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sist in pei^petual acquisition, non-existence is immediately present with them. Bnt to things which are not such as these, if you add the it will be, a departure from the seat of existence is the consequence of such an addition. For it is evident that existence is not connascent with them, if they are in any respect indebted to futurity for their subsis- tence. For in generated natures, indeed, essence is seen to be an extension from the beginning of generation, to the extremity of the time in which they no longer exist. This it is, therefore, for them to be; and if any one should de- prive them of this extension of being, their life would be diminished. So that it is necessary that the existence of the universe also, should be an extension of this kind. Hence, it hastens to be in futurity, and is not willing to stop, since it attracts existence to itself, in performing another and another thing, and is moved in a circle through a certain desire of essence. So that we have found what existence is in such natures as these, and also what the cause is of a motion which thus hastens to be perpetually in the future periods of time. In first and blessed natures, however, there is not any desire of the future; for they are now the whole, and whatever of life they ought to possess, they wholly possess, so that they do not seek after any thing, because there is not any thing which can be added to them in futurity. Hence, neither does that happen to them in which there is the future. The all-perfect and total essence therefore of being, is not only total in its parts, but is not in any thing deficient, and is that to which nothing pertaining to non-being can happen; for it is not only necessary that all beings should be present with the ally and the whole, but likewise that nothing should be added to it of that which sometimes is not. Hence this • disposition and nature of the all-perfect essence of being, will be eternity. For eternity is denominated from that which always is.
. ON ETERNITY AND TIME. 121 IV. He, ho-wiever, will know that eternity ^ thus subsists, who by the projecting^ energies of intellect is able to speak concerning it: or rather, he who sees it to be a thing of such a kind, that nothing in short has ever been generated about it; for otherwise it would not be perpetual being, or would not always be a certain total being. Is it therefore now perpetual? It is not, unless a nature of such a kind is in- herent in it, as to procure credibility concerning it, that it thus subsists, and no longer in any other way. So that •if again you sui'vey it by the projecting energies of -intellect, you will find that it is such a thing as this. What then, if some one should never depart from the con- templation of it, but should incessantly persevere in ad- miring its nature, and should be able to do this through the possession of an unwearied nature, such a one perhaps running to eternity, would there stop, and never decline from it, in order that he might become similar to it, and eternal, surveying eternity and the eternal by that which is eternal in himself. If, therefore, that which thus sub- sists is eternal, and always being, which does not decline in any respect to another nature, but the life which it possesses is now all, neither having received, nor receiving, nor being about to receive any thing in future; — that which thus subsists, will indeed be perpetual. And per- petuity is such a collocation as this of a subject, subsisting from it, and being inherent in it. But eternity is the sub- ject in conjunction with a collocation of this kind present- ing itself to the view. Hence eternity is venerable, and as our intellectual conception of it says, is the same with deity. But it says that it is the same with that God [whom we ^ Instead of nvi here, it appears to me to be necessary to read Ttif aiCivt, ^ The visive energies of intellect are thus denominated, because such an energy is an immediate darting forth as it were to the object of its intuition.
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call by the appellation of being and life.] And eternity may be properly denominated a God unfolding himself into light, and shining forth, such as he essentially is» viz. as immutable and the same, and thus firmly established in life. It ought not, however, to be considered as wonderful, if we say that it consists of many things. For every thing in the intelligible world is many, on account of the infinite power which it possesses; since the infinite re- ceives its appellation from a never-failing essence. And this properly, because nothing pertaining to it is consumed. Hence, if some one should thus denominate eternity, call- ing it life which is now infinite, because it is all, and nothing of which is consumed, because nothing pertaining to it is either past or future, since otherwise it would not be all things at once; — if some one should thus denominate it, he will be near to the true definition * of it. For what is afterwards added, viz. that it is all things at once, and that nothing of it is consumed, will be an exposition of the assertion, that it is now infinite life.
V. Because, however, such a nature as this, thus all- beautiful and perpetual, subsists about the one, proceeding from and with it, and in no respect departing from it, but always abides about and in the one, and lives according to it, hence I think it is beautifully and with a profundity of decision, said by Plato, that " eternity abides in one," * that he might not only lead it to the one which is in itself, but that he might also in a similar manner lead the life of being about the one. This, therefore, is that which we in- ^ This definition of eternity is justly admired by Proclus in his 3rd book "On the Theology of Plato," of which see my translation. Boetius, likewise, as I have elsewhere observed, has adopted this definition in lib. 5, **De Consol. Philosoph."
* Plato, however, does not by the one in this place, mean the ineffable principle of things, but the one of being, or the summit of the inteUigible order, as is shown by Proclus in the above men- tioned work.
ON ETERNITY AND TJME. 123 vestigate, and that which thus abides is eternity. For this very thing, and which thus abides, which is the energy of a life abiding from itself, subsisting with and in the one, and which neither in existing nor living is false and fictitious, will certainly be eternity. For to be truly, is never not to be, nor to be otherwise. But the former of these is to be invariably the same; and the latter is to be without diversity. Hence it has not in any respect, another and another. You must not, therefore, conceive it to have interval, nor evolve, nor extend it. Neither, therefore, must you admit that there is any thing of prior and posterior in it. Hence, if there is neither prior nor posterior about it, but the is, is the truest of all the things about it, and is itself, and this in such a way as to be essence and life; — if this be the case, again that which we call eternity will present itself to our view. But when we say that it is always, and that it is not at one time being, and at another time non-being, it is requisite to think that we thus speak for the sake of perspicuity; since the term always, is perhaps not properly employed, but is assumed for the purpose of manifesting its incorruptible ^ nature. And farther still, it signifies that it never fails. Perhaps, however, it would be better to call it only being. But though being is a name suflScient to essence, yet since some are of opinion that generation also is essence, it is requisite for the sake of discipline to add the term always. For one thing is not being, but another perpetual being; as neither is a philosopher one thing, but a true philosopher another.* Because, however, some persons are only philo- ^ After Tov a<l>9dfyrov in the Greek, the words nXavif av ti)v \pvxnv, t if U^div TOV nXiiovoQ follow, which are to me unintelligible. Some- thing, I conceive, is omitted; but I am not able to conjecture what the omission is. The version of these words by Ficinus is certainly nonsense; for it is, "animum potest reddere vagahundum per (|uendam in plora exitum et proventum. " 124 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
sophers in appearance, the addition of a true pHlosoplier became necessary. Thus, likewise, the alwajfs was added to being, and being to the always. So that it was called aion; on which account the always was assumed, in order that the conjunction of being with the always, might indicate that which is truly being. The always, likewise, must be contracted into a power devoid of interval, and which be- sides what it now possesses, is not in want of any thing. But it possesses every thing. Hence it is every thing and being, and is not indigent of any thing. Nor is a nature of this kind, full indeed in one respect, but deficient in another. For that which exists in time, though it may seem to be as perfect as is sufficient to body, yet it is perfect through soul, and is in want of something future, because it is deficient in time of which it is indigent; so that it exists together with time, if it is present with it, and being imperfect, runs in conjunction with it. On this account, therefore, it is equivocally said to be a perfect being. That, however, which is a thing of such a kind, as neither to be in want of futurity, nor to be measured by some other time, nor to be in futurity infinite, and this in- finitely, but now possesses that which it ought to be; — this is that after which our intellectual conception aspires; the being of which is not derived from a certain quantity of extension, but is prior to all quantity. For it is fit, since it is not of a definite quantity, that it should not at all come into contact vdth quantity, lest the life of it being divided, should lose its pure impartibility; but that it should be both in life and essence impartible. When, how- ever, it is said in the " Timseus " that the demiurgus was good, this must be referred to the conception of the universe, signifying that what is beyond the universe, does not originate from a certain time; so that neither is the world allotted a certain temporal beginning, since the cause of its existence is the source of priority. At the same time, however, Plato thus speaking for the sake of perspictiitj, blames afterwards this expression was good, as not altogether rightly employed in things which are allotted what is called and is intellectually conceived to be, an eternal subsistence.
VI. Do we, therefore, bear witness to the things of which we now speak, as to things foreign from our nature? But How is this possible? For how can intellectual per^ ception be effected, except by contact? And how can we come into contJact with things that are foreign to us? It is necessary, therefore, that we also should participate of eternity. Since, however, we exist in time, how is thi& possible? But we shall know what it is to be in time, and what it is to be in eternity, when we have discovered what time is^ We must, therefore, descend from eternity to time, and the investigation of time. For there, indeed, the progression was to that which is above, but we must now speak descending, yet not profoundly, but our descent mast be such as that of time. If, indeed, nothing had been said concerning time by ancient and blessed men, it would be necessary that connecting from the beginning what follows with eternity, we should endeavour to speak what appears to us to be the truth on this subject, and to adapt our opinion to the conception of it which we possess. Now, however, it is necessary first to assume those asser- tions which especially deserve attention, and to consider if what we say is concordant with some one of them. But perhaps the assertions concerning time, ought in the first place to receive a threefold division. For time may be said to be either motion, or that which is moved, or something pertaining to motion. For to say that it is either permanency, or that which is stable, or something pertain- ing to permanency, will be perfectly remote from the con- ception of time, since it is in no respect the same [and therefore, can never iccord with that which is stable}. Of 126 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS, those, however, who say that time is motion, some indeed assert that it is every motion; but others, that it is the motion of the universe. But those who say it is that which is moved, assert it to be the sphere of the universe. And of those who say it is something pertaining to motion, or the interval of motion; some assert that it is the measure of motion, but others that it is an attendant on it, and either on every motion, or on that which is arranged.* VII. It is not, indeed, possible, that time should be motion, neither if all motions are assumed, and one as it were is produced from all of them, nor if that motion is assumed which is orderly. For each of these motions is in time. If, however, some one should say that motion is not in time, much less will motion be time; since that in which motion is, is one thing, and motion itself another ^ thing. Since, however, there are beside these other assertions, it may be sufficient to observe, that motion may indeed cease and be interrupted, but time cannot. But if some one should say that the motion of the universe is not inter- rupted, yet this motion, if it is admitted that the circula- tion [of the world] is in a certain time, will itself be carried round to the same point from whence it began; and not to * Archytas the Pythagorean defined time to be the universal interval of the nature of the universe, in consequence of surveyinjx the continuity in the productive principles of that nature, and their departure into divison. Others still more ancient defined time to be, as the name manifests, a certain dance of intellect; but others defined it to he the periods of soul; others, the natural receptacle of these periods; and others, orderly circulations; all which (says lamblichus, from whom this information is derived) the Pythagoric sect comprehends. Both Archytas also and Aristotle appear to have admitted time to he a continued and indivisible Hux ofnows. See a treasure of the conceptions of the ancients on this subject, in the Additional Notes to my translation of Aristotle'?* "Physics." ^ ' For &KK* oi) here, it is necessary to read oKKov, ON ETERNITY AND TIME. 127 that point in which the half of it only is accomplished. And this motion, indeed, will be the half, but the other will be double, each being the motion of the universe, both that which proceeds from the same to the same, and that which arrives only at the half. The assertion, also, that the motion of the outermost sphere is most vehement and rapid, bears witness to what we say; so that the motion of it is one thing, and time another. For that motion is the most rapid of all, which in the least time passes through the greatest interval. But other motions are slower, which are performed in a longer time, and pass through a part only of the same space. If, therefore, time is not the motion of the outermost sphere, much less will it be that sphere itself, which in consequence of being moved is con- ceived to be time. Is, therefore, time something belonging to motion? If indeed it is interval, in the first place, there is not the same interval of every motion, nor of uniform motion. For the motion which is in place is swifter and slower, and both the intervals may be measured by another third interval, which may with greater rectitude be dominated time. But of which of these motions will time be the interval? Or rather, will it be the interval of any one of them, since they are infinite? And if time is the interval of orderly motion, it is not the interval of every motion, nor of every motion of this kind. For these are many. So that there will also be at once many times. But if time is the interval of the universe, if indeed it is the interval in motion itself, what else will it be than motion, viz. so much; and this quantity of motion will either be measured by place, because the place which it passes through is so much in quantity, and the interval will be this. This, however, is not time, but place. Or motion by its continuity, and from not immediately ceasing, but being always assumed, possesses interval But this will be the multitude of motion. And if some one looking to 128 SEJiECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS, motion should assert that it is much, just as if it should be said that heat is much» neither will time here also present itself to our view, nor become obvious; but motion agaid and again will occur, like water repeatedly flowing, and also the interval which is beheld in it. The again and again also wiU be number, as the duad or the triad; but the interval will belong to bulk. Thus, therefore, th« multitude of motion will be as the decad, or as the interval which is beheld as it were in the bulk of motion, which is not attended with a conception of time. But this quantity of motion will be generated in time; for otherwise, time will not be every where, but will be in motion as in a sub- ject. It will, likewise, again happen that time will be said to be motion. For the interval is not external to motion, but is motion not at once collected together. But if it is not at once collected, if an at-once-collected sub- sistence is in time, in what respect does that which is not at-once-collected differ from that which is? Shall we say that they differ in time; so that the separating motion, and the interval of it, are not time itself, but subsist in time? If, however, some one should say, that the interval of motion is time, by the interval not meaning the peculiarity of motion, but that with which motion has an extension, as if running together with it, yet what this is, is not unfolded. For it is evident that time is that in which the motion was generated. This, therefore, is that which was investigated from the first, viz. what that existing thing is which is time; since this is just as if some one being asked what time is, should say that the interval of motion is in time. What, therefore, is this interval, which he calls time, who supposes it to be external to the proper interval of motion? For again, he who places tem- poral interval in motion itself, will be dubious where he should place the interval of rest. For as much as a certain thing is moved, so much also will something else have been ON ETERNITY AND TIME. 129 quiescent. And jou may say that the time of each is the same, though its relation to the one, is different from its relation to the other. What therefore is this interval, and what nature does it possess? For it is not possible that it should be local since this has an external sub- sistence.
Vin. In the next place, it must be considered how time is the number or measure of motion; for it is better to assert this of it, on account of its continuity. In the first place, therefore, here also it may be doubted, whether it is similarly the number or measure of every motion, in the same manner as it was dubious respecting the interval of motion. For how can any one numerate inordinate and anomalous motion, or what number or measure will there be of it, or according to what will the measure subsist? But i£ he numerates and measures with the same thing, both irregular and regular motion, whether swift or slow, the number and the measure will be a thing of such a kind, as if it were the decad, measuring both horses and oxen, or as if the same thing were the measure both of moist and dry substances. If, therefore, time is a measure of this kind, it has indeed been shown what the things are of which time is the measure, viz. that it is the measure of motions, but it has not yet been shown what time is. If, however, in the same manner as the decad when assumed without horses, may be understood as number, and a measure is a measure possessing a certain proper nature, though it should not yet measure any thing, thus also it is necessary time should subsist, being a measure; — if therefore time is such a thing in itself as number, in what will it differ from this number which subsists according to the decad, or from any other monadic number? But if it is a continued measure, being a certain quantity, it will be such a measure as a certain cubital magnitude. It will, therefore, be magnitude, such as a line accompanied with motion. But K 130 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
how, since it also runs, can it measure that with which it runs in conjunction? For why should one measure rather than the other? And it is better and more probable to admit this not in every motion, but in that with which it concurs. This, however, ought to be continuous, so far as the concurrent motion is successive. But that which measures ought not to be considered as subsisting exter- nally, nor as separate, but as at once measured motion. And what will that be which measures? Will the motion indeed be measured, but the magnitude be that which measures? And which of these will time be? Will it be the measured motion, or the magnitude which measures? For time will either be the motion which is measured by magnitude, or magnitude which measures, or that which uses magnitude, as a cubit for the purpose of measuring the quantity of the motion. In all these, however, it is more probable as we have said to suppose that the motion is equable. For without equability, and besides this, without one motion of the universe, the doubt will be greater than that which results from admitting that time is in some way or other the measure of motion. But if time is measured motion, and is measured by quantity, then just as if it were necessary that motion should be measured, it would not be requisite that it should be measured by itseK, but by something else, thus also it is necessary, if motion has another measure besides itself, and on this account we are in want of a continuous measure, for the purpose of measuring it, that magnitude itself should have a measure, in order that the motion may be as much in quantity as its measure. And thus time will be the number of the magnitude attending the motion, and not the magnitude which runs in conjunction with the motion.
It is necessary, however, to doubt what this number is, whether it is monadic, and how it measures? For though ON ETERNITY AND TIME. 131