myself, if there is any one, who in conversing with another, wishes to know the very thing about which the conversation is, be assured, I say, that I am such a person; and I think that you are too.
_Gorg._ What then, Socrates?
_Socr._ I will now tell you. The persuasion which you speak of as resulting from rhetoric, what it is, and with what particulars it is conversant, be assured I do not clearly understand, not but that I have a suspicion of what I suppose you mean, and about what it is employed: yet I will not the less ask you what persuasion you mean results from rhetoric, and with what particulars it is conversant. Why then do I who have a suspicion ask you, and not rather myself speak? Not on your account, but on account of the discussion, that it may proceed in such a manner as to make the subject of the discussion most clear to us. 19.
For consider whether I seem to you right in putting the question to you: just as if I should ask you what kind of a painter is Zeuxis? if you were to tell me that he paints animals, might I not justly enquire of you, what kind of animals he paints? is it not so[61]?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And would it not be for this reason, because there are also other painters who paint many other animals?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ But if no one else but Zeuxis painted them, you would have answered properly.
_Gorg._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ Come then, with respect to rhetoric, tell me, whether it appears to you that rhetoric alone produces persuasion, or do other arts produce it likewise? My meaning is this: Does he who teaches any thing persuade what he teaches, or not?
_Gorg._ He does certainly persuade, Socrates.
_Socr._ Again, if we speak of the same arts of which we just now made mention, does not arithmetic teach us such things as relate to number?
and does not an arithmetician the same?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
20. _Socr._ Does it not also persuade?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ Arithmetic, then, is an artificer of persuasion.
_Gorg._ It appears so.
_Socr._ If, then, any one should ask us, What persuasion it produces, and with respect to what? we should answer, That which teaches about the quantity of even and odd. In like manner we may shew, that all the other arts of which we spoke just now, produce persuasion, and what kind of persuasion, and with respect to what: is it not so?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ Rhetoric then, is not alone an artificer of persuasion.
_Gorg._ You say truly.
_Socr._ Since then, it does not alone produce this effect, but other arts do the same, we may justly, as in the case of the painter, next enquire of the speaker; of what kind of persuasion, and of persuasion on what subject rhetoric is the art? Does it not appear to you that this question may fairly be asked?
----- Footnote 61: I have ventured to read ἢ οὔ for καὶ ποῦ, for which my only excuse is that the usual reading cannot be rendered intelligibly, and that the alteration I have ventured to import is an expression very commonly used by Socrates on similar occasions.
----- _Gorg._ It does.
_Socr._ Answer then, Gorgias, since this appears to you to be the case.
21. _Gorg._ I speak then, Socrates, of that persuasion which is produced in courts of justice, and in other public assemblies, as I just now mentioned, and with respect to matters that are just and unjust.
_Socr._ I suspected, Gorgias, that you meant that persuasion, and on such matters. But do not be surprised if I shortly ask you a question that may appear to be evident, but which I shall notwithstanding repeat, for, as I before observed, I ask it for the sake of carrying on the discussion in an orderly manner, and not on your account, but that we may not be in the habit of catching up each other’s words on suspicion; but do you finish what you have to say according to your own plan, just as you please.
_Gorg._ You appear to me to act rightly, Socrates.
_Socr._ Come then, let us examine this too. Do you admit that to learn is any thing?
_Gorg._ I do admit it.
_Socr._ Again? to believe?
_Gorg._ I do.
_Socr._ Whether, therefore, does it appear to you, that to learn and to believe, and learning and belief are the same, or different?
_Gorg._ I think, Socrates, that they are different.
22. _Socr._ You think rightly; and you may know from this; if any one should ask you, Is there, Gorgias, a false and true belief? I think you would say there is.
_Gorg._ I should.
_Socr._ Well then, is there a false and true science?
_Gorg._ Certainly not.
_Socr._ It is clear, therefore, that they (belief and science) are not the same.
_Gorg._ You say truly.
_Socr._ Yet both those who learn are persuaded, and those who believe.
_Gorg._ Such is the case.
_Socr._ Are you willing, therefore, that we lay down two kinds of persuasion, one that produces belief without knowledge, but the other science?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Which kind of persuasion, then, does rhetoric produce in courts of justice and other public assemblies, respecting what is just and unjust? is it that from which belief springs without knowledge, or that from which knowledge arises?
_Gorg._ It is evident, Socrates, that it is that from which belief springs.
_Socr._ Rhetoric then, as it seems, Gorgias, is the artificer of a persuasion which produces belief, and not of that which teaches respecting the just and unjust.
_Gorg._ It is so.
_Socr._ A rhetorician, therefore, does not profess to teach courts of justice and other public assemblies, respecting things just and unjust, but only to produce belief. For surely he could not teach so great a multitude in a short time things of such great importance.
_Gorg._ Certainly not.
23. _Socr._ Come then, let us see now what we ought to say of rhetoric.
For I, indeed, am not yet able to understand what I should say. When an assembly is held in a city, for the choice of physicians, or shipwrights, or any other kind of artificer, is it not the case that the rhetorician will refrain from giving his advice? for it is evident that, in each election, the most skilful artist ought to be chosen. Nor _will he be consulted_ when the question is respecting the building of walls, or the construction of ports or docks, but architects only. Nor, again, when a deliberation occurs respecting the choice of generals, or the marshalling an army against enemies, or the occupation of posts,—but on such occasions those who are skilled in military affairs will give advice, and not rhetoricians. What do you say, Gorgias, on such points?
For since you say that you are a rhetorician, and are able to make others rhetoricians, it is proper to enquire of you what are the things about which your art is concerned. And consider that I am labouring for your benefit. For, perhaps, some one who is now within the house may wish to become your disciple; for I perceive some, nay several, who probably are ashamed to question you. 24. In being questioned, therefore, by me, consider yourself to be questioned by them, What would be the consequence to us, Gorgias, if we should put ourselves under your instructions? On what subjects shall we be able to give advice to the city? Whether about the just only and the unjust; or on those subjects of which Socrates just now made mention? Endeavour to answer them.
_Gorg._ I will endeavour, Socrates, to develope clearly the whole power of rhetoric: for you have admirably led the way. You doubtless know that these docks and walls of the Athenians, and the structure of the ports, were made partly on the advice of Themistocles, and partly on that of Pericles, but not of artificers.
_Socr._ This is told of Themistocles, Gorgias: and I myself heard Pericles when he gave us his advice respecting the middle wall[62].
----- Footnote 62: The wall which connected the southern extremities of the long walls and the Phaleric wall.
----- _Gorg._ And when there is an election of any such persons as you mentioned, Socrates, you see that the rhetoricians are the persons who give advice, and whose opinion prevails in such matters.
25. _Socr._ It is because I wonder at this, Gorgias, that I have been for some time asking you, what is the power of rhetoric. For when I consider it in this manner, it appears to me almost divine in its magnitude.
_Gorg._ If you knew all, Socrates, that it comprehends under itself almost all powers! And I will give you a strong proof of this. For I have often, ere now, gone with my brother and other physicians to various sick persons, who would neither drink their medicine, nor suffer themselves to be cut or cauterized by the physician, and when the physician was unable to persuade them, I have done so by no other art than rhetoric. I say too, that if a rhetorician and a physician should go to any city you please, and it were necessary to contend by argument in a general assembly, or any other convention, which should be chosen, a rhetorician or a physician, the physician would be held in no account, but he that has the power of speaking would be chosen, if he pleased.
26. And if he should contend with any other artist whatever, the rhetorician would persuade that he himself should be chosen in preference to any one else. For there is no subject on which a rhetorician will not speak to the multitude more persuasively than any other artist whatever. Such, then, and so great is the power of this art. It is right however, Socrates, to use rhetoric in the same way as any other exercise employed in contests: for it is not right to use other exercises against all men alike; nor, because any one has learnt pugilism, and the pancratium, and to fight with arms, so as to be superior both to friends and enemies, is it therefore proper to strike, or pierce, or slay one’s friends. 27. Nor, by Jupiter, if some one who, by having frequented the palæstra, has made his body robust, and become a pugilist, should afterwards strike his father or mother, or any other of his relatives or friends, would it on that account be proper to hate, and expel from cities, the training masters and those who teach how to fight with arms. For they instructed their pupils in these exercises, in order that they might make a proper use of them against enemies, and those that do wrong, for self-defence, and not for attack; but they contrariwise, use their strength and skill improperly. The teachers, therefore, are not wicked, nor is their art either to be blamed, or for this reason wicked, but they, I think, who do not use it properly. 28.
The same may be said of rhetoric. For a rhetorician is able to speak against all men, and on every subject; so that he can best persuade the multitude, in a word, on whatever subject he pleases: but he ought not any the more on this account to detract from the reputation of physicians, because he is able to do it, nor of other artificers; but he should use rhetoric justly, as well as other exercises. In my opinion, however, if any one having become a rhetorician abuses this power and art, it is not proper to hate the teacher and expel him from cities, for he imparted the knowledge of it for just purposes, but the other makes a contrary use of it. It is just, therefore, to hate, banish, and slay him who does not make a right use of it, but not the teacher.
29. _Socr._ I think, Gorgias, that you as well as I, have been present at many discussions, and that you have observed this in them, that it is not easy for men, on whatever subject they undertake to converse, having propounded their ideas to each other, both learning themselves and teaching one another, then to put an end to the conference; but if they have a controversy about any thing, and one says that the other does not speak correctly or clearly, they are indignant, and each thinks that the other is speaking out of envy, from a love of contention, and not seeking what was proposed in the discussion: and some, at length[63], depart in a most disgraceful manner, having[64] reviled each other, and spoken and heard such things that even the bystanders are vexed at themselves for having deigned to listen to such men. 30. But why do I say this? Because you now appear to me to say what does not follow from, or accord with, what you first said respecting rhetoric. I am afraid, therefore, to proceed with my refutation, lest you should suppose that I do not speak with zeal for the subject, that it may be made clear, but out of opposition to you. If, then, you are of that class of men to which I belong, I should gladly question you: but if not, I would forbear to do so. But to what class of men do I belong? To those who are willingly refuted, if they say any thing that is not true, and who willingly refute if any one says any thing that is not true; and who are not less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I consider the former to be the greater good, inasmuch as it is a greater good one’s-self to be delivered from the greatest evil than to deliver another. For I think no evil so great to man as false opinion on the subjects we are now discussing. If, then, you say that you are such a man, let us continue our discussion; [31.] but if you think we ought to desist, let us give it up, and put an end to the argument.
----- Footnote 63: Ficinus, I think, correctly translates τελευτῶντες, _tandem_.
Footnote 64: ----- _Gorg._ But indeed, Socrates, I profess myself to be such a man as you describe. Perhaps, however, it is right to attend to the wishes of the company who are present. For, some time since, before you came, I explained many things to the present company: and now, perhaps, we shall protract it too far if we continue the discussion. We must, therefore, respect their wishes lest we detain any of them, who have something else to do.
_Chær._ You yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, hear the noise these men make, from their anxiety to hear, if you say any thing. For my part, may I never have so much business, as to be obliged to leave such a discussion and so conducted, from having any thing else more important to do.
32. _Cal._ By the gods, Chærephon, and I too, though I have been present at many conferences, know not whether I have ever been so delighted as now; so that you will gratify me much, should you even be willing to continue the discussion throughout the whole day.
_Socr._ There is no obstacle on my side, Callicles, if only Gorgias is willing.
_Gorg._ After this, Socrates, it would be shameful in me not to be willing, especially as I myself announced that any one might ask what he pleased. But, if it is agreeable to the company, continue the discussion, and ask any question you please.
_Socr._ Hear then, Gorgias, what I wonder at in what you said. For, perhaps, you spoke correctly, and I did not rightly apprehend you. You say that you can make any one a rhetorician, who is willing to be instructed by you?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ So that he can speak persuasively on any subject to the multitude, not teaching, but persuading?
_Gorg._ Exactly so.
_Socr._ You said too, that a rhetorician is able to speak more persuasively than a physician, on the subject of health.
_Gorg._ I did say so, at least to a multitude.
_Socr._ Does not, then, this expression “to a multitude” mean to the ignorant? for, surely, among the well-informed he will not be better able to persuade than the physician.
_Gorg._ You say truly.
33. _Socr._ If then he shall be better able to persuade than the physician, he is better able to persuade than one who possesses knowledge?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Although he is not a physician? is it not so?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ But he who is not a physician must, surely, be unskilled in those things in which a physician is skilled.
_Gorg._ Clearly so.
_Socr._ He, therefore, who is ignorant will be more capable than one who possesses knowledge of persuading the ignorant, since a rhetorician is better able to persuade than a physician. Is this the result, or something else?
_Gorg._ That is the result in this instance.
_Socr._ The case therefore is the same as concerns a rhetorician and rhetoric with respect to all other arts: I mean, there is no need for it to know the subjects themselves, how they are circumstanced, but only to discover some means of persuasion, so as to appear to the ignorant to know more than those who possess knowledge.
_Gorg._ Is it not a great advantage, Socrates, without having other arts, but this one only, to be in no respect inferior to artificers?
34. _Socr._ Whether from this being the case, a rhetorician is inferior, or not inferior to others, we will presently consider, if our argument requires it. But first let us consider this: Whether a rhetorician is in the same condition with reference to the just and the unjust, the base and the honourable, the good and the evil, as he is with reference to health, and other things with which other arts are concerned; I mean, that he does not know them, what is good, or what is evil, what is honourable or what is base, what is just, or what is unjust, but is able to devise some means of persuasion respecting them, so that, though he is ignorant, he appears to the ignorant to know more than one who possesses knowledge; or is it necessary that he should know these, and is it requisite that he who is about to learn rhetoric should have acquired these things before he comes to you; if not, will you, who are a teacher of rhetoric, teach him who comes to you none of these things (for it is not your province), but make him appear to the multitude to know these things, though he does not know them, and to seem to be a good man when he is not so? or shall you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows beforehand the truth respecting these things?
What is the case in this respect, Gorgias? And, by Jupiter, as you just now promised, unfold the whole power of rhetoric.
35. _Gorg._ I think, Socrates, that any one, if he did not know, would learn these things from me.
_Socr._ Stay; for you say well. If then you make any one a rhetorician, it is necessary that he should know what is just and unjust, either before, or afterwards from your instructions.
_Gorg._ Certainly.
_Socr._ What then? Is he who has learnt carpentering, a carpenter, or not?
_Gorg._ He is.
_Socr._ And is not he who has learnt music, a musician?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ And he who has learnt medicine, a physician? And so, in the same way, with regard to other things, is not he who has learnt any particular art such a person as each science respectively makes its proficient?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
_Socr._ By the same reason, then, does it not follow, that he who has learnt just things is just?
_Gorg._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ And he who is just surely performs just actions.
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ Is it not, therefore, necessary[65] that the just man should wish to do just actions?
----- Footnote 65: Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι] τὸν [δὲ] δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν. I concur with Ast and others in thinking that the words inserted in brackets have been interpolated, and have therefore omitted them in the translation. Their insertion would break the chain of the argument.
----- _Gorg._ It appears so.
_Socr._ The just man, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly.
_Gorg._ Necessarily.
_Socr._ And it follows from the argument that the rhetorician should be just?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ A rhetorician, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly?
_Gorg._ It appears not.
36. _Socr._ Do you remember that you said a little before that we ought not to accuse the trainers of youth, nor expel them from cities, if a pugilist does not make a good use of the pugilistic art, and acts unjustly? And so, likewise, if a rhetorician make an unjust use of rhetoric, that we should not accuse the teacher, nor expel him from the city, but the person who acts unjustly, and does not make a proper use of rhetoric? Were these things said, or not?
_Gorg._ They were said.
_Socr._ But now this very same rhetorician appears incapable of ever acting unjustly. Is it not so?
_Gorg._ It appears so.
_Socr._ And it was said, Gorgias, at the commencement of our discussion, that rhetoric is conversant with words, not those respecting the even and the odd, but those respecting the just and the unjust. Was it not so?
37. _Gorg._ It was.
_Socr._ When, therefore, you spoke thus, I supposed that rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, since it always discourses concerning justice.
But when you said shortly afterwards that a rhetorician might use rhetoric unjustly, then, wondering, and thinking that the two statements did not accord, I made that remark, that if you should think it a gain to be confuted, as I do, it was worth while to continue the discussion, but if not, to give it up. Afterwards, however, when we were investigating the matter, you see yourself that it is again allowed to be impossible for a rhetorician to make an unjust use of rhetoric, and to be willing to act unjustly. How the case really stands, by the dog, Gorgias, requires no little discussion to examine it thoroughly.
38. _Pol._ What then, Socrates? Have you really such an opinion of rhetoric as you now say? or do you not think that Gorgias was ashamed not to acknowledge that the rhetorician knows what is just, beautiful, and good, and that, if any one should come to him ignorant of these things, he himself would teach them? Then perhaps from this admission some inconsistency in his arguments followed; the very thing which you love, yourself leading the way to such questions. For who do you think will deny that he knows what is just, and can teach it to others? To lead the discussion to such matters is a piece of great rusticity.
_Socr._ Most excellent Polus! we get ourselves friends and sons, for this express purpose, that when we, through being advanced in years, fall into error, you that are younger, being with us, may correct our life both in deeds and words. If, then, Gorgias and I have fallen into any error in our arguments, do you who are present correct us: you ought to do so. And I wish that if any of the things that have been granted appear to you to have been improperly granted, you would retract whatever you please, only I beg you beware of one thing.
_Pol._ What is that?
39. _Socr._ That you would restrain that prolixity of speech which at first you attempted to employ.
_Pol._ What? shall I not be allowed to speak as much as I please?
_Socr._ You would indeed be very badly treated, my excellent friend, if, having come to Athens, where of all Greece there is the greatest liberty of speech, you alone should here be deprived of this liberty. But set this against it: if you speak in a prolix manner, and will not answer a question put to you, should not I be badly treated, if I am not allowed to go away and not listen to you? But if you feel any interest in the discussion that has taken place, and wish to correct it, as I just now said, retract whatever you please, and questioning and being questioned in turn, as Gorgias and I did, confute and be confuted. For you profess, surely, to know the same things as Gorgias; is it not so?
_Pol._ I do.
_Socr._ Will not you, then, also bid any one ask you what question he pleases, as knowing how to answer him.
_Pol._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ Then do whichever of these you please, ask or answer.
40. _Pol._ I will do so; and do you answer me, Socrates. Since Gorgias appears to you to be in doubt respecting rhetoric, what do you say it is?
_Socr._ Do you ask me what kind of art I say it is?
_Pol._ I do.
_Socr._ To tell you the truth, Polus, it does not appear to me to be an art at all.
_Pol._ What, then, does rhetoric appear to you to be?
_Socr._ A thing which you say produced art, in the treatise which I lately read.
_Pol._ What do you say this is?
_Socr._ A certain skill.
_Pol._ Does rhetoric, then, appear to you to be skill?
_Socr._ To me it does, unless you say otherwise.
_Pol._ Of what is it the skill?
_Socr._ Of procuring a certain gratification and pleasure.
_Pol._ Does not rhetoric, then, appear to you to be a beautiful thing, since it is able to gratify mankind?
_Socr._ What, Polus? Have you already heard from me what I say it is, that you afterwards ask me, if it does not appear to me to be beautiful?
_Pol._ Did I not hear you say that it is a certain skill?
_Socr._ Since, then, you prize giving pleasure, are you willing to give me a little pleasure?
_Pol._ I am.
41. _Socr._ Ask me, then, what kind of art cookery appears to me to be.
_Pol._ I do ask you; what kind of an art is cookery?
_Socr._ None at all, Polus.
_Pol._ What is it? say.
_Socr._ I say, then, it is a certain skill.
_Pol._ Of what? say.
_Socr._ I say, of procuring gratification and pleasure, Polus.
_Pol._ Are cookery and rhetoric the same thing?
_Socr._ By no means, but a part of the same study.
_Pol._ Of what study are you speaking?
_Socr._ I fear it would be too rude to speak the truth, for I hesitate to speak on account of Gorgias, lest he should think that I ridicule his profession. But I know not whether this is the rhetoric which Gorgias studies: for it was not at all clear from our late discussion what his opinion is. But what I call rhetoric is a part of a certain thing which does not rank among things beautiful.
_Gorg._ Of what thing, Socrates? say, without fear of offending me.
_Socr._ It appears to me, then, Gorgias, to be a certain study, that does not belong to art, but to a soul that is sagacious and manly, and naturally powerful in its intercourse with men. The sum of it I call flattery. 42. Of this study there appears to me to be many other divisions, and one of them is that of cookery; which, indeed, appears to be an art, but, as I maintain, is not an art, but skill and practice. I also call rhetoric a division of this, and personal decoration, and sophistry, these four divisions relating to four particulars. If, therefore, Polus wishes to enquire, let him enquire, for he has not yet heard what division of flattery I assert rhetoric to be: but he did not observe that I had not yet finished my answer, nevertheless he asks me, if I do not think that it is beautiful. But I shall not answer him, whether I think rhetoric is beautiful or base, till I have first answered what it is. For that would not be right, Polus. If then you wish to enquire, ask me what division of flattery I assert rhetoric to be.
_Pol._ I ask, then, and do you answer, what division it is.
_Socr._ Will you understand me when I answer? For rhetoric, in my opinion, is a semblance of a division of the political art.
_Pol._ What then? Do you say that it is beautiful, or base?
_Socr._ Base, I say; for I call evil things base: since I must answer you, as now knowing what I mean.
43. _Gorg._ By Jupiter, Socrates, but I do not myself understand what you mean.
_Socr._ Very likely, Gorgias: for I have not yet spoken clearly. But Polus here is young and hasty.
_Gorg._ But leave him alone; and tell me in what way you say that rhetoric is a semblance of a division of the political art.
_Socr._ I will endeavour to tell you what rhetoric appears to me to be.
And if it is not such as I describe it, Polus here will confute me. Do you not call body something, and soul something?
_Gorg._ How not?
_Socr._ Do you not, then, think that there is a certain good habit of each of these?
_Gorg._ I do.
_Socr._ What then? an apparent good habit, which is not really so? for instance, to explain my meaning, many appear to have a good constitution of body, whom no one but a physician, and a teacher in gymnastics, could easily perceive not to have a good constitution.
_Gorg._ You say truly.
_Socr._ I say that there is something of this kind both in the body and in the soul, which causes the body and the soul to appear to be in a good condition, when they are any thing but so.
44. _Gorg._ Such is the case.
_Socr._ Come now, if I can, I will explain to you more clearly what I mean. As there are two subject matters, I say there are two arts: and that which relates to the soul I call political, but that which relates to the body I am not able to describe to you off-hand by one name; but of the culture of the body, which is one, I say there are two divisions, one gymnastics, the other medicine. But in the political art I lay down legislation, as corresponding to gymnastics, and the judicial to medicine. Now these respectively communicate with each other, as being concerned about the same subject, medicine with gymnastics, and the judicial art with legislation; yet they in some respect differ from each other. These then being four, and always taking the best possible care, the former of the body, and the latter of the soul, flattery perceiving this, I do not say knowing, but sagaciously guessing it, and having divided itself fourfold, and having stealthily put on the garb of each of these divisions, feigns itself to be that which it has put on; and it is not in the least concerned for what is best; but by means of that which is most pleasant, captivates and seduces ignorance, so as to appear to be of great value. 45. Cookery, therefore, puts on the garb of medicine, and pretends that it knows the aliment best for the body. So that if a cook and a physician had to contend before boys, or before men as foolish as boys, which of the two was acquainted with good and bad aliments, the physician or the cook, the physician would die of hunger.
This, then, I call flattery; and I say that a thing of this kind is base, Polus, (for I say this to you,) because it looks to what is agreeable without regard to what is best; and I affirm that it is not an art, but skill, because it has no knowledge of the things which it employs, what they severally are in their nature, so that it is unable to tell the use of each. But I do not call that an art which is a thing without reason. If you are doubtful about these things, I am willing to give you a reason for them. The flattery, then, pertaining to cookery, as I have said, is concealed under medicine; and in the same manner, under gymnastics, personal decoration, which is mischievous, deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal, deceiving by means of gestures and colours, by smoothness and outward appearance; so as to make men put on an adventitious beauty, and neglect that which is their own, and is acquired by gymnastics. 46. That I may not, then, be prolix, I wish to tell you, after the manner of geometricians, (for perhaps you can now follow me,) that what personal decoration is to gymnastics, that is cookery to medicine: or rather thus, that what personal decoration is to gymnastics, that is sophistry to legislation, and that what cookery is to medicine, that is rhetoric to justice. As I have said, they are thus different in their nature: but as they are proximate to each other[66], sophists and rhetoricians are confounded with _legislators and judges_, and are employed about the same things, and know not what to make of themselves, nor other men of them. For, if the soul did not preside over the body, but the body over itself, and cookery and medicine were not examined into and distinguished by the soul, but the body itself decided, estimating things by its own gratifications, that tenet of Anaxagoras would prevail extensively, friend Polus, (for you surely are acquainted with it,) that is, all things would be confounded together, things medicinal, and healthy, and pertaining to cookery, being undistinguished from each other. 47. You have heard, therefore, what I consider rhetoric to be, corresponding to cookery in the soul, as that in the body. Perhaps, however, I have acted absurdly, in that, though I do not allow you to make a long speech, I myself have extended mine to a great length. But I deserve to be pardoned: for when I spoke briefly you did not understand me, nor were you able to make use of the answer that I gave you, but required an explanation. If, therefore, when you answer, I in my turn shall not know what to make of it, do you also prolong your discourse: but, if I do know, suffer me to do so; for that is fair. And now, if you can make any use of this answer, do so.
----- Footnote 66: Bekker omits the words σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, and Ast suggests δικασταὶ for σοφισταὶ, in either of which cases the addition of the words in italics would be unnecessary.
----- _Pol._ What do you say, then? Does rhetoric appear to you to be flattery?
_Socr._ I said, indeed, that it was a division of flattery. But do not you remember, Polus, though so young? What will you do by and by?
_Pol._ Does it seem to you, then, that good rhetoricians are to be esteemed as vile flatterers in cities?
_Socr._ Do you ask this as a question, or are you beginning an argument?
48. _Socr._ They appear to me to be of no estimation at all.
_Pol._ How to be of no estimation? Have they not the greatest power in cities?
_Socr._ Not, if you mean that to have power is a good to him who possesses it.
_Pol._ But I do say so.
_Socr._ In that case, rhetoricians appear to me to possess the least power of all men in cities.
_Pol._ But what? do they not, like tyrants, slay whomever they please, and deprive of their property, and banish from cities whomever they think fit?
_Socr._ By the dog, Polus, I am doubtful with respect to each of the things you say, whether you assert these things yourself, and declare your own opinion, or ask me.
_Pol._ I ask you.
_Socr._ Be it so, my friend. Then you ask me two questions at once.
_Pol._ How two?
_Socr._ Did you not just now say, that rhetoricians, like tyrants, slay whomever they please, and deprive them of their property, and banish from cities whomever they think fit?
_Pol._ I did.
49. _Socr._ I say, then, that these are two questions, and I will give you an answer to both. For I affirm, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants have very little power in cities, as I just now said: for they do scarcely any thing that they wish, though they do what to them appears to be best.
_Pol._ Is not this, then, to possess great power?
_Socr._ It is not, at least as Polus says.
_Pol._ I say not? On the contrary, I say it is.
_Socr._ By Jupiter, not you. For you said that to have great power is a good to him who possesses it.
_Pol._ And I repeat it.
_Socr._ Do you think, then, it is a good for any one to do what appears to him to be best, when he is void of understanding? And do you call this to possess great power?
50. _Pol._ Not I.
_Socr._ Prove, therefore, that rhetoricians are possessed of understanding, and that rhetoric is an art, and not flattery, if you mean to confute me. But, if you will leave me unconfuted, rhetoricians and tyrants, who do in cities whatever they please, will derive no good from thence. Power is, as you say, good; but to do, without understanding, whatever one pleases, you yourself admit is an evil. Is it not so?
_Pol._ I do.
_Socr._ How then can rhetoricians or tyrants have great power in cities, unless Socrates is persuaded by Polus to admit that they do what they wish?