As to ignorant and weak Perfons, they create to themfelves Matter of ridiculous and fantaftick Fears; like Children that walk in the dark without a Guide and Light, fanfie frightful Bugbears, aredillur'd and cry out as though they were undone. Knowledge retrieves them if they be igno- rant -, but if they be weak, their Imagination continues crazed, and the leatt thing that relates to xhat frightful Objecf, renews the Tracks, and opens the Current of the Spirits, which caufe the Symptoms of their Fear: So that it is altogether impoflible to cure or pacifie them for ever.
But when falfe Zeal meets with Hatred and Fear in a weak Mind, it incelfantly produces fuch unjuft and violent Judgments, as cannot be thought upon without Honour: To change a Mind polfcft with thofe Paflions, requires a greater Miracle than that which converted St. Paul -, and his Cure would be abfblutely impoflible, could we let Bounds to the Power and Mercy of God. Thofe that walk in the Dark, rejbyce at the fight of Light -, but this Man cannot fiifier it, be- caufe Chap. XII. The Search after Truth. * & caule ir wounds him by oppofing his Paflion. His Fear is in fome fort voluntary, as being pro- duced by his Hatred; and therefore he loves to feel its Commotions, becaufe we love to be agi rated even with the Paflions that have Evil for their Object, when the Evil is only imaginary, or rather when we know, as in Tragedies, that the Evil cannot hurt us.
The Phantafms which thole that walk in the Dark frame in their Imagi nations, vanifh at the Approach of Light •, but the idle Dreams of this fort of Men will not di fappear at the Light of Truth, which inftead of difliparing the Darknefs of their Mind, incenfes their Imagination •, fo that the frultrated Light recoils, becaufe they are wholly taken up with the Obje&s of their Pai: lion 5 and it feems thole Apparitions have a teal Body, fince they reflect fome weak Rays of the Light that falls upon them.
But though we Ihould fuppofe in thofe Men a fufficient Teachablenefs and Attention, to liffen to, and comprehend the Reafons that may diflipate their Errours; yet their Imagination being dif- ordcf d by Fear, and their Heart corrupted by Hatred and falfe Zeal, thole Reaions, how folic! fo- ever they might be, could not long flop the impetuous Stream of thofe violent Paflions, nor hin- der them from fpeedily juftifying themfelves by fenfible and convincing Proofs.
For we ought to obferve, that thete are tranfitory Paflions, which never return; whereas there are others that are conftant and permanent. Thole that are not kept up by the fight of the Mind, but are only produced and fortified by the fenfible View of an Object, and the Fermentation of the Blood, are not lafting, but commonly die foon after theit Birth; whereas thofe that are alTociated with the Contemplation of the Mind, are fteady, becaufe the Principle that produces them is not lubjett to change, as Blood and Humouts are. So that Hatred, Fear, and all other PaiTions that are excited or preferved by the Knowledge of the Mind, and not raifed by the fenfible View of Evil, mult needs be durable, and widial very violent and unjuft. However, thofe Paflions are not the molt lively and fenfible, as we (hall now fhew.
The Perception of Good and Evil, which raifes the Paflions, is produced Three ways 5 by the Senfes, by the Imagination, and by the Mind. By way of the Senfes it produces very quick and fenfible Paflions; -by way of the Imagination, much weaker i but thofe which proceed from the Perception of Good and Evil by the Mind alone, are true Paflions, on no other account than as that View of Good and Evil is always attended by fome Motion of the Animal Spirits.
Paflions ate only given us for the good of the Body, and for uniting us by it to fenfible Things: For though fenfible Things ate neither good nor bad, in reference to the Mind; yet they are fo in relation to the Body, to which the Mind is united: So that the Senfes and Imagination, difco- vering much better than the Mind the Relation of fenfible Objects to our Body, mult needs raife Paflions far livelier than a clear and evident Knowledge: But becaufe our Knowledge is always attended with fome Commotion of the Spirits, a clear and evident Knowledge of a great Good^ or a great Evil, not to be difcover'd by the Senfes, always raifes fome lecret Paflion.
However, all clear and evident Knowledge of aay Good or Evil, is not always followed with a fenfible and perceptible Paflion •, as all our Paflions are not accompanied with an intellectual Knowledge. For, as we fometimes think upon Good or Evil, without being confeious of any Commotion; fo we often feel our felves agitated with Paflion, without knowing or fometimes without being fenfible of the Caufe. A Man that fucks in a good Air is affected with Joy, and knows not why, nor what fort of Good he enjoys that produces it: And if fome invifible Cor- pufcle mixes with his Blood, and hinders its Fermentation, he is taken with Sotrow, and may even afcribe the Caufe of it to fomething vifible, that offers it felf to him in the time of his Paflion.
Of all Paflions, none are more fenfible nor quick, and conlequently lefs mingled with Know- ledge, than Horrour and Antipathy, Agreeablenefs and Sympathy. A Man fleeping under the Sha- dow of a Tiee, often ftarts up, when a Fly flings him, or a Leaf tickles him, as though a Ser- pent had bitten him: The confuted Senfe of a Thing as terrible as Death it lef£ frightens him, and he finds himfelf furpriz'd with a very ftrong and violent Paflion, which is an Averfton of Dejire, before he bethinks himfelf On the contrary, a Man in want difcovers by chance fome imall Good, the Sweetneljs of which furprizes him ^ and he is inconfiderately taken up with that Trifle, as though it were the greateft Good in the World, without making any Reflection on it. The fame happens in the Motions of Sympathy and Antipathy. We fee in a Company a Perfon whofe Deportment and Manners have fome fecret Agreeablenefs to the prefent Difpofition of our Body • fo his Sight pierces and ftrikes us, and we are inclined, without Reflection, to love and wifh him well. Thus we are agitated by I don't know what, fince Reafon has no Share in it. Tlie contrary befals thofe whofe Afpect and Looks fhed, as it were, Difguft and Averfion: They have I know not what, that offends and puts us back: for the Mind underftands nothing in it,$ the Senfes only are competent Judges of fenfible Beauty and Uglinefs, which are the Objects of thofe kinds of Paflions, F. MALEg^ F. MaLebranche Concerning Book VI.
ft MALEBRANCHEs EATISE Concerning the SEARCH after TRUTH.
BOOK VI.
Concerning METHOD.
r The Defegn of this Booh,. Two general Ways for the Preferring Evidence in the Search of Truth^ which Jhall be the SubjeB of this TraU.
WE have feen in the foregoing Books, that the Mind of Ma? is very obnoxious to Errour $ that the Deceptions of his Senfes *, the Vijions of his Imagination % and the Abjlraftions ofnis Mini ||, lead him into frequent Miftakes •, that die Inclinations of his Will v, and the PaJJtons of his Heart *, almoft ever conceal * Lib.y.' tne Truth from him, and never fufFer it to appear without being tinged with thofe falfe Colours that flatter Concupifcency. In fhort, we have partly difcover'd the Errours of the Mind, with their Caufes: Now 'tis time we mould fhew the Way that leads to the Knowledge of Truth, and' give the Mind all the poflible Skill and Strength to walk therein, without ftraying or wearying, it felf in vain.
But, to fpare the Readers an unprofitable Labour, we think fit to advife them, this Laft Book is only made for'fuch as earneftly defire to feek the Truth by themfelves, and to make ule of the Force of their own Mind for that purpofe. I require them to defpife for a while all probable Opinions, to wave the ftrongeft Conje&ures, to neglecf the Authority of all the Philofophers, to free themfelves, as far as pofhble, from all Prejudice, Intereft, and Pafiion ■, to enter into an ex- treme Miftruft of their Senfes and Imagination: In a word, well to remember the greateft part of the Things that have been faid in the former Books.
I attempt, in this laft Book, to give the Mind all the Perfection it can naturally attain to, by fupplying it with the neceflaiy Helps to become more attentive and enlarg'd, and prefcribing it r thofe Rules that muft be obferved in the Inquiry after Truth, that it may never miftake,but learn in time whatever can be known.
Could I carry this Defign to its utmoft Perfection, which I pretend not, this being but an Eflay rewards it, I might boaft to have found out an Univerfal Science, which would make thofe truly learned that knew how to make ufe of it -, fince they would have the Foundation of all the par- ticular Sciences, which they would acquire proportionably as they fhould make ufe of that llni- verial Science: For, by this Treatife we endeavour to render the Mind capable of paffing a true and certain Judgment upon all the Queftions that are not beyond its reach.
As, to be a good Mathematician, 'tis not fufficient to learn by Heart all the Demonftrationr of Euclid, P.rpjwr, Archimedes, Apollonii/s, and others that have written of Geometry ■, i'o, to be a Learned Philofophcr, 'tis not enough to have read Plato,. Arijlotle, Des Cartes, and perfectly to know their Sentiments upon Philofophical Queftions. For the Knowledge of all the Opinions and Judgments of other Men, either Philofophers or Geometricians, is rather a Hiftory, than a Science; tire true Science that perfects, as far as poflible, the Mind, confiding in a certain Ability of lolidly judging of all things proportioned to its Reach. But, not to lofe time, nor prepoflefs- the Header with precipitate Judgments, let us begin to treat of fuch an important Matter.
i-iift of all, we ought to remember the Rule that has been eftablifhed, and proved at the begin- ning of thehh'Ji Book, becaule 'tis the Foundation and Principle of whatever we fhall fay hereafter.
And Chap. Ii. The Search after Truth* %f And therefore I repeat it > H'c muft never give a full Confent, but to thofe Proportions that a$ pear fo evidently true,, that they cannot be denied K without feeling an immrdFain, and the je- er et Reproaches of our kcafon •, that Is to fay, without clearly knowing we Jlmdd fnMt a wrong I tie of our Liberty by zvitb-holding our Confent. For, as many times as we yield to Probabilities, we certainly venture to be miitaken; and Vis but by good Chance, or a lucky Hit', if we be not really deceived. So that the confuted Sight of a great number of Probabilities, upon different Subjefts, makes not our Reafon more perfeft? nothing but the clear View of the Truth being ' able to afford it any real Perfection and Satisfaction.. r • Thence 'tis eafie to conclude, That fince, according to our firft Rule, nothing' but Evidence can < affure us that we are not deceived, we ought to take a fpeci'al care to preferve that Evidence in all our Perceptions i that we may pafs a found Judgment upoiv all the Things to which our Reafon can attain, and difcover as many Truths as we are capable of. t _ The Things that can produce and preferve that Evidence, are of, two forts • fome are within us, and in fome manner depending on us h others are out of Out Jurifdiclion.' For, as, to fee cK-- ftin&ly vilible Objects, 'tis required to have a good Sight, and to fix it iteadfaftly upon them,; which two Things are in us, or in fome manner depending on us: So 'tis requifite to have a found Underftanding, and a ftrong Application, in order to pierce into the bottom of intelligible Truths' * which two Things are in us, or in fome fort in our power. „ But as the Eyes ftand in need of Light to fee, which Light depends upon foreign Caufes ^ fo the Mind needs Ideas to conceive, which, as it has been proved elfeWhere, have no Dependency upon us, but are furnifhed to us by a foreign Caufe. So that fhould the Ideas of Things fuper- fede being prefent to our Minds, as often as we defire to fee them; mould he that enlightens the World conceal them from us; it would not be more poflible for us to redrefs it, or to know any- thing, than it is to fee vilible Objects when the Light is gone. But we have no reafon to fear it: For the Prefence of Ideas being natural to our Minds, and depending on the general Will of God, which is conftant and immutable, they can never difappear, nor fail u$ in theDifcovery of fuch Things as are attainable by Natural Reafon. For, the Sun that enlightens the Minds, is, not like that which illuminates Bodies; it is never eclipfed, nor goes ever down, but penetrates' every thing without dividing its Light.
The Ideas of all Things being then continually prefent to us, even when we do not attefi- tively confider them-, all that we need doe to make all our Perceptions evident, is only to look for fuch Means as can increafe the Attention and Extent of the Mind; as nothing elfe is requi- red on our fide, to diftinguifh vilible and prefent Objects, but to have good Eyes, and to fix ' them thereupon.
However, becaufe the Objects we confider have more Relations than we can difcover a'f once, by a fimple EfTay of Thought ^ we ftill need fome.Rules, skilfully to unfold the Difficulties -, by which Succours, the Mind, being grown more attentive and extended, may with a full Evidence difcover all the Relations of the Thing examined.
We fhall divide this Sixth Book into Two Parts. We fliali treat in the Firft, of thofe Supplies that may afford the Mind more Attention and Extent; and in the Second we fhall pre^ fcribe thofe Rules that it muft follow in the Inquiry after Truth, to pafs found and undecel- Table Judgments. ' CHAP. II.
That Attention is neceffary io -preferve Evidence iti oiir Knowledge: That the Modifications of the Soul mahg her attentive^ but fbare and tahg up too much hen Capacity of Perceiving.
WE have fhewn at the Beginning of this Work, that the Underftanding does nothing but perceive; and- that, as to its Concern, there is no difference betwixt bare Perceptions, Judgments, and Reafonings, unlefs it be, that the fecohd and third are Perceptions more cbm- pofed than the firft; becaufe they not only reprefent many Things, but alio the Relations fhey have together. For naked Perceptions reprefent only Things to the Mind -7 whereas Judgments reprefent the Relations that are betwixt Things and Reafonings, the Relations that are betwixt the Relations of Things, provided they be fimple Reafonings * for if they were Complex, they "would reprefent Relations of Relations, or compound Relations, which are between the Rela- tion of Things, and fo ad infinitum. For, proportionably as Relations multiply, fo the Reafon- ings, that reprefent them to the Mind, become more compofed. However, Judgments and fim- ple Reafonings, as well as thofe that are compofed, are but, as to the Underftanding, bare Per- ceptions, fince it does no more than limply perceive, as has been already obferved.
Whence it appears, that the Underftanding never 'falls into Errour, fince there is none in Per- ceptions •, and, that Errour it feif is not of an intelligible nature: For, as we have already faid many times, it confifts in a too hafty Confent of the Will, which fuffers it felf to be dazzled by fome falfe Glimpfe, and, inftead of keeping its Liberty as loRg as poiiible, negligently relies upon the Appearance of Truth, K Notwithftanding, 3& F. Malebranche Concerning BookVl.
Notwithstanding, as it commonly happens that the Underftanding has but confufed and imper- fect Perceptions of Things h fo 'tis really a Caufe of our Errours, though only occafional. For, as the Corporeal Sight leads us into Miftake, when it reprefents outward Obje£rs confufedly and imperfectly j confufedly, when they are at too great a diftance, or for want of Light ^ and im- perfectly, when it only fhews fuch Faces of them as look towards us: So the Underftanding of- ten having but a confufed and imperfect Conception of Things, becaufe they are not fuffiriently prefent to it, and that it difcovers not all their Parts, caufesthe Will, that too eafily yields to thofe obicure and imperfect Conceptions, to fall into many Errours.
We muft then look out for Means that may hinder our Perceptions from being confufed and ' imperfect. And becaufe, as every one knows, nothing can make them more clear and diftinct, than Attention •, we muft find out Means to become more and more attentive. Thus we may hope to keep to Evidence in our Reafonings, and even to furvey all at once the neceffary Connexion be- twixt all the Parts of our lon'geft Inferences.
To find out thofe Means, 'tis neceffary to perfuade our felves of what has been faid elfewhere, That the Mind gives not an equal Attention to all the Things it perceives: For it applies it felf infinitely more to fuch as affect, modifie, and penetrate it, than to thofe which, though they be prefent, yet do not concern or belong to it: In more, 'tis more taken up with its own Modifica- tions, than with the bare Ideas of Objects, which Ideas are Things different from it felf.
Thence it comes, that we confider but with tedioufnefs, diflike, and remiffnefs, the abstracted Ideas of the pure Underftanding ^ that we apply our felves much more to Things that we ima- gine, efpecially when our Imagination is ftrong, and the Tracks of our Brain very deep: And lastly, that we are wholly taken up with fenfible Qualities, and even fo, that we can afford no Attention to the pure Ideas of the Mind, when we feel fomething very pleafant or painfuL For Pain, Pleafure, and other Senfations, being Modes ' of the Souls Exiftence, 'tis impoflible we fhould exift without perceiving them, and having the Capacity of the Mind taken up, fince our Senfations are nothing but Perceptions.
But 'tis not fo with the pure Ideas of the Mind, fince they may be intimately united to it, without its taking the leaft notice of them. For, though God is moft intimately united with us, and comprehends the Ideas of whatever we fee •, yet thofe Ideas, though never fo prefent, and, as I may fay, in the middle of our felves, are concealed from us, when the Motions of the Spirits do not raife their Traces, or when our Will applies not the Mind to confider them •, that is to . fay, when it performs not thofe Acts to which the Author of Nature has joined the Reprefen- tation of thofe Ideas. This is the Foundation of whatever we fhall fay concerning the Means that can improve our Attention, which Means will be drawn from the very Nature of the Mind -, fo that 'tis to be hoped, that they will not prove fruitlefs and chimerical, as many others, that are more puzling than ferviceable- And though they fhould not be as ufeful as we could wiffi, yet the Time that fhall be beftowed upon their Reading will not be entirely loft, fince this will afford us a fuller Knowledge of the Nature of the Mind.
The Modifications of the Soul have Three Caufes, the Senfes, the Imaginations^ and the TaJJt- ons.- For every one experimentally knows, that Pain and Pleafure, and all other ftrong Senfati- ons, lively Imaginations, and vehement PafTions, take up the Mind fo much as to make it inca- pable of Attention, at the time they too vigoroufly affect it ^ becaufe they fill, as I may fay, its whole Capacity, or Faculty of Perceiving. And even when thofe Modifications are moderate, they ftill divide its Capacity in fome fort; fo that it cannot give up it felf wholly to the Con- fideration of abstracted Truths.
Thence we muft draw this important Conclufion, That thofe that will earneftly apply them- felves to fearch after Truth, muft carefully, and as far as poflible, avoid all the Senfations that are too lively, as a great Noife, a bright Light, Pleafure, Pain, &c. That they muft inceflantly watch over the Purity of their Imagination, left deep Traces fhould be imprinted on their Brain, which would continually difturb, and, as it were, diffolve the Mind $ and that they muft above all flop the Motions of the Paflions, which make fo powerful an Impreflion on the Body and Soul, that it is for the moft part impoflible the Mind fhould think upon any thing elfe. For though the pure Ideas of Truth are always prefent, yet they cannot be attended to, while the whole Reach and Compafs of our Thoughts are charg d with thefe penetrating Modifications.
However, as it is not pofhble that the Soul fhould be free of PafTion, Senfation, or any other particular Modification, we muft make a Vertue of Neceflity, and endeavour to draw, from thofe very Modifications, fuch Succours as can make us more attentive: But the Ufe of them requires great Skill and Circumfpettion, if we defire to make an Advantage of them h and we muft care- fully examine how far we have occafion for them, that we may ufe them only when the necef- lity of being attentive compels us to it.
CHAP.
Chap. III. The Search after Truth. £w CHAP. III.
Of the Z)fe that can he made of the Pajpons and Senfes, to preferve the At- tention of the Mind.
TH E Paffions that may fuccefsfully incite us to the Enquify after Truth, are thofe that afford Strength and Courage to overcome the trouble of rendring our felves attentive: There are fome good, and others bad; the Good are fuch as the Defire of rinding out the Truth, of getting fo much Light as to conduct our felves, and be ufeful to our Neighbours, and the like; the Bad or Dangerous are, the Defire of getting Fame, of making Eftabliihments, of riling above our Fel- lows, and others yet more corrupted, of which we need not fpeak.
In our prefent unhappy State, it often happens, that the leaft rational Paffions are the rrioft inci- ting to the Enquiry after Truth, and are more pleafant Confolations in all the Troubles we are at to difcover it, than fuch as are jufter, and more reafonable: For Inftance, Vanity moves us much rnore than the Love of Truth ^ and we fee every day fuch Perfons as are extraordinarily given to itudy, as long as they find Men before whom they can boaft of their Learning -, whereas they en- tirely fbrfake it, when they meet with no body more to liften to them. The confufed Profpecl of the Glory that furrounds them when they vend their Opinions, bears up their Courage in the moft fruitlefs and tedious Studies: But if either by Chance, or the Neceffity of their Affairs, they come to be taken off from that little Flock of Applauders, their Heat prefently cools, the moft lolid Stu- dies are no longer alluring -y Diftafte, Tedioufneis and Morofenefs overtake them, and make them- fbrfake all. Vanity did triumph over their natural Lazinefs, but now Lazinefs triumphs over the Love of Truth -, for Vanity may fometimes refill Lazinefs, but Lazinefs commonly proves too ltrong and powerful for the Love of Truth.
However, as the Paffion for Glory may be referr'd to a good End, as, to the Glory of God, the publick Ufe, the Prefervation of our good Name; fome Perfons may perhaps be allow'd, in fome certain Cafes, to make ufe of that Paffion, as a powerful Help to make the Mind more attentive. But Care mtift be taken to, ufe it only when the reafonable Paffions, whereof mention has been made, are not fufficient, and that our Duty engages us to apply our felves to Subjefts that are very difguft- ing -r Firft, becaufe that Paffion is very dangerous to the Confcience -, Secondly, becaufe it infenfibly draws us into ill Studies, that have more Luftre than Ufe or Truth in them; and Laftly, becaufe it is very difficult to moderate it, and that we often become its Fool and Property -, and inftead of enlightning the Mind, we only ftrengthen the Concupifcence of Pride, which both corrupts our Moral Powers, and darkens our Underftanding with an undhTolvable Obfcurity.
For it mult be confider'd how That Paffion infenfibly increafes, fettles and fortifies it felf in the Heart of Man •, and when it is too violent, inftead of helping the Mind in the Search of Truth, it ftrangely blinds it, and even perfuades it that Things are juft as it defires they ifiould be. ■■ Sure it is, there would not be fo many falfe Inventions, nor imaginary Difcoveries, were not Men's Heads giddy'd by the ardent Defire of appearing Inventors. For the firm and obftinate Perfuafion wherein feveral Perfons have been to have found, for Inftance, the Perpetual Motion, the Quadrature of the Circle, the Duplication of the Cube by ordinary Geometry, in all likelihood proceeded from an extraordinary Defire of feeming to have perform'd what others have vainly at- tempted. \ And therefore 'tis fitter to excite in us fuch Paffions as are fo much more ufeful to our fearching out of Truth, as they are more ftrong, and wherein the Excels is not to be fear'd: Such are the Defires of making a good Ufe of our Mind •, of freeing our felves from Prejudices and Errours; of getting a fufficient Light to behave our felves in our Condition •, and fuch others as neither engage lis into fruitlefs Studies, nor carry us on to rafti and inconfiderate Judgments.
When we have begun to tafte the pleafure of making ufe of our Mind, to be fenfible of the Pro- fit that arifes from it, have freed our felves of violent Paffions, and have difrelifh'd fenfible Plea- fures, which always prove the Matters of, or rather the Tyrants over Reafon, in thofe that indif- ereetly give up themfelves to them •, we need not other Paffions, but fuch as we have lpoken of, to become attentive upon the Subjects on which we defire to meditate.
But moft Men are not in that Condition; they have neither Tafte, nor Underftanding, nor Cu- riofity for any thing but what affects the Senfes-, their Imagination is corrupted by an almoft infi- nite Number of deep Traces, which raife none but falfe Ideas •, and as they depend upon all the Obje&s that refort to the Senfes and Imagination, fo they always judge by the Impreffion they re- ceive from them •, that is, with reference to themfelves. Pride, Debauchery, the various Engage- ments, -the reftlefs Defires of Advancement, which are fo common amongft the Men of the World, darken the Sight of Truth, and ftifle in them the Senfe of Piety h becaufe they feparate them from God, who alone is able to enlighten, as he alone is able to govern us. For we cannot increafe our Union with fenfible Things, without diminifhing that which we have with intellectual Truth, iince we cannot be at the fame time ftriftly united with Things fo different and oppofite.
Thofe whofe Imagination is pure and chafte, that is, whofe Brain is not fill'd up with deep Traces, that fallen them to vifible Things, may eafily unite themfelves to God, liften attentively to the Truth that fpeaks to them, and even forbear the Ufe of the moft juft and rational Paffions.
r But £fi f. Maleb.ranche ConcMning Book VI.
But as to thole that live amOngft the Great, who depend upon too many things, and whofe Ima- gination is foil'd by the falle and obfcure Ideas of fenfible Objefts, they cannot apply themfelves to the Truth, unlefs they be born up by fome PaiTion, ftrong enough to countervail the Weight of the Body, that carries them down -, and to imprint Traces on their Brain,^ that may make a Revulfion upon the Animal Spirits. However, as every Paffion can only by it felf perplex our Ideas, they ought to life that Help but fo far as Neceflity requires; and all Men ought to ftudy themfelves, that they may proportionate their Paffions to their Weaknefs.