'Tis true, Adam more diftinftly knew than the greateft of Philofophers, that God alone was able to aft in him, and produce that Senfe of Joy which he felt upon the Confideration of his Happi- nefs and Perfections. This he knew clearly by the Light of Reafon, when he attended to it, but not by any Senfation; which, on the contrary, taught him that his Joy was a Conlequence of his Perfection, feeing he had the conftant Senfe of it, and that without any Application on his part: And fo this Senfation might lead him to coniider his own Perfections, and take pleafure in him- felf if he either forgot, or any ways loll fight of Him whofe Operations in us are not of -a fen- iible Nature. So far would this Joy have been from rendring him impeccable, as is pretended, that, on the contrary, it might probably be the Occafion of his Pride and Fall. And 'tis for this Realbn that I fay in this Chapter, that Adam ought to have taken care not to have fuffer'd the Ca- pacity of his Mind to be filPd. with a prefumptuo/ts Joy, kindled in his Soul upon Reflexion on hi$ own Natural Perfections.
THE The Search after Truth, i op THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Fifth CHAPTER of the Firft BOOK; T Hough I fay in this Chapter, that Preventing Delight is the Grace which JESUS CHR IS T has particularly merited for us •, and that I term it elfewhere abfolutely, The Qrace of our LORD; yet this is not faid as if there were no other Grace befides this, or as if there were any but what He has merited •, but I name it fo, to diftinguifli it from the Grace which GOD gave Adam in his Creation, which commonly we call the Grace of the Creator: For the Grace by which Adam might have perfever'd in Innocence was chiefly a Grace of Light? or Knowledge, as I have explain'd in the foregoing Reflexion •, becaufe, being free of Concupifcence, he had no need of Preventing Pleafures to refill it.
But the Grace which is at prefent neceffary to fupport us in our Duty, and to beget and keep Charity alive in us, is Preventing Delegation: For as Pleafure produces and cherifhes the Love of the Things that caufe, or feem to caufe it •, fo Preventing Pleafure s, which Bodies occafwnally ad- minifter, produce and maintain in us our Cupidity. So that Cupidity being entirely oppofite to Charity, if God did not beget and fuftain in us the Latter by Preventing Delegations, 'tis plain that it would be enfeebled by the Preventing Pleafures of Concupifcence, proportionably as Con- cupilcence was corroborated by them.
What I here fay, fuppofes that God leaves our Concupilcence to work in us, and does not weaken it by an infus,d Abhorrence to fenfible Objects, which ( as a Refult from Sin ) muft ne- ceffarily tempt us. I fpeak of Things according to ordinary procedure: But fuppofing that God leffens Concupifcence inftead of increafing Delegable 'Grace, it comes to the fame' thing; for it is plain that a Balance may be put two Ways in xauilibrio, when one of the Scales is too heavy burthen'd, either by adding Weight to the oppofite Scale, or retrenching the Excefs of the over- weighted.
Nor do I fuppofe it is impoflible to do any good A£tion, without a Preventing Delegation: Up- on which Particular I have explain'd my felf fufficientiy in the Fourth Chapter of the Third Book, And it feems too evident to be doubted, that a Man having his Heart poffels'd with the Love of God, may by the Strength of his Love, unaflifted with Preventing Delight, give, for inftance, a Peny to a poor Man, or patiently futTer fome little Affront. I am perluaded likewife that this De- light is not neceffary, except when the Temptation is ftrong, or the Love for God weak. How- ever, it may be faid to be abfolutely neceffary to a Righteous Man, whofe Faith might (one would think ) be refolute, and his Hope ftrong enough to conquer very violent Temptations; the Joy or f'ore-tafte of Eternal Happinefs being capable of refilling the lenfible Allurements of tranfkory Goods.
'Tis true, Delegation, or AUual Grace, is neceffary to every good Aftion, if by theie Words be meant Charity, in which Senfe St. Aufin commonly took them: For 'tis evident, that whatever is done without fome Refpecl: or other had to God, is good for nothing. But clearing the Terms of Equivocations, and taking Delegation in the Senfe I have given, I cannot fee how what I have laid can be call'd in queftion.
But fee wherein the Difficulty confiits: Pleafure and Love are fuppos'd to be one and the fame thing, becaufe feldom apart; and St. Auftin does not always diftinguifh them: And on this Sup- polition they may reafonably fay as they do; and we may conclude with St. Auftin, ^jtod amplim nos deleffat, fecundum id operemur hccejje efl: For certainly we will what we love; and fo likewile it may be faid, that we. cannot perform any good or meritorious Aclion, without Delegation or Charity. But I hope to make it appear in the Explanation I lhall make upon the Trafl concerning c!mP-?• the Paffions, that there is as much difference between Pleafure and deliberate or indeliberate Love, Bw^v« as there is between our Knowledge and our Love, or ( to give a fenfible Representation of this Difference ) between the Figure of a Body and its Motion, i E e THE ji0 F. Malebranche Concerning THE ILLUSTRATION Upon what I have faid at the Beginning of the ": Tenth CHAPTER of theFirft BOOK, And in the Sixth CHAPTER of the Second BO OK, CONCERNING "that 'tis 'very difficult to prove the Exijience of Bodies: What we ought to Efteem of the Proofs which are brought of their Exiftence.
"]i yrE N are commonly perfectly ignorant of what they prefume beft to underftand, and have JVj. a good Knowledge of other things, whilft they imagine they have not fo much as their Ideas. When their Senfes have to do in their Judgments, they fubmit to what they do not comprehend •, at leaft to what they know but imperfectly and confufedly. ' And when their Ideas are purely intelle&ual, (give me leave to ufe fuch ExpreiTions,) they will hardly admit undenia- ble Demonftrations.
What Notion, for Inftance, have the generality of Men, when we prove to them moft of Metaphyfical Truths; when we demonftrate the Exiftence of a God, the Efficacy of his Will, the Immutability of his Decrees: That there is but one God, or true Caufe, that works all in all things; but one Supreme Reafon which all Intelligent Beings participate •, but one neceffary Love, which is the Principle of all created Wills? They think we pronounce Words with- out Senfe •, that we have no Ideas of the things advanc'd •, and that we had better fay nothing. Metaphyfical Truths and Arguments are not of a fenfible Nature •, they have nothing moving and affecf ing, and confequently leave not Conviftion behind them. Neverthelefs, abfiraS Ideas are certainly the moft diftincf; and Metaphyfical Truths the moft clear and evident of all other.
Men fometimes fay they have no Idea of God, nor any Knowledge of his Will, and common- ly believe too what they fay •, but 'tis tor want of knowing what they know, it may be, beft: For where's the Man that hefitates in anfwering to the Queftion, Whether God is Wife, Juft, or Power- ful > Whether he is Divifible, Triangular, Movable, or fubjecf to any kind of Change whatever? Whereas we cannot anlwer Without fcruple,and fear of being miftaken,whether certain Qualities do or do not belong to a Subject which we have no Idea of. So again, Who is it dares lay, that God a£ts not by the moft. limple Means? That he is irregular in his Defigns? That he makes Mon- fters by a pofitive, direft, and particular Will, and not by a kind of NeceiTity? In a word, That his Will is, or may be, contrary to ORDER, whereof every Man knows fomething, more or lefs: But if a Man had no Idea of the Will of GOD, he might at leaft doubt whether he a£led according to certain Laws, which he clearly conceives he is obliged to follow, on Suppofition H E will aa.
Men therefore have the Ideas of things purely Intelligible; which Ideas are much clearer than thofe of fenfible Objects: They are better allured of the Exiftence of a God, than of that of Bo- dies; and when they retire into themfelves, they more clearly difcover certain Wills of God, by which he produces and preferves all Beings, than thofe of their beft Friends, or whom they have ftudied all their Lives: For the Union of their Mind with God, and that of their Will with his, that is, with the Laiv Eternal, or hnmut able Order, is immediate, direcf, and necefTary: whereas their Union with fenfible Objecfs, being founded only for the Prefervation of their Life and Health, gives them no Knowledge of thefe Obje&s, but as they relate to that Defign.
'Tis this immediate and direct Union, which is not known, lays St. Aa ft in, but by thofe whofe Mind is purified •, that enlightens our moft fecret Reafon, and exhorts and moves us in the inmoft Recdfes of our Heart. By this we learn both iheTboaghts and the Wills of God; that is, Eternal Truths and Laws: For no one can doubt but we know fome of them with Evidence. But our Union with our choicett Friends teaches us not evidently either what they think, or what they will. We think we know right well, but we are moft commonly miftaken, becaufe we receive our Information only from their Lips.
Nor can our Union, which we have through our Senfes, with circumambient Bodies, inftru£t us: For the Teftimony of the Senfes is never exacf ly true, but commonly every way falfe, as I have The Search after Truth. nt have made appear in this Treatife; and 'tis for that Reafon I fay 'tis an harder thing than is be- ltev'd, to prove pofitively the Exiftence of Bodies, though our Senfes tell us they exift; becaufe Reafon does not fo readily inform us, as we imagine h and it muft be molt attentively confuked to give us a clear Refolve.
But as Men are more Senfible t\nn Reafonable, fo they more willingly liften to the Verdict of the Senfes, than the Teftimony of internal Truth; and becaufe they have always confuked their Eyes to be affur'd of the Exigence of Matter, without troubling their Heads to advife with their Rea- "* fon J they are furpriz'd to hear it faid, it is hard to demonftrate it. They think they need but open their Eyes, to fee that there are Bodies; but if this does not take away all fufpicion of II- lufion, they believe it abundantly fufficient to come near and handle them 5 after which they can hardly conceive we can have any peffible Reafons to make us doubt of their Exigence.
But if we believe our Eyes, they'll tell us, that Colours are laid upon the furface of Bodies, and Light diftus'd in the Air and Sun 5 our Ears make us hear Sounds as undulated in the Air, and ecchoing from the ringing Bodies ^ and, if we credit the Report of the other Senfes, Heat will be in the Fire, Sweetnefs in the Sugar, Odour in Musk, and all fenhble Qualities in the Bodies which feem to exhale or difperfe them. And yet it is certain, from the Reafcns I have given in the Firlt Book, concerning the Search after Truth, that thefe Qualities are not out of the Soul that feels them, at lealt it is not evident they are in the Bodies that are about us. What Reafon there- fore is there, from the Reports of our always-treacherous and delufive Senfes * to conclude, there are actually Bodies without us, and that they are like thofe wey^r -, I mean thofe which are the immediate Objecf of our Soul, when we behold them with bodily Eyes? Certainly this does not want Difficulty, whatever may be faid of it.
Farther: If the Exiftence of any Body may be certainly prov'd upon the Teftimony of our Senfes, none could have better Pretence than That to which the Soul is immediately united: The livelier!: Senfation, and that which feems to have themoft neceffary relation to an acfually-exifting Body, is Pain. And yet it often happens that thofe who have loft an Arm feel moft violent Pains in it long after it has been cut off. They know well enough they want it, when they confult their Memory, or only look upon their Body -, but theSenfe of Pain deceives them: And if, as it often happens, they be fuppos'd to have quite forgotten what formerly they were, and to have no other Senfes left them than that whereby they feel Pain in their imaginary Arm -, certainly they could not be convinced but that they had an Arm in which they felt fo violent torment.
There have been thofe who have believ'd they had Horns on their Heads ^ others who have ima- gine! they were made of Butter, or Glafs, or that their Body was not of the Shape of other Mens, but fafhion'd like that of a Cock, a Wol£ or an Ox. But thefe, you'll fay, were mad Men -, and I readily believe it. But their Soul was capable of deceiving them about thefe things, and confe- quently all other Men may fall into the fame Errours, if they judge of Objects by the Teftimony of their Senfes: For it muft be obferv'd, that thefe mad Men actually feel themfelves to be fuch as they think they are, and their Errour confifts not in the Senfation they have, but in the Judg- ment they make. If they fhould only fay, they felt or Java themfelves like Cocks, they would not be deceived: But herein only they deceive themfelves, in that they believe their Body like that they feel; I mean, like that which is the immediate Objecf of their Mind, when they confider it. And fo thofe who believe themfelves fuch as they really are, are no more judicious in their Judg- ments they make of themfelves than thefe mad Men, if they judge precifely by the Teftimony of their Senfes; but are to thank their Fortune more than their Reafon, if they are not miftaken.
But at the Bottom, How can we be fure that thofe who go under the Notion of mad Men are really what they are taken for > May we not fay they are reckon'd craz'd, becaufe they have pe- culiar Sentiments > For 'tis evident, that a Man is not reckon'd mad for having the Senfe of what is not, but only for having a Senfe of things quite contrary to that of others, whether their Senfe be true or falfe, right or wrong.
A Clown, for Example, having his Eyes fo difpos'd as to fee the Moon juft fuch as fhe is, or only foas fhe is beheld, or fbmetime may -be hereafter, with new-invented Glaifes looks on her with Ad- miration, and cries to his Companions, What high Mountains and deep Valleys, what Seas, and The Moon Lakes, and Gulphs, and Rocks, do I behold! See, fays he, what a vaft Sea lies all along the when be- Eaft, whilft nothing but Land and Mountains extend from Weft to South I Don't you fee on the ^%,?*th fame hand a Mountain higher than ever we beheld? And don't you wonder to fee a Sea all over iookfmudi black, and an huge dreadful Gulph in the middle of the Planet > What would his Fellows an- like what fwer to fuch Exclamations > Or what would they think of him? Certainly, that he was Mad, is here re- or Lunatick, and diftemper'd by the malign Influences of the Planet he beholds and admires: For Preiented' no Man has the fame Notions, and that's enough. Thus to be mad in the Opinion of others, there's no need to be really fo, but only to have Thoughts and Senfation different from them: For if all Men fhould believe themfelves to be Cocks, he that maintain'd he had an humane Shape would certainly go for a Fool or a Mad Man.
But you'll fay, Has a Man a Beak at the end of his Nofe, and a Comb upon his Head > I fup- pofe not; but I don't know fo much, when I judge only by my Senfes, and know not how to put them to their proper ufe. In vain fhall I try by handling my Head and Face •, for I feel my own Body, and thofe about me, but with Hands whole length and figure I don't know. Nay I can- not be certainly affur'd whether I have truly Hands or not; for that which makes me think I have, is, that at the time that I feem to move them, there happen fome Motions in a particular part of my Brain, which, in the vulgar Notion, is the Seat of the Common Senfe. But it may be I have in F. Malebranche Concerning have not that Part which is fo generally talk'd of, and fo little known -, at leaft I am notfenfb/e of this, though I feel my Hands •, fo that I have more right to believe 1 have Hands than that little Gland which is ftill daily difputed againft. But, Laflly, I know neither the Figure nor Motions of this Gland, and yet I am allured, that by them only I can be inftrufted in the Figure and Motion of my own Body, and thofe that are round about me.
Well rhen, What are we oblig'd to conclude from all this? Why, that 'tis not a Body that can give Light to Reafon -, that the Part to which the Soul is immediately united, is neither vifiblenor intelligible of it felf -, that neither our own nor furrounding Bodies can be the immediate Objeft •of our Mind -, that we cannot learn from our Brain fo much, as whether it aQually exifts, much lefs whether there are circumambient Bodies: That therefore we are to fly to the Exiltence of ibmefuperiour Intelligence, who alone is capable of afring in us, in fuch a manner as to give a real Reprefentation of external Bodies, without giving us any Idea of our Brain, though theMo- tions produe'd in it ferve as an Occafwn to this Intelligent Being, to difcover thefe Bodies tojis: For, infhort, we fee with Eyes, whofe Figure we do not know, what is the Figure of external Bodies; and though the Colours which appear on Objects, are no livelier than thofe which are painted on the Optick Nerve, thefe are quite hid from us, whillt we 'admire the Splendour of the other.
But after all, Under what Obligation is an Intelligent Being to mew us Bodies upon fome Mo- tions happening in our Brain? Again, What Neceflity is there of external Bodies for him to ftir up thefe Motions in our Brain? Do not Sleep, Paflions, and Madnels, produce thefe Mo- tions, though external Bodies do not contribute to them? Is it evident, that Bodies incapable of 'fsee ch.$. moving one another, * mould communicate to thofe they ftrike, a moving Force which they have Part ii. of not in themfelves? But grant that Bodies move themfelves, and thofe they ftrike againit; can wkh V£he we tnence infer, that he who gives Being to all things cannot immediately by himfelf ftir up in illuftrati- our Brain the Motions to which the Ideas of our Mind are connected > Lafily, Where's the en. Contradiction, that our Soul mould receive new Ideas whilft our Brain remains without new Motions; fince it is certain the latter do not produce the former, fince we have no Knowledge of f Seech. 6. thefe Motions, and that God alone can reprefent to us our Ideas, t as I have elfewhere proved. Boll in °* Therefore 'tis abfolutely neceffary (pofitively to be allured of the Exiftence of external Bodies) to with its' ii- know God who gives us theSenfation of them; and to know, that, becaufe he is infinitely per- iuftration. fecf, he cannot deceive us. For if the Intelligence, who furnifhes us with the Ideas of all things, would, as I may fay, divert himfelf, by reprefenting Bodies as actually exifting, whilft there ,was nothing of them, it is plain he could eafily do it.
For thefe, or the like Reafons, M. des Cartes, refolving to eftablifh his Philofophy on im- movable Foundations, thought he had no right to fuppofe the Exiftence of Bodies, nor to prove them by fenfible Arguments, though highly convincing with the common part of Mankind. Un- doubtedly he knew as well as we, that he needed but open his Eyes to lee Bodies, and to draw •near and handle them, to be fatisfied whether his Eyes abufed him in their Reports. He well enough knew the Mind of Man, to judge that fuch like Proofs had been acceptable and welcome: But he did not feek iox fenfible Probabilities, nor vain and popular Applaufes-, preferring deipis'd Truth before the Glory of an unmerited Reputation -, and chufing rather to render himfelf ridicu- lous to little Souls, by Doubts, thought by them extravagant, than to affert what he thought not certain and undeniable.
But though M. des Cartes has given the ftrongeft Arguments that bare Reafon could furnifh out for the Exiftence of Bodies; though it be evident, that God is no Deceiver, and it may be laid he would really deceive us, did we deceive our felves, whilft we made a due ufe of our Mind, and the other Faculties, whereof he is the Author •, yet it may be affirmed, that the Exiftence of Matter is not yet perfectly demonftrated: For, in fine, in point of Philofophy, we are to believe nothing till the Evidence of it obliges us; but to make ufe of our Liberty as much as we can, giving no greater Extent to our Judgments than our Perceptions. Wherefore, when we lee Bo- dies, we mould judge only that we lee them, and that thefe vifible or intelligible Bodies actually exift. But why muft we judge pofitively there is a Material World ^without us, like the Intelli- gible World we perceive?
But, fay you, we fee thefe Bodies without us, and likewife very remote from that we animate: We may then judge they are without us, and yet our Judgments reach no farther than our Per- ceptions. But what? Don't we fee Light without us, and in the Sun, though it be not in it? But be it fo: Bodies that we fee without us are really without us; for indeed it is not to be deny'd. But is it not evident that there are Outneffes, and RemoteneJJes, and intelligible Spaces in the in- telligible World, which is the immediate Objeft of our Mind? The material Body which we annnate (oblerve it well) is not the fame we fee when we behold it, I mean when we turn our corporeal Eyes upon it, but an intelligible Body -, and there are intelligible Spaces between this in- telligible Body and the intelligible Sun we fee, as there are material Spaces between our Body and the Sun which we behold. Certainly God ordain'd Spaces between Bodies which he created, but he neither fees thefe Bodies nor thele Spaces by themfelves; he can only fee them by Bodies and Spaces intellectual: God derives no Knowledge but from himfelf; he fees not the material World, lave in the intelligible World which he comprehends, and in the Knowledge he has of his own Will, which gives actually Exiftence and Motion to all things. Therefore there are intelligible Spaces between the intelligible Bodies which we immediately fee, as there are material Spaces be- tween Bodies which our Eyes behold.
Now Ybe Search after Truth. \\o \ Now it ought to be obferv'd, that: as there is none but God who knows his Will by himfelf, which produces all Beings:, it is impoflible to know from any other, whether there be actually without us a material World like that we fee; becaufe the material World is neither Vifible, nor Intelligible of it felf. Therefore to be fully convinced of the Exiftence of Bodies, it is not only neceflary to de- monstrate there is a God, and that he is no Deceiver •, but alfo that this God has aftur'd us there is iuch a World actually created: Which thing I find wanting in M. des Cartels Woiks.
God fpeaks to the Mind, and obliges it to afient but two feveral ways. By Evidence and Faith. 1 acknowledge that Faith obliges us to believe the Exiftence of Bodies: But as to Evidence, me- thinks it wants fomething to be perfect •, and that we are not invincibly carry'd to believe there is any thing Exifling befides God and our own Mind. 'Tis true, we have an extream propenfion to be- lieve there are filch things, as circumambient Bodies • So far I agree with M. des Cartes. But this Propenfion however natural, does not evidently force us; but only perfwafively induce us, by the impreflion. But we ought only to form our Free Judgments, as Light and Evidence oblige us: for if we leave our felves to the guidance of fenfible Impreflions, we /"hall feldom or ever be unmiftaken. - For how comes it that we erre in the Judgments we make about feniible Qualities, about the Magnitude, Figure,and Motion of Bodies,but from our following an lmprejfion like that which indu- ces us to believe the Exiftence of Bodies? Do not wefenfibly perceive the Fire to be hot, Snow to be' white, and the Sun to be all glorious with a radiating Light? Do not we fee that fenfible Qualities nolefsjthan Bodies are without us? And yet 'tis certain, that the former winch we fee without us are not really fo •, or if you had rather, there is no certainty about it. What Reafon then have we, to judge, that befides intelligible Bodies which we fee there are others that we. beheld. Or what Evidence can a Man have, that an Impreflion, not only delufive, in refpect of feniible Qualities, but alfo in regard to the Magnitude, Figure, and Motion of Bodies, -mould not be as treacherous in refpect to the actual Exiftence of the Bodies themfelves: I ask, what Evidence can a Man have? For as to Probabilities I grant they are not wanting.
I know very well there's this Difference between fenfible Qualities^ and Bodies; that Reafon much eafier corrects the Impreflion, or natural Judgments which relate to fenfible Qualities, than thofe which concern the Exiftence of Bodies: and likewife that all the cOtre&ions made by Reafon, with reference to fenfible Qualities, perfectly comport with Religion, and Chriftian Morality, and that we cannot deny the Exiftence of Bodies, through a Principle of Religion.
'Tis eafie to conceive that Pleafure, and Pain, Heat, and even Colours, are not Modes ofcoYpo- real Exiftence; that fenfible Qualities in general are not contain'd in the Idea we have of Matter. In a Word, that our Senfes do not reprefent fenfible Objects, as they are in their own nature, but as_.they are with reference to the prefervation of our Health and Life; which is conformable, not only to Reafon, but much more to Religion, and Chriftian Morality; as has been evidene'd in fe- veral places of this Treatife. • . But 'tis not fo eafie to be pofitively afcertain'd of the Non-exiftence of External Bodies, as it is to be pofitively convine'd, that Pain and Heat are not in the Bodies which feem to caufe them in us. 'Tis moft certain, at leaft, that there's a poffibility of outward Bodies: We have no Argument to prove there are none, and we have a very ftrong inclination to believe there are; and there- fore we have more reafon to conclude for the Exiftence than the Non-exiftence of them; and confe-. quentiy it feems that we ought to believe they are. For we are naturally inclin'd to follow our na- tural Judgment fo long as it's not pofitively corrigible by Light and Evidence. For every natural Judgment coming from God may be rightly feconded by our free Judgments, when God furnifhes us not with means to manifeft its falfity •, And if on fuch occafions we miftake, the Author of our Mind may feem in a manner to be the Author of our Errors and Delinquencies.
This Reafoning is, poflibly, good: though it muft be acknowledg'd that it ought not to go for an Evident Demonftration of the Exiftence of Bodies: For indeed God does not irrefiftibly force us to confent to it •, if we give our confent, it is a free act, and we may with-hold it if we pleafe j If this arguing I have made be juft, we are to believe it highly probable, that there are Bodies; but this bare Argumentation alone ought not to give us a plenary Conviction and Acquiefcence; otherwife, it is we our felves that act, and not God in us-; it being by a free ad, and confequently liable to Error, that we confent^ and not by ah invincible Impreflion: for we believe it freely be- caufe we will, and not becaufe we fee any obliging Evidence.