And therefore 'tis neceflary to know God, and to be allured that he is no Deceiver; if we de- fire to be fully convinced that the moft certain Sciences, as Arithmetick and Geometry are true Sciences; for without that their Evidence is not full, and we can ftill with-hold our Confent. And 'els likewife neceflary to know by a fimple View, and not by Reafoning, that God is no De- ceiver; fince reafoning may ltill be falfe, in the fuppofition of a deluding God.
AU-the ordinary Proofs of the Exiftence and Perfections of God, drawn from the Exiftence and Perfections of his Creatures, are methinks liable to this Defect, that they convince not the Mind with a fimple Perception. All thofe Arguments are Reafonings convincing in themfelves; but be- caufe they are Reafonings, they are not demonftrative in fuppofing a wicked and deceitful! Genius. They fufticiently fhew that there is a Power fuperiour to us, which is granted even by that foo- lifh Suppofition: but they do not fully perfuade us that there is a God, or a Being infinitely per- fect ■, fo that the Conclufion of thofe Arguments is more evident than the Principle.
'Tis more evident that there is a Power fuperiour to us, than that there is a World, fince no Suppofition can obviate our demonftrating that fuperiour Power ^ whereas in fuppofing an evil and deceitfull Spirit, 'tis impoflible to prove the Exiftence of the World: becaufe it may ftill be conceived, that this wicked Genius gives us the Senfe of things that are not in being •, as Sleepy and fome Diftempers, make us perceive things that never were, and even feel an actual pain in imaginary Members, fuch as we have loft, or that we never had.
But the Arguments of the Exiftence and Perfections of God, drawn from our Idea of infinite, are Proois of fimple fight. We fee there is a God, as foon as we perceive infinite; becaufe ne- ceifary Exiftence is included in the Idea of infinite, and that nothing but infinite can furnifh to us the Idea of an infinite Being. We likewife fee that God is no Deceiver, becaufe knowing that he is infinitely perfect:, and that infinite cannot want any Perfection, we plainly perceive that he will not feduce us, and even that he cannot, becaufe he can but what he wills, and what he is able to will. And therefore there is a God, a true God, and a God that never deceives us; though he does not always enlighten us, and that we are Obnoxious to Miftakes, when we want his Light. Attentive Minds perceive all thofe Truths, by a fimple intuitive Perception, though we leem to make Arguments, that we may demonftrate them to others; fo that they may be fup- pofed as unquestionable Principles of our Reafonings $ for having known that God delights not in deceiving us, nothing hinders but we may proceed to Reafon.
'Tis alfo plain that the certainty of Faith depends on that Principle, That there is a God un- capable of Deceipt. For the Exiftence of God, and the Infallibility of his Divine Authority, are rather a natural Knowledge and common Notions, as to Minds capable of ferious Attention, than Articles of Faith; though to have a Mind fufceptible of a fufficient Attention rightly to conceive thofe Truths, and willingly to apply our felves to the underftanding them, be a parti- cular Gift or God. • From that Principle, That God is no Deceiver, we might likewife infer,. that we have a real Body, to which we are united in a particular manner, and that we are furrounded with feveral ooiers*. For we are inwardly convinced of their Exiftence by the continual Senfations, which ^ * % God produces in us, and which we cannot correct by Reafon, without offending Faith-, though 0^eoo\l * we yi F. Maleeranche Concerning Book VI.
we can correct by Reafon the Senfations that reprefent them, as endud with fome Qualities arid Perfections that are not in them: So that we ought not to believe that they are fuch as we ice or imagine them, but only that they exift, and that they are fuch as we conceive them by Reafon.
But tliat we may proceed orderly, we mull not yet examine whether we have a Body, whether there are others about us, or whether we have only bare Senfations of Things which exift not. Thofe Queftions include too great Difficulties, and are not perhaps fo neceffary as may be irna- gffi'd to perfeQ: our Mind, and to have an accurate Knowledge of Natural and Moral Philofo- phv, and fome other Sciences.
We have within us the Ideas of Numbers and Extention, whofe Exiftence is undeniable, and their Nature immutable; and which would eternally fupply us with Objects to think on, if we de- file to know all their Relations: It is neceffary to begin to make ufe of our Minds upon thofe Ideas, for fome Reafons, which it will not be amifs to explain, whereof the principal are Three.
The Firft is, That thofe Ideas are the moft clear and evident of all: For if, to avoid Errour, We niuft rtill keep to Evidence in cur Reafonings, 'tis plain that we muft rather argue from the Ideas of Numbers and Extenfion, than from the confus'd or compos'd Ideas of Phyficks^ Morals, Mechanicks, Chymifiry, and other Sciences.
Secondly, Thofe Ideas are the moft diftincf and exact of all, efpecially thofe of Numbers: So that the Habit ( which proceeds from the Exercife of Arithmetic!?, and Geometry ) of not being- content till we precifely know the Relations of Things, endues the Mind with fuch an Exactnefs of Thought, as is not to be found in thofe that are fatisfied with the Probabilities fo obvious to be met with in other Sciences.
The Third and chief Reafon is, That thofe Ideas are the immutable Rules and common Meafure of all the Objects of our Knowledge: For thofe that perfectly know the Relations of Numbers and Figures, or rather the Art of making fuch Comparifons as are requifite to know them, have a kind of Universal Knowledge, and a very fure Means evidently and certainly to dilcover whatever1 goes not beyond the ordinary Limits of the Mind. But thofe that are not skilful in this Art, can- not with Certainty dilcover fuch Truths as are ibmewhat intricate, though they have very clear Ideas of Things, and endeavour to know their Compound Relations.
Thefe, or the like Realons, mov'd fome of the Antients to apply their Youth to the Study of Arithmetick, Algebra and Geometry. Undoubtedly they well knew that Arithmetic/? and Algebra endue the Mind with fuch an Infight and Penetration, as was not to be gotten by other Studies j and that Geometry manages the Imagination fo well, as that it is not eafily puzzl'd or confounded; for that Faculty of the Soul, fo neceflary to Sciences, acquires by the Ufe of Geometry, fuch an univerfal Nicety as promotes and preferves the clear View of the Mind, even in the moft intricate Difficulties.
And therefore, he that defires always to preferve Evidence in his Perceptions, and difcover na- ked Truths, without Mixture of Darknefs and Errour, muft begin with the Study of Arithmetic/^ Algebra and Geometry, after he has obtain'd fome Knowledge, at leaft of himfelf, and the Sove- reign Being. As for Books that make the Way to thofe Sciences eafie, I may refer to the Medi- tations of des Cartes, as to the Knowledge of God, and our felves •, to the Elements of Mathe ma- ticks, newly printed, as to Arithmetick and Algebra; to the Neva Elements of Geometry, printed in 1667, or to the Elements of Father Taquet, Jefuit, printed ax. Antwerp in \66% as to ordij nary Geometry; and as to Conick Setlions, and the Solution of Geometrical Problemes, to the Trea- tifes of Monfieur de la Hire, intituled, Of Conick Setlions, Of Geometrical Places, and Of the Con- ftruffion of Equations; to which may be added, the Geometry of des Cartes.
I would not have advis'd to the Elements of Mathematicks, as to Arithmetick and Algebra, if I knew any Author who had clearly demonftrated thofe Sciences; but Truth obliges me to a thing, for which I may be blam'd by fome People; for Algebra and Analyticks being altogether requifite for the Difcovery of compos'd Truths, I muft needs mew my Efteem for a Book which carries thofe Sciences very far, and which, in the Opinion of many Learned, explains them more clearly than they had been hitherto.
By the careful Srudy of thofe general Sciences, we mall evidently know a great Number of Truths, very ferviceable in all accurate and particular Sciences. We may. afterwards ftudy Natu- ral and Moral Philofophy, as being very ufeful, though not very fit to make the Mind nice and quick-fighted. And if we defire to preferve Evidence in all our Perceptions, we muft take a fpe- cial Care not to be opinionated of any Principle that is not evident, and to which the Chmcfc, tor inftance, would not be fuppos'd to diffent, after having throughly weigh'd and confidefd it.
And therefore we mult only admit in Phyficks thofe Notions which are common to all Men-, fuch as Axioms of Geometry, and the clear Ideas of Extenfion, Figure, Motion, Reft, and others of that nature, if there be any. Perhaps it will be laid, that Extenfion is not the Eflence of Matter: But what is that to the purpofe? 'Tis fufficient that the World, which we conceive to confift'of Extenfion, appears like to that we fee, though it be not made of fuch a Matter, which is good for nothing, and altogether unknown, whilft ib much Noife is made about it.
It is not abfolutely neceflary to examine whether there are actually External Beings, corre- fponding to thofe Ideas-, for. we argue not from thofe Beings, but from their Ideas. We muft only take care that our Keafonings which we make upon the Properties of Things, agree with our inward Coulcioufnets; that is, that our Thoughts perfectly agree with Experience ■, te- caufe in Phyfks we endeavour to difcover the Order and Connexion of Ffiects with tlu r . r Cauks, Chap. VI. The Search after Truth. yi Caufes, either in Bodies if they exift, or in the Senfe we have of them if they are not in being; I fay not, however, that we can doubt whether Bodies are actually exiftirjg, when w-Vonfidtx that God is not a Deceiver $ and that the Order he has conftituted in our Sentiments of Thin;:-, both as to natural Occurrences, and fuch as are wrought to create our Belief of what Reafon is ac a Lofs to comprehend, is very regular. But I obferve this, becaufe 'tis not neceflary to infill at Hilt very long upon a thing which no body doubts of, and is not extremely conducible to the Know b by. of Pbyficks, confider'd as a true Science.
Neither muft we puzzle our Heads with enquiring whether there are in the Bodies about us fome other Qualities, befides thofe of which we have clear Ideas j for we mull only reafon up- on our Ideas 5 and if there be any thing of which we have no clear, diflinct and particular Idea, We fhall never know it, nor argue from it with any Certainty: Whereas, perhaps, by reafoning upon our Ideas, we may follow Nature, and perhaps difcover that fire is not fo hidden as is com- monly imagined.
As thofe who have not ftudy'd the Properties of Numbers, often imagine that it is not pomble to refolve fome Problemes, which are however fimple and eafie:, fo thofe that have not meditated upon the Properties of Exrenfion, Figures and Motions, are very apt to believe, and even to affert, tfrat moft part of the PhyficalQjteftions are inexplicable. But we mufl not be deterfd by the Opi- nion of thofe who have examin'd nothing, or nothing at leafl with due Application: For though f;w Truths concerning Natural Things have been fully demonflrated, yet 'tis certain that theie are fome that are general which cannot be doubted of, though it be very polTible not to think up- on them, to know nothing of them, and to deny them.
If we meditate orderly, and with due Time and all neceflary Application, we fhall difcover fe- veral of thofe certain Truths I fpeak of: But for more Conveniency, it will be requifite carefully to read des Cartes % Principles of Fbilqfopliy, without approving of any thing he lays, till the Strength and Plainnefs of his Reafons fhall fuffer us to doubt no longer.
As Moral Philofophy is the moft neceflary of all Sciences, fo it mufl be ftudy'd with the great- eft Application; it being very dangerous to follow in this the Opinions of Men. But to the avoiding Errour, and keeping to Evidence in our Perceptions, we mufl only meditate upon fuch Principles as are confefs'd by all thofe whofe Hearts are not corrupted by Debauchery, and their Minds blinded with Pride: For there is no MoralPrinciple undeniable to Minds of Flejb ami Bloody who afpire to the Quality of Bold Wits. Such People conceive not the moft fimple Truths; or if they do, they conftantly deny them through a Spirit of Contradict ion, and to keep up the Repu- tation of great Wits.
Some of the molt general Principles of Morality are, That God having made all things for him- felf, has made our Underftanding to know, and our Will to love him: That being fo juft and powerful as he is, we cannot be happy but by obeying his Commands, nor be unhappy in follow- ing them: That our Nature is corrupted, our Mind depending on our Body, our Reafon on our Senfes, and our Will on our PafTions: That we are uncapable of performing what we plainly fee' to be our Duty, and that we have need of a Redeemer. There are yet many other Moral Prin- ciples; as, That Retirement and Penitency are neceflary to diminifh our Union with fenfible Ob- jects, and to increafe that which we have with intelligible Goods, true Goods, and the Goods of the Mind: That we cannot enjoy vehement Pleafures, without becoming Slaves to them: That nothing muft be undertaken by Paffion: That we muft not long for Settlements in this Life, &c. But becaufe thefe laft Principles depend on the former, and on the Knowledge of Man, it behoves us not to take them at firft for granted. If we orderly meditate upon thofe Principles, with as much Care and Application as fo great a Subject deferves, and admit no Conclufion for true but fuch as follows from thofe Principles, we fhall compofe a very certain Syftem of Morals, and per- fectly agreeable with that of the Gofpel, though not fo large and compleat.
I grant that in Moral Reafonings it is not lb eafie to preferve Evidence aftd Exactnefs, as in fome other Sciences -, and that the Knowledge of Man being abfolutely neceflary to thole that will proceed far, many Learners make no confiderable Progrefles therein: They will not confult themfelves, to be fenfible of the Weaknefs of their Nature: They are foon weary of interroga- ting the Mailer, who inwardly teaches them his Will; that is, the Immutable and Eternal Laws, and the true Principles of Morality: They cannot Men with Pleafure to him that fpeaks not to their Senfes, who anfwers not according to their Defires, and flatters not their fecret Pride: They have no Veneration for fuch Words, the Luflre of which dazles not their Imagination, which are lowly pronoune'd, and never diftinctly heard but when the Creatures are filent: But they confult tvith Pleafure and Reverence Ariftotle, Seneca, or fome new Philofophers, who feduce them by the Obfcurity of their Words, by the Elegancy of their Exprefhons, or the Probability of their Reafons.
Since the Fall of our firft Parents we efteem nothing but what refers to the Prefervation of the. Body, and the Conveniencies of Life •, and as we difcover that fort of Good by means of the Senfes, fo we endeavour to ufe them on all Occafions. The Eternal Wifdom, which is our true Lite, and the only Light that can illuminate us, often fhines but upon the Blind, and fpeaks but to the Deaf when it fpeaks within the RecefTes of our Soul, becaufe we are for the moft -part exer- cis'd abroad. And as we are continually putting Queftions to the Creatures, to learn any News- from them of the Good we are in fearch of, it was requifite, as I have faid elfewhere, that this Wifdom fhould offer it felf to our Senfes, yet without going out of our felves, that we might learn by fenfible Words and convincing Examples, the way to eternal Happinefs. God perpetuai- ** F. Malebranche Concerning Book VI.
ly imprints on us a natural Love for him, that toe may always love him; yet by that fame Mo- tion of Love we inceflantly recede from him, funning toith all the ftrength he gives us to the finfible Good which he forbids us to lbvej and therefore as he defires we mould love him, fo he mult make himfelf fenfible and offer himfelf before us, to ft op by the dele&ation of his Grace all our reftlefs Agitations, and begin our Cure by Senfations or Satisfactions, like to the preventing Pleafures that had been the Original of our Difeafe.
For thefe reafons I pretend not that Men may eafily difcover, by the ftrength of their Mind, all the Rules of Morality necelTary to Salvation, and much lefs that they mould be able to a£t accor- ding to their Light • for their Heart isftill more corrupted than their Mind. I only fay, that if they admit nothing but evident Principles, and argue confequently from them, they fhall difcover the lame Truths that are taught us in the Gofpel: becaufe it is the fame Wifdom, which fpeaks imme- diately, and by it felf, to thofe that difcover the Truth in evident Reafonings, and which fpeaks in the Holy Scriptures to thofe that underftand them in their right fenfe.
We mult therefore ftudy Morality in the Gofpel, to fpare our felves the trouble of Meditation, and to learn toith certainty the Laws and Rules of our Life and Manners; As to thofe who are not fatisfied with a bare Certainty, becaufe it only convinces the Mind, toithout enlightening it, they mult meditate upon thofe Laws, and deduce them from their natural Principles; that they may know evidently by Realbn what Faith has already taught them, with an abfolute Certainty; Thus they will convince themfelves, that the Gofpel is the molt folid Book in the World, that Chrift perfectly knew the Diforders and Diftempers of Nature, that he has reftified and cured them in a manner the molt ufeful to us, and molt worthy of himfelf, that can be conceived. But that the Light of Philofophers is nothing but a dark Night, and their molt fplendid Ver- mes, an intolerable Pride: In fhort, that Ariftot/e, Seneca, and all the reft are but Men, to fay nothing worfft CHAP. VII.
Of the Vfe of the Firfl Rule concerning particular Quefiions.
WE have fufficiently infifted upon the general Rule of Method, more efpecially regarding the Subject of our Studies, and fhewn, that Des Cartes has exactly followed it in his Sy- ftem of the World; whereas Arifiotle and his Difciples have not obferved it. We proceed now to the particular Rules that are neceffary to refolve all forts of Queftions.
The Queftions that may be formed upon all forts of Subjects are of fo many Kinds, as that it is not eafie to enumerate them. However I fhall fet down the principal. Sometimes we fearch after the unknown Caufes of fome Effe£ts that are known, and fbmetimes after unknown Effects by known Caufes. Fire burns and diflipates Wood, we enquire after the Caufe of it. Fire con- fifts in a violent Motion of the fiery Particles; we defire to know what Effe£ts that Motion is able to produce, whether it may harden Clay, melt Iron, &c. ■ Sometimes we feek the Nature of a thing by its Properties, and fometimes its Properties by its Nature, that is known to us. We know, or fuppofe, that Light is tranfmitted in a mo- ment ^ and however, that it is reflected and collected by a concave Mirrour, fo as to confume and melt the molt folid Bodies; and we deiign to make ufe of thofe Properties to difcover its Nature. On the contrary we know, that all the fpace that reaches from the Earth to the Hea- vens, is full of little Spherical and molt movable Bodies, tohich continually endeavour their re- moval from the Sun: We defire to difcover whether the endeavour of thofe fmall Bodies may be tranfmitted in an inftant •, tohether being reflected by a concave Glafs, they mult unite them- felves, and diflipate or melt the folideft Bodies.
Sometimes toe enquire after all the Parts of the Whole, and fbmetimes after the Whole by its Parts. We fearch after all the unknoton Parts of a Whole that is known, tohen we feek all the Aliquot Parts of a Number, all the Roots of an Equation, all the Right Angles of a Figure, £?r. And we enquire after an unknoton Whole, all the Parts of which are known, tohen toe feek the Summ of feveral Numbers, the Area of many Figures, the Dimenfions of different VelTels. Or we feek a Whole, one Part of which is known, and whole other Parts, though unknown, include fome known Relation with that which is unknown •, as when we feek what is that Number, one Part of which, as 15, being known, makes with the other part the half, Or the third of an unknown Number ^ or when we feek an unknown Number equal to 1 j, and to the double of the Root of that unknown Number.
Laftly, We often enquire whether fome things are equal, or like to others ^ and how much they are unequal or different: As tohen we defire to know whether Saturn is greater than Jupiter, and how much the former furpalTes the latter: Whether the Air of Rome is hotter than that of London, and how many degrees.
What is general in all Queftions is, that they are formed for the Knowledge of fome Truths-, and becaufe all Truths are Relations, it may generally be faid, that in all Queftions, we fearch but after the Knowledge of fome Relations, either betwixt things, or betwixt Ideas, or betwixt things and their Ideas.
There are Relations of feveral forts, as betwixt the Nature of things, betwixt their Magnitudes, their Parts, their Attributes, their Qualities, Effects, Caufes, 0V. but they may all be reduced to two, Ghap. VII. ' The Search after Truth.
two, viz. to Relations of Magnitude and ofQiiaHty-, comprehending under the former, all thofe in which things are confider'd as fiiceptible of more and lefs; and all the others under the latter. So that it may he faid, that all Queftions tend to difcover fbffie Relation, either o£ Magnitude or of Quality.
The firft and chief Rule is, That we mull very diftin&ly know the fiate of the Queftion to be refolv'd; and have fuch diftinft Ideas of its Terms, that we may compare them together, and difcover their unknown Relations.
We mult then firft very clearly perceive the unknown Relation enquired after; for 'tis plain, that if we have no certain Mark to diftinguifh it, when '-Ms fought for, or when?tis found, our labour will be fruitlels., Secondly, We muft, as far as poffible, make tlie Ideas which anfwer to the Terms of the Qjte- ftion, diftin£t, by taking off their Equivocation; and make them clear, by confidering them with all the pbffible Attention: for if thofe Ideas are fo confufed and obfcure, as that we cannot make the neceffary Cbmparifons, to difcover' the Relations we look for, we are not yet in a ftate of re- folving the Queftion.
Thirdly, We muft cbnfider with all poffible Attention, the Conditions exprefFed in the Queftion, if any there he; fince without that we can but confufedly underftand the ftate of that Queftion: befides that the Conditions commonly trace out the way to refolve it. So that when the ftate of a Queftion, and its Conditions are rightly underftood, we not only know what we enquire •after, but alfo fometimes by what means it may be difcovered.
I grant that Conditions are not exprefs'd in all Queftions, but theri 'thofe Queftions are unde- terminate, and may refolved feveral ways •, as when 'tis required to rind out a Square Number, a- Triangle, &c without fpecifying any other particulars: Or it may be that the Querift knows not how to refolve, or that he conceals them, in order to puzzle the Refblver -, as when 'tis required to find out Two mean Proportionals betwixt Two Lines, without adding by the Interferon of the Circle and Parabo/a, or of the Circle and Ellipfis, &c.
And therefore 'tis altogether neceflary, that the diftinguifhing Character of what is fearcHed after; be very diftinft, and not equivocal, or that it be Only proper to the thing enquired -, other- wife we could nbt be certain whether the Queftion prbpofed is refolved. We muft likewife care- fully fepa'rate from the Queftion all the Conditons that friake it intricate, and without which it fubfifts entire-, becaufe they ftuitlefsly divide the capacity of the Mind. Befides that we have not a diftinft perception of the ftate of the Queftion, as long as the Conditions that attend it are ufelefs., Suppofe, for inftarice, a Queftion were propbfed in thefe Words; to eaufe that a Man be- fprinkled with fome Liquors, and crowned with a Garland of Flowers, be not able to reft, though he fees nothing that is capable of rrioving him. We muft enquire whether the word Man is Meta- phorical; whether the word Reft is" equivocal i whether it relates to local Motions, or to Paflions, as the iaft words, though he fees nothing that is capable of moving him, feem to hint: Laftly, We muft enquire whether the Conditions^ befprinkled with fome Liquors, and crowned with a Gar- land of Flowers are effential: Laftly, The ftate of that ridiculous and undeterminate Queftion be- ing thus plainly known, 'twill bfe eafie tb refolve it, by faying that we need but put a Man hi a Ship, with the Conditions exprefFed in the Queftion, - The Skill of thofe that propbfe fucH Queftions, is tb join fome Conditions to them, that feem neceflary though they be hot fo? that the Mind of the Refolver may be' diverted to things that are unferviceable, as to the Solution of it. As in ihii Queftion, which Servant-Maids often put to Children-, I have feen, fay they, Hunters, or rather Fifhers, which carried with them what they cbuld not catch, and threw into the Water what they catch d -, the Mind being prepoflefled with the Ideas of Fifhers that takeFifh, cannot underftand the ftate of that Foolifh Queftion-, the Whole Difficulty of which comes from hence, that we think not that Hunters and Fifhers, as well as other Men, often feek in theit Cloaths fome little Animals, which they throw away if they catch, and carry with them if they find them not.
Sometimes all the Conditions that are neceffary to refolve a Queftion are nbt mentibn'd, which makes them as hard as the ex'prefftng of unferviceable Characters, as in the following-, to make a Man unmbvable, without binding or wounding him; or rather, by putting his little Finger in- to his Ear; fo that he mail not be able to ftir, until he takes his little Finger out of his Ear 5 that at firft appears impoffible, and 'tis really To: for any one may walk having his little Finger in his Ear -, but there wants a Condition, which, if it were exprefs'd, would remove the whole Diffi- culty: for you need but make a Man embrace a Bed-poft, or fomething like, and put his little Finger into his Ear, fo that the Poft be included between his Arm and Ear, it being plain he can- not ftir without taking out his Finger. It is not mentioned that there is yet fomething to be done, on purpofe that the Mind fhOuld not feek for, nor difcover it. But thofe that undertake the refolving of filch Queftions, muft make all the Queries that are requifite, to underftand the point wherein lies the Strefs of the Difficulty.
Thofe arbitrary Queftions appear to be foolifh, and are indeed fo in one Senfe, as far as no- thing is learn1 d by their Solution. However they ate not fo different from natural Queftions as may be imagined -, for both are refolved by a Method that is very near the fame. And as the Skill or Malicioufnefs of Men, makes arbitrary Queftions intricate and difficult -, fo natural Effects are of themfelves furrounded with Obfcurity and Darknefs, that muft be diffipated by the Attention of die Mind, and by Experiments, which are a fort of Queries put to the Author of Nature; even 75 j 4 F. Malebrancae Concerning Book VI.
e'vehaS Equivocations, and ufelefs Circumftances are taken ofF from arbitrary £>j(cfiions, by the skilful Queries that are made ro the Propofers. Let us explain thefe things methodically, and in a more lerious and inftrucfing Manner.
There are many fguejuofts which appear very difficult, becaufe they are not underftood, which mould, rather be" taken for Axioms, that need Tome Explication, than for true ^jtejiions; for fome * Propoiirions which are undeniable, when the Terms that compoie them are rightly undeiitood, mutt not methinks be ranked in the Number of §>iieftions.