But whereas the Prejudices of different Perfons are not conftantly the fame, fhould one carefully ga- ther the leveral Judgments that are made upon the lame things, it would commonly appear, that ac- cording to thefe Judgments there is nothing Good; and at the fame time nothing Bad, in fuch kind of Books: There would be nothing good, becauie there is no Prejudices, but one or other eipoufes; and there would be nothing bad, becauie there is no Prejudice whatever but fome or other condemn. in which judgments there is ib much Equity, that fhould a Man pretend to make ufe of them to correct his Piece ■, he muft neceffarily ftrikc- it iil out for fear of leaving any thing that was Condemn'd, or not to touch it for fear of expunging lomething that was approvd. So that a' poor Author that ltudies to be inoffeniive, finds himielf perplex'd on all hands, by all the various Judgments which arc Ihe, Search after Truth. c?e; are pronounc'd both for and againft hixfe 5 and unlefs he refolve to Hand his ground, and ro be reckon'd obftinate in his Opinions 5 he mult inevitably contradict himfelf at every turn, and appeal in as many different Forms as there are different Heads in a whole Nation.
However, Time will do every Man Juftice, and Truth which at firlt feems a Chimerical and ri- diculous Phantailn, by degrees grows fenfible and manifeft: Men open their Eyes and contemplate her, they difcover her Charms, and fall in love with her. This Man who condemns ah Author for an Opinion that he dillikes, by chance meets with another that approves it, but condemns other Opinions which the former receives as undeniable 5 each of them talk fuitably to his Notion, and each of them contradicts the other. Hence they come to examine both their own and others Reafons affelhj theydifpute, and confider, andhefitate, and are not fo ready ro determine upon what they have not examined $ and if they are brought to change their Opinion, and to acknowledge that an Author is more reasonable than was believ'd •, thete rifes a fecret inclination in their Brea'ft, which prompts them to fpeak as well of him for the future as they have formerly fpoken to his d if ho- nour. Thus the Man who flicks refolutely to the Truth, though at fhft he move their Spleen of Laughter, need not defpair one day to fee Truth, which he defends, triumph over the Prepoffef- iion of Men. For there's that difference between Good and 111 Books, between thofe which enlighten the Mind, and thofe which gratitie the Senfes and Imagination, that the latter look charm- ing and delightful at firft, but they fade and wither in time; whilft the former, on the contrary, have fomething of a ftrange and difcouraging nature, which troubles and lets the Mind agaft-; but in time they are relifh'd, and fo much the better as they are more read and digefted, for 'tis Time generally that regulates the Price of Things.
The Books that encounter Prejudices leading to Truths through unbeaten Roads, require much longer time than others, to obtain the Reputation their Authors expect from them. For becaule Men are frequently baulk'd in the hopes that fuch fort of Performances had rais'd in them:, but Few there are that read them -, Fewer ftill that approve them; almoft All condemn them, whether they read them or read them not: and though we be well aifufd that the trite and common Roads lead not where we defign to go, yet the fear of venturing upon fuch as have no Footfteps of for- mer Travellers, difheartens us from entring on them. So that Men caft not fo much as their Eye about them to conduct themlclves, but blindly tread in the fteps of their Fredeceffors •'.- Company is diverting and encouraging; they think not what they are doing, they perceive not where they go, and often forget the place where they defign to arrive.
Men are made for a fociable Life, which to preferve, it is not enough to ufe the fame Tongue • we muft moreover keep to the fame way of ' Expreffion, and the fame road of Thinking, as other Men. We muff live by Opinion, as we act by Imitation. We then cOnfult advantageoufly, agree- ably, and farely for the Good of the Body, and the Eftablifhment of our Fortune, when we fubmit to the Opinions of others, and give way to be perfuaded by the Air, or fenfible Impreffion of ths Imagination of thofe we hear fpeak. But we undergo much Pains, and run the extreme hazard of our Fortune, when we will only hearken to internal Truth, and reject with Scorn and Abhorrence all the Prejudices of the Senfes, and all the Opinions we have receiv'd without Examination.
Thus all thofe Writers who combat with Prejudices, are much miftaken if they think by that means to recommend themfelves to the Favour and Efteem of others: Poffibly if they have fuc- ceeded in their Studies, fome few of the Learned will fpeak honourably of their Works when they are dead -, but while they live, they muft expeft to be neglected by molf People, and to be defpis'd, revil'd, and perfecuted, even by thole that go for the wifeft and moft moderate fort of Men.
And indeed there are fo many Reafons, and thofe fo ftrong and convincing, which oblige us to do the fame as thofe we live with, that we have commonly right to condemn, as Men of fan- taftical and capricious Spirits, fuch as aft contrary to others. And becaufe Men do not fufficiently diftinguifh between Ailing and Thinking, they commonly are highly offended that any one mould fall upon their Prejudices. They fuppoie it not fufficient to the prefervation of the Rules of Civil Society, externally to comport with the receiv'd Opinions and Cuftoms of our Country. They pretend it is Rafhnefs to examine common Sentiments, and a breach of Charity to enquire after Truths becaufe Truth is not fo much the Bond of Civil Societies, as Cuftoms and Opinion.
Arifiotle is receiv'd in the Vniverfities as the Rule of Truth: he is cited as infallible; and 'tis a Philofophical Herefie to deny what he maintains: in a word, he is reverenc'd as the Genius of Nature: and after all, Thofe that ate belt acquainted with his Fhyficks, cannot account for, nor perhaps are convinc'd of any thing: and the Scholars, when they have finifti'd their Courfe oi'Phi- lofophy, dare not declare before Men of Senfe, what they have learn'd of their Majters. Which, it may be, is enough with Men of Reflexion, to teach them what to think of fuch fort cf Stu- dies: for that Erudition which a 'Man muft unlearn to become Reafonable, cannot feem very folid. Yet a Man would be thought raffi^, and prefumptuous, who would attempt to fhew the Falfity of the Reafons that Authorize lb ftrange and. unacountable a Conduct: and he would neceflarily make himfelf work with thofe, who reap advantage by it, though he were of competent Ability to dif- abufe the Publick.
Is it not evident, that we muft make ufe of things that are known, to learn what is not known? and that it would be impofing on a French-man, to give him a Grammar in German Vcrfe to teach him the German Tongue? and yet we put into the hands of Children Dejpauterius's Latin Verfcs, to teach them Latin: Verfes intricate on all accounts; to Children that with difficulty comprehend things that are moft eafie. Reafon and alio Experience are viiibly againft this Cuftom: for they fpend a great deal of time to learn Latin but by halves; yet it would be temerity to find fault with it.
ioo F. Malebranche Concerning it; kChinefe who knew this Cuftom, could not help laughing at it; whilft in this part of the World, which we inhabit, the wifeft and moll learn'd cannot forbear approving it.
If Prejudices thus falfe and palpable, and Cuftoms fo irrational, and of fo great Confequence, find fo many Patrons and Defenders •, how fhall they fubmit to Reafons that oppofe the Prejudices of a purely Speculative Nature? There needs but a very little Attention to dilcover that the way taken to inftrutt. Children is not the beft; and yet it is not acknowledg'd Opinion and Cuftom carry it againft Reafon and Experience. How then can we imagine that the Books which deftroy an in- finite number of Prejudices, will not in many things be condemn'd by thofe who pais for the molt learn'd and wifeft Part of Men?
It mult be obferv'd that thofe who go for the moft underftanding and ingenious in the World, are Men that have read moft Books, both good and bad: Men of a molt happy Memory, and of a moft lively and comprehenlive Imagination. Now this fort of Perfons, commonly judge readily on all things, without Examination. They confult their Memory, and therein immediately find the • Law, or Prejudice by which they pronounce, without much reflexion. As they think their Parts better than orher Men's, they afford little Attention to what they read: Hence it comes, that Wo- men and Children eafily dilcover the Falfity of fome Prejudices which they fee attacked, becaufe they dare not judge without examining j and that they bring all the Attention they are capable of; to what they read: whilft Scholars, on the contrary, ftick refolutely to their Opinions, becaufe they will not be at the Trouble of examining thofe of others, when quite contrary to their pre- conceiv'd Notions.
As to the Attendants on the Great Men of the World, they have fo many external Adherencies, that they cannot eafily retire into themfelves •, nor bring a competent attention to dift inguifh Truth from Probability. Neverthelefs they are not extremely addicled to any kinds of Prejudices: For Itrongly to profecute a Wordly intereft, neither Truth nor Probability muft be rely'd on. As a feeming Humility, or Civility, and external fhew of Temper, are Qualities which all Men admire, and are abfolutely necelTary to keep up Society amongft Proud and ambitious Spirits: Men of* Worldly Defigns, make their Vertue and Defert to coniift in aliening nothing, and believing nc- thing, as certain and indifputable. It has ever been, and will ever be the Fafhion, to look upon all things as Problematical, and with a Gentleman-like Freedom to Treat the moft holy Truths, left they mould feem bigotted to any thing. For whereas the Gentlemen I mention, are neither appli- cative nor attentive to any thing but their Fortune-, there can be no Difpofition more Advantageous, or' that feems more reafbnable to them, than that which the Fafhion juftifies. Thus the Invaders of Prejudices, whilft they flatter on one hand, the Pride and Remifnefs of thefe Worldly Men, are well accepted by them; but if they pretend to affert any thing as Undeniable, and to manifeft the Truth of Religion and Chriftian Morality, they are look'd upon as Opinionated, and as Men who avoid One Precipice to run upon another.
What I have faid, is, meihinks, fufficient to conclude, what ihould be anlwer'd to the different Judgments divers Perfons have pronouod againft The Treatife concerning the Search after Truth*, and I fhall make no Application, which every Man may do himfelf to good purpofe without any trouble. I know indeed that every Man do will not do it^ but perhaps I might feem to be the Judge in my own Cafe, if I mould defend my felf as far as I was able. I therefore refign up my - Right to the Attentive Readers, who are the natural Judges of Books, and I conjure them to call to Mind, the requeft I made in the Preface of the foregoing Treatife, and elfewhere, Not to judge of my Opinions but by the clear and. diflintt Anfwers they jhall receive from the only Teacher of all Men, afier having confult ed him by aferious attention. For if they confult their Prejudices, as the decifive Laws to judge of the Book, Concerning the fear ch after Truth; I acknowledge it to be a very ill Book, fince purpofely written to deteft the Faliity and Injuftice of thefe Laws.
wj ADVERTISEMENT.
'Hereas the following Illuftrations were composed to fatiffie fome particular Perfons, who de- fied a more fpecial Explication of fome important Truths; I think ft to premife, that deary to apprehend what I Jhall fay, it will be requifite to have fome Knowledge of the Principles I have offered in the Treatife concerning the Search after Truth. Therefore it will be the beji way not to meddle with thefe Obfervations, till after having carefully read the whole Work for zvhich they were made-, and only to examine them at a fecond reading, as they fhall be found referred to by the Margin. This Caution however is not abfolutely neccfjary to be obferv'd by under funding Perjons, bccatifc I have endeavoured fo to write thefe Elucidations, as that they might be read without referring to the Book they were composed for; I know that Truth isof all things in the World that which gives leaf trou- ble to acquire it. Men life not willingly to collate thofe Puff ages in a Book, which have Reference to one another-, but commonly read things as they fall in their way, and underfand of them as much as they can: wherefore to accommodate my felf to this Temper of Men, I have tried to make thefe Remarks intelligible, even to thofe who have forgotten the Places of the foregoing Treatife, whereunto they refer. Neverthelefs 1 defire thofe who will not be at the trouble of carefully examining thefe Illullra- tions, not to condemn them oj jalfe and extravagant Confequences, which may be deduced from want of under fanding them. 1 have fome Reafon to make this Requeft, not only becaufe 1 have right to demand of the Readers, who are my Judges, not to condemn without underfanding me, but on fe- deral other Accounts, which it is not nccejjary for me to declare in this Place.
ILLUSTRA- The Search after Truth.
ioi ILLUSTRATIONS T UPON THE EAT I Concerning the SEARCH after TRUTH.
THE FIRST ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Firft CHAPTER of the Firft BOOK.
Cod worlds whatever is real in the Motions of the Mind, and in the Deter- minations of them *, notwithjianding which »* he is not the Author of Sin. He works whatever is real in the Sensations of Concnpifcence, and yet is not the Author of it.
SOME Perfons pretend that I relinquifh the Comparifon of the Mind and Matter too foon; and fanfie the one has no more Power than the other to determine the Impreflion which God gives it; and therefore wifh me to explain ( if I can ) what it is that God works in us, and what vie do our f elves, when we fin; fince in their Opinion, I fhall be oblig'd by my Explication, either to grant that Man is capable of giving himfelf fome new Mo- dification, or to acknowledge that God is actually the Author of Sin.
I anfwer, That Faith, Reafon, and my own inward Confcioufnefs, oblige me to quit the Com- parifon where I do; being every way convinc'd, that I have in my f elf a. Principle of my own De- terminations, and having Reafons to perfuade, that Matter has no fuch Principle; which (hall be prov'd hereafter: Mean while here is what God operates in us, and what We do our felves, when we fin.
. Firft, God continually drives us, by an invincible Impreflion, towards Good in general. Second- ly, He reprefents to us the Idea of a particular Good, or gives us the Serif ation of it. Laftly^ He inclines us to this particular Good.
Firft, God drives us continually towards Good in general. For God has made us, and Rill pre- ferves us for Himfelf. He wills that we fhall love all Good, and is the firft, or rather only Mover. In brief, this is evident from innumerable things that I have laid elfewhere, and thofe I ipeak to will not difpute it.
Secondly, God reprefents to us the Idea of a particular Good, or gives us the Sen] 'ation of it: For 'tis he alone that enlightens us, and the furrounding Bodies cannot aft upon our Mind. In a word, we are neither our own Light, nor our own Felicity, as I have proved at large in the Third Book, and elfewhere.
Laftly, God inclines w to this particular Good: For God inducing US to all that's Good, by a neceffary Confequence, inclines us to particular Goods, by producing the Idea or Senfation of them in our Mind. This therefore is all that God effects in us when we fin.
But whereas a particular Good includes not in it all Good •, and the Mind, considering it with a clear and diftinft View, cannot imagine it concludes all; God does not neceffarily and invinfibly incline us to the love of it. We are confeious of the Liberty we have to ftay this Love, and of our Tendency to proceed farther: In a word, we feel the Impreflion we have for Good Univer- fal: or, to ipeak as others do, we aizfenjible that our Willis not under any conftraint or neceffity to fix upon this particular Good.
So then this is what the Sinner does; Ueftops, he refts, he follows not the Impreflion of Go.i, he does nothing: For Sin is Nothing. He knows that the grand Rule he is to obferve is to em- ploy his Liberty fbfar as it will, go; and that he is not to fatten upon any Good, unlefs he be in- wardly convinc'd it would be offending againft ORDER, to refufe to ftay upon it. If he dis- covers not this Rule. 1 v the light of his Reaibn, he learns it at leaft from the fecret Reproaches of C c his his Conferences He is obliged then to follow the Impreffion he receives for the tlhiverial Good.; and to think of other Goods befides what he enjoys, and what he is only to make trie of: For 'tiS by thinking on other Goods befides what he enjoys, that he can produce in himfelf new De- terminations of his Love, and make ufe of his Liberty. Now I prove that by the Impreffion" God gives. him for Good in general, he may think of other Goods, befides that of his prefent Enjoyment, it being precifely in this that the Difficulty confifts. See the dth 5Tis a Law of Nature, that the Ideas- of Objects fhould offer themfelves to our Mind when we chap, of defire to think of them, provided our Capacity of Thought be not fill'd up by the lively and con- E°?H 3* fns'd Senfations we receive occafionally from the Motions in our Body. Now we can Will the Mradoni thinking on all things -? becaufe the natural Impreffion which carries us towards Good, reaches to all pofhble Objecls of our Thought: And we can at all times think on all things ^ becaufe we are united to Him who comprehends the Ideas of all things, as I have* formerly proved.
If it be true then that we can Will the confidering nearly, what we already fee as afar off, fince we are united with the Univerfal Being; and if it be certain that, by virtue of the Laws of Nature, Ideas approach us when we defire it; we ought thence to infer: Firft, That we have a Principle of our Determinations. For 'tis the actual Prefence of parti- cular Ideas, that pofitively 'determines, towards particular Goods, the Motion we have towards Good in general •, and fo changes our Natural Love, into Free and deliberate Loves: Our Confenr, or Acquiefcence in the preception of a Particular Good, has nothing real or pofitive in it on our Part •, as I (hall explain by and by.
Secondly, That the Principle of our Determinations is always free in regard to particular Goods-. For we are not invincibly inclin'd to love them; fince we can examine them in themfelves, and compare them with the Idea which we have of the Sovereign Good, or with other particular Goods. Thus the Principle of our Liberty confifts in this, that being made for God, and united to him, we can always think on the true Good, or on other Goods befides thofe which out Thoughts are actually engag'd on.
But this, on fuppofition that our Senfations do not take up. the Capacity of our Mind.. For to the end we may he free with -the Liberty foremention'd, it is neeeflary not only that God mould not pulh us, invincibly, to particular Goods; but alfo that we fhould be able to employ our Impreffion for Good in general, to the loving other Objects than thole we love at prefent. But as thofe only can be the a£tnal Objects of our hove, which can be of our Thoughts; and that we cannot actually think, except on thofe which Occafion very lively Senfations, whilft they Oc- cafion them •, it is plain, that the dependance we have upon our Body weakens our Liberty, and in many Junctures, quite deftroys the ufe of it. So that our Senfations obliterating our Ideas; and the Union we have with our Body, whereby we dilcern only our felves, enfeebling that we have With God, whereby all things are prefent to us; the Mind ought not to give way to be fhar'd by confus'd Senfations, if it would preferve entire the free Principle of its Determinations.
From all which it is evident, that God is not the Author of Sin, and that Man endues not him- felf with any new Modifications: God is not the Author of Sin; becaufe he continually imprefles on the Sinner, who flops at a particular Good, a Motion to go farther-, gives him a Power of thinking on other things, and tending to other Goods, than thofe which actually engage his Thoughts and Affetfions -, and commands him not to love whatever he can refufe to love without inward Difquiet and Remorfe: withal continually recalling him to his God, by the fecret Reproaches of his Reafon.
'Tis true that in one fenie God inclines the Sinner to Love the Obje£t of his Sin; if this Ob- ject appears Good to a Sinner: for as moft Divines fay, whatever there is of a pofitive nature of Alt, or Motion in the Sin, proceeds from God. But 'tis only by a falfe Judgment of our Mind that the Creatures feem good to us; I mean capable of a&ing in us, and making us happy. But the Sin of a Man confifts not in his loving a particular Good; for every Good, as fuch, is amiable; but in his loving only this Good, or loving it as much or more than another that is ^. jj greater -, or in his loving a Good which God forbids him to enjoy; for that the Mind being fub- ltration je& t0 tne Body, purfuant to the Fall, the Love, or rather the Enjoyment of this Good, would en- upon ch. create his Concupifcence, and alienate him from the love of the Jupreme Good. In a word, the Sin gi Part 2. of Man confifts in his not referring all particular Goods to the fupreme: or rather in his not con- wherel'ex- ^er'n§ an^ loving the fupreme Good in all the particular •, and ib not regulating his Love by the plain my WILL of GOD, or according to eflential and neeeflary ORDER, of which all Men have a meaning more or lefs perfect Knowledge, as they are ftri&er or loofer united to God •, or are more or lefs mere di- Scnfible to the Impreffions of their Senfes and Paffions. For our Senfes import am Soul into our flinttly. whole 0(jy h anj our Yaffwns, as it were, export it to circumambient Objects •, and fo remove us from the Divine Light, which would penetrate and illuminate us.
Nor does Man give himfelf new Modifications: For the Motion of Love which God cOn-» ftantly imprints on us, is neither augmented nor diminifh'd-, whether we do or do not actually love:, I mean, whether this natural Motion of Love be, or be not determin'd by fome Idea of our Mind. Nor does this Motion ceafe by its Acquiefcence in the Pofleffion of Good, as Mo- tion of Bodies ceafes by their Reft. There is great likelihood that God pufhes us at all times alike with an even Force towards him •, for he pufhes us on towards Good in general, as faft as we are.capable; and we are at all times equally capable, becaufe our Will, or our natural Ca- pacity of Willing, -is always equal to it feif. Thus, I fay, the Impreffion, or natural Motion, which carries us towards Good, never encreaies or.diminUhes*- The Search after truth. < 163 X confefs we have no clear Idea, nor indeed inward Senfation of the Evehnefs of that Impref- fion, or natural Motion towards Good: But this comes from our not knowing it by Idea, (which I have formerly *prov'd, ) and from our not being confeious of our Faculties, whilft they do hot *see rl-.e actually operate. We feel not what is natural and common, and always the fame in us;. as the 71'1 cllar' Heat and Beating of the Heart. We are even infenfible of our Habits, and whether we are deferving?f CJX 3d, of the Love, or Wrath of Godt. We have perhaps infinite Faculties, which are perfectly un- t|^jfi„!f known to us: For we are not inwardly confeious of all that we are, but only of all that we feci. ftratiort Had we never felt Pain, nor defir'd particular Goods, we could not by our Self-Confcioufnefs, upon it. have told whether we are capable oi jeeling Pain, or of vail ling thofe Goods: It being our Me-$;hcm0 fc,t mory,- and not our internal Scnfe, which teaches us we are capable of feeling what We do not J'f'""/0X feel •, or of being mov'd by fuch Pafiions, as do not actually agitate us. There is nothing there- iigmt frit. fore that can hinder our believing, that God draws us towards him with an equal Force, though Eccl.4. i.
in a very different manner •, and that he preferves in our Soul an equal Capacity of witling, ot one and the fame Will, as he preferves in Matter, collectively taken, an equal quantity of Motidni But though this fhould not be certain, yet I can't fee how it can be laid, that the Augmentation or Diminution of the Natural Motion of our Soul depends on us, fince we cannot be the Caufe of the Extent of our own Will..
It is moreover certain, from what I faid before, That God produces and preferves in us all that's real and pofitive in the particular Determinations of the Motion of our Soul •, namely, our Ideas and Senfat'wns: For this it is which determines our Motion towards Good in general, to particular Goods, but not in an irrefiftible manner, becaufe we have a tendency to go farther. Hence all that is done on our part when we fin, is our not doing all we yet have the power to do, by means of our impreflion towards Him who comprehends all Goods •, for all our Power is de- riv'd from our Union with Him who works all in us. Now the principal caufe of our finning is, that preferring Enjoyment to Examination, by reafon of the Pleafure accruing to our Enjoy- ing, and the Pain attending our Examining; we defift to employ the Motion which is given us for the purfuit and difquifition of Good -, and we dwell upon the enjoyment of things, which we mould no more than make ufe of But if we obferve the Matter nearly, we fhall lee that in this there is nothing real on our part, but only an intermijjion and ceffation of Enquiry, Which corrupts, as I may fay, the A£tion of God in us, but yet can. never deftroy it. So then, when we do not fin, What is it we do? We do all that God does in us; for we. do not confine to a particular Good, or rather a Falfe one, the Love which God impreiTes on us for the True. And when we fin, What do we do then? 'Nothing. For we love a falfe Good, to which God does not carry us by an irrefiftible impreflion •, we ceafe to perfue the true Good, and ffuftrace the Motion God gives us towards it*. Now whilft we love a particular good only, or againft OR- WJ,. DE R, we receive as great an impreflion of Love from God, as if we did not fix upon it. More- Editions it over this particular Determination, which is neither neceflary nor invincible, is given us of God •, utbw: But