Now then we fee what Order is, and how it has the ftrength of a Law, by that neceffary Love which God has for himfelf. We conceive how this Law comes to be general for all Minds God not excepted, and why it is neceffary, and abfolutely indifpenfible Laff.ly, we conceive, or we may eafdy conceive in general, that it is the Principle of all Divine and Humane Laws, and that 'tis according to this Law that all Intelligences are judg'd, and all Creatures difpos'd in the re- ipedive rank that belongs to them.
I acknowledge it is not eafie to explain all this in particular, and I venture not to" -undertake It. For fhould I go to fhow the Connexion particular Laws have with, the general^ and account for the agreement which certain manners of ading have to Order, 1 fhould be forc'd to engage in Difficul- ties, that it may be I could not refolve, and which would lead me out of fight of ray fubjed.
Neverthelefs if it be confiderM that God neither has, nor can have any other Law, than his own Wifdom, and the neceffary Love he has for it, we fhall eafily judge, that all Divine Laws muft de- pend on it: And if it be obferv'd. that he has made the World with reference only to thatWifdom and Love, fince he ads only for Himfelf • we mall not doubt but all natural Laws muft tend to the Prefervation, and Perfedion of this World, according to indifpenfable Order, and by their de- pendance on neceffary Love. For the Wifdom and Will of God regulates all things.
There is no need I fhould explain at prefent, this Principle more at large: what I have already faid being fufficient to infer this Confequence, That in the firft inftitution of Nature it was Impof- fible for Minds to be fubjeded to Bodies. For fince God cannot ad without Knowledge and againft: his Witt, he has made the World by his Wifdom, and by the motion of his Love: He has made all things by his Son, and in his Holy Spirit, as we are taught in Scripture. Now in the Wifdom of God, Minds are perfeder than Bodies, and by the neceffary Love God has for himfelf, he prefers what is more perfed to what is lefs fo. Therefore it is not poffible that Minds fhould be fubjed to Bodies in the firft inftitution of Nature. Otherwife it muft be faid, that God in creating the World, has not follow'd the Rules of his Eternal Wifdom, nor the Motions of his natural and ne- ceffary Love: which not only is inconceivable, but involves a manifeft contradidion.
True it is that at prefent the created Mind is debas'd below a material and fenfible Body, but that's becaufe Order confidered as a neceffary Law, will have it fb. 'Tis becaufe God loving him- felf by a neceffary Love, which is always his Inviolable Law, cannot love Spirits that are repugnant to him, nor consequently prefer them to Bodies, in which there is nothing evil, nor in the hatred of God. For God loves not Sinners in themfelves. Nor would they fubfift in the Univerfe but through JESUS CHRIST. God neither preferves them, nor loves them, but that they may p^J^-jl. ceafe to be Sinners, through the Grace of CHRIST JESUS: or that, if they remain eter- i0' 0fa" nally Sinners, they may be eternally condemned, by immutable and neceffary Order, and by the Chriftian Judgment of our L O R D, by vertue of whom they fubfift for the Glory of the Divine Juftice: Conveifa- for without Him they would be annihilated. This I fay by the way, to clear fome difficulties that tions* might remain touching what I faid elfewhere about Original Sin, or the general Corruption of Nature.
'Tis, if I miftake not, a very ufeful refledion to confider that the Mind has but two ways of knowing Ob jeds. By Light and by Senfation. It fees them by Light, when it has a clear Idea of them, and when by confuting that Idea it can difcover all the properties whereof they are capa^ ble. It fees things by Senfation, when it finds not in it felf their clear Idea to confult it -, and fo cannot clearly difcover their properties; but only know them by a confus'd Senfation without Light and Evidence. 'Tis by Light and a clear Idea the mind fees the E [fences of things, Numbers and Extenfion: 'Tis by a confusM Idea, or Senfation, that it judges of the Exijlence of Creatures, and knows its own.
What the Mind perceives by Light, or by a clear Idea, it perceives in a moft perfed manner: moreover, it fees clearly that all the Obfcurity, or Imperfedion of its Knowledge proceeds from its own Weaknefs and Limitation, or from want of Application, and not from the Imperfedion of the Idea it perceives. But what the mind perceives by Senfation is never clearly known: not for want of any Application on part of the Mind, (for we always are very applicative to what we feel,) but by the defedivenefs of the Idea, which is extreamly obfcure and confus'd.
Hence we may conclude that it is in God, or in an immutable nature, that we fee all that we know by Light,or a clear Idea; not only becaufe we difcover byLight,only numbers Extenfion, and the Eflences of Beings, which depend not on a free Ad of God, as 1 have already faid ^ but alfo M m becaufe 1^3 F. Malebranche Concerning becarfc (-re know thefe things in a very perfed manner, and we fhould even know them in an infi- nitely perfect manner^ if cu. thinking Capacity weie infinite, fince nothing is wanting to the Idea that leprefenis them. We ought likewifeto conclude, that we fee in our felves whatever we know by Senfation, However, this is not, as if we -could produce in our felves any new modification, or that the fenfations,, or modifications of our Soul could reprefent the Objects, on occalion whereof God excites them in us: But only that our Senfations which are not diftinguifbed from our felves, and confequently cannot reprefent any thing diftindt from us, may neverthelefs reprefent the exi- ftence of Beings, or caufe us to judge that they exift. Fo God railing Senfations in us upon the prefence of Objects, by an action that has nothing fenfible, we fancy we receive from the Object not only the Idea which reprefents its effence, but alfo the Senfation which makes us judge of its exiftence: For there is always a pure Idea, and a confufed Senfation in the Knowledge we have of things as actually exifting, if we except that of God, and of our own Soul. I except the Exiftence of God. For this we know by a pure Idea, and without Senfation, lince it depends not on any caufe, and is included in the Idea of a neceffary Being, as the Equality of Diameters is included in the Idea of a Circle. And I except the Exiftence of our Soul •, becaufe we are inwardly confeious that we Think, Will, and Feel: and have no clear Idea of otir Soul, as 1 have fufficiently explain- ed in the feventh Chapter of the fecond Part of the third Book, and elfe where.
Thefe are fome of the Reafons which we have to add to thofe already given, to prove that all our Light is deriv'd to us from God, and that the immediate, and direct Object of our clear and evi- dent notices is an immutable, and neceffary Nature: Some Objections are ufually made againft this Opinion \ which I fhall now endeavour to folve.
Againft what has been [aid, that none hut God enlightens us^ and that we fee all things in him.
OBJECTION I.
OU R Soul thinks becaufe it is her Nature. God in creating her gave her the faculty of think- ing: and (he needs nothing more. But if any thing elfe is wanting, let us ftick to what Ex- perience teaches us of ovr fenfes, which is, that they are the manifeft caufes of our Ideas. 'Tis ari ill way ofPhilofophizing to argue againft Experience.
ANSWER.
I cannot but admire that the Cartefian Gentlemen, who with fo much reafon reject and fcorn the general Terms of Nature and faculty fhould fo willingly employ them on this occafion. They cry out againft a Man that fhall fay the Fire burns by its nature, and converts certain Bodies into Glafs by a natural Faculty: And yet fome of them fear not to fay that the Humane Mind produces the Ideas of all things in it felf by its nature, and becaufe it has a thinking faculty. But be it fpoken without offence, thefe words are no more fignifkative in their Mouths, than in the Peripateticks, I know very well that the Soul is capable of thinking. But 1 know like wife that extenfion is capa- ble of Figures: The Soul is capable of Will as matter is of Motion. But as it is falfe that matter though capable of figure, and motion, has in it felf a force, faculty^ or nature by which it can move it felf, and give it felf now a round figure, and anon a fquare one; fo though the Soul be naturally, and effentially capable of Knowledge, and Will, it is falfe that fhe has Faculties where- by fhe can produce in her Ideas, or motion towards good. There is a great difference between be- ing Moveable, and felf moving. Matter is by its nature moveable, and capable of Figures- nor can it fubfift without a figure. But it neither moves it felf, nor fhapes it felf, nor has it any facul- ty to do it, The Mind is of its nature capable of motion, and Ideas I acknowledge. But it nei- ther moves, nor enlightens its felf. But 'tis God that does all in Minds, as well as in Bodies. See the Can we ^av tnaC God effects the changes that happen in matter, and that he caufes not thofe firfc illu- which occur in the Mind? Is this to give to God the things that are his, to leave thefe latter fort of ftration. Beings to their own management? Is he not equally Lord of all things? Is he not the Creator, Prefer ver, and true mover of Minds as well as Bodies? Certainly he makes all, both Subftances, Accidents, Beings, and Modes of Being. For in fhort, he knows all: But he knows nothing but what he does. We therefore ftreighten him in his Knowledge, if we limit him in his Action.
But if it muftbe faid thatCreatures have fach faculties as are commonly conceived,and that natural Bodies have a Nature which is the Principle of their Motion and Reft, as fays Ariftotle and his Follow- ers: This indeed overthrows all my Ideas •, but yet I will rather agree to it, than fay the Mind enlightens it felf. Men may fay that theSoul has the force of movjng divei fly the Limbs of herBody, and of communicating to them Senfe and Life: They may. fay, if they pleafe, that it is fhe that gives heat to the Blood, motion to the Spirits! and to the reft of her Body, its Bulk, Situation and Figure: Only let them not fay that the Mind gives Light and Motion to it felf. If God works not all, let us allow him at leaft to do what is Nobleft and Perfecteft in the World. And if Creatures do any thing, let them move Bodies, and range and pofture them as they think fit: But let them never act upon Minds. We will fay (\i that will ferve) that Bodies move each other, after they have been mov'd themfelves The Search after Truth'. I2q f elves; or rather will fit down ignorant of the different Difpofitions of matter as not concerning us: But let not our Minds be ignorant whence proceeds the Light that enlightens thtm: Let them know frofn what hind they receive all that can make them more happy, or more perfect, let them at knowledge their dependence in its whole extent, and know, that whatever rhev actually have, God gives them every moment •, for as fays a great Father upon another Subject, "7m a very criminal Eft quippe fPride to ufe the gifts of God, as our onm innate Perfections. -Above all let us take heed of imagining fupi-rb'a,^ that the Senfes inftru't Reifon, that the Body enlightens the Mind, that the Soul receive of the bo- ^ccm^ dy what it waits it felf. We had better believe our felves independent, than to believe we truly ^TcLais*1' depend on Bodies. 'Tis much better to be our own Miters, thm to feek for Mailers a- tanquam mong inferior Creatures. But we had much better fubmit our felves to Eternal Truth, which af- math. lures usin the Gofpel, that none elfe is our Inftrudtor 5 than to believe the Teftimony of our Senfes, s; Beni.rfs or of fome Men, who prefume to talk to us as our Teachers. Experience (whatever may be faid,) ^%»rfo does not countenance prejudices. For our Senfes, no lefs than our Teachers after the Flefh, are only occafionalcaufes of the Inftrucrion which Eternal Wifdom infufes into our moft inward Reafon. But becaufe this Wifdom enlightens us by an infenfible Operation, we imagine it is our Eyes, or the Words of thofe that verberate the Air againft our Ears, who produce this Light, or pronounce that intelligible Voice which inftructs us. And for this Reafon, as I have faid in another place, our L O R D thought it not enough to inftrud us in an inte'Hble manner by his Divinity ^ unlefs he condefcended alfo to inform us in a fenfible wav bv his Humanity, thereby teaching us that he is e- yery way our Mailer. And beraufe we cannot eafily retire into our felves, to confult him, in Qua- lity of eternalTruth, immutable Order, intelligible Light, he has rendred Truth fenfible by his Words, O^der Amiable by his Example, Light Vifible by a Body which breakstne force of itsLuilre; and after all we are Hill fo ung-ateful, unjufl, flupid and infenfible, as to reiped: as our Mailers, aid that againft his exprefs prohibition, not only other Men, buc it may be the moft infenfible and vileft Bodies.
OBJECTION II.
Si.ice the Soul is more perfect than Bodies, how comes it that fhe cannot include in her that which reprefe its them? Why may not the Idea of extenfion be one of her Modifications ^ 'tis true there is none but God who acts in her, and modifies her? But why muft (he fee Bodies in G, 11 fhe caa fee th^m ia her own Subflance, fhe is not material, it's confefs'd. But God, though a pure Spirit, fees Bodies in himfelf } why then may not the Soul though Spiritual fee Bodies by coufideiing for/t//?
ANSWER.- ANSWER.- Do not we fee that there is this difference between God and the Humane Soul, that Gcd is Being without tefhidtion, Univerfal, Infinite Being, and the Soul is a fort of particular Being? fj "T« a This is property of infinite to be at the fame time one, and yet all things; composed as we may fay of infinite per- omitted in feilwns, and yet fo fimple that every per fecJion he poffefjes, includes all the other without ary real diftmfti- '?me Edi' on • for as every Divine perfeclion is infinite, it conflitutes the whole Divine Effence; But the Soul fince a ti0ns* limited Being cannot have extenfion in her without becoming material."] God includes in himfelt Bo- dies in an intelligible manner. He fees their EfTences or Ideas, in his Wiidom •, and their Exi- flencein his Love, or in his Wills. This muft: neceffarily be faid, fince God has made Bodies -, and he knew what he made before any thing was created. But the Soul cannot fee in her felf what fhe does not contain: Nor can fhe fee clearly what fhe does contain, but only has a confus'd Senia- tion of it. I explain my felf.
The Soul does not include Intelligible extenfion, as one of her modes of Being: Becaufe this ex- tenfion is not any mode of Being but a true Being. We can conceive that Extenfion feparately from any thing elfe, but we cannot conceive any modes of Being without perceiving the Subject, or Be- ing whereof they are the modes. We perceive this extenfion without thinking on oui mind, and we cannot conceive it to be any modification of our mind. This extenfion when circumfcrib'd makes fome figure, but the Limits of the mind cannot be figured. This extenfion having parts may be divided, at leaft in one fence, but we fee nothing in the Soul that is divifible. This exten- fion therefore that w&fee is no mode of the minds Exiftence, and therefore the mind cannot fee it within it felf. How can we fee it in one fpecies of Being all forts of Beings? In one particular and finite Being, a Triangle in general, and infinite Triangles? For in fine, the Soul perceives a Tri- angle, or a Circle in general, though it be a Contradiction for the Soul to have a modification in general. The Senfations of Colour which the Soul afcribes to figures make them particular, becaufe no modification of a particular Being can be general.
Surely we may affirm what we clearly conceive. But we clearly conceive that theExtenfion which we fee is fomething diftind from our felves, therefore we may affirm, that this extenfion is not a modification of our Being, and that 'tis fometbing actually diftind from us. For we muft obferve, that the Sun for tnitance that we fee is not that we look lipon. The Sun and all we fee in the ma- terial World is not vifible of it felf, as 1 have formerly prov'd. The Soul can only fee the Sun to which fhe is immediately united. But we have a clear Perception, and a dijiintl Senfation, that the Sun is fomething different from us. Therefore we fpeak againft our Light, and againft our Confci- ence, when we fay the Soul fees all furrounding Bodies in her own modifications.
Pleafure, Pain, Savour, Heat, Colour, all our Senfations, and Paffions, are the modifications of bur Soul. But though they be fo, do we clearly know them? Can we compare Heat with Savour, • Odor j^d F. Malebranche Concerning Odor with Colour? Can we difcover what Relation there is between Red and Green 1 Or even be- tween Green and Green? 'Tis not fo with figures, we compare them with one another, we find out exactly their Proportions: We know precifely that the ' diagonal of a Square, multiplied into it felf, makes a Square, that's double to the former, what Analogy is there between thefe in- telligible Figures, which are moft clear Ideas, with the modifications of our Soul, which are only confus'd Senfations? And why mult it be pretended, that intelligible Figures cannot be perceived by the Soul, unlefs they be her modifications, fince the Soul knows not any of her modifications by a clear Idea, but only by Confcience or internal Senfe? As I have elfewhere prov'd, and lhall prove again in the next llluftration. If we could not fee the figures of Bodies, except in our felves,they would be on the contrary unintelligible to us: For we do not know our felves, but are darknefs to our felves •, and we mult caft our Eye outward if we would behold our felves / And we lhall never know what we are till we lhall contemplate our felves in him who is our Light, and in whom all things become Light. For no where but in God material Beings are perfectly intelligible ^ but out of him the rnoft Spiritual Subltances are utterly invifible. The Idea of Extenfion, which we fee in God, is moft clear. But though we fee not in God the Idea of our Soul, we are very confcious that we exifi^ and are fenfible of what we actually have. But 'tis impoffible to difcover what we are, or any of the modifications we are capable of.
OBJECTION III.
In God there is nothing moveable: In him there is nothing Figured. If there be a Sun in the In= telligible World, that Sun is always equal to it felf •, whereas the vifible Sun appears bigger when' near the Horizon, than when remote from it, therefore it is not the intelligible Sun we fee. The cafe is the fame in refpedt of other Creatures. Therefore we fee not in God the Works of Godo' To give an Anfvver to all this we need only confider, that God includes within himfelf, an infi- nite intelligible Extenfion ^ For God knows Extenfion, in. as much as he has made it, and he can know it no otherwife than in himfelf. Therefore as the mind may perceive part of that intelligi- ble Extenfion, which God includes, it is certain it may perceive in God all Figures; for a\\ finite In- telligible Extenfion is neceffarily an intelligible Figure, fince Figure is nothing but the termination of Extenfion. Moreover that Figure of intelligible and general Extenfion becomes fenfible, and parti- cular, by Colour, or fome other fenfible Quality, which the Soul afcribes to it j for the Soul almoffc always beftows her own Senfation upon a lively and affecting Idea. Thus there is no neceffity, that there fhould be in God fenfible Bodies, or Figures in Intelligible Extenfion, in order to our feeing them in God, or that God may fee them himfelf, though he confiders nothing but himfelf.
So likewife if it be conceived that a Figure of intelligible Extenfion, made fenfible by Colour, fhould be taken, fucceffively, from the different Parts of that fame infinite Extenfion -0 or if it be conceiv'd that a Figure of Intelligible Extenfion may turn upon its Center, or fucceffively approach another, we perceive the motion of a fenfible or Intelligible Figure, though there be no motion in intelligible Extenfion. For God fees not the motion of Bodies in his Sub/lance, or in the Idea he has of them in himfelf. But only by the knowledge he has of his own Wilis relating to them. He fees their Exiftence only by that way, becaufe his Will only gives Being to all things. The Wills of God change nothing in his Subftance: nor do they move it: Perhaps Intelligible Extenfion is im- moveable all manner of ways, even intelligibly. But though we fee only this intelligible Extenfion, immoveable or otherwife, it feems moveable to us, becaufe of the Senfation of Colour^ or the con- fufcd Image remaining after the Senfation, which we fucceffively annex to the feveral parts of In- telligible Extenfion, that furnilhes us with an Idea, when we fee or imagine the motion of any Body.
From what I have faid, we may underftand why we fee the Intelligible Sun, fometimes greater and fometimes lefs, though it be always the fame with refpedt to God. For all that is requir'd to this, is but to fee, one while, a greater part of Intelligible Extenfion, and another while a lefs, and to have a lively Senfation of Light, tobeftow upon that part of Extenfion. Now as all the Parts of Intelligible Extenfion are all of the fame nature, they may all indifferently reprefent any Body whatever.
It muft not be imaginM that the Intelligible World has any fiich relation to the material and fen- fible, that there mult be for inftance an Intelligible Sun, an intelligible Horfe, and an Intelligible Tree dcftinM to reprefent to us the Sun, an Horfe and a Tree ^ and that all thofe who fee the Sua necctfarily fee this pretended intelligible Sun. All intelligible Extenfion may be conceived Circu- lar, or to have an intelligible Figure of an Horfe, or a Tree, and fo may ferve to reprefent the Sun, an Horfe and Tree, and confequently be a Sun, a Horfe and a Tree in the intelligible World, and likewife to become a fenfible and vifible Sun, Horfe, and Tree, if the Soul has any Senfation occafion by Bodies to affix to thefe Ideas.
Therefore when I faid that we faw different Bodies by the knowledge we have of the Perfections of God which reprefent them: I did not mean precifely that there were certain particular Ideas in God to reprefent each Body in particular; and that we faw fuch a particular Idea, in feeing fuch a particular Body. For it is certain we could not fee this Body fometimes great, and fometimes fmall, one The Sedrch after Truth. i 4 1 fene while round, and another while fquare, if we faw it by a particular Idea, that was always the feme. But I fay we fee all things in God, by the application God makes ot intelligible Extenfion to our mind, in a thoufand different ways, and that thus intelligible Extenfion includes in it all the Perfections, or rather differences, of Bodies -, becaufe of the different Senfations, the Soul beftows upon the Ideas which fhe receives occafionally from them. I have difcours'd after another manner • but it mould be concluded, that wasonlf to make fomeof my proofs more forcible and fenfible- and it mould not be gather'd from what I have here faid, t] it the foundation of thofe proofs is ruin'd. I could give the reafons of the different ways wherein 1 explain my felf, if I thought it ne- ceflary.
I venture not to dive deeper into this Subject, for fear of fpeaking things either too Abftracr, or Uncommon: Or, if that feem better, for fear of hazarding to fpeak things which I neither know.* nor am capable of difcovering: Only let me produce thofe paflages of Scripture which fcem con- trary to what I have now eftablifh'd, which I mail endeavour to Explain.
OBJECTION.
; St. John in his Gofpel, and in the.firfr. of his Epiftles, fays, No man bath feen God at any time: ch. 1. i8t*. The only begotten Son who is in the bofom of the father he hath declar d him. Ch.4. 12°.
ANSWER.
I anfwer, that 'tis not properly to fee God, to fee the Creatures in him. 'Tis not to fee his ef- fence to fee the eff-nces of Creatures irt his Subftance^ as it is not to fee a Mirrour, to view only the Objeds it reprefeats., Not but that we might fay with.St. Paul, St. Auftin, St. Gregory, and many other. Fathers of the Cor. 13. Church, that we fee God in this Life, though in a very imperfect Manner. The Words cf St. Gre- gory in his Morals upon Job, are thefe. A luce incorruptibili caligo nos noftra corruptionis obfeurat; cumq- L.31.C.20 & videri aliquatenus poteft & tamen videri lux ipjaficuti eft non poteft, quam longe fit indicat. Quam ft mens non cerneret,nec quia longe effe videret.Si autem perfttle jam cerneret,profeclo ham quafifcr caliginem non videret. lgitur quia nee omnino cernitur, nee rurfum omntno non cernitur, retle diclum eft, quia a longe Deus videfur. Though. St. Gregory in explaining this paffage of Jobficuli ejus a longe profpiciunt fays, that in this Life we only fee God a far of: This is not as if God were not mod prefent to us •, but that the Clouds of our Concupifcence conceal him from us. Caligo nos noftra corruptionis objeur at. For in other places, he with St. Auftin compares the light of God, which is God lumfelf, to the Light of the Sun which furrounds us, and which we fee not becaufe we are blind, or fhut our Eyes when dazled with its Luftre. In Sole oculos claufos tenemus, St. Auftin goes farther yet than his faithful Difciple St. Gregory. For though he confeffes that we know God but in a very imperfect, manner at prefent, yet he affirms, in feveral places, that God Vrop'mquu is better known to us, than thofe things wefancy we know belt. He that has made all things, ffays «>"?"*»?»* he) is near er us, than his Creatures; For in him we have Life, and Motion and Being, Mo ft of 'muitJqu* Created Beings are not proportionate to our Mind, becaufe they are corporeal, and of a fort diftinguifhd fdlafunt. from it. And lower °. The Inquirers into the fecrets of Nature, are juftly condemn d in the Book of Wif- In illo e- dom; for if they have been able to penetrate what is mo ft fecret and unreveafd to Men, with how much nim vivi- gr eater eafe might they have difcover'dthe Author and Sovereign of the Vniverfe; The Foundations of the ^L?% Earth are hid from our Eyes: But he that laid the Foundations is prefent to our Minds. And for this fumus.' Reafon that Holy Father believes, that he that has Charity knows God better than he knows his iftorum au- Brother. Ecce flays he) jam poteft Notiorem Deum habere quam Fratrem. Plane Notiorem, quia prafen- te^ pteraf,