XVI. As in the ftudy; of the Sciences, thofe who fubmit not to the falfe GHmpfes of Probabili- ties, and who are wont to fufpend their Judgment pll the Light of Truth breaks into them, fall rarely NATURE and GRACE.
rarely into Esrour; whereas the vulgar part of Men are daily deceiv'd by their precipitate Tudements So „ Moral Difophne, thofe who ufe to facrifice their Pleafures to the Love of ( ders aKh0 continually momhe their Senfes and Paflions, efpecially in tilings which feem of lkt e moment which every one may do, will in things important obtain a great Facility of ftipendtag tKd£ rnen which regulates their Love Pleafure does not furprile them, like other Men a? leafl dofs rot drag them along unawares. It feems, on the contrary, that wh lit it fenhbly afiVcls the* k K*" t0 ^ecare of themfeives, and to coniuit Reafon or die ffi oftte SeL ^^^^^SI^^T^^^^ °r,herS' whJ' m the Scripture Phrafe,S tions of nS T 7 * % fe"flblt; to the fecietReproaches of Reafon, and the wholfome Precau- tions of inward Truth. So that tne acquir'd Habit of refilling feeble and light Pleafures mahes way for the conquering the more violent, at leaft for the fuffeVmg ibme Regfet andShame when a Man is conquer'd which creates forthwith Diflike and Abhofrence. Libertv thus infeSv mcreafing, and peeing it felf by Exercife, and the Affifce of Grace, we may at laft Z ourfelves in a Capacity of performing the molt difficult Commandments, in as much as by the ordinary Graces which are conftantly afforded Chnftiam, we may overcome common Tempta- tions, and for the molt part avoid the greateft j and by the Aihifance of the Grace of Jcfus drift there is none but may be vanquifli'd. J J ■ XdF' 71S true' thaoa Sinner fo difP°s,d5 as not able fo much as to think of refilling a furpri- zing rlealure, cannot actually accomplifh the Commandment that oiders him not to enioy it. For the 1 leafure is mluperable to him in that Eftate. And if we but fuppofe this Perfon in this State of Impotence, through a Natural Neceffity, his Sin not being free, could not make him more cul- pable, I mean, more worthy of the Puniffiment of Pain, than if he were inordinate in his Sleep. May it this Impotency were a necelTary Confequence of the free Diforders which had preceded his Coijvemon, it would not be imputed to him, by reafon of his Charity. But fince he was both abie and oblig'd to ufe himfelf to refilling Plealine, and combating for the Prefervation and Aug- mentation of his Liberty; this Sin, though actually committed by a kind of NecefTity, renders him guilty and punifhable h if not by reaion of his Sin, at leaft becaufe of his Negligence, which is the Principle of if. The Commandment of God is not abfolutely importable h but the Sinner may and ought, for the foregoing Reaions, to put himfelf into a Condition of obferving it h fince Men are oblig'd, as well as able, to labour conftantly to augment and perfe£l their Liberty h not only by the Helps reach'd to them by Jefos'Chrifl, but alfo by natural Forces, or ordinary Graces. For, in brief, Nature may be made fubfervient to Grace in a thoufand Inftances.
i7 PART IL Of GRACE.
XVIII. 'IpHE Inequality which is found in the Liberty of different Perfons being clearly known, A it will be no hard Matter, methinks, to difcover how Grace works in us; if we but affix: to the Word Grace diftincF and particular Ideas, and remember the Difference between the Grace of the Creator and Renovator. I laid, in the preceding Difcourfe, that there is this difference between Light and Pleafure, That the former leaves us entirely to our felves, whilft the latter incroaches upon our Liberty. For Light is fomething extraneous to us; it does not affe£t and modifie our Soul; it does not drive us to the Objects it difcovers •, but only difpofes us to move our felves, and to confent freely, and by Reafon to the Impreffion God gives us towards Good. The Know- ledge of our Duty, the clear Idea of Order, feparatefrom all Seniation, the Contemplation of na- ked, abflracl, wholly pure, and intelligible Good, that is, Good without Taft or Fore-tall, leaves the Soul to her entire Liberty. But Pleafure is an Inmate to the Soul, it touches and modifies her. And fo it diminifh.es our Liberty, makes us love Good, rather by a Love of Inftinct and Paf- fion, than of Choice and Reafon. And it tranfports us, as I may fay, to fenfible Objects: Not that Pleafure is the fame thing as Love, or the Motion of the Soul towards Good, but that it caufes this Love, or determines this Motion towards the Objefr. that makes us happy. But becaufe no Truths are demonftrable, fave thofe whereof we have clear. Ideas, which we have not of our own inward Motions, 'tis not,poflible for me to demonftrare what I advance, as we demonftrate the Conclufions depending on common Notions. Every one therefore mull confult his own in- ward feeling of what paries in his Soul, if he would beconvinc'd of the difference between Light and Pleafure •, and mult carefully obferve, that commonly Light is attended with Pleafure, which yet he mull feparate to judge foundly of it. But of this I have fiid enough.
XIX. If then it be true, that Pleafure naturally- produces Love, and is like a Weight which gives the Soul a Propenfity to the Good that caufes or feems to caufe it; 'tis vifible that the Grace ofjefus Chrift, or the Grace of Senfation, is of it felf efficacious. For though preventing Delecta- tion, when but weak, works nor an entire Converfion in the Heart of thofe whofe Paflions are too lively; yet it never fails of its Effect, in as much as it always inclines them towards God. It is in fome meafure always efficacious, but it has not always all portible Effect, becaufe of the Re- finance of Concupifcence,. _ r XX. Put, XX. Put, for Example, in one Scale of a Balance ten pound weight, and in the other only- fix; this latter weight (hall truly gravitate:, for adding but fo much more weight to this, or ta- king it from the oppofite Scale, or laltly, hanging the Balance nearer the over-weighted, and the fix pounds {hall carry it. But though this weight gravitates, 'tis viflble its effect depends ftill on the refilling weight, and the manner of its refilling. Thus the Grace of Senfation is always of it felf efficacious; it conftantly weakens the Effort of Concupifcence, fince Pleafure naturally cre^ ates Love, for the Cauie which produces, or feems to produce it. But though this Grace be al- ways Self-efficacious, yet it depends, or rather its Effect depends on the actual Difpofitions of the Receiver. The weight of Concupifcence refills it, and fenfible Pleafures, which draw us to the Gteatures that feem to produce it in us, hinder the Pleafures of Grace from uniting us ftrictly to him, who alone can act in us, and make us happy.
XXI. But the cafe is otherwise with the Grace of Light, or the Grace of the Creator. It is not of it felf efficacious. It does not move or convey the Soul, but leaves her perfectly to her felf. But though it be not efficacious of it felf, it nevertheless is perfued by many Effects, when 'tis great, and animated by fome delectable Grace, which gives it Force and Vigour:, or when it meets with no contrary Pleafure that greatly refills it. Such is the difference between the Grace of the Creator and that of the Rejlorer •, between Light and Pleafure; between the Grace which fuppo- fes not Concupifcence, and the Grace which is given us to counterpoize the Pleafures of it. The one is fufficient to a Man perfectly Free and Fortified with Charity •, the other is efficacious to a Man Infirm, to whom Pleafure is necelTary to draw him to the Love of the True Good.
XXII. But the Force and Efficacy of Grace ought always to be compar'd with the A£lion of Concupifcence, with the Light of' Reafon -, and efpecially with the degree of Liberty the Perfon is endued with. And we muft not imagine that God bellows it by particular Wills, with defign to produce certain Effects by it, and nothing more. For when 'tis laid that Grace always works in the Heart the Effect, for which 'tis given, we err if we fuppofe God acts like Men, with parti- cular Confiderations. God diffufes his Grace with a General Defign of fanctifying all that receive it, or according as the Occafional Caufe determines him to refufe it. Mean while he knows very well that it will not have fo much Effect in fome, ' as in others; not only becaufe of the Inequality of Force 'On the part of Grace, but alfo of the Inequality of Refiftance on the part of Concupifcence.
XXIII. Since Concupifcence has not utterly deftroy'd the Liberty of Man, the Grace of Jcfus Chriji, as efficacious as it is, is not abfolutely irrefiftible. A fenfible Pleafure is fuperable, when weak:, and a Man may-fufpend the Judgment of his Love, when he is not hurried by a too vio- lent Paffion: And when he ftoops to the Lure of an adulterate Pleafure, he is culpable through the Abufe of his Liberty. So likewife the Delectation of Grace is not ordinarily invincible. A Man may decline following the good Motions it infpires, which remove us from the falfe Objects of our Love. This, Grace fills not the Soul in fuch a manner as to hurry her to the True Good, without Choice, Judgment, and Free Confent. Thus when we refign up our felves to its Motion, and advance farther, as I may fay, than it irrefiftibly carries us -, when we facrifice the Plealures of Concupifcence, which weaken its Efficacy; or, laftly, when we act by Reafon, or love the true Good as we ought, we merit through the good ufe we make of our Liberty.
XXIV.:Tis true, that Delectable Grace, confider'd in it felf, and feparate from the Pleafures of Concupifcence, which are contrary to it, is always invincible. Becaufe this holy Pleafure being conformable to the Light of Reafon, nothing can withftand its Effect in a Man perfectly free. When the Mind fees clearly, by the Light of Reafon, that God is its Good; and has a lively Senfe of him by the Taft of Pleafure, 'tis not poflible to avoid loving him. For the Mind defires Hap- pinefs, and then nothing hinders it from following the agreeable Motions of its Love. It feels no Remorfes which oppofe its prefent Felicity -, nor is it withheld by Pleafures contrary to that which it enjoys. The Delight of Grace is then invincible -, nor is the Love k produces merito- rious, unlefs it be greater than its Caufe. I lay, that the Love which is merely a Natural or Ne- celTary Effect of the Delectation of Grace, has nothing meritorious, though it be good in it felf. For whillt we move no farther than we are driven, or rather, when we advance no longer than we are paid in hand, we have no Claim to any Recompence. When we love God but fo far as we are attracted, or becaufe we are attracted, we love him not by Reafon, but by Inftinct -, we love him nbt on Earth as he requires and deferves from us. But we merit only when we love God by Choice, by Reafon, by the Knowledge we have of his being amiable. We merit in proceeding on, as I may fay, towards Good, when Pleafure has determin'd the Motion of Love.
XXV. This fole Reafon demonftrates either that the firft Man was not invited to the Love of God, by the blind Inftinct of Pleafure; or at lealt, that this Pleafure was not fo lively as what he felt in reflecting on his own Natural Perfections, or in the actual ufe of fenfible Goods. For 'tis evident fuch a Pleafure would have made him impeccable; it would have put him in a State like that of theBleffed-, which merit no longer: Not becaufe they are out of a Way-fairing State; (for Merit always follows from meritorious Actions -, and God, being Juft, muft necelfarily re- ward them:) But they merit not, becaufe the Pleafure they find in God is equal to their Love, that they are throughly imbued with it, and that being freed from all fort of Pain, and all Motions of Concupifcence, they have nothing left to iacrifice to God.
XXVI. For that which makes us impeccable is not precifely that which incapacitates us to me- rit. JeJ'us Chriji was impeccable, and yet he merited his Glory, and that of the Church, where- of he is the Head. Being perfectly free, he lov'd his Father,- not by the Inftinct of Pleafure, but by Choice and Reafon. He lov'd him, becauie he intuitively law how amiable he was. For the moft NATURE W GRACE. i$ moft perfect Liberty is that of a Mind, which has all poflible Light, and is not determin'd by any Pleafure; becaufe all Pleafure, preventing or other, naturally produces fome Love -, and un- lets we refill it, it efficacioufly determines towards the agreeable Object", the Natural Motion of the Soul. But Light, though conceiv'd never fo great, leaves the Mind perfectly free, fuppofing this Light be confidefd alone, and feparate from Pleafure.
XXVII. As Jefus Cbrijl is nothing but the Word, or Reafon Incarnate, certainly lie ought not to love Good with a blind Love, with the Love of Inftinct, with the Love of Senfation, bur by Reafon. He ought not to love an infinitely amiable Good, and which he knew perfectly worthy of his Love, as we love Goods that are not amiable, and which we cannot know as worthy of Love, He ought not to love his Father by a Love in any refpeft like that wherewith we love the vilefi Creatures, wherewith we love Bodies: His Love to be pure, at lealt, to be perfectly meritorious, ought to be no wife produe'd by preventing Pleafures.
For Pleafure may andmuft be the Recompence of a Legitimate Love, as in effeStitis in the Saints, and Jefus Cbrijl himfelf But it cannot be the Principle of Merit, nor ought it to precede Rea- fon, unlefs debilitated. But Reafon in Jefus Cbrijl was no ways weakned. Supreme Reafon fup- ported the Created. Jefus Cbrijl, who was free from the Motions of Concupifcence, had no need of preventing Delight to counterbalance fenfible Pleafures which furprize us. Nay, it may be he refus'd to tait the Pleafure of Joy, which was a natural Refult of the Knowledge he had of his Vertue and Perfections, that, being deprived of all forts of Pleafures, his Sacrifice might be more holy, more pure, and more difinterefs'd. Laftly, Befide the Privation of all Pleafures, preventing and others •, 'tis likely he inwardly fuffer'd unfpeakable Droughts, not better exprefhble by Souls fill'd with Charity, than by the Dereliction of God, according to thefe Words of our Saviour on the Oofs 5 My God, my God, wby bajl tbou foif alien me? But if we will abfolutely have it, that Jefus Cbrijl was carried by preventing Pleafures to. the Love of his Father, 'tis neceffary to fay, according to the Prin- ciples I have laid down, either that his Love was more intenfe than his Pleafure •, fince Natural Love, produe'd by the Inftinct of Pleafure is no ways meritorious •, or at leaft, we muft fay he merited by fenfible Pains, by the continual Sacrifice, which he freely and voluntarily offer'd to his Father. Fof 'twas neceffary he fhould fuffer to enter in PofTeffion of his Glory -, as we are taught by Scripture.
XXVIII. Though the Delegation of Grace, without relation to any contrary Pleafure,' infalli- bly gains the Content of the Will; yet it is not fo with the Pleafures of Concupifcence. Thefe Pleafures, confider'd in themfelves, without refpeft to other a&ual Pleafures, are not always in- furmountable. The Light of Reafon condemns them; the Remorfe of Confcience makes us abr hor them •, and we may commonly fufpend our Confent. Therefore the Grace of Jefus Cbrijl is ftronger than Concupifcence; and we may call it Victorious, fince the former always mailers the Heart, when equal to the latter. For when the Balance of our Heart is perfectly in Equilibrio\ by the even Weights of contrary Pleafures, that which is moft folid and reafonable, has the Ad- vantage -, becaufe Light adds fome Grains to its efficacy, and the Remorfes of Confcience with- ftand the Influence of a counterfeit Pleafure.
XXIX. We muft conclude, from what we have faid, that we always merit when we love the true Good by Reafon; and that we merit not at all, when we love it by InitineL We merit al- ways when we love the true Good by Reafon -, becaufe Order will have the true Good lov'd in that manner, and that mere Light does not convey us, or invincibly determine us to the Good difco- ver'd by it. We merit not when we love the true Good by Inftin£t, or as much as we are invin- cibly mov'd and determin'd by Pleafure: Becaufe Order requires that the true Good, or the Good of the Mind, mould be lov'd by Reafon, by a tree Love, a Love of Choice and Judgment; whilft the Love which is produe'd by Pleafure, is a Blind, Natural, and Neceffary Love. I own, that when we advance farther than Pleafure forces us, we merit. But that's becaufe we therein aft by Reafon, and in the way that Order would have us. For Love, fo much as it exceeds Pleafure, is a pure and reafonable Love., - XXX. So likewife we muft conclude, that we always demerit when we love a faife Good, by the InftinSl of Pleafure, provided we love it more than we are invincibly fore'd. For when our Liberty is naturally fo ftraitned, and our Capacity of Mind fo little, that we are carried in an ii- refiftible manner, then though we are corrupt, and our Love be evil, and againft Order; yet we don't demerit: To demerit, I mean to deferve to be punifh'd, we muft purfue falfe Goods with more ardency, or tend farther than Pleafure irrefiftibly carries us. For we mult obferve, that there is great difference between a Good and a Meritorious Action -, between a Corrupt and a Demerito- ous. The Love of theBleffed is Good, but it is not Meritorious: The Love of a Righteous Per- fon is often deprav'd in his Sleep •, but it is not Demeritorious. Whatever- is conformable to Order, is good; and whatever is contrary to it is naught. But there is nothing of Merit or Demerit, fave in the good or ill ufe of our Liberty, fave in that in which we are the Factors. But we make a good ufe of our Liberty, when we follow Light •, when we unconftrain'd, and of our felves, ad- vance to the true Good, or were at firft determin'd by preventing Delegation, or the Light of Reafon; when we facrifice fenfible Pleafures to our Duty, and furmount Pain, by the Love of Order. On the contrary, we make an ill ufe of our Liberty, when we make Pleafure our Rea- fon when we facrifice our Duty to our Paffions, our Perfeftion to prefent Felicity, the Love of Order to the Love of our felves -, and all this at a time, when we might really have prevented its But I proceed to explain this ftill more clearly...
XXXI. When two ObjeQs are offer'd to the Mind, and it determines it felt about them, 1 confefs it never fails to take that fide where molt Reafon and Pleafure appears 5 or, all things con* H fidet'd/ g £ Malebranche Concerning fider'd, where moft Good is to be found. For the Soul not being able to will, orlove,but through the Love of Good fince the Will is nothing but the Love of Good, or the Natural Motion of the fider' the _ fider' the _ Soul towards it fhe unavoidably loves what has moft conformity with what Hie loves invincibly. But 'tis certain, that when fenfible Pleafure, or fome thing of like nature, does not perturbate the Mind, we may ever fufpend the Judgment of our Love, and not determine, efpecially in point of falfe Good. For the Soul can have no Evidence that falfe Goods are the true, or that the Love of the former agrees perfectly with the Motion which carries us to the latter. Therefore when a Man. loves falfe Goods, whilft his Senfes and Paflions leave his Reafon entirely free, he deme- rits: Becaufe then he may and ought to fufpend the Judgment of his Love. For if he itood any time to examine what was fpeedily to be done, the falfe Good would appear in its own Colours, the Pleafure which it feems to infufe into the Soul would vanifh, the Idea of fome other Good would prefent it felf to the • Mind; the Remorfe of Confcience, and perhaps the Delegation of Grace, would change all the Difpofitions of his Mind and Heart: For the State of a Traveller lias nothing certain. A thoufand different Objects are continually offefd to the Mind, and the Life of Man on Earth is nothing but a continual train of Thoughts and Defires.
XXXII. At flrft Sight it feems that, in point of the true Good, we cannot fufpend the Judgment of our Love •, for we cannot fufpend our Judgment, fave when Evidence is not perfect. Now we may fee with thecleareft Evidence, that God is the true Good; and that none but he can be good to, us: We know that he is infinitely more amiable than we can conceive. But it is obfervable, that though we cannot fufpend the Judgment of Reafon, in refpect of Speculative Truths, when the Evi- dence is entire -, yet we may fufpend the Judgment of our Love in point of Goods, whatever Evidence there is in our Ideas. For when Senfe fights agakft Reafon, when Taft oppofes Light, when that is found fenfibly bitter and difagreeable, which Realbn clearly reprefents as fweet and delegable, we may fufpend our Choice, and follow either Reafon, or the Senfes. We may act, and commonly do aft againft our Light; becaufe, when we attend to the Senfation, Light difappears, unlefs we ftrive to retain it: And becaufe we are ordinarily more attentive to Senfation than to Light, becaufe Senfation is always more lively and agreeable than the moft evident Knowledge.
XXXIII. "lis Pleafure which makes Minds actually happy. Therefore we ought to enjoy Pleafure, when we love the true Good. Yet a Mind thinks on God, draws nigh him by its Love, and taft s no Satisfaction. On the contrary, God fills it fometimes with Bitternefs and Drought, he deferts it, and repels it, as I may fay •, not that it may ceafe to love him, but rather that its Love may be more humble, more pure, and meritorious: Laftly, he prefcribes it certain things which render it actually miferable. But if it approaches Bodies, it finds it felf happy in proportion to the StriQnefs of its Union to them. Certainly, this is perplexing to a Man never fo intelligent, iince we are invincibly paffionate for Happinefs. ■ Therefore we merit much, if, following our Light, we renounce our felves h notwithstanding thofe difcomforting Droughts, if we facrifice our ] actual Happinefs to the Love of the true Good; if living by Faith, and relying on the Promifes of God, we remain inviolably bent upon our Duty. Hence we clearly underftand, that Jefus Cbriji might merit his Glory, though he knew the true Good in the higheft Evidence ^ becaufe, having an extreme Love for his ¥atbe>\ he was entirely conformable to his Orders, without being car- ried by preventing Pleafures; becaufe, being fteadily guided by his Light, he fuffer'd moft vio- lent Pains, and facrific'd the moft lively and fenfible Pleafures to his Charity. For he took on him a Body like to ours, that he might have -a Victim to offer to God, and that duly receiving through this Body, as the Occafional or Natural Caufe, an abundance of various Senfations, he might accomplifti a perfect Holocauft, to the Honour of the true Good, by the enduring Pain, and the Privation of fenfible Pleafures.
XXXIV. To the end every one may have a moft perfect Idea of the Grace of Jefus Qmfi, I think it requifite to add, that it confifts not in Delectation alone: For all Grace of Senfation is the Grace of Jefus Cbriji. But of this Grace there are many Species, and of every Species infinite degrees. God fometimes cafts Diftaft and Bitternefs on the Objects of our Paffions, he weakens their fenfible Charms, or makes us hate or abhor them. And this kind of Grace of Senfation makes the fame Effect as preventing Delight; It reftores and fortifies our Liberty, reinftates us almoit in Equilibrio, and thereby puts us in a Capacity of following our Light in the Motion of our Love. For to reftore a Balance to an even poize, or to change its propenfion, we need not augment the leffer Weight, but only retract from the over-loaden Scale. Thus there are Graces of Senfation of feveral forts, and every fort is capable of infinite degrees. For there are Pleafures, Averfions, and Diflikes, greater and leffer ad infinitum. What I have hitherto faid of Delectation, may be eafily apply'd to other Species of the Grace of Senfation. I only made choice of Pleafure or Delegation, as a particular Example, to explain my felf clearly, and without Ambiguity.
If there be any other Principle of our Determinations to Good befides the Grace of Senfation, and that of Light, I confefs I am utterly ignorant of it ^ and therefore I have refolv'd to explain the Effects of Grace, neceiTary to the Converfion of Heart $ but by thefe two Principles, for fear of in- curring the blame of difcourfing in general Terms, that of themfelves excite only confus'd Ideas 5 which thing I avoid with all poffible Care. But though I have explain'd my felf in Terms underftood by all Mankind •, fince there is nobody but knows, that the Knowledge and Senfe of Good arePrin- % n ciples of our Determinations; yet I prefume not to impugn thofe, who, flicking not to thefe clear thus ui<m~ Ideas, &y in general, that God operates the Converfion of our Souls by a particular Action, diffe- rhc Search rent, it may be, from all I have here and el few here faid •, that God * works in us. Experi- t'fterTrnth, encing in my felf no other Motion than towards Good in general, and that determin'd by Know- ledge NATURES GRACE.
NATURES GRACE.
ledge or Senfation, I ought to fuppofe nothing more •, if by this alone I can account for all that the Scripture and Councils have determined about the prefent Subject, In a word, I am well af~ fur'd that Light and Senfation are the 'Principles of our Determinations:, but I declare that I can- not tell but there may be fome other whereof I have no Knowledge.