* larged by embracing fo great an Idea •, whereas the Mind ceates to exjft when it thinks upon no- ' thing. Should that Idea vanifh, my Mind, it teems, mould vanifh with it, or at teaft become c lmaller and narrower, if it mould fix upon a lefs considerable Idea; fo that the pretervation of 4 that great Idea, being the pretervation of my own Greatnefs, and the perfecFion of my Being, c I am in the right to admire; nay others ought to admire me for it, mould they give me my due. ' For I am really fomething great, by the Relation I have to great things, and I enjoy them in * fome manner by my Admiration, and that Foretaft which a fort of Hope affords me. Other 1 Men would be Happy, as well as I am my telf, if, knowing my Greatnefs, they fliould fix them- ' telves upon the Caute that produces it -, but they are blind and infenfible to great and fine things, £ and know not how to raife and make themfelves confiderable.
It ri72v be faid, That the Mind naturally, and without Reflection, argues in fome fuch manner,' when it it fjffers it telf to be led away by the abufive Meteors of the Paffions: Thofe Reafonings have fome Likelihood, though their Weaknefs be fufficiently vifible; however, that Probability, or rather the confuted Sente of the Probobility that attends natural and inconfiderate Arguments, is fo prevalent, that they never fail of {educing us, when we Hand not upon our guard.
For Inftance' When Poetry, HilFory, Chymifhy, or any other Humane Science has ftruck the Imagination of a young Man with fome Motions of Admiration, if he do not carefully watch the Attempt thete Motions make upon his. Mind, if he examine not to the bottom the life of thofe Sciences, if he compare net the Trouble of learning them with the Benefits that may accrue to him; in fiiort, if he be not as nice in his Judgment as he ought to be, he runs the hazard of be- ing teduced by his Admiration, (hewing him only the faireft Part of thofe Sciences; and 'tis even to be feared, left they Ihould fo far. corrupt his Fleart, as that he fhould never awake out of his Dream, even when he comes to know it to be but a Dream-, becaufe it is not poflible to blot out of the Brain deep Tracks, engraven and widened by a long-continued Admiration. And therefore we ought to take diligent care to keep our Imagination untainted; that is to fay, to hinder the ° ° g formation iS P. Malebranche Concerning BookV; formation of dangerous traces, that corrupt the Heart and Mind. I fhall here fet down a very ufeful Way to prevent not only the Excefs of Admiration, but alfo of all other Paffions in general.
When the Motion of the Animal Spirits is fo violent, as to imprint on the Brain deep Traces; that corrupt the Imagination, it is always attended with fome Commotion of the Soul: And as the -Soul cannct be moved without being confcious of it, fhe is thereby fuffkiently warn'd to ftand upon her guard, and to examine whether it be for her good to fuffer thofe Traces to be en- larged and finifhed. But at the time of the Commotion, the Mind is not fo free, as rightly to' judge of the Ufefulnefs of thofe Traces, becaufe the fame Commotion deceives and inclines it to' indulge them: We mull therefore endeavour to ftop that Commotion, or to turn to fome other Place the Current of the Spirits that caufe it •, and in the mean while 'tis abfolutely neceffary to fufpend our Judgment.
But we ought not to imagine that the Soul always can, by her bare Will, ftop the Courfe of the Spirits that hinder her from making ufe of her Reafon -, her ordinary Power being not fuffici* ent to quell Motions not railed by her; fo that fhe muft dexteroufly endeavour to deceive an Enemy that attacks her unawares.
As the Motions of the Spirits ftir up refpective Thoughts in the Soul, fo our Thoughts excite fuch and fuch Motions in the Brain; fo that to ftop a rifing Motion of the Spirits, a bare Will is not fufficient, but Stratagem muft be us'd •, and we muft skilfully reprefent to our felves fuch Things as are contrary to thofe that ftir up and indulge that Motion, whence a Revuljion will arife: But if we would only determine another way the Motion of the Spirits already rifen, we muft not think of contrary but only different Things from thofe that have produced it, which will certainly make a Diver/ion.
But becaufe the Diverfiori and Revuljion are great or little, as the new Thoughts are accompa- nied with a greater or lefs Motion of the Spirits; we muft carefully obferve, what fort of Thoughts agitate us moft, that we may in urging Occafions reprefent them to our feducing Ima- gination, and ufe our felves fo much to that fort of Refiftance, that no furprizing Motion may affect our Soul.
If we take care firmly to unite the Idea. of Eternity, or fome other folid Thought, to thole violent and extraordinary Motions, they will never be ftirr'd up for the future, without railing that Idea, and furnifhing us with Weapons to refill them. This appears from" Experience, and * Book 2. from the Reafon mention'd in the Chapter Of the Connexion of Ideas *; fo that we muft not Parr 2. imagine it abfolutely impoffible, by a dexterous Managery, to conquer our Paffions, when we are However, by that Refiftance we ought not to pretend to Impeccability, nor to the avoiding of all Errours whatfoever.
Firft, Becaufe 'tis very difficult to acquire and preferve fuch a Habit, as that our extraordinary- Motions fhall raife in us Ideas fit to oppofe them.
Secondly, Though we mould have gotten that Habit, thofe Motions of the Spirits will directly excite the Ideas to be impugned, and but indirectly fupply us with the neceffary Weapons to a£ fault them: So that the Evil Ideas, being ftill the principal, will be ftronger than the Good, that are but acceffary •, and the latter ever ftand in need of the Help of the Will.
Thirdly, Thofe Motions of the Spirits may be fo violent, as to take up the whole Capacity of the Soul -, fo that there will remain no room, if I may fo fpeak, for the reception of the acceflary Idea, that is proper to make a Revulfion in the Spirits -, or not at leaft for fuch a Reception as may incite us to an attentive Contemplation of it.
Lafily, There are fo many particular Circumftances, that can make that Remedy ufelels, that though it ought not to be neglected, yet we muft not relie too much upon it. We muft have a perpetual Recourfe to Prayer, that we may receive from Heaven neceffary Helps in the time of Temptation •, and in the mean while endeavour to prefent to the Mind fome Truths fo folid and prevalent, as that they may overcome the moft violent Paffions. For I muft needs add by the way, That feveral pious Perlbns often return into the fame Faults, becaufe they fill their Mind with a great many Truths that are more glittering than folid, and fitter to weaken and diffolve, than to fortifie it againft Temptations; whereas others, that are not endued with fo much Know- ledge, faithfully ftick to their Duty, becaufe of fome great and folid Truth, which they have rendred familiar, and which bears 'em up and ftrengthens them in all Occafions.
CHAP. IX.
Of Love and Averfion^ and their principal Species, LOve and Hatred are the Paffions that immediately fucceed Admiration •, for we dwell not long upon the Confideration of an Object, without difcovering the Relations it hath to us, or to fomething we love. The Objeft we love, and to which confequently we are united by that Paf fwn, being for the mofl part prefent, as well as that which we actually admire; our Mind quick- ly, and without any confiderable Reflection, makes the neceffary Comparifons, to find out the Re- lations they have to each other, and to us; or elfe is naturally aware of them, by a preventing Senfe of Pleafure and Pain. Then it is, that the Motion of Love we have for our felves, and for Chap. IX. The Search after Truth, if for the beloved Object, extends to that which is admired •, if the Relation it has immediately to hs, or to fomerhing united to us, appear advantageous, either by Knowledge or Senlation. Now that new Motion of the Soul, (or rather that Motion of the Soul newly determin'd, join'd'to that of the Animal Spirits, and followed with the Senfation that attends the new Dilpoiition, that the fame, new Motion of the Spirits produces in the Brain) is the Paffion we call here Love.
But when we feel by any Pain, or dilcover by a clear and evident Knowledge, that the Union or Relation of the admired Object would prove diiferviceable to us, or to fomething united to us, then the Motion of the Love we have for our felves, or for the Thing united to us, terminates in us, or cleaves to the united Object, without following the View of the Mind, or being car- ried to the admired Thing. But as the Motion towards Good in general, which the Author of Nature continually imprints on the Soul, carries her to whatever is known and felt, becaufe what is either intelligible or fenfible is Good in it felf j io it may be laid, that the Refiftance of the Soul againft that natural Motion which attracts it, is a kind of voluntary Motion, which termi- nates in Notbingnefs. Now that voluntary * Motion of the Soul being join'd to that of the Spi- * Left any rits and Blood, and followed by the Senfation that attends the new Dilpoiition, which that Mo-/*">«W mU tion of the Spirits produces in the Brain, is the Paffion we call here Averfion or Hatred. flake what voluntary Motion, Ideftre him to read the firft Illuftration on the firfl Chapter. It would intricate my Conceptions fliould I fay whatever relates to it, to fatiffie the Nicety of fome Perfonsi That Paffion is altogether contrary to Love, and yet 'tis never without Love: It is altogether contrary to it, becaufe Averfion feparates, and Love unites; the former has moft commonly No- thingnefs for its Object; and the latter has always a Being: The former refills the natural Mo- tion, and makes it of no effect -, whereas the latter yields to it, and makes it victorious* How- ever, Averfion is never feparated from Love, becaufe Evil, the Object of the former, is the Pri- vation of Good -, fo that to fly from Evil, is to fly from the Privation of Good; that is to fay, to tend to Good: And therefore the Averfion of the Privation of Good, is the Love of Good. But if Evil be taken for Pain, the Averfion of Pain is not the Averfion of the Privation of Plea- fure 5 becaufe Pain is as real a Senlation as Pleafure, and therefore is not the Privation of it: But the Averfion of Pain, being the Averfion of fome internal Mifery, we mould not be affected with that Paffion, fhould we not love our felves. Laftly, If Evil be taken for what caufes Pain in us, or for Whatever 4eprives us of Good, then Averfion depends on Self-love, or on the Love of fomerhing to which we defire to be united: So that Love and Averfion are two Mother-Paffions, oppofite to each other; but Love is the Firft, the Chief, and the moft Univerial.
As at that great Diftance and Eftrangement we are from God fince the Fall, we look upon ouf Being as the Chief Part of the Things to which we are united -, fo it may be faid in fome fenfe, that our Motion of Love for any thing whatfoever, is an Effe£t of Self-love. We love Honours, becaufe they raife us •, our Riches, becaufe they maintain and preferve us; our Relations, Prince, and Country, becaufe we are concern'd in their Prefervation. Our Motion of Self-love reaches to all the Tilings that relate to us, and to which we are united; becaufe 'tis that Motion which unites us to them, and fpreads our Being, if I may fo fpeak, on thole that furround us, propor- tionably as we difcover by Reafon, or by Senfation, that it is our Intereft to be united to them.
And therefore we ought not to think, that, fince the Fall, Self-Love is only the Caufe and Rule of all other Affections ^ but, that moft part of other Affections are Species of Self-love: For when we lay, that a Man loves any new Object, we muft not fuppofe that a new Motion of Love is produe'd in him 5 but rather, that knowing that Object to have fome Relation or Union with him, he loA^es himfelf in that Object, and that with a Motion of Love coeval to himfelf For in- deed without Grace there is nothing but Self-love in the Heart of Man: The Love of Truth, of Juftice, of God himfelf, and every other Love that is in us, by the firft Inftitution of Nature, have ever fince the Fall been a Sacrifice to Self-love.
There is no doubt, however, but the moft wicked and barbarous Men, Idolaters and Atheifts themfelves, are united to God by a natural Love, of which confequently Self-love is not the Caufe 5 for they are united to him by their Love to Truth, Juftice, and Vertue •, they praife and efteem good Men, and do not love them becaufe they are Men, but becaufe they fee in them fuch Qualities as they cannot forbear to love, becaufe they cannot forbear to admire and judge them amiable. And therefore we love fomething befides our felves; but Self-love over-rules all the reft, and Men foriake Truth and Juftice for the fmalleft Concerns: For when by their natu- ral Force they venture their Goods and Lives to defend opprefs'd Innocence, or on any other Oc- calion, their greateft Spur is mere Vanity, and the hopes of getting a Name by the feeming Pof feffion of a Vertue which is reverene'd by all the World. They love Truth and Juftice when on their fide, but never againft themfelves j becaufe without Grace they cannot obtain the leaft Vi- ctory over Self-love.
There are many other forts of natural Love: We naturally love our Prince, Country, Relations, thofe that have any Conformity of Humour, Defigns, and Employments with us: But all thofe forts of Love are very weak, as well as the Love of Truth and Juftice; and Self-love being the moft violent of all, conquers them fo eafily, as to find no other Refiftance but what it creates againft it felf.
Bodies that ftrike againft others, lofe their Motion proportionably as they communicate it to the ftricken -, and, after having moved many other Bodies, may at laft entirely lofe their own Motion. It is not fo with Self-love: It determines every other Love by its Impreffions upon it, and -8 F. Malebranche Concerning BookV.
and its own Motion diminifhes not-, on the contrary, it gets new Strength by its new Victories: For as that Motion never goes out of the t Heart, fo it cannot be loft, though it be continually communicated.
, Sell-love is therefore the Ruling and Univerfal Love, fince it is to be found, and bears the fwav every where •, lb that ail the Paffions having no proper Motion of their own, it may be faid, that Selr-iove is the moft extenfive and powerful of all Paffions, or the Ruling and Univerlal Paffion. find as all Vertues are but Species of that firft Vertue we call Charity, according to St. An (I'm; ib all Vices and Paffions are but as fo many Effects and Sorts of Self-love, or of that general V ice we call Qoncupifccnce.
We often diftinguifh in Morals the Vertues or Species of Charity, by the Difference of Ob- jects -? but that fometimes confounds the true Idea we ought to have of Vertue, which rather depends on its own Motive, than any thing elfe: And therefore we (hall' not follow that Me- thod in treating of the Paffions, nor diftinguiih them by the Objects ^ becaufe one and the fame Object may excite them all, and that ten thoufand Objects may raife but one. For though Ob-. jecls differ from each other, yet they differ not always in relation to us, nor do they ftir up in us different Paffions. The promis'd Staff of a Marefchal of France differs1 from a Bifhop's Crofier, or Paitoral Staff promis'd -, yet thofe two Marks of Honour excite almoft the fame Paffion in the Ambitious, fince they raife in the Mind of both the fame Idea of Good. But the lame Mare- lchafs Staff, when promifed, granted, enjoyed, taken away, ftirs up Paffions altogether different, becaufe it raifes in the Mind different Ideas of Good.
We muft not then multiply the Paffions by their different Objects that caufe them -, but only admit as many as there are accefTary Ideas that attend the chief Idea of Good or Evil, and confi- derably alter it in relation to us. For the general Idea of Good, or the Seniation of Plealure, which is good to him that enjoys it, agitating the Soul and Animal Spirits, produces the general Paffion of Love:, and the acceflary Ideas of that Good determine that general Agitation of Love, and Courfe of the Spirits in fuch a particular manner, as puts the Mind and Body in a conveni-' ent Difpofition in relation to the perceived Good: And thus they produce all the particular Paffions.
And therefore the general Idea of Good' produces an indeterminate Love, which is but an Ex- teniion of Self-love. The Idea of Good, as polTefs'd, produces a Love of Joy: The Idea of GOod, not as polTefs'd, but hop'd for, that is, as judg'd poffible to be polTefs'd, produces a Love* of Defire: And lafily, The Idea of any Good, that is neither polTefs'd nor hop'd for -, or, which' is the fame, the Love of any Good which' we cannot hope to enjoy without lofing fome other, or which we cannot preferve when we are polTefs'd of it, produces a Love of Sorrow. Thofe are the Three fimple and primitive Paffions that have Good for their Object; for the Hope that produces Joy, is not a Commotion of the Soul, but a fimple Judgment.
However, we muft obferve, That Men confine not their own being within themfelves, but ex-" tend it to all Things and Perfons, to whom they believe it their Advantage to unite themfelves i So that We muft conceive that they are polTefs'd in fome manner of a Good, when enjoy'd by their Friends, though they do not poffefs it immediately themfelves: And therefore when Ifay, That the PofTeffion of Good produces Joy, I underftand it not only of an immediate PolTeffion or Union, but alfo of any other; for we naturally feel a' Joy upon the Succefs or good Fortune of thofe we love, Evil, as I faid, can be taken Three ways; for the Privation of Good, for Pain, and for the Thing that caufe s the Privation of Good, or produces Pain.
In the firft fenfe, the Idea of Evil being the fame with the Idea of a Good not enjoy'd, it is plain that Idea produces Sorrow, or Defire, or even Joy; for Joy is always excited from that we find our felves exempt of the Privation of Good, that is to fay, when we poffefs Good: So that thofe Paffions that refer to Evil, taken in that fenfe, are the fame as thofe that relate to Good, becaufe at the Bottom they have likewife Good for their Object.
When Evil fignifies Pain, which alone is always a real Evil to him that fuffers it, whilft he fuffers it -, then the Senfe of that Evil produces thofe Paffions of Sorrow, Defire, and Joy, that are Species of Averfion, and not of Love; becaufe their Motion is altogether oppofite to that which accompanies the Perception of Good, that Motion being but the Refiftance of the Soul againft the natural Impreffion.
The Actual Senfe of Pain produces an Averfion of Sorrow. The Pain we fuffer not, but are afraid to fuffer, produces an Averfion of Defire. And laftly, the Pain we neither fuffer, nor are afiaid to fuffer; or, What is the fame, the Pain that (hall be attended by a confiderable Re- ward, or the Pain from which we are freed, produces an Averfion of Joy. Thofe are the Three limple or primitive Paffions that have Evil for their Object -, for the Fear that produces Sorrow, is nor a Commotion of the Soul, but a bare Judgment.
Laftly, If by Evil we underftand the Perfon or the Thing that deprives us of Good, or caufes us to endure Pain, the Idea of Evil produces a Motion of Love and Averfion together, or only a Motion of Averfion: The former, when the Evil is that which deprives us of Good -, for by the fame Motion We tend towards Good, and fiy from that which hinders its PolTeffion: And the latter, when 'tis the Idea of an Evil which caufes Pain in us^ for 'tis by the fame Motion of Averfion that we hate Pain, and whatever produces it.
And therefore there arc Three limple or primitive Paffions that relate to Good, and as many that jelcrto Pain, or to that which caufes it, viz. Joy, Defire, and Sorrow.. For we are joyful when Chap. X. The Search after Truth. i$ when Good is prefent, and Evil is paft; we are forrowful when Good is gone, and Pain is pre- lent; and we are agitated with Defires when Good and Evil are to Come.
Thofe Paffions than relate to Good are particular Determinations of that Motion God gives us for Good in general, and therefore have a real Objecf •, but others, who have not God for tise Caufe of their Morton, terminate only in Notb'mgnejs.
CHAP. X.
Of Fajfions in particular; and in general of the way to explain them^ and to know the Errours they 'caufe.
WHen we confider how Paffions are formed, it vifibly appears, that their Number is unde- terminable, or that there are more than we have Terms to exprefs them by. For Palhons differ not only by the various Complication of the Three flrft Primitive, which would not encreafe them to a great Number; but alio differ by the different Perceptions and Judgments that caufe or accompany them. Thole different Judgments of the Soul, concerning Good or Evil, produce different Motions in the Animal Spirits, to difpofe the Body in relation to the Object, and confe- *quendy caufe in the Soul Senfations that are not altogether like: Whence it proceeds, that fome Paffions are obferv'd to differ from each other, though their Commotions be not different; In the mean while, the Commotion of the Soul being the chief Thing obfervable in every Paf- £on, 'tis better to refer them to the Three original Pafhons, in which thofe Commotions are very different, than to treat confufedly and diforderly of them, in reference to the different Percepti- ons we may have of the Good and Evil. that raifes them. For we may have fo many different Perceptions of Objects, in reference to Time, to our felves, to what belongs to us, to the Per- fons or Things to which we are united, either by Nature or Choice, that it is wholly impoffible to make an accurate Enumeration of therri.
When the Soul perceives any Good which file cannot enjoy, it may perhaps be faid, that fhe hopes for it, though fhe defires it not: However, 'tis plain, that this her Hope is not a Paffion;, hut a fimple Judgment And therefore 'tis the Commotion that attends the Idea of any Good, of which we take the Enjoyment to be poffible, that adopts Hope into a true Paffion. It is the fame when Hope grows into Security: For the latter is a Paffion, only becaufe of the Commoti- on of Joy that mixes with that of Defire; fince the Judgment of the Soul that confiders any Good as certain, is a Paflion but as much as it is a foregoing Tafte of the Good that affecfs us. Laft of all, When Hope diminifhes, and is fucceeded by Defpair, 'tis vifible again, that the latter is a Paffion but becaufe of the Commotion of Sorrow that mixes with that of Defire; for the Judgment of the Soul, that confiders any Good as unattainable, would not be a Paflion, mould we not be aft uated by that Judgment.
But becaufe the Soul never looks upon Good or Evil without any Commotion, and even with- out any Alteration in the Body, we often give the Name of Paflion to the Judgment that produ- ces it, confounding together whatever happens both to the Soul and Body at the fight of any- Good or Evil: For the Words, Hope, Fear, Boldneis, Shame, Impudence, Anger, Pity, Derifion, •Grief, and the Names of all other Paffions in common ufe, are fhort ExpreffiOns made up of fe- veral Terms, by which can be explain'd in particular whatever Paffions contain.
We underftand by the Word Faffion the View of the Relation any thing has to us, the Com- motion and Senfation of the Soul, the Concuffion of the Brain, and'the Motion of the Spirits, a new Commotion and Senfation of the Soul -, and laftly, a Senfation of Pleafure that always at- tends the Paffions, and makes them grateful. All thefe we commonly underftand by the Name of Paffions i but fbmetimes it only fignifies either the Judgment that raifes it, or only the Commoti- on of the Soul, or the bare Motion of the Spirits and Blood, or laftly, fomething elfe that ac- companies the Commotion of the Soul.
It is very ufeful, for the Knowledge of Truth, to abridge Ideas and Expleffions ^ but that of- ten caufes fome confiderable Errour^ efpecially when thofe Ideas are abridg'd by popular life •. For we ought never to abridge them, but when we have made them very clear and diltincf, by. a .great Application of Mind; and not, as 'tis ordinarily done, as to Paffions and fenfible Things, when we have made them familiar to us by their Senfations, and the mere Acf ion of the Imagi- -nation, which eafily impofes on the Mind.
There is a great difference betwixt the pure Ideas of the Mind, and the Senfations or Com- motions of the Soul. Pure Ideas are clear and diftincf, but 'tis a hard Task to make them fami- liar, whereas Senfations and Commotions are intimate with us, but can never plainly and di- ftinftly be known. Numbers, Extenfion, and their Properties, may be clearly known; but un- lefs we make them fenfible by ibme expreffive Characters, 'tis very difficult to reprefent them to our Mind, becaufe whatever is abftrafted moves us not. On the contrary, the Commotions and Senfations of the Soul may eafily be reprefented to the Mind, though the Knowledge we have of them be but confufed and imperfect ^ for all the Words that raife them, lively ftrike the Soul, and make it attentive. Thence it proceeds, that we often imagine we rightly underftand fome X)ifcourJes that are altogether incomprehenfible •, and that reading fome Defcriptions of the Sen- H fations facioiis and Paflions of the Soul, we perfuade our felves that' we perfectly comprehend them s be- caufe they ttrongly move us, and that all the Words that reverberate upon our Eyes agitate our Soul. The hearing of tile very Names of Shame, Defpair, Impudence, &c. ftraightway excite in our Mind aconfafed Idea, and obfcure Senlation, that powerfully influences us •, and becaufe this Senfacion is very familiar to us, and prefents it felf without any Trouble or Endeavour of the Mind, we fancy it to be clear and diftinct: Thefe Words, however, are the Names of compounded Paffions, and "by confequence abridg'd Exprefhons, which popular Life has made up of many confuted and obfcure Ideas.