For Inlfance, Ir is propofed as a very difficult ^jte'fiion, Whether the Soul be ivwwrtal; becaufe fhey whopiopqfe, or pretend to refolve it, do not diltinctly apprehend the Senie of the Terms, for as the Words Soul and immortal fignirie different things, and that they know not how to uh- deritand them, io they cannot tell whether the Soul is immortal, having no diftinct. Idea, either of what they ask, or enquire after..
By the Word- Soul may be underftood a Subftance that thinks, wills, feels, fstc. or it may be taken for the Motion or Circulation of the Blood, and the Configuration of the parts of the Body: and laitly, for the Biood it felf, and the Animal Spirits. Likewife' by the Word immortal, we underftand what cannot periih by the ordinary Force of Nature, or what cannot be changed =, or laitly, what cannot be corrupted or diifipated, as a Vapour or Smoke.- The Words 5Wand immortal, being fuppos'd thus diftinguithed into their feveral Significations, a very mean Atten- tion of the Mind will be able to judge whether fire is immortal or not.,; Firit, 'tis plain that the Soul taken in the firit Senfe, or, for a thinking Subftance, is immortal, if you explain immortal in the fifft Senfe, what cannot perijh by the ordinary Force of Nature; iince 'tis not conceivable, that any Subftance mould be annihilated, but that to conceive the Poffibility of it, we muft have Recourfe to the Omnipotence of God.
Secondly, The Soul is immortal, taking immortal in the third Senfe, for what cannot be cor- rupted, nor refolved into Vapour, or Smoke; fince 'tis evident, that what cannot be divided into feveral Parts, cannot be corrupted, nor refolved into Vapours.
Thirdly, The Soul is not immortal, taking it in the fecond Senfe, for what is unchangeable; for we have convincing Proofs enow of the Alterations of our Soul, which feels one while Pain and another Pieafure, which often defires fome things which fhe afterwards ceafes to defire -, which is united to a Body from which me may be feparated, CV.
•If the Word Soul be taken in fome other Senfe,- it will be as eafie to perceive, whether me is immortal, fixing a determin'd Senfe to that Epithet. And therefore what makes fuch Qiteftions difficult, is, that they are not diftinctly underftood, or that the Words, in. which they are exprefs'd are equivocal g fo that they rather need Explication than Proof.
There are fome People lb dull, and others fo fanciful, as that they always take the Soul for fome Configuration of the Parts of the Brain, and for the Motion of the Spirits. 'Tis indeed impoflible to prove that the Soul is immortal, and unperifhable in that Senfe, the contrary being. evident: fo that this is not a Qiieflioh difficult to be refolved, but a Proportion which 'tis not eafie to make fome people apprehend; becaufe they have not the fame ideas as we, and that they labour all they can not to have them, and to blind themfelves.
When we are asked, whether the Soul is immortal, or any other ^uefiion whatfoever ', we muft firit rake off the Equivocation of Words, and know in what Senfe they are underftood, that we may diltinctly conceive the State of the Quejlion. If thofe that propofe it are ignorant of the Signification, we muft put Queries to them, in order to illuminate and determine them. If by thefe Queries we difcover, that their Ideas are not agreeable with ours, 'tis in vain to anfwer them; for to anfwer one who imagines that a Defire, for inftance, is nothing but the Motion of fome imall Parricles calfd Spirits; that a Thought is but*a Trace or an Image, which the Objects or thole Spirits have left in the Brain •, and that all the Reafonings of Men confift but in the various Situation of fome little Corpufcles, which difpofe themfelves differently in the Head; to anfwer him, I lay, that the Soul taken in his Senfe is immortal, is to deceive him, or to appear ridicu- lous to him; but to tell him that Ihe is mortal, is, in fome Senfe, to confirm him in a very dangerous Errour: we muft then reply nothing at all, but only endeavour to make him retire into himfelf, that he may receive the lame Ideas that we have from him who is only able to enlighten him.
'lis likewiie a guefiion which feems pretty difficult, To know whether Beafts have a Soul j how- • ever die Equivocation being taken off, it is fo far from being hard, that thofe who fuppofe they have one, and thofe that think they have none, are ignorantly at bottom of the fame Opinion.
The Soul may be taken for fomething Corporeal, difperfed through all the Body, which gives it Lite and Motion; or elfe for fomething Spiritual. Thofe that pretend Beafts have no Soul, undeiltand it in the fecond Senfe;, for never any Man denied that there is in Animals fomething Corporeal, which is the Principle of their Lite or Motion; lince it cannot be denied even of Watches. On the contrary, Thofe who aflert that Beafts have Souls, underftand it in die firit Send- lor lew believe them endued with a Spiritual m& Indivifible Soul: 16 that both Peripate- tic/a and Cartcjians believe that Beafts have a Soul, or ^Corporeal Principle of their Motion, and both think they have none, or rhat there's nothing in them Spiritual,- and Indwijible. ^ And there-love the Difference betwixt, the Panpateticks and Cartcjians confifts not in that the former believe Beafts have a Soul, and the latter deny it ■, but only in that the Arifotelians chink that Jkyfls are capable of Pain and Pieafure, of perceiving Colours, hearing Sounds, and of all the other Sedations and Paiiions of Men; whereas the Cartcdans are of a contrary Opinion.
The Chap. VII. The Search after Truth. yy The latter diftinguifh the Word Scnfation, to take off the Equivocation. For inftanee, Thfjr lay that when one is too near the Fire, the Parts Of Wood ftrike againft his Hand, vibrate the Fibres; which Vibration is communicated to the Brain, and determines the Animal Spirits con- tained in it to difperfe through the outward Parts of the Body, in fuch a manner as is fit to make them fhrinkii?, or withdraw. They agree that all thofe tilings, or the like, may poflibly be found in Animals, and that they actually are, as being Properties of Bodies: And the Peripa- teticks diffent not from it.
The Cartefians add, that the Percuflion or Vibration of the Fibres of the Brain in Men, \k attended with a Sedation of Heat, and that the courfe of the Animal Spirits to the Heart, and other Vifccra, is accompanied with a Paflion of Hatred, or Averfion • which Senfe and Paflion of the Soul they deny to be in Beafts, whereas the Peripateticks afTert, that Brute Animals feel thar Heat as well as we do; that they have, as we, an Averfion to what is uneafie to them; and ge- nerally, that they are capable of all our Senfations and Paflions. The Cartefians do not think that Beafts are fenfible of Pleafure or Pain, nor that they love or hate any thing •, becaufe they admit nothing in them but what is material, and believe not that Senfations and Paflions may be Properties of any Matter whatfoever. On the contrary fome Peripateticks efteem Matter capable of Seniation and Paflion, when 'tis extremely fubtle and refined; that Beafts may feel, "by means of the Animal Spirits, that is to fay, of a very fubtle and fine Matter •, and that our Soul is fuf- ceptible of Seniation and Paflion, only becaufe fhe is united to fuch a Matter.
And therefore to refolve that Queftion, Whether Beafts have a Soul, we rhuft retire within out felves, and confider with all poflible Attention our Idea of Matter: if we can conceive that Mat- ter fo and fo figut'd, as fquare, round, oval, &V. is- fome Pain, Pleafure, Heat, Colour, Odour, Sound, {ffc. then we may afTert that the Soul of Beafts, though never fo material, is however capable of Senfe •, but if we cannot conceive it, we muft not alTert it; for we muft afTure no farther than we can conceive. And likewile if we conceive that Matter tofs'd and extremely agi- tated upwards, downwards, in a Circular, Spiral, Parabolical, Elliptick Line, &c. is any thing of Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, &c. We may fay that Beafts have the fame Paflions as we, but if we apprehend it not, we muft not fay it, unlefs we will fpeak without underftanding our felves. But I am lure no Motion of Matter will ever be miftaken for Love, or Joy, by him that mail earneftly think upon it: So that to refolve that Queftion, Whether Beafts have Senfe, we need only take off Equivocation, as thofe that are called Cartefians ufe to do; for then that Queftion will be made fo fimple and eafie, as to be refolved with a little Attention.
'Tis true that St. An ft m fuppofing, according to the common prejudice of Mankind, that Lib. 4. a Beafts have a Soul; which he never doubted of, as far as I can perceive, becaufe he never feriouf ly Mma. & examin'd it in his Works: this great Man, I fay, perceiving that it is contradictory to fay, that ®m 0y'£'~ a Soul, or a Subftance which thinks, feels defires, 0V. is material, believed that the Soul of Beafts ^amnti-' was really fpiritual and indivifible. He proves by very evident Reafons, that a Soul, or whatever tote Amrna has Senfe, Imagination, Fear, Defire, tfc. muft needs be Spiritual j but I never obferved that he & alias. produe'd any Reafon to maintain that Beafts have Souls. He even cares not to prove it, becaufe 5trs likely that fcarce any body doubted of it in his time.
There being now Men, who endeavour wholly to free themfelves of their Prejudices, and call in Queftion all Opinions that are not grounded upon clear demonftrative Reafonings: it has }>een call'd into doubt, whether Animals have a Soul fufeeptible of the fame Senfations and Paflions as ours -, however there are ftill feveral Defenders of the ancient Prejudices, who pre- tend to prove that Beafts feel, will, think, and argue, even as we do, though in a more im- perfect- manner.
Dogs, fay they, know their Matters, love them, and patiently bear the Blows they receive from them, as judging it their belt intereft not to forfake them; but as to Strangers, they hate them fo much as not to away with their Flatterings. All Animals love their Young -, Birds, which build their Nefts in the extremities of the Branches, fufficiently lfiew, that they are afraid left fome Creature mould devour them: They judge thofe Branches too weak to bear their Enemies, though itrong enough to fupport both their Young and their Nefts. Even Spiders, and the vileft Infers, give fome Intimations of an Intelligence that animates them: For one cannot but wonder at the conduft of a little Beaft, which though it be blind, yet finds means to trapan in its Nets, others that have Eyes and Wings, and are fo bold as to attack the biggeft Animals we fee.
I giant that all the actions that Beafts perform are certain indications of an Intelligence; for whatever is regular demonftrates it. A Watch mews the fame -, fot 'tis impoflible Chance fhould have compofed its Wheels, but an underftanding Agent muft have ordered its Motions. We plant a Seed inverted, the Roots that were upward fink down into the Ground of themfelves, and the Seminal Nib that. was turn'd downwards endeavours to alter its Pofition, to break out: That intimates an Intelligence. That Plant produces Knots at certain Diftances, to ftrenghen it felf * it covers its Seed with a Skin that preferves it, and furrounds it with Prickles to defend it: This ftill denotes an Intelligence. In ftiort, whatever we fee done, either by Plants or by Animals, undoubtedly denotes an underftanding Agent. All the true Cartefians agree to it, but they make Diftincfions, to take away as much as poflible, the Equivocation of Words.
The Motions of Beafts and Plants intimate an Intelligence, but that Intelligence is not Matter, and is much diftinguifhed from Beafts, as that which difpofes the Wheels of a Watch is diftinguifh- ed from the Watch it felf For that Intelligent Being feems infinitely Wife, Powerful, and infinitely the fame who has famed us in our Mother's Womb, and affords us a growth to which all the U. attempts F. Malebranche Qonmning Book VI.
attempts of our Mind and Will cannot add fo much as a Span. And therefore there is in Beafts neither Underftanding nor Soul, in the fenfe thofe Words are commonly taken- They eat with- out pleafure, they cry without Pain, they grow without being confcious of it, they neither deiire, nor fear, nor know any thing •, and if they aft in fuch a manner as intimates an Intelligence, it is becaufe God having made them for a certain time, he has framed their Body in fuch a manner as that they machinally, and without Fear, (hun whatever is able to deftroy them...Orherwiie it muft be faid, that there is more Underftanding in the fmalleft Infect, or even in a little Seed, than in the moft Ingenious Man; it being certain that there are in them more different Pares, and regular Motions, than we are able to know.
But as Men are ufed to confound all things, and imagine that their Soul produces in their Bo- dies moft or all the Motions and Changes which befal it, they fix to the Word Soul the wrong Idea of Former and Preferver of the Body. So that thinking that their Soul produces in them whatever is abfolutely requilite to the Prefervation of their Life, though (he knows not fo ^much as the Con- texture of the Body which me animates, they judge that there mull needs be a Soul in Beaiis, to produce all theMotions and Changes which befall them, becaufe they are fo like thole which oc- cur in us. For Beafts are begot, fed, ftrengthened, as our Body: they eat, drink, fleep, as we do -, becaufe we are altogether like them, as to our Body: the only Difference betwixt us and them con- fiding in this, that we have a Soul, and they have none. But our Soul frames not our Body, di- gefts not our Aliments, and gives no Motion and Heat to our Blood. She feels, wills, argues, and animates the Body, as to the Senfations and Pamons that relate to it: but not by difperiing- her felf through our Members, to communicate Senfe and Life to them; for our Body can receive nothing of what belongs to the Mind. Thence 'tis plain, that the Reafon why we cannot refolve feveral Queftions, proceeds from our not diftinguifhing, and even from our not thinking to diftin- guifh the different fignifications of a Word.
'Tis true,' that we diftinguifti fometimes, but we do it fo ill, that inftead of taking off the Equi- vocation of Words by our Diftin£tions, we make them more perpkxed and dark. For inlhnce, when we are asked, whether the Body lives, how it lives, and in what manner the Rational Soul animates it. Whether the Animal Spirits, the Blood, and other Humours live; whether the Teeth,' the Hair, and the Nails are animated, &c. we diftinguifh the Words, live and be animated, in living or being animated with a Rational, with a Senfitive, or with a Vegetative Soul. But that Diftincf ion is only fit to perplex the Qneftion •, for thofe Words want an Explanation themfelves 5 and perhaps the two laft, Vegetative and Senfitive, are inexplicable and inconceivable in the Senfe? they are commonly underftood.
If we deiire to fix a clear and diftinft Idea to the Word life, we may fay, That the Life of the Soul is the Knowledge of Truth, and the love of Good; or rather, that her Thoughts are her Life •; and that the Life of the Body confifts in the Circulation of the Blood, and the juft Proportion and Mixture of Humours •, or rather, that the Life of the Body is fuch a Motion of its parts as is fit for its Prefervation. The Ideas fix'd to the Word Life being thus made plain, it will evident-/ ly appear, Firjl, That the Soul cannot communicate her Life to the Body, flnce me cannot make it think. Secondly, That (he cannot give it the Life by which it is fed, grows, &c. fince fhe knows- not fo much as what is requifite to digeft our Aliments. Thirdly, That (he cannot make it feel, fince Matter is incapable of Senfation, fie. Thus all other Queftions concerning that Subjecf,- may be refolved without Trouble; provided the Words, in which they are exprefs'd, excite clear Ideas; for if they raife confufed and. dark, it is impoffible to folve them.
In the mean while, 'tis not always abfolutely neceflary to have Ideas that perfectly reprefenr thole things, the Relations of which we deiire to examine. It is often' fufficient to have but an initial or imperfecf Knowledge of them, becaufe we feek not always exacfly to know their Re- lations. I (hall explain this more at large.
There are Truths or Relations of two Sorts; fome are exactly known, and others but imper- fectly. We exacfly know the Relation betwixt fuch a Square, and fuch a Triangle, but have only an imperfecl: Knowledge of the Relation betwixt London and Tor/i. We know that fuch a Square is equal to fuch a Triangle, double or treble of it, &c. but we only know that London is big- ger than Jork, without knowing precifely how much.
Moreover there are infinite Degrees of lmperfecHon in Knowledge; and no Knowledge is imper- fecl, but in reference to a more perfecb. For Inftance, We know that London is bigger than Lin- colnfs Inn fields, and that Knowledge is only imperfecl:, in Relation to another more exac>, by which we might accurately know, how much London is larger than that open place contained in it,' 'There are therefore feveral forts of Queftions. Firjl, There are fome in which we feek a per-1 fecf Knowledge of all the exacb Relations of two or feveral things betwixt each other.
Secondly, There are fome in which we fearch after the perfect. Knowledge of fome exact Re- lation betwixt two or feveral things.
Lhirdly, There are (bme in which we enquire after the perfeel Knowledge of fome Relation nearly approaching to the exacf Relation, that is betwixt two or more feveral rhings.
Fourthly, There are ibmc in which we are content to find a general and indefinite Relation.
Tis evident, Firlt, That to refolve the Queftions of the Fitft (bit, and perieftly to know all the exacf Relations of Magnitude and Quality betwixt two or more things; we mult have diftincl; Ideas perfectly reprelenting them, and compare rhem together in all the poflible manners. We may, ior Inftance, refolve all the Queftions that tend to difcover the exact Relations betwixt 2' and 8, becaufe both Numbers being accurately known may be compared together, as much as is< necef- Chap. V'ili. The Search after Truth. -y neceffary to know the exact Relations of their Magnitude and Quality. We may know that 8 is 4 times 2, and that 8 and 2 are even, but not fquare Numbers.
Tis plain. Secondly, That to reiblve §>yejlipns of the fecond fort, and accurately to know fome Relation of Magnitude or ^uality^ which, is betwixt two or more things; 'tis neceiTary and fuffici ent'diftinttly to know thofe Faces by which they mult be compared, to diicover the enquired Relation. For Inftance, to refolve fuch ^tcftions as tend to diicover fome exact Relations be- twixt 4 and 16, as that 4 and 16 are even and fquare Numbers, it's fufficient exactly to know that 4 and 16 can be divided into equal parts without Fractions, and that both are the product of a Number multiplied by it felf; and 'tis to no purpofeto examine what is their true Magnitude: It being plain, that to know the exa£t Relations of Quality betwixt things, adiltinct Idea of their Quality is fufficient, without thinking on their Magnitude; and that to know the exaft Relations of Magnitude, we need not fearch after the true Quality, an accurate Knowledge of their Mag- nitude being all that is required.
', Thirdly, It clearly appears that to refolve the Queftions of the third fort, or to know fome Relation very near approaching the exa£t Relation that is betwixt two or feveral things -0 it is enough nearly to know the Faces by which they muft be compared, to difcover the Relation re- quired, whether it be of Magnitude or Quality. For Inftance, I may evidently know that the V 8 is greater than 2, becaufe I may very near know the true Magnitude of the V 8'j but I cannot dif- cover how much the V 8 is greater than 2, becaufe I cannot exactly find out the true Magnitude of the V 8.
Laftly, 'Tis evident that to refolve the Queftions of the fourth fort, or to difcover general and un- definite Relations, it is enough to know things in a manner propotion'd to the need we ftand in of comparing them together, to find out the required Relation. So that 'tis not neceiTary to the Solu- tion of all forts of Queftions, to have very diftinct Ideas of their Terms, or perfectly to know the things exprefled by thofe words. But our knowledge muft be the more exa£t, as the Relations we fearch after are more accurate and numerous: For as we have faid in imperfect Queftions, im* perfect Ideas of the things conlider'd are fufficient to refolve them perfectly, that is, as far as they reach. And many Queftions may be refolved even without any diftincl: Idea of their Terms 5 as when we are ask'd whether Fire is capable of melting Salt, hardning Clay, refolving Lead into Va- pours, and the like, we underftand perfectly thofe Queftions, and may very well folve them, though we have no diftincl: Idea of Fire, Salt, Clay, &c. Becaufe the Querifts only defire to know, whe- ther we are afcertained by fenfibie Experiments that Fire produces thofe Effects. And therefore may receive a fatisfactory Anfwer, by a knowledge drawn from the Senfes.
CHAP. VIII.
CHAP. VIII.
An Application of the other Rules to particular Queftions.
QUeftions are of two forts, fome are fimple and others compound. The former may be folved _by the bare Attention of the Mind to the Ideas of the words, in which they are exprefled: buc The Solution of the latter muft be perform'd by comparing them to a third or to many other Ideas. We cannot find out the unknown Relations that are exprefs'd in the Terms of a Queftion, by immediately comparing the Ideas of thofe Terms, fince they can neither be joined nor compa- red. We muft then have one or feveral mean- Ideas, that we may make fuch Comparifons, as are neceffary to difcover thofe Relations $ taking a fpecial Care that thole mean Ideas be the more clear and diftinft, as the Relations enquired after are more exact and numerous.
That Rule is but a Confequence of the firft, but of an equal importance with it. For if ex- actly to know the Relation of the things compared, it is neceffary to have clear and diftin£t Ideas of them: It plainly follows from the fame Reafon, that we muft have an accurate knowledge of the mean Ideas, by which we intend to make our Comparifons; fince we muft diftindtly know the Relation of meafure with each of the things meafured, to find out their Relations. I fhall give fome Inftances of it.
When we put a piece of Cork, or other fmall and light Veflel, in the Water, with a Load- ftone in it, and offer to the North Pole of that Stone the fame Pole of another Magnet which we keep in our Hands, we prefently perceive that the former Load-ftone flies back, as though it were driven by a violent Wind.. 'Tis requir'd to difcover the Caufe of that Effect.
'Tis plain that to render a Reafon of the Motion of that Load-ftone, it is not fufficient to know the Relations it has to the other; for we might perfectly know them all, and yet not underftand how two Bodies could repel each other without meeting.
We muft therefore examine what are the Things which we diftin£tly conceive capable, accord- ing to the Courfe of Nature, of moving Bodies; for 'tis requir'd to find out the natural Caufe of the Motion of a Load-ftone, which is certainly a Body. And therefore we muft not have re- courfe to any Quality, Form, or Being, which by a clear Knowledge we cannot conceive capable of moving Bodies; neither muft we afcribe their Effect: to an underltanding Agent, fince we are not affur'd that Intelligences are the ordinary Caufes of the-natural Motions of Bodies, and know not fo much as whether they can produce Motion.
We plainly know that it is a natural Law, that Bodies fhould move each other when they meet: We muft then endeavour to explain the Motion of the Load-ftone, by the Means of fome concurrent Bo F. Male-branche Concerning Book VI.
concurrent Body. 'Tis true that fomething befides a Body may move it •, but as long as we have no diftinct Idea of that Thing, we muft not admit it as a proper Means to difcover what is fearch- ed after, nor to explain it to others •, for to contrive a Caufe which none clearly conceives, is not to give account of an Effect. We muft not then trouble our felves to enquire whether there is, or is not any other natural Caufe of the Motion of Bodies, belides the mutual Impulfe; but rather fuppofe that there is none, and attentively confider what Bodies may meet with, and move that Load-ltone.
We prefently fee that it is not mov'd by the Magnet we keep in our Hands, fince it touches it not -, but becaufe 'tis mov'd only when that Magnet is brought near it, and that it moves not of it felf, we muft infer that it is mov'd by fome fmall Effluviums, of little Bodies, that proceed from that Magnet, and are driven to the other Load-ftone; To difcover thofe Corpufcles, we muft not open our Eyes, nor nearly confider that Magnet £ for our Senfes might impofe upon our Realbn, and make us judge that nothing proceeds out of it," becaufe we perceive it nOt. ' Perhaps we mould not reflect that we fee not the molt impetuous Winds, nor feveral other Bodies that produce very furprizing Effects: We muft then keep dole to that clear and intelligible Means, and carefully examine all the Effects of a Load-ftone, to difco- ver liow that Magnet may continually vent fo many little Bodies, without diminifhing •, for the Experiments we fhall make will difcover, that the fmall Particles that evaporate at one fide, im- mediately re-enter through another ^ and will ferve to explain all the Difficulties that may be ob- • jetted againft the Method of folving this Queftion. But it muft be obfetv'd, that this Medium muft not be fbrfaken, though we fhould not be able to anfwer fome Objections proceeding from our Ignorance in feveral things.
If we defire not to examine why Load-ftones remove from each other when their Poles of the' fame Name are in Oppoiition to each other, but rather why they approach and endeavour to unite together when the North Pole of one is oppofite to the South Pole of the other, the Queftion will be more difficult, and one Medium alone will not be fufflcient to refolve it -, for it is not enough exactly to know the Relations betwixt the Poles of thofe two Load-ftones, nor to have recourfe to the Medium propos'd in the fore-going Queftion; for that Means feems only fit to hinder the Ef- fect, whereof the Caufe is fought for: Neither muft we propofe any of thofe Things that are not clearly known to be the natural and ordinary Caufes of Corporeal Motion;. nor evade the Diffi- culty of the Queftion, by the rambling and uncertain Notion of an Occult Vitality in Load-ftones, by which they attract each other -, for the Mind cannot conceive any fuch Attraction in Bodies."
The Impenetrability of Bodies plainly convinces us, that Motion may be communicated by In>" pulfion •, and Experience evidently proves, that it is communicated that way: But there is no Rear fon, nor Experiment, that clearly demonftrates the Motion of Attraction ^ for when the true and certain Caufe of the Experiments, which are alledg'd to prove that fort of Motion, is found out, it is vifible that what appear'd to be done by Attraction, is produc'd by Jmpulfwn. We muft not therefore iniift upon any other Communication of Motion but that effected by Impulfwn, fince this Way is fure, and undeniable; whereas all the others imaginable have at leaft fome Obfcurity in them. But though it might be demonftrated, that mere Corporeal Things have fome other Prin- ciples of Motion befides the Concourfe of Bodies, this might not however be reafonably rejected, but muft rather be infifted upon preferably to all others, it being the moft clear, and molt evident -y and appearing fo undeniable, that we may confidently affert, that it has always been receiv'd by- all Nations and Ages in the World.
Experience fhews, that a Load-ftone, freely fwimming upon the Water, draws towards that which we keep in our Hands when their different Poles are oppofite to each other; we muft then conclude, that the Load-ftone upon the Water is driven to it. But as the Magnet we hold cannot drive the other, feeing this other approaches it, and that the free Load-ftone only moves at the Pre- • fence of the other Magnet, 'tis plain that to refolve this Queftion by the receiv'd Principle of the Communication of Motions, we muft have recourfe to two Means at leaft.
The Load-ftone c approaches the Magnet C, and therefore the furrounding Air drives it, fince no other Body can do it -, that's the firft Means. The Load-ftone c moves not, except at the Pretence of the Magnet C; and therefore the Magnet C muft needs determine the Air, to drive the Load-ftone c-, that's the fecond Means. 'Tis evident thefe two Means are abfolutely neceflary: So that now the whole Difficulty confifts in joining thofe two Means together •, which may be done two feveral Ways; either beginning' by fomething known in the Air, that encompafles the Load-ftone c; or by fome- thing known in the Magnet C