The firft Error is this, that a Man unreafonably imagines he has no Knowledge of his Senfa- II. tions. We daily find a great number of fuch Men as are much concern'd, and very follicitous "MataMan to know what Pain and Pleafure, and the other Senfations are: Neither will they grant that*^je^_ they are only in the Soul, and the Modifications of it: I confefs thefe are a ftrange fort of Men, tions better who would needs be taught what they cannot be ignorant of: For 'tis impoffible a Man fhould be than he abfolutely ignorant what Pain is, when he is under the fenfe of it. ^inks be A Man, for example, that burns his Hand, does very well diftinguifh the Pain he feels from ' Light, Colour, Sounds, Tails, Smells, Pleafure, and from every other Pain befides that he feels. He diftinguifh.es it very well from Admiration, Deiire, and Love. He diftinguifhes it from a Square, a Circle, and a Motion, in a word, he finds 'tis very different from every thing which is not the Pain he feels. Now if he has no Knowledge of Pain, I would fain be fatisfy'd, how he can tell with any certainty of evidence, that what he feels is none of all thefe things.
We know then in fome meafure what we are immediately fenfible of ^ as when we fee Colours or have-any other Senfation: And if it were not for this Knowledge, it is certain we could know nothing of any fenfible Object. For 'tis manifeft, for example, that we would be unable to diftinguifh Wine from Water, did we not know that the Senfations we have of the one were different from thofe we have of the other •, and fo 'tis with all other things which we know by our Senfes.
'Tis true, fhould a Man be importunate in defiring me to explain what is Pain, Pleafure, Co- lour, or the like, I fhould not be able to define it in words as it ought to be. But it does not follow from thence, that if I fee a Colour, or burn my felf, I have no manner of Knowledge of that whereof I have an Actual Senfation.
Now the reafon why our Senfations cannot be explain'd by words, as well as all other things, m is, becaufe it depends on the Arbitrary Will of Men, to joyn the Idea's of things to what Anohxs- Names they pleafe. They may call the Heavens Ouranos, Shamajim, as the Greeks and Hebrews.• (Hon ani But the fame Men have not an equal Liberty of affixing their Senfations to words, nor indeed -Anfmr, to any thing elfe. They fee no Colours, unlefs they open their Eyes, difcourfe to them what you will about them. They have no Reliih of Tafts, unlefs fome change happens in the difpofition 32 K Malebranche Concerning Book I.
fition of the Fibres of their Tongue and Brain: In ftiort, the Senfatiorts have no manner of De- pendence upon the Will of Men: And 'tis only he that created Men, that ftilf preferves them In that mutual correfpondence of the Modifications of their Soul to thofe of their Body. So that if a Man would have me reprefent to him Heat, or Colour, I cannot make ufe of words to do it: But I mull imprefs in the Organs of his Senfes, fuch Motions as Nature has affixt thefe Senfations to. I rauft bring him to the Fire, and fhew him a piece of Painting.
And this is the reafon why 'tis impoffible to give Men that are born Blind the leaft Know- ledge of that which we underftand by Red, Green, Yellow, or the like. For fince 'tis impof- fible for a Man to make another underftand him, when he that hears, has not the fame Idea's as he that fpeaks ', it is manifeft that fince Colours are neither conjoyn'd to the found of words, nor to the Motion of the Auditory, but to that of the Optick Nerve, we can never reprefent them to Men that are Blind, fince their Optick Nerve cannot be Vibrated by colour'd Objeds.
We have therefore fome fort of Knowledge of our Senfations. Let us now fee how it comes to pafs that we are flill cafting about to know them, and that we believe our felves deflitute of any Knowledge of them. The reafon of it undoubtedly is this.
IV. The Soul, fince the Original Sin, is now, as it were, Corporeal in her Inclination •, the Love From fhe has for feniible Objects, is perpetually lefTening the Union or the Relation (he has with thofe vfame it tnat are intellectual. She is difgufted and uneafy in conceiving things that will not enter by the Sen- IIZZm.-, ^K anc* is prefently for leaving the Confideration of them. She imploys her utmoft endeavour imagine to produce the Images that reprefent them in her Brain, and fhe is fo throughly inur'd to this he has no kind of Conception from our Infancy, that fhe thinks that fhe can have no Knowledge of what fhe inowkdge can nave no imagination. Notwithanding there are a great many things, which, being not CorfJicmsSen~ Poreal? cannot be reprefented to the Mind by Corporeal Images j as, to inftance, our Soul with all her Modifications. At what time therefore our Soul would reprefent to her felf her own Nature, and her own Senfations, fhe endeavours to form a Corporeal Image thereof. She is in fearch of her felf amongft all Corporeal Beings. One while fhe takes her felf for one Thing, and another while for Another j fometimes for Air, fometimes for Fire, or for the Harmony of the parts of her own Body. And being thus defirous of finding her felf among the mafs of Bodies, and of imagining her own Modifications, which are her Senfations, as the Modifications of Bodies, we need not wonder if fhe's bewildred in her wandrings, and is mifguided out of the Knowledge of her felf.
see the Tnat wmcn induces the Soul to be flill more fond of Imagining her Senfations, is her judging jUuftrati-" them to be in the Objects: And moreover, that they are the Modifications of them j and conons upon fequently that they are fomething Corporeal, and fit to be Imagined. She judges then that the the j. ch. j\jatllre of her Senfations confifts only in the motion -which produces them, or in fome other Fmoftt Modification of a Body, which is manifeflly different from what fhe feels; this being nothing -id. Book. Corporeal, nor poffible to be reprefented by Corporeal Images: This is what confounds her, and makes her believe fhe is altogether ignorant of her own Senfations.
As for thofe who make none of thefe fruitlefs Attempts, to reprefent the Soul and its Modifi- cations by Corporeal Images, and yet are defirous of having their Senfations explain'd to them; they rauft underftand that neither the Soul nor its Modifications can be known by Idea's, taking the word Idea in its moft proper fignification, as I have detennin'd and explain'd it, in the third Book } but only by Conference or Internal Senfation. So that when they ask us to explain the Soul and her Modifications by any Idea's, they demand what is impoffible for all the Men in the World put together to give them: Becaufe Men cannot inflruct us by giving us Idea's of things, but only by making us attentive to thofe we have already.
The fecond Error whereinto we fall about our Senfations, is the attributing them to Objects \ which has been explain'd in the XI and XII Chapters.
V. The third is our judging that all Mankind have the fame Senfations of the fame Objects. We That 'tis believe, for example, that all the World fees the Sky Azure, the Meadows Green, andallvifible an Error to objects in the fame manner as we fee them j and fo likewife all the other feniible Qualities of *Men fav tne otller Sen*~es' Tnere are manY wno w^ wonder even that we call in queftion thofe things, thTfmT which they believe indubitable. However, I can certify them they have not any Reafon to judge senfations of thefe things as they do. And though I cannot Mathematically demonftrate they are in an Er- of the fame for, I can neverthelefs demonftrate, 'tis the greateft chance in the World, if they are not: objelis. ^n(j j jiave Arguments flrong enough to convince them tjiey are certainly deceiv'd.
That the Truth of what I here advance may be here acknowledg'd, we muft call to mind what has been already prov'd j namely, That there is a vaft difference betwixt our Senfations and the caufesof our Senfations. We may conclude from thence, that abfolntcly fpeaking, it is poffible for fimilar Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Optick Nerves, to produce in different Perfons, different Senfations, that is to caufe them to fee different Colours: And it may fo fall out, that a Motion which fhall produce in one Perfon the Senfation of Blew, fhall caufe the Senfation of Green or Gray in another, or perhaps a new Senfation, which never any man had befides.
It is certain, I fay, that this is poffible, and there is no reafon in the World that can prove the contrary: However, we will grant that it is not probable it fhou Id be fo. It is much more rea- fonable to believe that GOD acts always uniformly in the Union he haseftablifiYd betwixt our Souls and our Bodies; and that he has affixtthe fame Idea's and the fame. Senfation to fimilar Mo- tions of the Internal Fibres of the Brain of different Perfons.
Let Chap. XIII. ' 'Ike Search after Truth. 33 Let it be granted then that theTame Motions of the Fibres which terminate in the middle of the Brain are accompany'd with the fame Senfations in all Men } if it fortunes that the fame Ob- jects produce not the fame Motions in their Brain, they will not, by confequence excite the fame Senfations in their Soul: Now to me it feems indifputable, that the Organs of the Sen- fes of all Men, being not difpos'd in the fame manner, cannot receive the fame Impreffions from the fame Objefts.
The blows, for inftance, that Porters give one another by way of Complement, would cripple fome fort of People: The fame blow produces very different motions, and confequently excites very different Senfations, in a Man of a Robuft Conftitution, and in a Child or a Woman of a tender make: Thus, iince we cannot be afcertain'd that there are two Perfons in the World, who have the Organs of their Senfes exactly match'd } we cannot be affur'd there are two Perfons in the World who have altogether the fame Senfations of the fame Obje&s.
This is the Original caufe of the'ftrange Variety which is found in the Inclinations of Men. Some there are who are extremely pleas'd with Mufick, others find nothing agreeable in it: And even between thefe'who delight in it, fome one fort of Mufick, fome another, according to that almoft Infinite Diverlity which is found in the Fibres of the Auditory Nerve, in the Blood, and the Animal Spirits. How great, for inftance, is the difference between the Mufick of Italy, of France, of the Chinefe, and other People } and confequently between the Relifh thefe diffe- rent People have of thefe different forts of Mufick? It is ufual likewife for the fame Men at feveral times to receive different Impreffions from the fame Conforts. For if the Imagination be well warm* d by a great plenty of brisk and a&ive Spirits, a Man is much more pleas'd with a bolder Hand or a Voluntarie, wherein there are many Difcords } than with a fofter Mufick, that is compos'd with exafter Rules and a Mathematical Nicenefs. Experience proves this, and 'tis eafie to give a Reafon for it.
'Tis juft the fame with Smells. He that loves an Orange-flower, poffibly cannot endure a Rofe % and fo on the contrary.
As for Tafts, there is no lefs a Diverlity in them than in the other Senfations. Sawces muft be made wholly different, equally to pleafe different Men, or equally to pleafe the fame Perfon at different times: One loves Sweet, another Sowre; One loves the Tafte of Wine, another abhors it } the fame Perfon who thinks it pleafant when he's in Health, finds it bitter in a Fever } and fo 'tis with the other Senfes. And yet all Men are fond of Pleafure -? they all delight in agreeable Senfations: And in this have all the fame Inclinations. They receive not therefore the fame Senfations from the fame Objects, fince they do not love them equally alike.
Thus, that which makes one Man fay, he likes fweet things, is the agreeable Senfation he has of them-, and that which makes another fay, he does not love fweet things, is, indeed, becaufe he has a different Senfation from him that loves them. And fo in faying he loves not fweet things, k is not impl'y'd that he would not have the fame Senfation as the other; but only that he has it not. Wherefore 'tis an Impropriety of Speech for a Man to fay, he loves not what is Sweety he fhould fay, he loves not Sugar, or Honey, or the like, which, to others, feem fweet and agreeable } and that he has not the fame Tafte as others, becaufe the Fibres of his Tongue are differently difpos'd: But to give a fenfible Inftance j Let us fuppofe that among twenty Men there were fome one of them whofe Hands were Cold, and that he was unacquainted with the words they make ufe of in England to explain the Senfation of Heat and Cold by; and on the contrary, that the Hands of all the reft were extreamly Hot. If in Winter fome Water fomewhat frigid fhould be brought them all to wafh in, thofe whofe Hands were very Hot, waffling after each other, might very well fay, This Water is very Cold, I can't endure- it: But when the other, whofe Hands were extreamly Cold, came to wafh at laft, he might fay on the contrary, I can't imagine, Gentle- men, why ye like not the Cold Water} for my part, I take pleafure in feeling it Cold and warning in it.
It is manifeft in this particular inftance, That the laft, in faying he lov'd the Cold, could mean nothing elfe but that he lov'd the Heat, and that he felt the Water Hoi^ whilft others felt the contrary.
Thus when a Man fays, I love what is bitter, and can't endure fweets \ no more is meant thereby, than that he has not the fame Senfations, as thofe who fay they love fweets, and have an averfion to what is bitter.
It is certain therefore, that a Senfation which is agreeable to one Man, is fo to all others Who have the fame} but the fame Objefts does not caufe the fame Senfation in all Men; becaufe of the different difpofition of the Organs of the Senfes} which is a thing of greateft confequence to be obferv'd both as to Natural and Moral Philofophy.
To this only one Objection can be made, and that very eafie to be anfwer'd } which is this: jy. It fometimes happens that thofe very Perfons, who love extreamly fome forts of Meat, at length An obje- fhall hate them in as great a degree, either becaufe in eating they met with fome uncleanlinefs #'<»» <*»<* in the Difh, which furpriz'd and difgufted them } or becaufe they furfeited on them by eating to Anfoer' excefs, or for feveral other reafons: Thefe Men (°tis obje&edj love not the fame Senfations as they lov'd before: For ftill, though they eat the fame Meats, yet they find them no longer plea- fant and palatable.
K la 34 K Malebranche Concerning Book I.
In anfwering this Obje&ion, it mult be obferv'd, that thefe Men upon eating thofe Meats, to which they have fo great an abhorrence and loathing, have two very different Senfations at the fame time. They have that of the Meat which they eat,as 'tis fuppos'd in the Obje&ion: And they have yet another Senfation of Diftafte or Loathing, which proceeds, for inftance, from a ftrong imagination of fome uncleanlinefs they have formerly feen mingled with what they eat. The reafon of this is, that when two Motions are occafion'd in the Brain at the fame time:, one of them is never excited without the other, unlefs it be fome confiderable time after. Thus becaufe the Agreeable is always accompany'd with theLoathfome Senfation:, and we ufually confound things which happen at the fame time, we imagine with our felves, that this Senfation which was formerly pleafant and agreeable is no longer fo. And yet if it were always the fame, it mull neceflarily be always agreeable: Wherefore fuppofing it to be difagreeable and impleafant, 'tis becaufe it is joyn'd and confounded with another Senfation, which is more diftaftful than it is it felf agreeable.
There is much more difficulty to prove that Colours, and fuch other Senfations, which I term'd the Faint and Languid, are not the fame in all Mankind. Becaufe all thefe Senfations af- fect the Soul fo weakly, that a Man cannot diftinguifh as he may in Tafts or other more power- ful and lively Senfations, whether one is more agreeable than another \ nor difcover the di- verfity of Mens Senfations by the variety of Pleafure or Diftaft, which might be found in dif- ferent Perfons. Yet Reafon which fhews that the other Senfations are not all alike in different Perfons, does likewife fhew there mull; neceflarily be variety in the Senfations we have of Co- lours. And, indeed, it cannot be doubted but there is much diverfity in the Organs of Sight of different Perfons, as well as in thofe of Hearing and Tafting. "For, what reafon is there to fuppofe an exaft conformity and refemblance in the difpofition of the Optick Nerve of all Men, fince there is fuch an infinite variety in all the things of Nature, but efpecially in thofe that are Material. There is then great probability that all Men do not fee the fame Colours in the lame Objefts. 7his Fa- Neverthelefs I am of Opinion that it never happens, at leaft very rarely, that any Perfons fee graft is Black and White of a different Colour from what our felves fee them, though they do not fee wantingin them equally Black or White. But as to middle Colours, fuch as Red, Yellow, Blue, andefpe- ^e^*f£ daily thofe that are compounded of thefe three, I am perfuaded there are very few Men that cbfcure in have exa&ly the fame Senfations. For there are Men fometimes to be met with, who fee fome the French fort of Bodies of a yellow Colour, for inftance, when they view them with one Eye, and of a and there- Green or Blue when they behold them with the other. And yet fuppofing thefe Men to be bora f°r.e!},asf.re' with one Eye only, or with two Eyes fo difpos'd as to fee that of a Red or Yellow Colour, "herJtimi which others call Green or Blue, they would believe they faw Objects of the fame Colours as that h * others do, becaufe they would always have heard the Name Green given to that which they fee might be Yellow, and Blue to that which to them feems Red.
perfpuMtti jt might, as a farther proof, be alledg'd, that all Men fee not the fame Obje&s of the fame Colour, becaufe, according to the Obfervations of fome Men, the fame Colours are not equally pleafing to all forts of People \ fince on fuppofition thefe Senfations were the fame, they would be equally agreeable to all Mankind: But becaufe very ftrong Objections might be urg'd againft this Argument founded on the Anfwer I gave to the former Objection, I thought it not folid enough to be propos'd.
Indeed is is very rarely found that a Man is much more pleas'd with one Colour than another, as he takes greater pleafure in one Tafle than another. The reafon of it is, That the Senfations of Colours, are not given us to judge whether the Bodies about us are fit tonourifh us or not: This is the part of Pleafure and Pain, to fhew which are the Natural Chara&ers of Good and Evil. Obje&s in point of Colours^are neither good nor bad to eat: If Objects, on account of their Colour, mould either feem agreeable or difagreeable, the Sight of them would con- itantly be fucceeded with the courfe of the Animal Spirits, which excite and accompany the Paf- iions j fince the Soul cannot be affe&ed without fome Commotion. We fhould often hate good Things, and be fond of the bad; fo that our Life could not be long preferv'd. In fhort, the Senfations of Colour are given us meerly to diftinguifh Bodies from one another; and this is effeded well enough, whether a Man fees Grafs green or red, provided the Perfon who fees it green or red, lees it always in the fame manner.
But fb much for our Senfations: Let us now fay fomething of our Natural Judgments, and our Voluntary Judgments that attend them. The fourth thing to be confider'd which we confound with the three others, whereof we have been fpeaking.
CHAP.
Chap. XIV. The Search after truth: ' j 5 CHAP. XIV.
I. Of the Falfe Judgments that accompany our Senfations^ and which w£ confound with them. II. The Reafons of thefe Falfe Judgements. III. That Error w not in our Senfations^ but only in thefe Judgments.
WE inftantly fore-fee, that there are very few Perfons who will not be offended at this T. general Propofition we lay down, namely, That we have not any Senfation of Exter- of the falfe nal things, but contains one or more Judgments. We kftow well enough too that W1^ the generality of Men are of opinion that there is not any Judgment True or Falfe in our 5en- Jj^JJJ*" fations: Infomuch that thefe Perfons, furpriz'd with the Novelty of this Propofition, will rajr- sevfttiwtt doubtedly fay with themfelves; How is this poffible? I do not judge the Wall to be white, I and n>hich fee well enough it is fo. I do not judge that Pain is in my Hand, I feel it raoft infalliby there. ^e ""-,, And who can doubt of things fo certain, unlefs he has a different Senfation of Obje&s from ^"^w"*1 what I have my felf? In fine, their Inclinations for the Prejudices of Childhood will carry therh much farther. And if they proceed not to Contumely, and to the Contempt of thofe whom they believe of a contrary Sentiment to themfelves, they will doubtlefs deferve to be reckon'd amongft the moderate fort of People.
But 'tis not our bufinefs to ftand prophefying any longer what ill Reception and Succefs our Thoughts (hall meet with \ 'tis much more expedient to draw them out with fuch convincing Arguments, and to fet them info clear a Light, as to leave it impoffible for a Man to engage them with his Eyes open, or to confider them attentively, without fubmitting to them. We are to prove that we have no Senfation of External things, which does not include fome falfe judg- ment or other. And the Proof is as follows.
To me it feems paft Controverfie, that our Souls take not up fuch vaft fpaces as are thofe we fee betwixt us and the fix'd Stars, though itfhould.be allow'd that they are extended. Thus it is unreasonable to believe our Souls are in the Heavens,whenthey lee the Stars there: Nor is it more credible that they depart out of their Bodies a mile, fuppofe, when they fee the Houfes at that di-* fiance: The Soul then muft necefTarily fee Stars and Houfes where thejr are not, fince fhe goes not out of the Body wherein fhe is, and neverthelefs fees them out of it. Now whereas the Stars which are immediately united to the Soul, and which are the only Stars the Soul can fee, are not in the Heavens, it follows that all Men who fee the Stars in the Heavens, and thereupon voluntarily judge that they are there, make two falfe Judgments, the one Natural, and the other Free and Voluntary. The one is a Judgment of the Senfes, or a Compound Senfa- tion which ought not to be a meafure for us to judge by. The other is a Free Judgment of the Will, which a Man may avoid making, and confequently muft not make, if he would avoid falling into Error.
But let us fee upon what grounds a Man believes thofe fame Stars he immediately fees, to it be out of the Soul, and in the Heavens: The reafon is this, That it is not in the power of the Thezeafin Soul to fee them when fhe pleafes: For fhe can perceive them only at fuch times as thofe Motions fjhfej& are excited in her Brain, to which the Idea's of thefe Objeds are affix'd by Nature. Now be-^y" "«" caufe the Soul has no Perception of the Motions of her Organs, but only of her own Senfations, and is confident thefe fame Senfations are not of her own producing in her; fhe is indue'd to judge they are without her, and in the Caufe that reprefents them to her. And fhe has fo often made thefe kinds of Judgments, at the time of her perceiving Objefts, that 'tis hardly in her power at laft to prevent them.
In order to explain more throughly what I have been faying, it would be neceffary to fhew the unufefulnefs of thofe infinite numbers of little Beings, which we call Species and Idea's, which are, as it were, Nothing, and yet reprefent all things -, which we Create and Annihi- late at our pleafure, and which our Ignorance has caus'd our Imagination to invent, that we might account for thofe things which we do not underftand. We fhould fhew too the folidity of thofe Mens Opinion, who believe GOD to be the True Father of Light, who alone en- lightens all Men, without whom, the moft fimple and eafie Truths would not be intelligible, nor the Sun, as bright and glorious as he is, be vifible -7 who acknowledge no other Nature, than the Will of the Creator j and who, upon thefe Confiderations, have difcover'd that Idea's which re- prefent the Creatures to us are nothing but the Perfe&ions of G O D himfelf, which are corre- fpondent to the fame Creatures', and which reprefent them.
Laftly, It would be neceffary to treat of the Nature of what we call Idea's; and afterwards we might with greater eafe, difcourfe more diftin&ly of the things I have been fpeaking of i But this would lead us too far \ and thefe things fhall be referv'd for the Third Book only, becaufe our method will require them there. At prefent let it fuffice, that I bring a moft fen- fible and uncontroverted Inftance •, wherein we find many Judgments confounded with one and the fame Senfation.
I fuppofe there is no Man in the World, who, looking on the Moon, does not fee her about a mile's diftance from him, and finds her greater at her Riling and Setting, than in the Meri- dian., dian, or when a good way Elevated above the Horizon.• And perhaps too he fancies he only fees her larger, without thinking there is any Judgment in his Senfation. However, it is undoubted- ly certain, that if he had no kind of Judgment included in his Senfation, he would not fee her at that diflance fhe appears to him; and befides, would fee her leffer at her Riling, than when in her Exaltation above the Horizon \ fince we only fee her greater at her Riling, be- caufe we judge her more remote by a Natural Judgment which I have Ipoke to in the fixth Chapter.
But befides our Natural Judgments, which may be regarded as Compound Senfations, there occurs in almofl all our Senfations a Free or Voluntary Judgment. For Men do not only judge by a Natural Judgment, that Pain, for inflance, is in the Hand, they judge it is by a Free and Voluntary Judgment alfo, They not only Feel it there, but Believe it there too, and they are fo flrongly habituated to form fuch fort of Judgments, that they find great difficulty to for- bear them when they would.
And yet thefe Judgments are moll falfe in themfelves, though very advantageous to the Welfare and Prefervation of Life. For our Senfes do not inftruct us but with reference to the Body: And all our Free Judgments which are conformable and adapted to the Judgment of the Senfes, are very remote from Truth.
But not to leave thefe things without fhewing how to difcover the Reafons of them; we mult take notice that there, are two forts of Beings.- Beings which our Soul immediately fees, and others which fhe knows only by the Mediation of the former. When, for inflance, I perceive the Sun arifing, I firfl perceive that which I immediately fee j and becaufe my Perception of the for- mer, is only occafion'd by fomething without me, which produces certain Motions in my Eyes and in my Brain, I judge the former Sun which is in my Soul, to ht without mz, andtoExifl.