to the best of their ability, must keep in view this estimate 0 evils, that their amount is not always the same, owing to the working of a Providence which either preserves earthly things, or purges them by means of floods and conflagrations; and effects this, perhaps, not merely with reference to things o! earth, but also to the whole universe of things * which stands in 1 ἀῤῥητοποιοὺς οὐκ ἴσασι.
3 οὐ πάντως καὶ ἡ τῶν καχῶν γένεσις del 49 αὐτή.
ὃ οὐκ dil τὼ αὐτά ἐστι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ, τὸς πράξεις.
4 βιωρίαι:;. 5 τῶν ὅλων. 6 τὰ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ.
καὶ Boor 1v.] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 231 need of purification, when the wickedness that is in it has become great.
CHAPTER LXV.
After this Celsus continues: “ It is not easy, indeed, for one who is not a philosopher to ascertain the origin of evils, though it is sufficient for the multitude to say that they do not proceed from God, but cleave to matter, and have their abode among mortal things; while the course! of mortal things being the same from beginning to end, the same things must always, agreeably to the appointed cycles? recur in the past, present, and future." Celsus here observes that it is not easy for one who is not a philosopher to ascertain the origin of evils, as if it were an easy matter for a philosopher to gain this knowledge, while for one who is not a philosopher it was difficult, though still possible, for such an one, although with great labour, to attain it. Now, to this we say, that the origin of evils is a subject which is not easy even for a philosopher to master, and that perhaps it is impossible even for such to attain a clear under- standing of it, unless it be revealed to them by divine inspira- tion, both what evils are, and how they originated, and how they shall be made to disappear. But although ignorance of God is an evil, and one of the greatest of these is not to know how God is to be served and worshipped, yet, as even Celsus would admit, there are undoubtedly some philosophers who have been ignorant of this, as is evident from the views of the different philosophical sects; whereas, according to our judgment, no one is capable of ascertaining the origin of evils who does not know that it is wicked to suppose that piety is preserved uninjured amid the laws that are established in different states, in conformity with the generally prevailing ideas of government? No one, moreover, who has not heard what is related of him who is called “devil,” and of his “angels,” and what he was before he became a devil, and how he became such, and what was the cause of the simultaneous apostasy of those who are termed his angels, will be able to ascertain the origin of evils. - 1 χερίοδος. 3 xard ras τεταγμένας ἀνακυκχλήσεις.
8 μὴ ἐγνωχώς κακὸν εἶναι τὸ νομίζειν εὐσέβειαν σώζξισθαι ἐν Toig καθιστηκόσι x&TÀ τὰς κοινότερον νοουμένας πολιτείας νόμοις.
282 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Boox rv.
But he who would attain to this knowledge must learn more accurately the nature of demons, and know that they are not the work of God so far as respects their demoniacal nature, but only in so far as they are possessed of reason; and also what their origin was, so that they became beings of such a nature, that while converted into demons, the powers of their mind! remain. And if there be any topic of human investigation which is difficult for our nature to grasp, certainly the origin of evils may be considered to be such.
CHAPTER LXVI.
CHAPTER LXVI.
Celsus in the next place, as if he were able to tell certain secrets regarding the origin of evils, but chose rather to keep silence, and say only what was suitable to the multitude, con- tinues as follows: “It is sufficient to say to the multitude regarding the origin of evils, that they do not proceed from God, but cleave to matter, and dwell among mortal things." It is true, certainly, that evils do not proceed from God; for according to Jeremiah, one of our prophets, it is certain that *out of the mouth of the Most High proceedeth not evil and good.”? But to maintain that matter, dwelling among mortal things, is the cause of evils, is in our opinion not true. For it is the mind of each individual which is the cause of the evil which arises in him, and this is evil in the abstract;* while the actions which proceed from it are wicked, and there is, to speak with accuracy, nothing else in our view that is evil. I am aware, however, that this topic requires very elaborate treat- ment, which (by the grace of God enlightening the mind) may be successfully attempted by him who is deemed by God worthy to attain the necessary knowledge on this subject.
CHAPTER LXVII.
CHAPTER LXVII.
I do not understand how Celsus should deem it of advantage, in writing a treatise against us, to adopt an opinion which requires at least much plausible reasoning to make it appear, as far as he can do so, that “the course of mortal things is the same from beginning to end, and that the same things must always, according to the appointed cycles, recur in the past, 1 τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. 3 Cf. Lam. iii. 88. 8 ὅτις ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν.
Book 1v.] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 233 present, and future.” Now, if this be true, our free-will is annihilated. For if, in the revolution of mortal things, the same events must perpetually occur in the past, present, and future, according to the appointed cycles, it is clear that, of necessity, Socrates will always be a philosopher, and be con- demned for introducing strange gods and for corrupting the youth. And Anytus and Melitus must always be his accusers, and the council of the Areopagus must ever condemn him to death by hemlock. And in the same way, according to the appointed cycles, Phalaris must always play the tyrant, and Alexander of Phere commit the same acts of cruelty, and those condemned to the [torture of the brazen] bull of Phalaris continually pour forth their wailings from it. But if these things be granted, I do not see how our free-will can be pre- served, or how praise or blame can be administered with pro- priety. We may say further to Celsus, in answer to such a view, that “if the course of mortal things be always the same from beginning to end, and if, according to the appointed cycles, the same events must always occur in the past, present, and future," then, according to the appointed cycles, Moses must again come forth from Egypt with the Jewish people, and Jesus again come to dwell in human life, and perform the same actions which, [according to this view], he has done not once, but countless times, as the periods have revolved. Nay, Christians too will be the same in the appointed cycles; and Celsus will again write this treatise of his, which he has done innumerable times before!
CHAPTER LXVIII.
Celsus, however, says that it is only *the course of mortal things which, according to the appointed cycles, must always be the same in the past, present, and future;" whereas the majority of the Stoics maintain that this is the case not only with the course of mortal, but also with that of immortal things, and of those whom they regard as gods. For after the con- flagration of the world! which has taken place countless times in the past, and will happen countless times in the future, there has been, and will be, the same arrangement of all things from 1 có ἐφ᾽ ἡμὶν οἰνήρηται. 2 χοῦ παντός.
234 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [ Book 1v.
the beginning to the end. The Stoics, indeed, in endeavouring to parry, I don't know how, the objections raised to their views, allege that as, cycle after cycle returns, all men will be alto- gether unchanged! from those who lived in former cycles; so that Socrates will not live again, but one altogether like to Socrates, who will marry a wife exactly like Xanthippe, and will be ac- cused by men exactly like Anytus and Melitus. Ido not under stand, however, how the world is to be always the same, and one individual not different from another, and yet the things in it not the same, though exactly alike. But the main argument in answer to the statements of Celsus and of the Stoics will be more appropriately investigated elsewhere, since on the present occasion it is not consistent with the purpose we have in view to expatiate on these points.
CHAPTER LXIX.
CHAPTER LXIX.
He continues to say, that “neither have visible things? been given to man [by God], but each individual thing comes into existence and perishes for the sake of the safety of the whole, passing agreeably to the change, which I have already men- tioned, from one thing to another." It is unnecessary, however, to linger over the refutation of these statements, which have been already refuted to the best of my ability. And the fol- lowing, too, has been answered, viz. that “there will neither be more nor less good and evil among mortals.” This point also has been referred to, viz. that “God does not need to amend His work afresh."? But it is not as a man who has imperfectly designed some piece of workmanship, and executed it unskil- fully, that God administers correction to the world, in purifying it by a flood or by a conflagration, but in order to prevent the tide of evil from rising to a greater height; and, moreover, I am of opinion that it is at periods which are precisely determin beforehand that He sweeps wickedness away, so as to contribute to the good of the whole world.* If, however, he should asser that, after the disappearance of evil, it again comes into exist ence, such questions will have to be examined in a special treatise. It is, then, always in order to repair what has become 1 dwaparraxrovs. 3 τὸ ὁρώμενα. 8 οὔτε τῷ Θεῷ καινοτέρας dei διορθώσεθ!: * ὅτι καὶ πάντη τιταγμένως αὐτὴν ἀφανίζων συμφερόντως τῷ “παντί.
Book 1v. | ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 235 faulty! that God desires to amend His work afresh. For although, in the creation of the world, all things had been arranged by Him in the most beautiful and stable manner, He nevertheless needed to exercise some healing power upon those who were labouring under the disease of wickedness, and upon a whole world, which was polluted as it were thereby. But nothing has been neglected by God, or will be neglected by Him; for He does at each particular juncture what it becomes Him to do in a perverted and changed world.. And as a hus- bandman performs different acts of husbandry upon the soil and its productions, according to the varying seasons of the year, so God administers entire ages of time, as if they were, so to speak, so many individual years, performing during each one of them what is requisite with a reasonable regard to the care of the world; and this, as it is truly understood by God alone, so also is it accomplished by Him.
. CHAPTER LXX.
. CHAPTER LXX.
Celsus has made a statement regarding evils of the following nature, viz., that “although a thing may seem to you to be evil, it is by no means certain that it is so; for you do not know what is of advantage to yourself, or to another, or to the whole world." Now this assertion is made with a certain degree of caution;? and it hints that the nature of evil is not wholly wicked, because that which may be considered so in individual cases, may con- tain something which is of advantage to the whole community. However, lest any one should mistake my words, and find a pretence of wrongdoing, as if his wickedness were profitable to the world, or at least might be so, we have to say, that although God, who preserves the free-will of each individual, may make use of the evil of the wicked for the administration of the world, so disposing them as to conduce to the benefit of the whole; yet, notwithstanding, such an individual is deserving of censure, and as such has been appointed for a use, which is a subject of loathing to each separate individual, although of advantage to the whole community. It is as if one were to say 1 τὰ σφάλματα ἀναλαρβά»ει». 3 ἔχει τὶ εὐλαβές.
καὶ as Ψεκτὸ; κατατίταχται εἰς χρείαν ἀπευνχταίαν μὲν ἑκάστῳ, χρήσι- oy δὲ τῷ παντί.
236 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Boor ix.
that in the case of. a city, a man who had committed certain crimes, and on account of these had been condemned to serve in public works that were useful to the community, did something that was of advantage to the entire city, while he himself was engaged in an abominable task,’ in which no one possessed of moderate understanding would wish to be engaged. — Paul also, the apostle of Jesus, teaches us that even the very wicked will contribute to the good of the whole, while in themselves they will be amongst the vile, but that the most virtuous men, too, will be of the greatest advantage to the world, and will therefore on that account occupy the noblest position. His words are: “ But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself, he shall bea vessel unto honour, sanctified and meet for the Master's use, pre- pared unto every good work.”? These remarks I have thought it necessary to make in reply to the assertion, that ‘although a thing may seem to you to be evil, it is by no means certain that it is so, for you do not know what is of advantage either to yourself or to another," in order that no one may take occasion from what has been said on the subject to commit sin, on the pretext that he will thus be useful to the world.
CHAPTER LXXI.
But as, in what follows, Celsus, not understanding that the language of Scripture regarding God is adapted to an anthro- popathic point of view, ridicules those passages which speak of words of anger addressed to the ungodly, and of threatening directed against sinners, we have to say that, as we ourselves, when talking with very young children, do not aim at exerting our own power of eloquence,' but, adapting ourselves to the weakness of our charge, both say and do those things which may appear to us useful for the correction and improvement of the children as children, so the word of God appears to have dealt with the history, making the capacity of the hearers, 3? the benefit which they were to receive, the standard of the appropriateness of its announcements [regarding Him].
l ἐν ἀπευκταίῳ πράγματι. 3 Cf. 1 Tim. ii. 20, 21. δ οὐ rov ἑαυτῶν ἐν τῷ λέγειν στοχαζόμεθα δυνατοῦ.
Book rv.] ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. 297 generally, with regard to such a style of speaking about God, we find in the book of Deuteronomy the following: “The Lord thy God bare with your manners, as a man would bear with the manners of his son."! It is, as it were, assuming the manners of a man in order to secure the advantage of men that the Scripture makes use of such expressions; for it would not have been suitable to the condition of the multitude, that what God had to say to them should be spoken by Him in a manner more befitting the majesty of His own person. And yet he who is anxious to attain a true understanding of Holy Scripture, will discover the spiritual truths which are spoken by it to those who are called “ spiritual," by comparing the meaning of what is addressed to those of weaker mind with what is announced to such as are of acuter understanding, both meanings being frequently found in the same passage by him who is capable of comprehending it.
CHAPTER LXXII.
CHAPTER LXXII.
We speak, indeed, of the “wrath” of God. We do not, however, assert that it indicates any “ passion" on His part, but that it is something which is assumed in order to discipline by stern means those sinners who have committed many and grievous sins. For that which is called God's * wrath," and * anger," 1s a means of discipline; and that such a view is agree- able to Scripture, is evident from what is said in the sixth Psalm, “Ὁ Lord, rebuke me not in Thine anger, neither chasten me in Thy hot displeasure;"? and also in Jeremiah, * O Lord, correct me, but with judgment: not in Thine anger, lest Thou bring me to nothing."? Any one, moreover, who reads in the second book of Kings of the * wrath" of God, inducing David to number the people, and finds from the first book of Chronicles that it was the devil who suggested this measure, will, orr com- paring together the two statements, easily see for what purpose the * wrath" is mentioned, of which * wrath," as the Apostle Paul declares, all men are children: * We were by nature 1 Cf. Deut. i. 31. Origen appears to have read, not irpofopnet», the com- mon reading (Heb. NU), but ἐτροποφορησεν, the reading of the Codex Alex. 3 298 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [Box rv.
children of wrath, even as others."! Moreover, that ‘ wrath” is no passion on the part of God, but that each one brings it upon himself by his sins, will be clear from the further state- ment of Paul: * Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? But after thy hardness and impenitent heart, treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judg- ment of God.” How, then, can any one treasure up for himself * wrath" against a “day of wrath,” if “wrath” be understood in the sense of “passion?” or how can the “ passion of wrath” be a help to discipline? Besides, the Scripture, which tells us not to be angry at aH, and which says in the thirty-seventh Psalm, * Cease from anger, and forsake wrath,”? and which commands us by the mouth of Paul to “put off all these, anger, wrath, malice, blasphemy, filthy communication,” * would not involve God in the same passion from which it would have us to be altogether free. It is manifest, further, that the language used regarding the wrath of God is to be understood figuratively from what is related of His * sleep," from which, as if awaking Him, the prophet says: “ Awake, why sleepest Thou, Lord?” * and again: * Then the Lord awaked as one out of sleep, and like mighty man that shouteth by reason of wine." 5 If, then, “sleep” must mean something else, and not what the first acceptation of the word conveys, why should not “ wrath” also be underst in a similar way? The «threatenings," again, are intimations of the [punishments] which are to befall the wicked: for it 5 as if one were to call the words of a physician “ threats, when he tells his patients, “I will have to use the knife, and apply cauteries, if you do not obey my prescriptions, 88 regulate your diet and mode of life in such a way as I direct you.” It is no human passions, then, which we ascribe to God, nor impious opinions which we entertain of Him; nor do we err when we present the various narratives concerning 41% drawn from the Scriptures themselves, after careful comparison one with another. For those who are wise ambassadors of t€ * word" have no other object in view than to free as far 85 Cf. Eph. ii. 3.? Of, Ps. xxxvii, 8. s Cf. Col. iii. 8 * Ps. xliv. 23. |". 58 Qf. Ps. Ixxviii. 65.
Boox Iv. | ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. ο 3289 they can their hearers from weak opinions, and to endue them with intelligence.
CHAPTER LXXIII.
And as a sequel to his non-understanding of the statements regarding the “wrath” of God, he continues: “Is it not ridiculous to suppose that, whereas a man, who became angry with the Jews, slew them all from the youth upwards, and burned their city (so powerless were they to resist him), the mighty God, as they say, being angry, and indignant, and uttering threats, should, [instead of punishing them,] send His own Son, who endured the sufferings which He did?” If the Jews, then, after the treatment which they dared to inflict upon Jesus, perished with all their youth, and had their city consumed by fire, they suffered this punishment in consequence of no other wrath than that which they treasured up for themselves; for the judgment of God against them, which was determined by the divine appointment, is termed ‘ wrath” agreeably to a traditional usage of the Hebrews. And what the Son of the mighty God suffered, He suffered voluntarily for the salvation of men, as has been stated to the best of my ability in the pre- ceding pages. He then continues: “But that I may speak not of the Jews alone (for that is not my object), but of the whole of nature, as I promised, I will bring out more clearly what has been already stated.” Now what modest man, on " reading these words, and knowing the weakness of humanity, would not be indignant at the offensive nature of the promise to give an account of the * whole of nature,” and at an arro-- gance like that which prompted him to inscribe upon his book the title which he ventured to give it [of a True Discourse]? But let us see what he has to say regarding the “whole of nature," and what he is to place * in a clearer light.”
CHAPTER LXXIV.
He next, in many words, blames us for asserting that God made all things for the sake of man. Because from the history of animals, and from the sagacity manifested by them, he would show that all things came into existence not more for the sake of man than of the irrational animals. And here he seems to 240 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. [ Book rv.
me to speak in a similar manner to those who, through dislike of their enemies, accuse them of the same things for which their own friends are commended. For as, in the instance referred to, hatred blinds these persons from seeing that they are accusing their very dearest friends by the means through which they think they are slandering their enemies; so in the same way, Celsus also, becoming confused in his argument, does not see that he is bringing a charge against the philosophers of the Porch, who, not amiss, place man in the foremost rank, and rational nature in general before irrational animals, and who maintain that Providence created all things mainly on account of rational nature. Rational beings, then, as being the principal ones, occupy the place, as it were, of children in the womb, while irrational and soulless beings hold that of the envelope which is created along with the child! I think, too, that as in cities the superintendents of the goods and market discharge their duties for the sake of no other than human beings, while dogs and other irrational animals have the benefit of the super- abundance; so Providence provides in a special manner for rational creatures; while this also follows, that irrational creatures likewise enjoy the benefit of what is done for the sake of man. And as he is in error who alleges that the super- intendents of the markets? make provision in no greater degree for men than for dogs, because dogs also get their share of the goods; so in a far greater degree are Celsus and they who think with him guilty of impiety towards the God who makes provision for rational beings, in asserting that His arrangements are made in no greater degree for the sustenance of human beings than for that of plants, and trees, and herbs, and thorns.
- CHAPTER LXXV.
For, in the first place, he is of opinion that * thunders, and lightnings, and rains are not the works of God,"—thus showing more clearly at last his Epicurean leanings; and in the seco? place, that “even if one were to grant that these were t?
1 καὶ λόγον μὲν ἔχει τὸ Aoyine, ὥπερ ἐστὶ προηγούμενα, Talou? γεννο μένον τὼ δ' ἄλογα καὶ rà ἄψυχα χωρίον συγκτιζομένου τῷ παιδίῳ.
2 ἀγορανόμοι.
Book ιν. ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. Ot works of God, they are brought into existence not more for the support of us who are human beings, than for that of plants, and trees, and herbs, and thorns,’—maintaining, like a true Epicurean, that these things are the product of chance, and not the work of Providence. For if these things are of no more use to us than to plants, and trees, and herbs, and thorns, it is evident either that they do not proceed from Provi- dence at all, or from a providence which does not provide for us in a greater degree than for trees, and herbs, and thorns. Now, either of these suppositions is impious in itself, and it would be foolish to refute such statements by answering any one who brought against us the charge of impiety; for it is manifest to every one, from what has been said, who is the person guilty of impiety. In the next place, he adds: “ Although you may say that these things, viz. plants, and trees, and herbs, and thorns, grow for the use of men, why will you maintain that they grow for the use of men rather than for that of the most savage of irrational animals?" Let Celsus then say distinctly that the great diversity among the products of the earth is not the work of Providence, but that a certain fortuitous concurrence of atoms! gave birth to qualities so diverse, and that it was owing to chance that so many kinds of plants, and trees, and herbs re- semble one another, and that no disposing reason gave existence to them,’ and that they do not derive their origin from an under- standing that is beyond all admiration. We Christians, however, who are devoted to the worship of the only God, who created these things, feel grateful for them to Him who made them, be- cause not only for us, but also (on our account) for the animals which are subject to us, He has prepared such a home,’ seeing *€ He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man, that He may bring forth food out of the earth, and wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face to shine, and bread which strengtheneth man’s heart.” * But that He should have provided food even for the most savage animals is not matter of surprise, for these very animals are said by some who have philosophized [upon the subject] to have been created for the purpose of affording exercise to the l συντυχία Tig dropay. 2 οὐδεὶς λόγος τεχνικὸς ὑπέστησεν αὐτά. S ἑστίαν. 4 Cf. Ps. civ. 14, 15. ORIG.—VOL. II. Q 242 ORIGEN AGAINST CELSUS. | [Boox rw.
rational creature. And one of our own wise men says some- where: “ Do not say, What is this? or Wherefore is that? for all things have been made for their uses. And do not say, What is this? or Wherefore is that? for everything shall be sought out in its season." * CHAPTER LXXVI.