379. The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism con* cealed beneath an artful abuse of moral values: (a) Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity. (V) The most impersonal intellect (" the philo sopher ") can know the truth, " the true essence and nature of things." (c) Genius, great, men are great, because they do not strive to further their own interests: the value of man increases in proportion as he effaces himself. (d) Art as the work of the "pure free-willed subject "; misunderstanding of " objectivity." (e) Happiness as the object of life: virtue as a means to an end. The pessimistic condemnation of life by Scho penhauer is a moral one. Transference of the gregarious standards into the realm of meta physics. The " individual " lacks sense, he must there fore have his origin in " the thing in itself" (and the significance of his existence must be shown to be " error "); parents are only an " accidental cause." The mistake on the part of science in considering the individual as the result of all past life instead of the epitome of all past life, is now becoming known. 303 380. 1. Systematic falsification of history; so that it may present a proof of the moral valua tions: (a) The decline of a people and corruption. () The rise of a people and virtue. (c) The zenith of a people (" its culture ") regarded as the result of high moral excellence. 2. Systematic falsification of great men, great creators, and great periods. The desire is to make faith that which distinguishes great men: whereas carelessness in this respect, scepticism, " immoral ity," the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to greatness (Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe). The principal fact their " free will " is always suppressed.
381. A great lie in history; as if the corruption of the Church were the cause of the Reformation! This was only the pretext and self-deception of the agitators very strong needs were making themselves felt, the brutality of which sorely re quired a spiritual dressing.
382. Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the emancipation from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral pre judices which is coincident with the emancipation 304 of a great mind; he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully contrived to set up the only moral value he honored self-effacement, as the one condition of highest intellectual activity: " objective " contemplation. " Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the withdrawal of the will...Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a fundamentally different valuation. Such absurd distinctions as " genius " and the world of will, of morality and immorality, knoiv nothing about at all. The moral is a lower kind of animal than the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed he is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type of his own. He is a copy; at the best, a good copy the standard of his worth lies without him. I value a man according to the quantum of power and fullness of his will: not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I con sider that a philosophy which teaches the denial of will is both defamatory and slanderous...I test the power of a will according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been. The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive at the knowledge that all is to no purpose in short, to recognise what the good man already does instinctively...30$ He denies that there can be higher states of intellectuality he regards his view as a non plus ultra...Here intellectuality is placed much lower than goodness; its highest value (as art, for instance) would be to lead up to, and to advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predomin ance of moral values. Next to Schopenhauer I will now characterise Kant: there was nothing Greek in Kant; he was quite anti-historical (cf. his attitude in regard to the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (see Goethe s words concerning the radically evil element in human nature *). Saintliness also lurked somewhere in his soul...I require a criticism of the saintly type. Hegel s value: " Passion." Herbert Spencer s tea-grocer s philosophy: total absence of an ideal save that of the mediocre man. * TRANSLATOR S NOTE. This is doubtless a reference to a passage in a letter written by Goethe to Herder, on yth June 1793, from the camp at Marienborn, near Mainz, in which the following words occur: " Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen Mantel, nachdem er ein langes Menschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von mancherlei sudel- haften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, fre-ventlich mit dem Schand- fleck des radikalen Bosen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen herbeigelockt iverden den Saum zu kussen." (" Kant, on the other hand, after he had tried throughout his life to keep his philosophical cloak unsoiled by foul pre judices, wantonly dirtied it in the end with the disreputable stain of the radical evil in human nature, in order that Christians too might be lured into kissing its hem.") From this passage it will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche s view of Kant; namely, that he was a Christian in disguise.. U 3C6 Fundamental instinct of all philosophers, historians, and psychologists: everything of value in mankind, art, history, science, religion, and technology must be shown to be morally valuable and morally conditioned in its aim, means, and result. Everything is seen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau s question concerning civilisation, " Will it make man grow better?" a funny question, for the reverse is obvious, and is a fact which speaks in favour of civilisation.
383. Religious morality. Passion, great desire; the passion for power, love, revenge, and property: the moralists wish to uproot and exterminate all these things, and " purify " the soul by driving them out of it. The argument is: the passions often lead to disaster therefore, they are evil and ought to be condemned. Man must wring himself free from them, otherwise he cannot be a good man...This is of the same nature as: "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out." In this particular case when, with that " bucolic simplicity," the Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His disciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be only the loss of a parti cular member, but the actual castration of the whole of the man s character...And the same applies to the moral mania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions, sues for 307 their extirpation. Its conclusion always is: only the emasculated man is a good man. Instead of making use of and of economising the great sources of passion, those torrents of the soul which are often so dangerous, overwhelming, and impetuous, morality this most shortsighted and most corrupted of mental attitudes would fain make them dry up.
384. Conquest over the passions? No, not if this is to mean their enfeeblement and annihilation. They must be enlisted in our service: and to this end it may be necessary to tyrannise them a good deal (not as individuals, but as communities, races, etc.). At length we should trust them enough to restore their freedom to them: they love us like good servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.
385. Intolerance on the part of morality is a sign of man s weakness: he is frightened of his own " immorality," he must deny his strongest instincts, because he does not yet know how to use them. Thus the most fruitful quarters of the globe remain uncultivated longest: the power is lack ing that might become master here...
386. There are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous fine weather would be 308 a desirable thing: they still believe today in rebus moralibus, that the " good man " alone and nothing else than the " good man " is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man s evolution will be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that it is only to that end that all efforts should be directed). This is in the highest degree an uneconomical thought; as we have already suggested, it is the very acme of simplicity, and it is nothing more than the expression of the agreeableness which the " good man " creates (he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, he gives what one is able to take). With a more educated eye one learns to desire exactly the reverse that is to say, an ever greater do-minion of evil, man s gradual emancipa tion from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the growth of power around the greatest forces of Nature, and the ability to enlist the passions in one s service.
387. The whole idea of the hierarchy of passions: as if the only right and normal thing were to be led by reason whereas the passions are abnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as their end is concerned, nothing more than desires for pleasure...Passion is deprived of its dignity (i) as if it only manifested itself in an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the motive force, 309 (2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high purpose merely at pleasure...The misinterpretation of passion and reason, as if the latter were an independent entity, and not a state of relationship between all the various passions and desires; and as though every passion did not possess its quantum of reason...
388. How it was that, under the pressure of the dominion of an ascetic and self-effacing morality, it was precisely the passions love, goodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were necessarily misunderstood? It is the richness of a personality, the fullness of it, its power to flow over and to bestow, its instinctive feeling of ease, and its affirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love and great sacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism as surely as do the desire to be master, to obtrude, and the inner certainty that one has a right to everything. The opposite views, according to the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and if one does not stand firmly and bravely on one s legs, one has nothing to give, and it is perfectly useless to stretch out one s hand either to protect or to support others...How was it possible to transform these instincts to such an extent that man could feel that to be of value which is directed against himself, so that he could sacrifice himself for another self! O the 310 psychological baseness and falseness which hither to has laid down the law in the Church and in Church-infected philosophy! If man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do is to hate himself. As a matter of fact, he ought not to regard even his fellows otherwise than he does himself; the love of man requires a justifi cation, and it is found in the fact that God commanded it. From this it follows that all the natural instincts of man (to love, etc.) appear to him to be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he re-acquires a right to them only after having denied them as an obedient worshipper of God...Pascal, the admirable logician of Christianity, went as far as this let any one examine his relations to his sister. " Not to make one s self loved," seemed Christian to him.
389. Let us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this (" an ideal ") makes us pay. (Its enemies are well? The " egoists.") The melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in Europe (Pascal, La Rochefoucauld) inner en- feeblement, discouragement, and self-consumption of the non-gregarious man. The perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being the most valuable (modesty in rank and file, Nature converted into an instrument). Pangs of conscience associated with all that 311 is self-glorifying and original: thus follows the unhappiness the gloominess of the world from the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men! Gregarious consciousness and timorousness transferred to philosophy and religion. Let us leave the psychological impossibility of a purely unselfish action out of consideration!
390. My ultimate conclusion is, that the real man represents a much higher value than the " de sirable " man of any ideal that has ever existed hitherto; that all " desiderata " in regard to man kind have been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular kind of man has sought to establish his measures of preservation and of growth as a law for all; that every " desideratum " of this kind which has been made to dominate has reduced man s worth, his strength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre intellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even today, when he reveals a desire; that man s ability to fix values has hitherto been developed too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely to the "desirable," worth of man; that, up to the present, ideals have really been the power which has most slandered man and power, the poisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which have seduced men to yearn for nonentity...312 D. A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating.
391. The standard according to which the value of moral valuations is to be determined. The fundamental fact that has been overlooked: The contradiction between "becoming more moral " and the elevation and the strengthening of the type man. Homo natura: The " will to power."
392. Moral values regarded as values of appearance and compared with physiological values.
393. Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde: the last of the " desiderata " concerning men, for instance, have never been regarded as problems by philosophers. They always postulate the "improvement" of man, quite guilelessly, as though by means of some intuition they had been helped over the note of interrogation following the question, why necessarily " improve "? To what extent is it desirable that man should be more virtuous, or more intelligent, or happier? Granting that nobody yet knows the " wherefore? " of mankind, all such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one of them who knows? perhaps one is frustrating the other. Is an increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and insight? Dubito: only too often shall I have occasion to show that the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the strict sense of the word, not always been opposed to happiness hitherto? And again, does it not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation as a necessary means? And if the aim were to arrive at the highest insight, would it not therefore be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in happiness, and to choose danger, adventure, mistrust, and seduction as a road to enlighten ment?...And suppose one will have happiness; maybe one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit."
394. The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called moral improvement, We do not believe that one man can be another if he is not that other already that is to say, if he is not, as often happens, an accretion of person alities or at least of parts of persons. In this case it is possible to draw another set of actions from him into the foreground, and to drive back " the older man."...The man s aspect is altered, but not his actual nature...It is but the merest factum brutum that any one should cease from performing certain actions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations. Neither does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing a certain action is entirely arrested, nor that the reasons for that action are dissipated. He whose destiny and abilities make him a criminal never unlearns anything, but is con tinually adding to his store of knowledge: and long abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on his talent...Certainly, as far as society is con cerned, the only interesting fact is that some one has ceased from performing certain actions; and to this end society will often raise a man out of those circumstances which make him able to per form those actions: this is obviously a wiser course than that of trying to break his destiny and his particular nature. The Church, which has done nothing except to take the place of, and to appropriate, the philosophic treasures of antiquity, starting out from another standpoint and wishing to secure a " soul " or the " salvation " of a soul, believes in the expiatory power of punishment, as also in the obliterating power of forgiveness: both of which supposed processes are deceptions due to religious prejudice punishment expiates nothing, forgiveness obliterates nothing; what is done can not be undone. Because some one forgets some thing it by no means proves that something has been wiped out...An action leads to certain consequences, both among men and away from men, and it matters not whether it has met with punishment, or whether it has been "expiated," " forgiven," or " obliterated," it matters not even if the Church meanwhile canonises the man who performed it. The Church believes in things that do not exist, it believes in " Souls "; it believes in "influences" that do not exist in divine influences; it believes in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual salvation: in all things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with signs, attitudes, words, to which it lends an arbitrary interpretation. It possesses a method of counterfeit psychology which is thought out quite systematically.
395. " Illness makes men better," this famous assumption which is to be met with in all ages, and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as in the mouth and maw of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of discovering whether there is any truth in it, one might be allowed to ask whether there is not perhaps a fundamental relationship between morality and illness? Regarded as a whole, could not the " improvement of mankind " that is to say, the unquestionable softening, humanising, and taming which the European has undergone within the last two centuries be regarded as the result of a long course of secret and ghastly suffering, failure, abstinence, and grief? Has illness made " Euro peans " " better "? Or, put into other words, is not our modern soft-hearted European morality, which could be likened to that of the Chinese, perhaps an expression of physiological deteriora tion?...It cannot be denied, for instance, that wherever history shows us " man " in a state of particular glory and power, his type is always dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares little for humanity; and perhaps, in those cases in which it seems otherwise, all that was required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the surface in psychological matters, in order even in them to discover the general pro position: " the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful, and enterprising a man may feel, the more immoral he will be as well." A terrible thought, to which one should on no account give way. Pro vided, however, that one take a few steps forward with this thought, how wondrous does the future then appear! What will then be paid for more dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing which we are all trying to promote, by all means in our power the humanising, the improving, and the increased " civilisation " of man? Noth ing would then be more expensive than virtue: for by means of it the world would ultimately be turned into a hospital: and the last conclusion of wisdom would be, " everybody must be everybody else s nurse." Then we should certainly have attained to the " Peace on earth," so long desired! But how little "joy we should find in each other s company "! How little beauty, wanton spirits, daring, and danger! So few " actions " which would make life on earth worth living! Ah! and no longer any " deeds "! But have not all the great things and deeds which have re mained fresh in the memory of men, and which have not been destroyed by time, been immoral in the deepest sense of the word?...
396. The priests and with them the half-priests or philosophers of all ages have always called that doctrine true, the educating influence of which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so that is to say, tended to " improve." In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian empiric and miracle-worker who, because he had tried a certain poison as a cure, declared it to be no poison. " By their fruits ye shall know them " that is to say, " by our truths." This has been the reasoning of priests until this day. They have squandered their sagacity, with results that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the " proof of power " (or the proof " by the fruits ") pre-eminent and even supreme arbiter over all other forms of proof. " That which makes good must be good; that which is good cannot lie "- these are their inexorable conclusions " that which bears good fruit must consequently be true; there is no other criterion of truth."...But to the extent to which " improving " acts as an argument, deteriorating must also act as a refuta tion. The error can be shown to be an error, by examining the lives of those who represent it: a false step, a vice can refute...This indecent form of opposition, which comes from below and behind the doglike kind of attack, has not died out either. Priests, as psychologists, never dis covered anything more interesting than spying out the secret vices of their adversaries they prove Christianity by looking about for the world s filth.
They apply this principle more particu larly to the greatest on earth, to the geniuses: readers will remember how Goethe has been attacked on every conceivable occasion in Ger many (Klopstock and Herder were among the first to give a " good example " in this respect- birds of a feather flock together).
397. One must be very immoral in order to make people moral by deeds. The moralist s means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he who has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for anything else, but not for the duties of a moralist. Morality is a menagerie; it assumes that iron bars may be more useful than freedom, even for the creatures it imprisons; it also assumes that there are animal-tamers about who do not shrink from terrible means, and who are acquainted with the use of red-hot iron. This terrible species, which enters into a struggle with the wild animal, is called " priests." * Man, incarcerated in an iron cage of errors, has become a caricature of man; he is sick, emaciated, ill-disposed towards himself, filled with a loathing of the impulses of life, filled with a mistrust of all that is beautiful and happy in life in fact, he is a wandering monument of misery. How shall we ever succeed in vindicating this phenomenon this artificial, arbitrary, and recent mis carriage the sinner which the priests have bred on their territory? * In order to think fairly of morality, we must put two biological notions in its place: the taming of the wild beasts, and the rearing of a particular species. The priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to " improve"...But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a lion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his " improved " animals. As a rule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even the moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his species. But he is less harm ful...
398. What I want to make clear, with all the means in my power, is: (a) That there is no worse confusion than that which confounds rearing and taming: and these two things have always been confused...Rearing, as I understand it, is a means of hus banding the enormous powers of humanity in such a way that whole generations may build upon the foundations laid by their progenitors not only outwardly, but inwardly, organically, developing from the already existing stem and growing stronger...($) That there is an exceptional danger in believing that mankind as a whole is developing and growing stronger, if individuals are seen to grow more feeble and more equally mediocre. Humanity mankind is an abstract thing: the object of rearing, even in regard to the most individual cases, can only be the strong man (the man who has no breeding is weak, dissipated, and unstable).
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS CONCERNING THE CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
399. These are the things I demand of you how ever badly they may sound in your ears: that you subject moral valuations themselves to criticism. That you should put a stop to your instinctive moral impulse which in this case demands submission and not criticism with the question: " why precisely submission? " That this yearning for a " why? " for a criticism of morality should not only be your present form of morality, but the sublimest of all moralities, and an honor to the age you live in. That your honesty, your will, may give an account of itself, and not deceive you: " why not? " Before what tribunal?
400. The three postulates: All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the " vulgar man "). All that is contrary to Nature is high (the protest of the physiologically botched). 321 All that is of average worth is high (the pro test of the herd, of the " mediocre "). Thus in the history of morality a will to power finds expression, by means of which, either the slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and the botched, those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre, attempt to make those valuations prevail which favour their existence. From a biological standpoint, therefore, the phenomenon Morality is of a highly suspicious nature. Up to the present, morality has developed at the cost of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts, the well - constituted and beautiful natures, the independent and privileged classes in all respects. Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature s endeavours to arrive at a higher type. Its effects are: mistrust of life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral), hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are felt to be opposed to the higher instincts), Degeneration and self-destruc tion of " higher natures," because it is precisely in them that the conflict becomes conscious.
401. Which values have been paramount hitherto? Morality as the leading value in all phases of philosophy (even with the Sceptics). Result: this world is no good, a " true world " must exist somewhere. What is it that here determines the highest. X value? What, in sooth, is morality? The instinct of decadence; it is the exhausted and the dis inherited who take their revenge in this way and play the masters...Historical proof: philosophers have always been decadents and always in the pay of Nihilistic religions. The instinct of decadence appears as the will to power. The introduction of its system of means: its means are absolutely immoral. General aspect: the values that have been highest hitherto have been a special instance of the will to power; morality itself is a particular instance of immorality. * Why the Antagonistic Values always succumbed. 1. How was this actually possible! Question: why did life and physiological well-constitutedness succumb everywhere? Why was there no affirma tive philosophy, no affirmative religion? The historical signs of such movements: the pagan religion. Dionysos versus the Christ. The Renaissance. Art. 2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and the rule. There is no doubt as to who is the stronger., o General view of history; Is man an exception in the history of life on this account? An objection to Darwinism. The means wherewith the weak suc ceed in ruling have become: instincts, " humanity," "institutions."...3. The proof of this rule on the part of the 323 weak is to be found in our political instincts, in our social values, in our arts, and in our science. * The instincts of decadence have become master of the instincts of ascending life...The will to nonentity has prevailed over the will to life Is this true? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and of the species in this victory of the weak and the mediocre? is it not perhaps only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere slackening of the pace, a protective measure against something even more dangerous? Suppose the strong were masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice! Self -contempt on the part of the weak would be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind. And would this be desirable! should we really like a world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the plasticity in fact, the whole influence of the weak was lacking? *...* * TRANSLATOR S NOTE. We realize here the great differ ence between Nietzsche and those who draw premature con clusions from Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of modern problems in Nietzsche s philosophy. He did not advocate anything so ridiculous as the total suppression of the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to resist and to overthrow was their supremacy, their excessive power. He felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need of having its hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld in defiance of Christian values. We have seen two " wills to power " at war (in this special case we had a principle: that of agree ing with the one that has hitherto succumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto triumphed): we have recognized the " real world " as a " world of lies" and morality as a form of immorality. We do not say "the stronger is wrong." We have understood what it is that has deter mined the highest values hitherto, and why the latter should have prevailed over the opposite value: it was numerically the stronger, If we now purify the opposite "value of the in fection, the half-heartedness, and the degeneration with which we identify it, we restore Nature to the throne, free from moralic acid.
402. Morality, a useful error; or, more clearly still, a necessary and expedient lie according to the greatest and most impartial of its supporters.
403. One ought to be able to acknowledge the truth up to that point where one is sufficiently elevated no longer to require the disciplinary school of moral error. When one judges life morally, it disgusts one. Neither should false personalities be invented; one should not say, for instance, " Nature is cruel." It is precisely when one perceives that there is no 325 such central controlling and responsible force that one is relieved! Evolution of man. A. He tried to attain to a certain power over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and " wild animals.") B. If power over Nature has been attained, this power can be used as a help in our development: Will to Power as a self-enhancing and self-strengthening principle.
404. Morality may be regarded as the illusion of a species, fostered with the view of urging the individual to sacrifice himself to the future, and seemingly granting him such a very great value, that with that self-consciousness he may tyrannise over, and constrain, other sides of his nature, and find it difficult to be pleased with himself. We ought to be most profoundly thankful for what morality has done hitherto: but now it is no more than a burden which may prove fatal. Morality itself in the form of honesty urges us to deny moralfty.