The attitude of hostile observation and spying in regard to everything which may be bad in us, or hail from a bad source, culminates in a most tormented and most anxious state of mind: thus " miracles," rewards, ecstasy, and transcendental solutions of the earth-riddle now became desir able...The Christian type: or the perfect bigot. C. The stoical type. Firmness, self-control, imperturbability, peace in the form of the rigidity of a will long active profound quiet, the de fensive state, the fortress, the mistrust of war firmness of principles; the unity of knowledge and will; great self-respect. The type of the anchorite. The perfect blockhead.
343. An ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours to further its purpose (a} by laying claim to a spurious origin; () by assuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals already existing; (c] by means of the thrill produced by mystery, as though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself; (d) by the slander of its opponents ideals; (e) by a lying teaching of the advantages which follow in its wake, for instance: happiness, spiritual peace, general peace, or even the assistance of a mighty God, etc. Contributions to the psychology of the idealists: Carlyle, Schiller, Michelet. Supposing all the means of defence and protection, by means of which an ideal survives, are discovered, is it thereby refuted? It has merely availed itself of the means of which every thing lives and grows they are all " immoral." My view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life are lying beneath the ban of morality: morality is the life-denying instinct. Morality must be annihilated if life is to be emancipated. 29 344. To avoid knowing himself is the prudence of the idealist. The idealist: a creature who has reasons for remaining in the dark concerning himself, and who is also clever enough to remain in the dark concerning these reasons also.
345. The tendency of moral evolution. Every one s desire is that there should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means of which he himself succeeds. Thus the fundamental tendency of the weak and mediocre of all times, has been to enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of the weak: their chief weapon in this process was the moral principle. The attitude of the strong towards the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become bad bywords. The struggle of the many against the strong, of the ordinary against the extraordinary, of the weak against the strong: meets with one of its finest interruptions in the fact that the rare, the refined, the more exacting, present themselves as the weak, and repudiate the coarser weapons of power.
346. (1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge of all philosophers is dictated to them by their moral " truths," and is only seemingly inde pendent. (2) The " Moral Truths," " thus shall things be done," are mere states of consciousness of an instinct which has grown tired, "thus and thus are things done by us." The " ideal " is supposed to re-establish and strengthen an instinct; it flatters man to feel he can obey when he is only an automaton.
347. Morality as a means of seduction. " Nature is good; for a wise and good God is its cause. Who, therefore, is responsible for the corruption of man? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling classes are responsible they must be wiped out ": this is Rousseau s logic (compare with Pascals logic, which concludes by an appeal to original sin). Refer also to Luther s logic, which is similar. In both cases a pretext is sought for the introduction of an insatiable lust of revenge as a moral and religious duty. The hatred directed against the ruling classes tries to sanctify itself...(the " sin fulness of Israel " is the basis of the priest s powerful position). Compare this with Paul s logic, which is similar. It is always under the cover of God s business that these reactions appear, under the cover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In the case of Christ the rejoicings of the people appear as the cause of His crucifixion. It was an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even in the anti-Semitic movement we find the same trick: the opponent is overcome with moral condemnations, and those who attack him pose as retributive Justice.
348. The incidents of the fight: the fighter tries to transform his opponent into the exact opposite of himself imaginatively, of course. He tries to believe in himself to such an extent that he may have the courage necessary for the " good Cause " (as if he were the good Cause); as if reason, taste, and virtue were being assailed by his opponents...The belief of which he is most in need, as the strongest means of defence and attack, is the belief in himself, which, however, knows how to misinterpret itself as a belief in God. He never pictures the advantages and the uses of victory, but only understands victory for the sake of victory for God s sake. Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in a struggle, strives to convince itself of this: " Good taste, good judgment, and virtue are ours" War urges people to this exaggerated self-esteem..., 349. Whatever kind of eccentric ideal one may have (whether as a " Christian," a " free - spirit," an " immoralist," or a German Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being the ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature. One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it, and thus level one s self down to the rest of mankind. How is it, that in spite of this obvious fact, the majority of idealists indulge in propaganda for their ideal, just as if they had no right to it unless the majority acquiesce therein? For instance, all those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this way, who claim the right to study Latin and mathematics. What is it urges them to do this? I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror of the herd: they fight for the " emancipation of woman," because they are best able to achieve their own private little distinction by fighting for it under the cover of a charitable movement, under the banner bearing the device " For others." The cleverness of idealists consists in their per sistently posing as the missionaries and " repre sentatives " of an ideal: they thus " beautify " themselves in the eyes of those who still believe in disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real heroism consists, not in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission, and disinterestedness, but in not fighting at all..." I am thus; I will be thus and you can go to the devil! " 350. Every ideal assumes love, hate, reverence, and con tempt. Either positive feeling is ih&primum mobile, or negative feeling is. Hatred and contempt are the primum mobile in all the ideals which proceed from resentment.
B. A Criticism of the " Good Man" of the Saint, etc.
351. The "good man" Or, hemiplegia of virtue. In the opinion of every strong and natural man, love and hate, gratitude and revenge, goodness and anger, affirmative and negative action, belong to each other. A man is good on condition that he knows how to be evil; a man is evil, because otherwise he would not know how to be good. Whence comes the morbidness and ideological unnaturalness which repudiates these compounds which teaches a sort of one-sided efficiency as the highest of all things? Whence this hemiplegia of virtue, the invention of the good man? The object seems to be to make man amputate those instincts which enable him to be an enemy, to be harmful, to be angry, and to insist upon revenge...This unnaturalness, then, corresponds to that dualistic concept of a wholly good and of a wholly bad creature (God, Spirit, Man); in the first are found all the positive, in the second all the negative forces, intentions, and states. This method of valuing thus believes itself to be " idealistic "; it never doubts that in its concept of the " good man," it has found the highest de sideratum. When aspiring to its zenith it fancies a state in which all evil is wiped out, and in which only good creatures have actually remained over. It does not therefore regard the mutual depend ence of the opposites good and evil as proved. On the contrary, the latter ought to vanish, and the former should remain. The first has a right to exist, the second ought not to be with us at all..
.What, as a matter of fact, is the reason of this desire? In all ages, and particularly in the Christian age, much labour has been spent in trying to reduce men to this one-sided activity: and even today, among those who have been deformed and weakened by the Church, people are not lacking who desire precisely the same thing with their " humanisation " generally, or with their " Will of God," or with their " Salvation of the Soul." The principal injunction behind all these things is, that man should no longer do anything evil, that he should under no circum stances be harmful or desire harm. The way to arrive at this state of affairs is to amputate all hostile tendencies, to suppress all the instincts of resentment, and to establish " spiritual peace " as a chronic disease. This attitude of mind, in which a certain type of man is bred, starts out with this absurd hypothesis: good and evil are postulated as realities which are in a state of mutual contradic tion (not as complementary values, which they are), people are advised to take the side of the good, and it is insisted upon that a good man resists and forswears evil until every trace of it is uprooted but ivith this valuation Life is actually denied, for in all its instincts Life has both yea and nay. But far from understanding these facts, this valuation dreams rather of returning to the wholeness, oneness, and strengthfulness of Life: it actually believes that a state of blessedness will be reached when the inner anarchy and state of unrest which result from these opposed impulses is brought to an end. It is possible that no more dangerous ideology, no greater mischief in the science of psychology, has ever yet existed, as this will to good: the most repugnant type of man has been reared, the man who is not free, the bigot; it was taught that only in the form of a bigot could one tread the path which leads to God, and that only a bigot s life could be a godly life. And even here, Life is still in the right Life that knows not how to separate Yea from Nay: what is the good of declaring with all one s might that war is an evil, that one must harm no one, that one must not act negatively? One is still waging a war even in this, it is impossible to do otherwise! The good man who has renounced all evil, and who is afflicted according to his desire with the hemiplegia of virtue, does not therefore cease from waging war, or from making enemies, or from saying " nay " and doing " nay." The Christian, for instance, hates " sin "! and what on earth is there which he does not call " sin "! It is precisely because of his belief in a moral antagonism between good and evil, that the world for him has grown so full of hatefulness and things that must be combated eternally. The " good man " sees himself surrounded by evil, and, thanks to the continual onslaughts of the latter, his eye grows more keen, and in the end discovers traces of evil in every one of his acts. And thus he ultimately arrives at the conclusion, which to him is quite logical, that Nature is evil, that man is corrupted, and that being good is an act of grace (that is to say, it is impossible to man when he stands alone). In short: he denies Life, he sees how " good," as the highest value, condemns Life...And thus his ideology concerning good and evil ought to strike him as refuted. But one cannot refute a disease. Therefore he is obliged to conceive another life!...
352. Power, whether in the hands of a god or of a man, is always understood to consist in the ability to harm as well as to help. This is the case with the Arabs and with the Hebrews, in fact with all strong and well-constituted races. The dualistic separation of the two powers is fatal...In this way morality becomes the poisoner of life.
353. A criticism of the good man. Honesty, dignity, dutifulness, justice, humanity, loyalty, uprightness, clean conscience is it really supposed that, by means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities they stand for are approved and affirmed for their own sake? Or is it this, that qualities and states indifferent in themselves have merely been looked at in a light which lends them some value? Does the worth of these qualities lie in themselves, or in the use and advantages to which they lead (or to which they seem to lead, to which they are expected to lead)? I naturally do not wish to imply that there is any opposition between the ego and the alter in the judgment: the question is, whether it is the results of these qualities, either in regard to him who possesses them or in regard to environment, society, " humanity," which lend them their value; or whether they have a value in themselves...In other words: is it utility which bids men condemn, combat, and deny the opposite qualities (duplicity, falseness, perversity, lack of self- confidence, inhumanity)? Is the essence of such qualities condemned, or only their consequences? In other words: were it desirable that there should exist no men at all possessed of such qualities? In any case, this is believed...But here lies the error, the shortsightedness, the monocularity of narrow egoism. Expressed otherwise: would it be desirable to create circumstances in which the whole advan tage would be on the side of the just so that all those with opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and would slowly become extinct? At bottom, this is a question of taste and of (Esthetics: should we desire the most honorable types of men that is to say, the greatest bores alone to subsist? the rectangular, the virtuous, the upright, the good-natured, the straightforward, and the " blockheads "? If one can imagine the total suppression of the huge number constituting the " others," even the just man himself ceases from having a right to exist, he is, in fact, no longer necessary, and in this way it is seen that coarse utility alone could have elevated such an insufferable virtue to a place of honor. Desirability may lie precisely on the other side. It might be better to create conditions in which the "just man" would be reduced to the humble position of a " useful instrument " an " ideal gregarious animal," or at best a herdsman: in short, conditions in which he would no longer stand in the highest sphere, which requires other qualities.
354. The "good man" as a tyrant. Mankind has always repeated the same error: it has always transformed a mere vital measure into the measure and standard of life; instead of seeking the standard in the highest ascent of life, in the problem of growth and exhaustion, it takes the preservative measures of a very definite kind of life, and uses them to exclude all other kinds of life, and even to criticise Life itself and to select from among its forms. That is to say, man ultimately forgets that measures are a means to an end, and gets to like them for themselves: they take the place of a goal in his mind, and even become the standard of goals to him that is to say, a given species of man regards his means of existence as the only legitimate means, as the means which ought to be imposed upon all, as " truth," " goodness," " perfection ": the given species, in fact, begins to tyrannise...It is a form of faith, of instinct, when a certain species of man does not perceive that his kind has been conditioned, when he does not understand his relation to other species. At any rate, any species of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed as soon as it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights, and no longer desires to be master.
355. " All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong enough to be evil," said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker. * " Disasters are not to the faint-hearted," is a Russian proverb.
356. Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus you would that men were? that good men were? But such men I can only conceive as slaves, the slaves of the future.
357. The metamorphoses of slavery; its disguise in the cloak of religion; its transfiguration through morality.
358. The ideal slave (the " good man "). He who cannot regard himself as a " purpose," and who cannot give himself any aim whatsoever, in stinctively honors the morality of unselfishness. Everything urges him to this morality: his prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And even faith is a form of self-denial. A tavism: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for once. *. T 2pO Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just so many obstacles in the way of sovereign sentiments, of great ingenuity, of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one s self. It is not a question of going ahead (to that end all that is required is to be at best a herdsman, that is to say, the prime need of the herd), it is rather a matter of getting along alone, of being able to be another.
359. We must realize all that has been accumulated as the result of the highest moral idealism: how almost all other values have crystallised round it. This shows that it has been desired for a very long time and with the strongest passions and that it has not yet been attained: otherwise it would have disappointed everybody (that is to say, it would have been followed by a more moderate valuation). The saint as the most powerful type of man: this ideal it is which has elevated the value of moral perfection so high. One would think that the whole of science had been engaged in proving that the moral man is the revest powerful and most godly. The conquest of the senses and the passions everything inspired terror; the un natural seemed to the spectators to be super natural and transcendental.
360. Francis of Assisi: amorous and popular, a poet who combats the order of rank among souls, in favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual hierarchy " all alike before God." Popular ideals: the good man, the unselfish man, the saint, the sage, the just man. O Marcus Aurelius!
361. I have declared war against the anaemic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate it, but only to put an end to its tyranny and clear the way for other ideals, for more robust ideals...The continuance of the Christian ideal belongs to the most desirable of desiderata: if only for the sake of the ideals which wish to take their stand beside it and perhaps above it they must have opponents, and strong ones too, in order to grow strong themselves. That is why we im- moralists require the power of morality: our instinct of self-preservation insists upon our opponents maintaining their strength all it requires is to become master of them. C. Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities.
362. Egoism and its problem! The Christian gloominess of La Rochefoucauld, who saw egoism 2p2 in everything, and imagined that he had therefore reduced the worth of things and virtues! In opposition to him, I first of all tried to show that nothing else could exist save egoism, that in those men whose ego is weak and thin, the power to love also grows weak, that the greatest lovers are such owing to the strength of their ego, that love is an expression of egoism, etc. As a matter of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those who find it useful, whom it helps in fact, the herd; it fosters a pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the cause of uni versal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of men.
363. Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest regards his habits as more important than his advantage.
364. Egoism! But no one has yet asked: what is the ego like? Everybody is rather inclined to see all egos alike. This is the result of the slave theory, of universal suffrage, and of "equality."
365. The behaviour of a higher man is the result of a very complex set of motives: any word such as " pity " betrays nothing of this complexity. The 293 most important factor is the feeling, " who am I? who is the other relative to me? " Thus the valuing spirit is continually active.
366. To think that the history of all moral pheno mena may be simplified, as Schopenhauer thought, that is to say, that pity is to be found at the root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto, is to be guilty of a degree of nonsense and ingenuousness worthy only of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which the Germans, from Herder to Hegel, have undergone.
367. My "pity? This is a feeling for which I can find no adequate term: I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what power and what tasteless problems fit for back woodsmen! (At a time when the brave and light- hearted scepticism of a Montaigne was already possible in France!) Or when I see some one standing below where he might have stood, thanks to the development of a set of perfectly senseless accidents. Or even when, with the thought of man s destiny in my mind, I contemplate with horror and contempt the whole system of modern European politics, which is creating the circum- 294 stances and weaving the fabric of the whole future of mankind. Yes, to what could not "mankind" attain, if! This is my " pity "; despite the fact that no sufferer yet exists with whom I sympathise in this way.
368. Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to the health, " it cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in the world." If one does good merely out of pity, it is one s self and not one s neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon maxims, but upon emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an infection.
369. There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and does not exceed them consequently, the " allowable," the " morally in different" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all. " One is continually promoting the interests of one s ego at the cost of other people "; " Living consists in living at the cost of others " he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to himself.
370. The " subject " is a piece of fiction: the ego of which every one speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.
371. Our " ego " which is not one with the unitary controlling force of our beings! is really only an imagined synthesis; therefore there can be no " egoistic" actions.
372. Since all instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent a standpoint as far as they are concerned. Every instinct, when it is active, sacrifices strength and other instincts into the bargain: in the end it is stemmed, otherwise it would be the end of everything owing to the waste it would bring about. Thus: that which is "unegoistic," self- sacrificing, and imprudent is nothing in particular it is common to all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare of the whole ego (because they simply do not think), they act counter to our interests, against the ego: and often for the ego innocent in both cases!
373. The origin of moral values. Selfishness has as much value as the physiological value of him who possesses it. Each individual represents the whole course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach, something that begins at his birth. If he re present the ascent of the line of mankind, his value is, in fact, very great; and the concern about his maintenance and the promoting of his growth may even be extreme. (It is the concern about 296 the promise of the future in him which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right to egoism.) If he represent descending development, decay, chronic sickening, he has little worth: and the greatest fairness would have him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as possible from the well-constituted. In this case society s duty is to suppress egoism (for the latter may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid, and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and a religion of" love," the curbing of the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, re signation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy, feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the botched, and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty, of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness, the gospel of the lowly and of " God on the Cross." The preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon ex amination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth much," simply a psychological valua tion; more plainly still: it is the feeling of im potence, of the lack of the great self-asserting 297 impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation gets translated, according to the particular culture of these classes, into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion " value " hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of power and of self-con fidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society: when, however, the Socialist, the Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their existence is something for which some one must be guilty, they are very closely related to the Christian, who also believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he has found some one whom he can hold responsible for it. The instinct of revenge and resentment appears in both cases here as a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure, as is also the favour shown to altruistic theory and practice. The hatred of egoism, whether it be one s own (as in the case of the Christian), or another s (as in the case of the Socialists), thus appears as a valua tion reached under the predominance of revenge; and also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct of the suffering, in the form 398 of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity...At bottom, as I have already suggested, the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism (one s own or that of others) is still a self-pre servative measure on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological cir cumstances. When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his inade quate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying; if he were more at ease he would take jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the " world " and does not even except himself. But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander.
374. Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to caricatures at least in its own imagination, as also to starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our "criminal" In the midst of the Roman and aristocratic order of values, the Jew was reduced 299 to a caricature. Among artists, " Mrs. Grundy and the bourgeois " become caricatures; while among pious people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among immoralists it is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in my books becomes a caricature.
375. All the instincts and forces which morality praises, seem to me to be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the service of the will to power.
376. The turning of man s nature inivards. The process of turning a nature inwards arises when, owing to the establishment of peace and society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting themselves outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with the imagi nation. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence is reverted, " it steps backwards "; in the thirst for knowledge there lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the powers of dissimulation and falsehood find their scope; the instincts are thus transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.
377. Falsity. Every sovereign instinct makes the others its instruments, its retainers and its sycophants: it never allows itself to be called by its more hateful name: and it brooks no terms of praise in which it cannot indirectly find its share. Around every sovereign instinct all praise and blame in general crystallises into a rigorous form of ceremonial and etiquette. This is one of the causes of falsity. Every instinct which aspires to dominion, but which finds itself under a yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the most generally accepted values to strengthen it and to support its self-esteem, and this explains why as a rule it dares to come forward under the name of the " master " it is combating and from whom it would be free (for instance, under the domination of Christian values, the desires of the flesh and of power act in this way). This is the other cause of falsity. In both cases complete ingenuousness reigns: the falseness never even occurs to the mind of those concerned. It is the sign of a broken instinct when man sees the motive force and its " expression " (" the mask ") as separate things it is a sign of inner contradiction and is much less formidable. Absolute innocence in bearing, word, and passion, a " good conscience " in falseness, and the certainty wherewith all the grandest and most pompous words and attitudes are appro priated all these things are necessary for victory. In the other case: that is to say, when extreme clearsightedness is present, the genius of the actor is needful as well as tremendous discipline in self-control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why priests are the cleverest and most conscious hypo crites; and then come princes, in whom their position in life and their antecedents account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists come third, and women fourth. The fundamental thought: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and the will is directed so inexorably against perfect self-knowledge and accurate self-classification, that one is very pro bably right in supposing that Truth and the will to truth are perhaps something quite different and only disguises. (The need of faith is the greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness.)
378. " Thou shalt not tell a falsehood ": people insist upon truthfulness. But the acknowledg ment of facts (the refusal to allow one s self to be lied to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognized the reality of this popular " truthfulness." There is too much or too little being said continually: to insist upon people s exposing themselves with every word they say, is a piece of naivete". People say what they think, they are " truth ful "; but only under certain circumstances: that is to say, provided they be understood (inter pares), and understood with good will into the bargain (once more inter pares]. One conceals one s self in the presence of the unfamiliar: and he who would attain to something, says what he would fain have 302 people think about him, but not what he thinks. (" The powerful man is always a liar.")