our felves, we perceive them at a very lame and imperfect rate; or rather we per- ^m "-r ceive our own Senfations, and not the things we deiire to perceive^ and which we falfly think vermg we do. - T™tb< To fee things as they are in themfelves, requires much Application, becaufe atprefent we can- not unite to GOD without great Pain and Reluftancy: But to fee them in our felves, requires no Application at all on our part, fince we arefenfible of what touches us whether we will or no. We do not naturally find any Preventing Pleafure in our Union with GOD; the pure Ideas of things do not touch and quicken us: Therefore the Inclination we have for Pleafure, is not a Means to. apply and unite us to G 0 D, but on the contrary ilackens our Engagements ro-him, and perpetually removes us farther from him, carrying us continually to confider things by their Sen- fible Ideas, becaufe thefe falfe and impure Ideas are thofe that affect: us. Love of Pleafure then, and the Actual Enjoyment of it,' which revives and corroborates this Love, throw us continually off Truth, to plunge us into Errour, Hi Thoft :e 1 6o F. Malebrauche Concerning Book IV.
Thole therefore who would draw near to Truth, to be illuminated by its Light, muft begin by the Privation of Pleafure. They muft carefully iliun whatever fenfibly affefts, and agreeably mares the Mind. For the Voice of Truth cannot be heard, unlefs in the Silence of the Senfes and thePaffions: An Averfion to the Worlds -and -'Contempt for all Senfible things, being equally ne- ceflary to the Perfection of the.Mind as to the Converfion of the Heart.
When our Pleafures are great, and our Sedations lively, we are incapable of the moft fimple Truths; nor do we agree to common Notions, unlefs of a fenfible Make and Character. When our Pleafures' or other Senfations are moderate, we may difcover fome plain and eafie Truths: But if it were pof- fible to be abfolutely delivered from Pleafures and Senfations, we mould be able eafily to difcover the moft abftra£t and difficult Truths that are known. For proportionably to our Removing from what is not GOD, we approach to GOD himfelf •, we avoid Errour, and difcover Truth. But ever fince the Ivz//,fince the disorderly Love of Preventing Pleafure, which domineers and triumphs, the Mind is grown fo weak, that it can pierce into nothing '•; and ib materialize, and dependent on its Senfes, that it cannot lay hold of things abftra£l and unafTecling. With much ado it perceives com- mon Notions, and for want of Advertency, frequently concludes them falfe or obfcure. It cannot diftinguifh the Truth of things from their Utility, the Relation they have to one another, from the Relation they have to it f elf, and often takes thofe to be moft true that are moft ufeful, agreeable and moving. Finally, this Inclination infects and muddies all our Perceptions of Objetts, and confequently all the Judgements that we make of them. Here follows fome Examples: II. " 'Tis a common Notion, that Vertue is preferable to Vice; that 'tis better to be Sober and Chaffy Some In- than Intemperate and Voluptuom. But the Inclination for Pleafure fo ftrangely confounds that Idea Jlances. on certain Occafions, that we have but a tranfient glimpfe of it, nor can draw thofe Confequences from it that are neceffary to the Management of Life. The Sou/is violently bent upon the Pleafures fhe hopes for, that fhe fuppofes them innocent, andfeeks only for the Means of enjoying them.
Every body well knows that 'tis more eligible to be Juft than Rich: That Juftice exalts a Man more than the PofTeflion of the moft magnificent Buildings, which often ferve more to manifeft the Greatnefs of the Injuftices and Crimes of the PoiTeiTor, than his own Grandeur. But the Plea- fure that wretched Men feceive in the vain Oftentation of their falfe Grandeur, fufficiently fills up the narrow Capacity of their Mind, to conceal and obfcure fo evident a Truth from them. They abfurdly imagine they are Great Men, becaufe they have Great Houfes.
Special Algebra, (or Analyticks,) is certainly the flneft, I mean the moft fruitful and moft certain of all Sciences. Without it^ the Mind has neither Penetration nor Extent -, and with it, it is ca- pable of knowing almoft whatever is poflible to be certainly and evidently known. As imperfect as this Science has been, it has made Famous all that have been skill'd in't,and knew how to employ it, having by it difcover'd Truths thatfeem'd incomprehenfible to other Men. It is fo well propor- tion'd to an Humane Mind, that without dividing its Capacity with things ufelefs to the Queftion, it infallibly condufts it to its Point. In a word, it is an Vniverfal Science, and as it were the Key of all other. Yet as valuable as it is in it felf, it has no Charms nor Luftre to captivate Men 5 for this Reafon only, that it is not of a Senfible Nature. It has been buried in Oblivion for many Ages, and there are ftill very many that know not fo much as the Name; and fcarce one in a thou- fand to be found that underftands any thing of it. The moft Learned, who have reviv'd it in our Days, have not yet carried it very far, nor handled it with that Order and Perfpicuity it deferves.
Being Men no lefs than others, they have grown at length difgufted with thefe pure Truths, whilft unaccompanied with Senfible Pleafure •, and the Uneafinefsof their Will, debauch'd by Sin; the Le- vity of their Mind, which depends on the Motion and Circulation of the Blood, have with-held them from reeding and growing upon thofe great, thofe vaft and fecond Truths, which are the Im- mutable and Univerfal Rules of all tranfitory and particular Truths poflible to be exaQly known.
Metaphyfick likewife is an Abjlratl Science, which flatters not the Senfes, nor does the Soul receive any Pleafure in the Study ofit^ and for the fame Reafon it is fo miferably negle&ed, that 'tis ufual to find Perfons ftupid enough confidently to deny Common Notions. There are thofe who ftick not to deny, that we may, or ought to affirm of a thing, what is included in the clear and diftincl: Idea we have of it: That Nothing has no Properties: That a thing cannot be annihilated without a Miracle: That a Body cannot move by any Force of its own: That a Body in Motion cannot com- municate to occurrent Bodies more Motion than it has it felf; and other things of the lame kind. They have never confider'd thefe Axioms with a View fteady, and diftinct enough, to fee clearly the Truth of them ■, and they have fometimes try'd Experiments, which have abufively convinc'd them, that fome of thefe Axioms were falfe.
They have feen in certain Junctures, that two vifible Bodies meeting each others, have ceas'd to move at the Inftant of their Collifion. They have obferv'd in others, that the impuls'd Body had mere Motion than the vifible impelling; and this fenfible Obfervation of fome Experiments, the Reafons whereof they don't perceive, makes them determine about things againft certain Princi- ples, and which go for common Notions with all Attentive and Confidering Men. Ought they not to confider, that Motions may be communicated from Vifible to Invifible Bodies, when Bo- dies meet in their Motion? And from Vifible to Invifible on other Occafions? When a Body is fufpended by a Cord, 'tis not the Sciffars which cut the Cord, which gives Motion to that Body, but an Invifible Matter: When we throw a Fire-coal into an heap of Gun-pouder, 'tis not the Motion of Coal, but an Invifible Matter which feparates all the Parts of the Pouder, and actu- ates them with a Motion capable of blowing up an Houfe. A thoufand unknown Ways there are whereby the Motion of an Invifible Matter is communicated to Grofs and Vifible Bodies: At Chap. XL The Search after Truth; At leaft it is not evident that it cannot be done, as it is evident that the moving Force of Bodies can neither be augmented nor diminifh'd by the ordinary Strength of Nature.
Thus Men feeing that the Wood they throw on the Fire ceafestobewhatitwas1, and that all the fenfible Qualities they obferve in it, vanifli away, imagine from thence they have Right to conclude it poffible for a thing to return into Nothing, whence it came.. They fee the Wood no more and rhey fee but a few Allies that fucceed it, and thereupon judge that the greater} part of the Wood is reduc'd to nothing, as if it could not be feparated into Parts not poflible to be feen. At leaft it is not fo evident rhat this is impoflible, as it is evident that the Power which gives Being to all things is not liable to Change; and that by the ordinary Force of Nature, Being cannot be reduc'd to Nothing, as Nothing cannot begin to be. But few Men know what it is to retire into themfelves, to hear the Voice of Truth fpeaking to them within, by which they ought to judge of all things -, 'tis their Eyes that govern their Determinations. They judge by what they feel, and not by what they conceive -, for They feel with Pleafure, but conceive with Pain.
Demand of allthe Men in the World, whether it may not be affirm'd without Danger of Er- rour, that xheWhole is greater than its Part -, and I am positive not one will be found, but will im- mediately anfwer pertinently to the Question. Ask them afterwards, whether we may with the fame Security affirm of a thing, what we clearly conceive to be included in the Idea rcprefenting it, and you'll find that few will grant it without boggling and hefitation; more will deny, and rnoft of all will not know what to fay to't. And yet this Metaphyseal Axiom,- viz. That we affirm of a thing what we clearly conceive to be contain d in the Idea that reprefents it, is more evident than this I Axiom, Tlie Whole is bigger than its Part: For as much as this laft is not an Axiom, but only a Conclusion in refpe£l of the former -, it may beprov'd from the former Axiom, That the Whole is bigger than its Part 5 but the former can't be prov'd by any other, as being absolutely the Firft and the Foundation of all clear and evident Knowledge. Whence comes it then that no bo- dy hefitates at this Conclufion, and yet many doubt of the Principle from whence 'tis taken -, but only that the Ideas of Whole and Part are fenfible, and we fee, as we may fo fay, with our Eyes, that the Whole is bigger than its Part, but have no ocular Proof of the Truth of the prime Fun- damental Axiom of all the Sciences?
Whereas there is nothing in this Axiom which naturally fixes and, applies the Mind, we muft be willing to confider it, and that too with fome Conftancy and Refolution, to be evidently con- vine'd of the Truth of it. The Earneftnefs of the Will mult fupply the Defe£t of fenfible In- ducements: But the Thoughts of considering Objects which have no Charms for the Senfes, ne- ver enter Mens Heads; or if they do, their Endeavour is too languid and ineffectual.
For (to carry on our faid Instance) they think 'tis, evident, That the Whole is bigger than its Part; that a Mountain of Marble is poflible ^ and that a. Mountain without a Valley is impofli- ble, but that there is not equal Evidence for the Exiftence of a. GOD. Neverthelefs, we may aflert, that there is equal Evidence -in all thefe Propositions, fince they are all at an equal distance from the firft Principle.