81 The fomteer/ Heads of this Imaginary Method, are in the places whence they are taken either incidental Propofirions, or Anfwers to Objeaions, or Opinions he afcribes to me, for want or Undemanding what.he engages; or laftly Examples, which of themfelves neither are nor can be Heads of a Method. Here fol- lows the firft of thefe Heads. ■ _"L..-.:;..-.., <. •! „ A A • I begin thus " The Mind (or Soul) of Man being neither material nor extended, is un- p,*e r " doubtedly a fimple Subftance, indivifible, and without any Compofmon of Parts notwith- " Handing it has been the cuitom to diftingifli in it two Faculties, namely, the Underitand- « ins and the Will-, which it is neceiTary in the firft place to explain: for it feems, &?c. And m order to render the abftraa Ideas of thefe two words fenfible, I explain them not as our Author mifreprefents me, with delation to the Effence of Matter, which he fuppofes unknown; but by Relation to. the Properties which all the World acknowledge are in Matter: i.e. the capacity of being movd, and or receiving diffe- rent external Figures, and internal Configurations. „.t,, „ ',, • IMAX-I. The Animadverter fuppohng, as has been faid, that the Book he impugns is a Method, be- Pa-e 20. • gins thus: The firft thing to be obfervd when a Man pretends to the fear ch of Truth, is not to tuppofe he has already found it, though he be in perfect poffejfion of it, &c. And lower, Which ge "' thins the Author feems not to have Sufficiently confide? d; for at his very firft. Jetting out, he engages in the fuppofition of a thing, the Knowledge whereof is the principal motive to bis Enquiry after Truth, and which he ought not to determine before he had exhaufted the greateji ^iieflions in Phlofophy. Thus it is he enters on his matter in his firjl Chapter. The Mind of Man being neither material nor extended, &e. 'tis eafie to fee this Supposition is not indifferent, &c. ' ',.
I aniwer, firft, that it was not my Defign to give a Method in the Book he impugns, but only to prepare the Mind by delivering it from Prejudices.
Secondly, that though it had been my Defign, I might have-fuppos'd fome Truths, which are commonly acknowledge as that the Soul is not material: efpecialy if I employ them not as a Foundation to build 0TanlwerSthe third place, that thePropofitionhe will have to be an Head of my Method is an incidental Propofition. The bare conftruaion of the words, is a fufficient indication; the procefs of the Difcourfe an undeniable proof-, and all that I fay in this place might fubfift though the Soul were material. Tk not the part of a good Critick fo take an incidental Propofition, for a Fundamental and an Head of a Method. Nor is this to prove I have fiippos'd to have found the Truth I am in quell of* fince the thing I fuppofe, or rather which I do not examine, is not of any ufe to me. ^,.
When it was neceiTary to the fequel of Difcourfe, to know that the Soul was a kind of * Book i. Being diflina from Matter, * I have prov'd it, or referf d to thole that have. But why will •Ch. 9. B.?. in he oblige me to prove a thing in. this place,.which would be ufelefs to the following Dilfeveral places. courfe banci j f^ouid have been forry to have prov'd here? Whether the Soul be material or not it is always true, that it has been the cuftom to diftinguifh. two Faculties in it, the Underftanding and Will. Thefe two words are in ufe, and I may employ them, they are perhaps obfcure and I ought to define them •, and becaufe their Ideas are abftraa, I may make them fenfible. This is what I have done, and I cannot yet fee what any one can blame in- it., At my very firft: fetting out, he fays, I engage in the fuppofition of a thing, the knowledge whereof is the principal motive to my Enquiry after Truth, and which I ought not to determine before having exhaufted the All this Difcourfe is falie, I engage not in a Suppofition, for incidental Proportions come not into account. The principal motive to my Enquiry after Truth, is not to know whether the Soul be Material 01: Immaterial; and fo far is this Queftion W being infoluble, till having drained the greateji ^iteftions of Phlofophy, that its Refolution depends on no other. This Queftion is not complex'd, and the bare Companion or Ideas which anfwer to the terms is fufficient to refolve it, as I mall (hew in the fixth Book, though this is not difcover- able by thofe who make more ufe of their Imagination than their Reafon. There is no neceflity of explain- ing this more at prefentr we need but know that this Suppofition is an incidental Propofition, from which I draw no Conference, and which I ihould have been to blame to prove -, and yet if we will Page 22. credit the Animadverter, What is worft of all, is that thkfole Anticipation is enough to ruine all the hopes the Search after Truth might have raised in us. v TT In the four or five firft Pages which our Animadverter fpends in refuting the firft pretended Head of the Imaginary Method, many things would deferve our confideration, if we thought our felves obliged to let the World know all his Faults 5 for he impofes on me here, as in other places, without any Proof, Opi- nions and Defigns which never entred my Head; and he does it with a confidence which is capable of fur- online all thofe who believe others on their Words. I am willing to think he is too honeft: and fincere a Man to prevaricate, and to be prodigal of that Refpea which is due to the Publick -, but if fo, there is Levitv or Temerity in his enterprife: he mould not have undertaken to oppoie what he did not underftand. Yet I cannot chufe but relate how he finifhes his firft Attack; we fhall know what we are to think of the reft bv the Beginning and End. ■ 1 1,, I laid that the Soul being a Simple and Indivifible Subftance has no patts; however it had been the cu- ftom to diftinguifh in it two Faculties, the Underftanding and Will, 0V. This has given occafion to the A- nimadverter to accufe me of Contradiftion j and after having prov'd, after his manner, by many Interroga- tions and Rhetorical Figures extremely convincing, he concludes with thefe words which reprefent his ttrhnle figurative Reafoning in fhort, and for that Reafon he has put it m Italickj Which is the fame thing, fi«te^?/5s!^^rM SOUL IS WITHOUT ANT COMPOSITION OP PARTS, BUT Wt I AM WING TO EXPLAIN HOW SHE CONTAINS THEM Toufee, Sir continues he that this Suppofition fervcs only to throw us immediately into objcurity-, befulcs thaty it PREFACE. % is contrary on other grounds to the fuccefs of this Method. But who ever took Faculties for Parts? Cer- tainly the Paffion for Criticifing muft be very blind, to put into the Mouth of a Man of Parts, fo extraor- dinary Companions, and to nuke him believe the World muft be content with them. But let us examine his fecond Head of my pretended Method, and fee how he impugns it.
After having fhewn that to the avoiding Errour, we muft only give our confent to things appearing in fuch Light and Evidence as make it impoflible for us to withhold it, without clearly tln- derftanding the fecret Reproaches of our Reafon: I adjoyn h " Tis not however to be de- Page?. " nied but there are fome Truths, befides thofe of Faith, for which it would be unreasonable " to demand indifputable Demonltrations, as are thofe which relate to matter of Fa£t in Hiltory, and other " things which have their dependence on the Will of Men h for there are two kinds of Truth, the one ne- " ceffary, the other contingent. And becaufe thefe two words Neceffary and Contingent, are not it may be clear enough, I explain them thus: " I call neceffary Truths thole which are immutable by their Na- " ture, and thole which have been fix'd and determined by the Will of God, which is not fubje£fc to change: " All other forts of Truth are contingent. And lower, We demand therefore an exact obfervation of the " Rule we have been eftablifliing in the Search of neceffary Truths, the knowledge of which may be call'd " Science; and we muft be content with the greatelt probability in Hiftory, which includes the knowledge- " of things contingent. For under, &c.
I wifh it might be examin'd, firft, whether the things I have been faying are clear or ohicure? Whether it may not be fuppos'd there are necelTary Truths, as that 2 times 2 are 4, and contingent Truths as that Mr. lhall fay fuch a thing at fuch an hour, efpecially when we have no defign of eftablifliing any Syftem upon this Suppolition? Whether there be any thing more certain than this Suppolition, whereby it may be proved. Laftly, whether a Man can reafonably perfuade himfelf, that I lay down for one of the Heads of my Method, or a Suppolition elTentiai to any Syftem, a Propolition which begins with FOR.
This being fuppos'd I come now to produce the Reafonings of our Animadverter againft what I have laid of contingent and neceffary Truths, I lhall only place in the Margin fome Notes or Anfwers I lhall think neceffary:, this being the Ihorteft and ealieft way for me •, fince it is an harder thing than is imagined to an- fwer clearly fuch as are unintelligible and inconfequent Reaibners. For we muft at leaft put their Objecti- ons in fome form to folve them, which cannot be always done, either becaufe they will not bear it or be- caufe we do not underftand them. For my own part, I am very glad it cannot be imagined I ufe the Ani- madverfions, as the Animadverter has us'd the Search -, or that from different Paffages of this Book I com- pofe an incomprehenilble peice of Nonfenfe.
ANIMADVERSIONS.
The Second Suppofition concerning Neceffary Truths, Page <?„ ANIMADVERSIONS. ANSWER.
TH E Second thing fuppofed by the Author is, that there (a) '/"lp I S becaufe this is more certain are two forts of Truths, Neceffary and Contingent. I JL than any thing elle, and that know not for what reafon he looks upon what he here afferts, there is nothing certain if this be not. For as (a) undeniable, and why he does not think of proving it. if Two times Two are neceffarily equal to For this is one of the moll considerable Queftions that has em- Four, if a Whole be neceffarily bigger than ployed the Learned, efpecially the Ancients; infomuch that the its Part, there are neceffary Truths. I foil Philofophers were (b) all, except Parmenides, of a con- know not for what reafon the Animadverter trary opinion to that he maintains in this place. Yet Parme- would have me think of proving what cannides acknowledged but one neceffary Truth, whereas he lup- not be prov'd, unlefs by fbmething more pofes a very great number. Protagoras believ'd there was no obicure and difficult. This is Truth on the part of things, fo far was he from owning any not to Philofophize * after * Pref. Page^ neceffary •, and that Man was the Meaiure and Rule of all that the manner of the ancient Acould come in Queftion ^ that there was nothing but mere Ap- cademy.
pearances, and no Realities, and confequently there were no (b) This is curious and far fetch1 d. All Truths to feek, or Errours to avoid, all being equally true, or the firft Philofophers, except Parmenides rather equally falfe. The Pyrronifis have ftill maintained there have denied there were neceffary and con- was nothing certain or truly determined, or 'that if there were, tingent Truths. What wonder is it? 'Tis yet we could not know it. The new Philofophers grant that a fine thing, this Erudition; certainly Me- individuals are no wife immutable* but are fubjecl: to continual ditation can never teach us what we learn Viciffitudes -, which being fo, what becomes of neceffary Truths? from the reading the Ancients, though we I fpeak not of thofe which are found in the Mathema ticks, that% underftand them but by halves.. But 'tis ought to make a Queftion (c) apart-, but of thofe he fuppofes * vifible that our Author underftands the' old in Phyficks, Medicine and Morality, though I ftill except thofe Philofophers -no better than the new. which regard the Effence or Exiftence of a God. Where then (c) I fay indeed that ought to make a could he place them, except in the (d) Species and Effences Queftion apart, but he will let it have of the fame Individuals which are fubjecl: to change? And if no part.
thefe Effences or Species are nothing but Ideas, as may be fu- (d) The demand is pleafant, but the ipetted if their immutability be only in appearance, mould not Author would not have made it, if he we, in following that fuppofition, engage in an Errour, which had but read the Third Book of the would abfolutely exclude us from the knowledge of the true Search after Truth, lince I have there ftate of things? clearly given my Thoughts upon thefe things. But it feems our Author takes Truths for certain little Beings, which are born and die every Moment.
But let us fee what the Author calls neceffary Truths, for at leaft he explains what he means by thefe words, " I call neceffary Truths, thole which are immutable by their Nature, and thofe which have been " fixed and determined by the Will of God, which is not fubjecl to change.
. To 4 PREFACE.
To fay that thefe Truths are immutable by their Nature, what is it more than to fay, they are immu- table becaufe immutable, unlefs this fignihes they are effentially fp without any external affiftance? But if thefe Truths were neceiTary in this manner, how were they determin'd by the Will of God, fince God being free, as the Author will not deny, he might, if he had pleas'd, have not determin'd them to be immutable (e). And (c) There are two forts of immutable' if fo, they are immutable only by Grace, becanfe God will'd Truths. Some are immutable of them- it fo,' and' determin'd them to that ftate of immutability. felves, or by their Nature, as that twice Two are Four-, and others becaufe they have been determin'd by the Will of God, which is not fubje£t to change; as that a Bowl Ihould move another on fuch an encounter. 'Tis eaiie to fee he has not underilood what he pretends to oppofe. He was not aware that the ConjuCtive Particle and had fometimes the fame purport as the Disjunctive or-, for if he had obferv'd it, he could with no good Grace have ferioufly wrangled upon the Ambiguity of a Particle. He might have eafily confider'd that Truths which are NeceiTary by their Nature, as that Two times Two make four, need not the Will of God to make them fuch. But be it granted, that I had not fufficiently explain'd my fell'-, yet the place on which he criticifes being but accelfary to my Defign, it was not neceiTary to explain my felf more at large. Would a Man be at the pains of reading it, he might fee I needed only to fay, there were neceiTary Truths, and that I was not oblig'd to examine the caufe of their nececeffity., This being fo, how come they to be immutable by their Nature, fince it was poffible for them to be liable to change? But if it were not poffible for them to be fubjecf to change, how could they be deter- min'd by God to be immutable? and how could he have hYdthem by the operation of his Will?
The Author may explain himfelf upon this Point, if he think convenient-, mean time it is no little con- cern to know whether God can change the EfTences of things, and make two Contradictories true at the fame time h for as a celebrated Divine of our Age has faid upon the lame words that are now under exa- mination, Is God the Author of the Truth of his own Exigence? Or ought we to affirm that we can form a right-lined Triangle, whofe three Angles fnall be greater than two Rights, or that mall have one Side longer than the other two? In a word, if it be poffible for Contradictories to be true and falfe at the fame time, what will become of humane Reafoning? And (f) For my part I know not what he what mall we fay to thofe Theological Conclufions, which drives at: this is a very commodious way allure us that God is not Corporeal, that he is not fubjeCt to of cridcifing 5 z Man has Reafon when* Change, that he has always been? (f) &c. ever he defires it.
(g) Might we not fay in following this Hypothefis, that its ^ (g) He impofes on me three Falfities in poffible for him to have been eternally, and not to have been fix Lines, Ifhave never determin'd upon this eternally; that he 'is liable and not liable to change? I mean Queftion, neither in undue Circumftances, not to pronounce upon fo difficult a Queftion, but I may af- nor with infuirlcient Proofs h fori have not firm the Author had no right to do it, efpecially in the Cir- fo much as fpoken of it -, but if he has a cumftances he has done it, and without alleadging fufficient mind to know my Thoughts ofit, I fear not Proofs. t0 affirm that God cannot caufe Contradictories to be true and falfe at the fame time.
Yet methinks I perceive a fhew of Reafoning in thefe words, and by the Will of God which is notfubjetl to change. He feems to confider the Will of God as the Caufe of the Neceffity of thefe Truths. But if fo, he proves too much in the place where we complain he proves nothing at all; for if what God wills be' immutable, becaufe his Will is not fubjeCt to change; it follows that whatever he wills, muft have an equal immutability, fince it is the lame Will which is the Caufe of it: Mean while it is certain he wills things which are fubjeCl to change, when he determines the (h) He confounds Beings with Truths. Exiftence or Non-exiftence of Creatures in the Viciffitude of Man is capable of Reafon and Senfe. A times (h). Thus though God Ihould have fix'd thefe Truths Globe may be divided into two Hemi- but for fome Ages, his Will thereby would be no lefs immu- fpheres. A Man and a Globe are fubje£t table, than for his producing daily all thofe admirable changes to change, but thefe Truths are immu- whic'h make the Beauty of the Univerfe. table.
But the Author will lay, God wills that thefe Truths mould be immutable for ever. But how could he know this, had he any particular Revelation? yet he fpeaks as positively as if lie was very certain.
It may be he bottoms upon this, that if thefe Truths feem immutable to us whilft they are fubjeCl to change, we mould err in pretending to Science (I). But if it were fo, all that (I) All this concerns not me, but only could thence be concluded is that the firft Philofophers, the (hews the Fecundity of our Author. Academicks and Fyrronifls, have better Philofophiz'd than the Feripateticks, Cartefw.ns, and other Dcgwatijh; and I do not believe the Author would eftablifh his Phi- lofophy upon fuch a Sophifm, unlefs there were neceffary Truths^ we could have no true Science -, there- fore there are neceffary Truths.
(m ) But though we might fuppole there were neceiTary (m) Confider, if you pleafe, all thefe Truths in Phyfick, Medicine, &c. and might determine about Flourifhes, endeavour to undeiftand them, this Queftion, without being utterly excluded from the know- and admire how the Imagination feduces ledge of Truth. Reafon: I think our Author may be faid Though thefe Truths were neceiTary by their Nature, and to refemble a Man, who imagining he their immutability by fome new Myltery was ftill an effeCl of fees his Enemy at hand, mould prefently the free determination of the Will of God. charge againft the Phantom, mould pierce Though the neceffity of thefe Truths proceeded from the it with his Sword, fhould cut off its Head; immutability of this Will, whilft yet it is the Caufe of all the and then, over-joy'd with fo. fuccefsful ( Changes happening in the Univerfe. and eafie a Conqueft, mould triumphant- Though we fhould be moreover aflur'd that God had refolv'd ly exclaim, though my Piftols had mif- to preferve thefe Truths in an entire immutability. carried, my fword had run him through ^ We muft ftill fuppole in order to enter into his Opinion, the but though my Sword had milTed him, knowledge of the Exiltence of God and of his Will, of his Li- yet I had cut off his Head; but laftly, berty and of his Power. - though though his Head fhould have remained upon his Shoulders, yet I found him fo feeble and eafily to be con- quered, that I had nothing to fear from him. 'Tis vifible from all thefe Flourifhes, that our Author fan- cies he has feverely handled me, whilft yet I am as infenfible of his Wounds, as the Enemy the poor Man thought he had fo cruelly Butcher'd., (n) Which obliges me to make fome Reflexions upon what (n) I ought in our Author's opinion to he has borrowed from Faith to add to Reafons Philofophical, have begun with Theology to prove me- which is what we may look upon as his third Suppofition. thodically there are neceflary and contingent Truths: but I do not believe that Conduct would have had the Approbation of many People 5 and feeing it is an hard task to content the Criticks, I cannot believe our Animadverter would have been well fatisfied. This third Head, which I am going to comment on, as on the preceding, fufficiently {hews us what he is.
After having prov'd that we muft yield only to Evidence, except in matters of Faith, which are not lubmitted to the difquifition of Reafon; I conclude with thefe words. " Myfteries Page 9, " then of Faith muft be diftinguifhed from things of Nature: we ought equally to fubmit " to Faith and to Evidence, but in the concernments of Faith we. muft not look for Evidence, as in thofe " of Nature we ought not to take up with Faith; that is, with the Authority of Philofophers. In a word, " to be a Believer 'tis required to affent blindly, but to be a Philofopher it is neceflary to fee plainly.
Myfteries of Faith muft. be diftinguifhed from things of Na- (0) I know not whether what I lay ture. Thus judicioufly fpeaks the Author, and concludes with ought to be rank'd amongft Proverbs and thefe words, which might even pafs for (0) a Proverb: To Quibbles, for that depends upon the Taft -, be a Beli ever 'tis required to affent blindly, but Jo be a Philofopher and I refer my felf to thofe whom the 'tis ncceffary to fee plainly. Mean while I wonder he obferves Paflion for criticifing has not made over not in his Book the Refolution he made of not (p) mingling fcrupulous and dainty. They likewife may the concerns of Religion with the decifions of Philofophy: for refleft: whether this nicenefs fuits well it's too vifible that one half of his Book is nothing but Reflexi- with the Author of this Difcourfe, and ons upon original Sin, deprav'd Manners, and corrupt Inclina- whether he ought fo much to pretend to tions, which Chriftian Morality is to correft. an exquifite Taft.
(p) There's a great difference between mingling and confounding. I mail always diftinguiffi things of Faith from thofe of Nature, as I here fay ought to be done. But I never made a Refolution not to lpeak of God or Chriftian Morality in treating about the Search after Truth. The Author feems not to under- ftand me, that he may play the Critick with lels trouble.
(q) I blame not his Piety in this, not believe it a thing un- (q) Can he not fee that thefe things are becoming a Chriftian to labour upon thefe Subje&s. But that not of themfelves Articles of Faith, and ought to be referv'd for Sermons. that we may fpeak of the Goodnefs of God, deprav'd Manners, and corrupt Incli- nations without having recourfe to Faith.
(r ) Or if he had defign'd to take the occafion of infinuating (r) There are in thefe Animadverfions thefe Morals, as knowing that the true way of moving the fome little Raileries which provoke to Heart pathetically is to do it by difcovering to the Mind the Pity, but this might raife ones Indigna- Truths that are of neareft concernment to it $ he might have tion. Let him know once for all, that if fatisfied that laudable defire, but fhould have contriv'd for that I confented to the Publication Of this purpofe particular Chapters, which he has done too in fome Book, 'twas chiefly becaufe it places. But once more, a very little thing will ferve to con- contains thofe things which he Page 12, found the Light we begin to receive in the Search after Truth. condemns as Enthufiafms.
(s) We cannot at the fame time fatisfie both Reafon and (s) If he fpeaks of himfeif, we ought Faith, fince Reafon obliges us to open our Eyes, and Faith to take his word for it, commands us to {hut them.
(t) And yet I find he has fo interwoven his principal Pro- (t) What he has faid is true, but what pofitions with the Credenda of Religion, that he feems to talk he goes to conclude from it is falfe, it be- more like a Divine than Philofopher. For exam- ing Reafon and not Faith which teaches Page 6. pie, among other things he concludes, That (u) if us God is no Deceiver.
the Will had not this Liberty^ but muft have embraced (u) He has here fupprefs'd two words, every thing that came cloath'd with an appearance of Truth, it which give all the force to my reafoning, would have almoft ever been deceived; whence probably it might which runs thus, If it muft infallibly and be concluded that the Author of its Being was the Author of its necelTarily have embraced every thing; we Errours and Seducements. And afterwards, We have therefore fhall fee by and by what reafon he had a Liberty given us by God, that we might avoid falling into Er- for this Retrenchment, rour. 'Tis vifible this reafoning is founded on the Author's fuppofing God will not deceive us (x). But may it not be doubt- (x) Reafon teaches us, that God is no ed whether God has not made us for the enjoyment of proba- Deceiver, 'and Faith fuppofes it •, which bility only, and refolv'd to referve the knowledge of Truth as is quite contrary td what the Animadver- his own peculiar; or whether he defigns not this as a pure ac- ' ter imagines".
ceflion to our Happinefs (y) in Heaven •, wherefore we ought (y) It cannot be doubted when we have not to conclude that he would be a Deceiver, if he mould not Reafons for it ^ but it is needlefs to ftand afford us the means of difcovering it. to anfwer all thefe Queftions.
(z) I leave it, Sir, to you to think what the Pyrronifts (z) I do nbt conclude it with that Ar- would fay, if they ftiould hear this arguing. Many fuch there gumfcnt: Mine is good, and this good for are in the procefs of this piece, efpecially in the laft part, nothing ■, there is difference between I_N- whereof moft Chapters contain Arguments which include the- F A L L I B LY and N E C E 3 S A R I LY ological Queftions (a). forcing us to embrace Errour, and not. giving us the means to difcover Truth. Certainly thefe words, Infallibly and Neceffarily, ought not to be" fupprefs'd.
(a) He cannot {hew a place in the whole Book he animadverts on, where I fuppoie any Article of Faith as a Principle from whence to draw any Confequences Effential to the Search of Truth.' But he imagines if a Man fpeaks but of the Goodnefs of God, deprav'd Manners, and corrupt Inclinations, he is treating of fome Article of Faith, (b) (b) Whether (b) Whether then he confiders all thefe Suppofitions as Arti- (b) Methinks thefe two Conclufions eles of Faith, or regards them as Truths demonftrahle by Phi- have no other aim than to gain by fur- lofophy, he ought ftill to diftinguifli them from the Fundamen- prife ibme little Applaufes from fuch as tals of his Work. give them gratis.
If he confiders them as Articles of Faith, he is very well p rfuaded they are obfcure; If he looks on them as conclufions of Humane Science, his Method ought to precede them, and not imploy them as Principles to depend upon.