some one should discover how it measures, jet he would not find time measuring, but a certain quantity of time. This, however, is not the same with time [simply considered]. For it is one thing to speak of time, and another, of so much time. For prior to the so much, it is necessary to say what that is which is so much. Is time, therefore, the number which measures motion externally? Such as the decad in horses, and not that which is assumed together with horses. What this number, therefore, is, has not been shown, which prior to measuring, is what it is, in the same manner as the decad. Shall we sav it is that number which measures by running according to the prior and posterior of motion? ^ But it is not yet manifest what this number is which measures according to prior and posterior. That, however, which measures according to prior and posterior, whether by a point, or by any thing else, entirely measures according to time. This number,'* therefore, which measures motion by prior and posterior, will be suc- cessive to, and in contact with time, in order that it may measure it. For prior and posterior, must either be assumed locally, as the beginning [and end] of a stadium, or tempo- rally. For in short, with respect to prior and posterior, the former indeed is time ending in the now; but the latter is time beginning from the now. Time, therefore, is different from the number which measures motion according to prior and posterior, not only motion of any kind, but also that ^ Time is defined by Aristotle, to be the number of motion according to prior and posterior, which accords with Plato's defini- tion of it in the " Timseus," viz. that it is an eternal image flowing according to number. For this shows that time subsists according to number which has the relation of an image, and exists accord- ing to the order of motion, i.e. according to prior and posterior. In short, time is properly the measure of motion according to the flux of being, which is the peculiarity of generation, or becoming to be.
* For xpf^vos here, it is necessary to read apiBiioc, 132 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
which is orderly. In the next place, why when number is adjoined, whether according to the measured, or the measuring, (for the same number may be both that which measures, and is measured) — why therefore when number is added, will there be time; but motion existing, and prior and posterior entirely subsisting about it, there will not be time? Just as if some one should say that magni- tude is not as great as it is, unless some one apprehends what the quantity of it is. Since time, however, is, and is said to be infinite, how will there be number about it, unless a part of it being selected is measured, in which case it will happen that it exists prior to its being measured. But why will not time be prior to the existence of soul that measures it? Unless it should be said that the genera- tion of it is effected by soul; since it is by no means neces- sary that time should exist because it is measui'ed by soul. For it would exist as much as it is in quantity, though no one should measure it. And if some one should say that it is soul which uses magnitude for the purpose of measuring time, what will this have to do with the conception of time? IX. But to say that time is an appendix of motion, is not to teach what time is, nor ought this to be said before it is shown what the appendix is. For perhaps it may be time. With respect to this appendix, however, it must be considered, whether it has a posterior, or simultaneous, or prior subsistence; if there is an appendix of this kind. For in whatever manner it may be spoken of, it is spoken of in time. Hence, if this is time, it will follow that time is the appendix of motion in time. Since, however, we do not investigate what time is not, but what it is, and much has been said on this subject by many prior to us, according to each position, he who discusses thesS would rather com- pose a history [than discover the nature of time]. To which may be added, that we have occasionally said some- thing concerning these different positions. Some things ON ETERNITY AND TIME. 133 also may be opposed from what has been already said, to him who asserts that time is the measure of the universe, and likewise such other things as have just now been asserted respecting the measure of motion. For separate from inequality, all the other particulars may be adduced, which are adapted to their positions. It follows, therefore, that we should now show what it is necessary to think time is.
X. Again, therefore, it is requisite that we should betake ourselves to that condition of being which we have said is in eternity; a condition which is immutable, and at once total, a life now infinite and perfectly inflexible, and abiding in one, and directed to the one. But time was not yet, or at least was not in those natures; but was about to be generated ^ by the reason and nature of that which is posterior. Intelligibles, therefore, quietly energizing in themselves, he who desires to know how time first fell, will not perhaps call upon the Muses who did not then exist, to tell him. Perhaps, however, he will, since the Muses also then had a being.^ Perhaps, too, he will find time itseK generated, so far as it is generated and unfolded into light. Bnt he will speak about it as follows: Before this priority originated, and was indigent of the posterior, the former was quiescent together with the latter in being, time •not yet existing; but itself also quietly abiding [i.e. subsisting casually] in real being. A certain ^ Time, as well as the world, is said to have been generated, not because it once was not, for it always existed, but because it depends for its subsistence on causes naturally prior to itself.
^ The Muses, considered according to their subsistence in Apollo, belong to the intellectual order, and are therefore superior to time. But if time is supposed to have had a beginning, then the Muses, according to their mundane subsistence, had no existence prior to the generation of time. To say, therefore, that the Muses did not once exist, is equivalent to the assertion that the intellectual is prior to the mundane order of them, according to nature, order, dignity, and causality.
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nature, however, mucli conversant witli action, wishing to govern, and possess authority from itself, and chusing to explore more of the present, was itself indeed moved, and together with it likewise time, always tending to hereafter and the posterior, and not to the same, but to another, and again another existence. But we from this motion pro- ducing a certain length of progression, conceive time to be the image of eternity. For since there was a certain unquiet power of the soul, wishing always to transfer what it there saw to something else, it was not willing that an at-once- collected all should be present with it. But as reason [i.e. a productive principle] evolving itself from a quiet seed, l>roduces as it fancies an abundant progression, abolishing the abundant by division, and instead of the one subsisting in itself, consuming the one which is not in itself, and thus l>roceeds into a more imbecile length; in a similar manner, this nature of soul, producing the sensible through the imitation of the intelligible world, and being moved not with the motion which is there, but with a motion resem- bling it, and wishing to be its image, in the first place indeed, renders itself temporal, producing this instead of eternity. In the next place, it causes that which is gene- rated to be subservient to time, making the whole of it to be in time, and comprehending all the progressions of it in time. For the world is moved in the nature of soul; since there is not any other place of this universe than soul, and in the time of soul it is moved. For soul exhibiting its energy successively, generates together with its energy that which is successive, and proceeds in conjunction with another reasoning process after that energy, which was not before; since, neither was the discursive energy of reason effective, nor the present life of soul similar to that which preceded it. Hence, at the same time, there is another life, and this other life will have another time. Distance of life, therefore [or the interval between one life and another], . ON ETERNITY AND TIME, 135 will be attended with time. The perpetual extension of life also to the anterior part, will have perpetual time: and the past life will be accompanied with past time. If, therefore, some one should say that time is the energy ^ of soul, proceeding in a transitive motion from one life to another, will he not appear to say something to the pur- pose? ^ For if eternity is life consisting in permanency, and in an invariable sameness of subsistence, and which is now infinite, but it is necessary that time should be the image of eternity, just as this universe is the image of the intelligible world; — ^if this be the case, instead of the life which is there, it is necessary there should be another life of the discursive power of the mundane soul, homonymous as it were to the life of eternity; and instead of intellectual motion, that there should be the motion of a certain part of the soul. It is also necessary, that instead of an invariable sameness and permanency of subsistence, there should be that which does not abide in the same, but always has another and another energy. Likewise, that instead of an essence which is without interval and one, there should be an image of the one, and which possesses unity in continuity of succession. That instead of that which is now infinite, and a whole, there should be that which proceeds ad ^ The word ivkfrfEia is omitted in the original.
^ Time, however, according to Proclus, is a medium between that which is alone the cause of motion, as soul, and that which is alone immoveable, as intellect. Hence time is truly, so far as it is considered in itself, immoveable, but so far as it is in its partici- pants, it is moveable, and subsists together with them, unfolding itself into them. He adds, hence it is a certain proceeding intel- lect, established indeed in eternity, but proceeding and abundantly flowing into the things which are guarded by it. This definition of time by Proclus, appears to me to be uncommonly beautiful and accurate. See the whole of the passage from which it is taken, in the Additional Notes to my translation of the " Timoeus " of Plato.
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infinitum, according to what is perpetually successive. And that instead of an at-once-coUected whole, there should be that which is a whole according to parts, and is always about to be a whole. For thus it will imitate that which is now wholly what it is, and which is at-once-coUected, and infinite, if it wishes its being to consist in perpetual acquisition; since it will thus also imitate the being of eternity. It is necessary, however, not to assume time externally to soul, as neither is eternity in the intelligible world external to being. Nor again, must it be considered as any thing consecutive, or posterior to soul, as neither is eternity to being. But it must be beheld within, and sub- sisting together with soul, in the same manner as eternity with being.
XI. Here, however, it is necessary to understand, that this is the nature of time, viz. that it is the length of such a life as we have before mentioned, proceeding in equable and similar mutations, which themselves proceed in a silent course; this length also possessing a continuity of energy. If, therefore, we again in words make this power to revert, and the life of it to cease which it now possesses, and which is unceasing, and will never end, because it is the energy of a certain ever-existing soul, not directed to itself, nor in itself, but employed in producing and gene- rating; — if, therefore, we suppose this power no longer energizing, but ceasing from this energy, and also this part, of the soul converted to real being and eternity, and abiding in quiet, what will there any further be besides eternity? What will any longer be another and another, where all things abide in one? And what will be prior or posterior, or more extended? Where, likewise, will the soul any further betake itseK to any other thing than that in which it is? Or rather, neither will it betake itself to this. For in this case, it must have first departed from it, in order that it may accede to it; since neither is it the ON ETERNUT AND TIME. 137 sphere itself [of the universe] which had not an existence prior to time. For this sphere exists, and is moved in time. And though time should stop, this sphere still con- tinuing to energize, we should nevertheless measure the duration of its permanency, as long as the permanency of eternity is* external to it. If, therefore, this sphere becoming quiescent and united, time is taken away, it is evident that the commencement of its motion, round the earth, and this its life, generate time. Hence, also, it is said [in the " Timseus " of Plato], that time was generated together with the universe, because soul produced it in conjunction with the universe. For in an energy of this kind, this world was generated. And this energy indeed is time, but the universe is in time. If, however, some one should say, that the circulations of the stars are also denominated by Plato times, he should recollect that he says these were generated for the purpose of rendering time manifest and distinct, and that the measure of it might be conspicuous to us. For since it was not possible for time itself to be bounded by soul, nor for each part of it to be measured by us, since it is invisible and incom- prehensible, and especially since this is impossible to those who do not know how to numerate, — hence the Demiurgus made day and night, through which mankind were enabled to apprehend two things by their difference; from which, as Plato says, they arrived at the conception of number. Afterwards receiving the interval produced by the motion of the sun from the east to the east again, they apprehended what was the quantity of time, the form of the motion being equable; adhering to which, we use a thing of this kind as a measure of time. For time itself is not a measure. For how could it measure; and what would it say if it measured? Will it say this thing is as much in quantity as I am? Who therefore is it that says I? Is it that according to which the measure subsists? Has it 138 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
not therefore an existence in order that it may measure, but is not a measure? Hence the measiu*ed motion of the universe will be according to time. And time will not be the measure of motion, according to that which it is, but according to accident, so that being something else prior to this, it renders the quantity of the motion manifest. One motion also being assumed in so much time, and being frequently enumerated, leads to a conception of the quantity of time that is past. So that if some one should say that motion and circulation, after a certain manner, measure time as much as possible, as manifesting in their quantity the quantity of time, which cannot in any other way be assumed or understood, he indeed will not adduce an absurd manifestation of time. Hence, that which is measured by circulation, viz, which is manifested, and not generated by it, will be time. And thus the measure of motion is that which is measured by a definite motion, and is measured by it, as being different from it. For if that which measures was one thing, and that which is measured another, but is measured accidentally; in this case, it would be just as if some one should say that what is measured by a cubit is magnitude, but should not say what that is which defines the magnitude. It would also be just as if some one not being able to render motion itself manifest on account of its indefinite nature, should say that motion is that which is measured by place. For assuming the place which motion passes through, he will say that the quantity of the motion is equal to the quantity of the place.
XII. Circulation, therefore, renders time in which it is performed manifest. It is necessary, however, that time should no longer alone be that in which something is per- formed, but that prior to this it should be what it is, namely, that in which other things are moved and at rest^ in an equable and orderly manner; and that from a certain ON ETERNITY AND TIME. 139 thing of an orderly nature, it should become apparent, and shine forth to our conceptions, yet not be generated by this thing, whether it is at rest, or in motion. It becomes, how- ever, more apparent when this thing is in motion. For motion contributes more to the knowledge, and transition to the nature of time than rest. And the quantity of the motion of a thing is more known than the quantity of its rest. Hence [some philosophers] have been induced to say that time is the measure of motion, instead of saying that it is measured by motion. In the next place, it is requisite to add what that is which is measured by motion, and not to adduce that which accidentally takes place about it, and this alternately. Perhaps, however, they do not intend to say that this takes place alternately, and we do not understand their meaning; but they clearly asserting that time is a measure according to that which is measured, we do not apprehend their conceptions on this subject. The cause, however, why we do not, is because they have not clearly shown in their writings what time is, whether it is a measure, or that which is measured, as if they were writing to those who were acquainted with their opinions, and to their auditors. Plato, indeed, does not say that the essence of time is either a measure, or that which is measured by something, but asserts in order to render it manifest, that the circulation [of the universe] is allotted something which is the smallest [i.e. the centre,] for the purpose of unfolding the smallest part of time; so that from hence both the quality and quantity of time may be known. Wishing, however, to manifest the essence of time, he says that it was generated together with the universe, and that it is a moveable image of its paradigm eternity; because neither does time remain, life not re- maining, in conjunction with which it runs and is con- volved. But he says, it was generated together with the universe, because such a life as this produced the universe, 140 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
and one life fabricated both tbe world and time. If, there- fore, this life could be converted into one, time which exists in this life would immediately cease, and also the universe, in consequence of no longer possessing this life.
If, however, some one assuming the prior and posterior of the life which is here, should assert this to be time, because this is something, but that the more tnie motion which has prior and posterior is not any thing, his assertion would be most absurd. For he would ascribe to inanimate motion the prior and posterior, and also time together with it, but he would not grant this to the motion through the imitation of which the inferior motion exists; though from this superior motion prior and posterior primarily subsist, since it is a self -operative motion. As, likewise, it generates its several energies, thus too it produces that which is suc- cessive, and together with the generation a transition of energies. Why, therefore, do we refer this motion of the universe to the comprehension of the more true motion, and assert that it is in time, but do not refer to this the motion of soul which subsists in itself, and proceeds in a perpetual course? Shall we say it is because that which is prior to it is eternity, which neither runs in conjunction, nor is co-extended with this motion? This first motion, therefore, is referred to time which also it generates, and which together with its own energy it possesses. How, therefore, is time every where? Because this life and motion are not absent from any part of the world, as neither does the life which is in us desert any part of us. If, however, some one should say that time consists in a non-hypo stasis, or non-hyparxis, for we are deceived about its essence, in the same manner as when we say of G-od that he was or will he; for thus he will he and was in the same manner as that in which it is said he will he [^.e. in the same manner as time]; to assertions of this kind there belongs another mode of discussion. With respect to all ON ETERNITY AND TIME. 141 that has been said, however, it is necessary to observe, that when any one assumes the quantity of space passed over by a man that is moved, he also assumes the quantity of the motion, and when he assumes the quantity of the motion, such for instance as is produced in walking, he directs his attention to the boundary ^ of motion existing in the man prior to this motion, in order that he may judge whether he has walked to the full extent of this boundary. And the body, indeed, which has been moved in so much time, he refers to so much motion; for this is the cause of its being moved; and to the time of this motion. But he refers this motion of the body to the motion of the soul which produced an equality of interval. To what, therefore, will he refer the motion of the soul? For that whatever it may be to which he may wish to refer it, will be now without interval. Hence, this subsists primarily, and is that in which the rest are contained; but it is itseK no longer contained in any thing else. For there is not any thing by which it can be contained. This, there- fore, is primarily; and the like takes place in the soul of the imiverse. Is then time in us also? May we not say that it is in every such soul, that it subsists uniformly in every similar soul, and that all of them are [in a certain respect] one? Hence, time will not be divulsed, since neither is eternity, which according to another charac- teristic is in all uniform natures.
^ The word used by Plotinus here is Kivrifm, which signifies in the Physics of Aristotle, the boundary of motioru VII. ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
IV. viL I. Whether each [part] of us is immortal, or the whole perishes, or one part of us is dissipated and corrupted, but another part perpetually remains, which part is the man himself, may be. learnt by considering conformably to nature as follows: Man, indeed, is not something simple, but there is in him a soul, and he has also a body, whether it is annexed to us as an instrument, or after some other manner. However this may be, it must be admitted, that the nature and essence of each of these must be thus divided. Since the body, therefore, is itself a composite, reason shows that it cannot remain [perpetually the same]; and sense likewise sees that it is dissolved and wastes away, and receives all- various destructions; since each of the things inherent in it tends to its own [i.e. to the whole form from which it was derived], and one thing belonging to it corrupts another, and changes and perishes into something else. ' This, too, is especially the case when the soul, which causes the parts to be in friendly union with each other, is not present with the corporeal masses. If each body, likewise, is left by itself, it will not be one, since it is capable of being dissolved into form and matter, from which it is also necessary that simple bodies should have their composition. Moreover, as being bodies they ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 143 have magnitude, and consequently may be cut and broken into the smallest parts, and through this are the recipients of corruption. Hence, if body is a part of us, we are not wholly immortal. But if it is an instrument [of the soul] it is necessary that being given for a certain time, it should be naturally a thing of this kind. That, however, which is the most principal thing, and the man himseK, will be that with reference to the body which form is with reference to matter, since this according to form is as body to matter; or according to that which uses, the body has the relation to it of an instrument. But in each way soul is the man himseK.
II. What, therefore, is the nature of this thing [soul]? If indeed it is a body, it is in every respect capable of being analyzed. For every body is a composite. But if it is not a body, but of another nature, that also must be con- sidered either after the same, or after another manner. In the first place, however, it must be considered into what body this body which they call soul ought to be analyzed. For since life is necessarily present with soul, it is also necessary that this body which is supposed to be soul, if it consists of two or more bodies, should have a connascent life in both, or in each of them; or that one of these should have life, but the other not, or that neither should be vital. If, therefore, life is present with one of them only, this very thing will be soul. Hence, what body will this be which has life from itself? For fire, air, water and earth, are of themselves inanimate; and with which- ever of these soul is present, the life which it uses is adven- titious. There are not, however, any other bodies besides these. And those to whom it appears that there are other bodies the elements of these, do not assert that they are souls, or that they have life. But if it should be said, that though no one of these bodies possesses life, yet the con- gress of them produces life, he who says this would speak 144 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.