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illuminates all intelligibles with reality. By sucli a soul as this, therefore, it may be properly said, Farewell, a God immortal now am I,^ haying ascended to divinity, and earnestly striving to be- come similar to him. If, however, purification causes the soul to have a knowledge of the most excellent things, the sciences also which are inwardly latent will then shine forth, and which are truly sciences. For the soul does not by running to externals behold temperance and justice, but perceives them herself by herself, in the intellection of her- self, and of that which she formerly was, and views them like statues established in herself, which through time have become covered with rust. These she then purifies, just as if gold were animated, and in consequence of being in- crusted with earth, and not perceiving itself to be gold, should be ignorant of itself; but afterwards shaking off the earth which adheres to it, should be filled with admira- tion on beholding itself pure and alone. Then, also, it would perceive that it has no need of adventitious beauty, and would consider with itself that it is then in the best condition when it is permitted to be wholly by itself.
XI. Who, therefore, endued with intellect will doubt that a thing of this kind is not immortal, to which in- destructible life is present from itself? For how is it possible it should perish, since it is not adventitious, and is not possessed in the same way as heat is present with fire? I do not mean by this, that heat is adventitious to fire, but that it is so to the subject matter of fire, though it is not to fire itself. For through this fire is dissolved. Soul, however, does not possess life in such a way, as that matter is the subject of it, but life acceding, demonstrates the presence of soul. For either life is essence, and is an essence of such a kind as to live from itself, which is soul, ^ A celebrated line of Empedocles* ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 157 the object of our investigation, and this they acknowledge to be immortal; or they must analyze it as a composite* This, also, they must analyze, till they arrive at that which is immortal, and moved from itself, and to which it is not lawful to receive the destiny of death. Or if they say that life is a passion adventitious to matter, they are compelled to acknowledge that nature to be immortal from which this passion was imparted to matter, and which is incapable of receiving the contrary to that which it imparts. For it is one nature living in energy.
XII. Farther still, if they say that every soul is corrup- tible, it would be requisite that all things should have long since perished. But if they assert that one soul is corrup- tible, and another not, as for instance, that the soul of the universe is immortal, but ours not, it is necessary that they should assign the cause of this difference. For each is the cause of motion, and each lives from itself. Each, like- wise, comes into contact with the same things by the same power, intellectually perceiving the natures in the heavens, and also those that are beyond the heavens, investigating everything which has an essential subsistence, and ascend- ing as far as to the first principle of things. To which may be added, that it is evident the soul gave being to itself prior to the body, from its ability of apprehending what each thing is, by itself, from its own inherent spectacles, and from reminiscence. And from its employing eternal sciences, it is manifest that it is itself perpetual. Besides, since everything which can be dissolved receives composi- tion, hence, so far as a thing is a composite, it is naturally adapted to be dissolved. But soul being one simple energy, and a nature characterized by life, cannot be corrupted as a composite. Will it, therefore, through being divided and distributed into minute parts, perish? Soul, however, is not, as we have demonstrated, a certain bulk or quantity.
May it not, therefore, through being changed in quality.
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be corrupted? Change in quality however which corrupts takes away form, but leaves the subject matter. But this is the passion of a composite. Hence, if it is not possible for the soul to be corrupted according to any of these modes, it is necessarily incorruptible.
XI IT. How, therefore, since the intelligible is separate, does the soul descend into body? ^ Because so far as in- ^ Souls fall into bodies, (says Proclns in Tim. p. 343.) because they wish to imitate the providential energies of the Gods, and on this account proceed into generation, and leave the contem- plation of true being. For as divine perfection is twofold, one kind being intellectual and the other providential, and one kind consisting in an abiding energy, but the other in motion, hence souls imitate the prolific, intellectual, and immutable energy of the Gods by contemplation, but their providential and motive characteristic, through a life conversant with generation. As the intelligence too, of the human soul is partial, so likewdse is her providence; but being partial it associates with a partial body. But still further, the descent of the soul contributes to the per- fection of the universe. For it is necessary that there should not only be immortal and intellectual animals, such as are the per- petual attendants of the Gods, nor yet mortal and irrational animals only, such as are the last progeny of the Demiurgus of the universe, but likewise such as subsist between these, and which are by no means [wholly] immortal, but are capable of par- ticipating reason and intellect. And in many parts of the universe, there are many animals of this kind. For man is not the only rational and mortal animal, but there are other such-like species, some of which are more daemoniacal, and others approximate nearer to our essence. But the descents of a partial soul con- tribute to the perfect composition of all animals, which are at the same time mortal and rational.
Should it be again asked, Why, therefore, are partial souls descending into generation filled with such material perturbation, and such numerous evils? We reply, that this takes place through the inclination arising from their free will; through their vehe- ment familiaritj' with body; through their sympathy with the image of soul, or that divisible life which is distributed about the body; through their abundant mutation from an intelligible to a sensible nature, and from a quiet energy to one entirely convter- ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 159 tellect alone is impassive in intelligibles, having an intellec- tual life alone, it abides there eternally. For it has not any impulse, or appetite. But that which receives appetite, and is next in order to that intellect, by the addition of appe- tite proceeds as it were to a greater extent, and being de- sirous to adorn, in imitation of the forms which it sees in intellect, it becomes as it were pregnant from them. Hence, becoming parturient, it hastens to make and fabri- cate, and through this f estination becoming extended about a sensible nature, when it subsists in conjunction with the soul of the universe, it transcends the subject of its govern- ment, by being external to it, and thus together with the mundane soul presides over the universe with a providen- tial care. But when it wishes to govern a part of the world, it then governs alone, and becomes [merged] in that in which it is; yet not so as to be wholly absorbed by body, but even then it possesses something external to body. Hence, neither is the intellect of this soul passive. But this soul is at one time in body, and at another exsant with motion; and through a disordered condition of being, naturally arising from the composition of dissimilar natures, viz. of the immortal and mortal, of the intellectual and that which is deprived of intellect, of the indivisible and that which is endured with interval. For all these become the cause to the soul of this mighty tumult and labour in the realms of generation; since we pursue a flying mockery which is ever in motion. And the soul, indeed, by verging to a material life, kindles a light in her dark tenement the body, but she herself becomes situated in obscurity; and by giving life to the body, she destroys herself and her own intellect, in as great a degree as these are capable of receivinjr destruction. For thus the mortal nature participates of intel- lect, but the intellectual part of death, and the whole becomes a prodigy, as Plato beautifully observes in his Laws, composed of the mortal and immortal, of the intellectual and that which is deprived of intellect. For this physical law, which binds the soul to the body, is the death of the immortal life, but is the cause of vivification to the mortal body."
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ternal to it. And being impelled, indeed, to descend from first natures, it proceeds as far as to such as rank in the third degree, and to those with which we are conyersant, by a certain energy of intellect; intellect at the same time abiding in itself, and through soul filling every thing with all that is beautiful, being an immortal adorner through an immortal soul. For intellect itself also exists eternally, through unceasing energy.
XIV. With respect to the souls of other animals, such among these as have fallen from a better condition, and have proceeded as far as to brutal bodies, these likewise are necessarily immortal. But if there is another species of soul, it is necessary that this also should not be derived from any other source than a vital nature, since this like- wise is the cause of life to animals, and besides this, of the life which is in plants. For all these proceeding from the same principle, have an appropriate life of their own. And these souls also are incorporeal, impartible, and essences. If, however, it is requisite that the soul of man being tri- partite should be dissolved with the composite, we must say that pure souls which are liberated from the body, dis- miss that which adhered to them in generation; but that this is accomplished by others in long periods of time. That also which is dismissed, is the worst part, nor will this be destroyed, as long as that subsists from whence it originates. For nothing which is comprehended in being perishes.
XV. And thus much has been said by us to those who require demonstration on this subject. But such things as should be adduced to those who stand in need of the evidence arising from faith mingled with sensible informa- tion, may be selected from history, which abounds with in- stances in confirmation of the immortality of the soul. It may also be obtained from what the Grods have delivered in Oracles, when they order the anger of souls that have ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 161 been injured, to be appeased; and likewise bonours to be paid to tbe dead, as being still sentient, wbicb honours all men pay to departed souls. Many souls also who once ranked among men, do not cease when liberated from bodies to benefit mankind. And these by employing divination benefit us in other respects, and demon- strate through themselves, that other souls also do not perish.
M VIII.
ON THE THREE HYPOSTASES, THAT RANK AS THE PRINCIPLES OF THINGS.
V. i.
I. What is the reason tliat souls become oblivious of divinity, being ignorant both of themselves and him, though their allotment is from thence, and they in short partake of Q-od? The principle therefore of evil to them is audacity, generation, the first difference,^ and the wish to exercise an unrestrained freedom of the will. When, therefore, they began to be delighted with this unbounded liberty, abundantly employing the power of being moved from themselves, they ran in a direction contrary [to their first course], and thus becoming most distant from their source, they were at length ignorant that they were thence derived. Just as children who are immediately torn from their parents, and have for a long time been nurtured at a great distance from them, become ignorant both of them- selves and their parents. Hence, souls neither seeing their father, nor themselves, despise themselves through ignor- ance of their race, but honour other things, and admiring * The five genera of being are, essence, sameness, difference, motion and permanency. This difference, therefore, which ranks as the first, and which is the source of all diversity, causes souls by predominating in them to be forgetful of deity, and themselves.
ON THE THREE HYPOSTASES. 163 every thing rather than themselves, being vehemently astonished about, and adhering to sensible natures, thej as much as possible hurl themselves [from their true parents], and thus despise the beings from which thej have become elongated. Hence, the honour which they pay to sensible objects, and the contempt of themselves, happen to be the causes of their all-perfect ignorance. For at the same time they pursue and admire something else, and acknowledge themselves to be inferior to that which they admire and pursue. But the soul admitting that it is something subordinate to things which are generated, and corrupted, and apprehending that it is the most ignoble and mortal of every thing which it honours, neither believes in the nature nor power of God. Hence, it is necessary that there should be a twofold discourse to those who are thus affected, in order to convert them to the contraries [to the things they admire], and to first natures, and to elevate them as far as to that which is highest, and one, and the first. What, therefore, is each of these dis- courses? One of them, indeed, is that which shows the cause why the soul honours these sensible objects, which we have elsewhere largely discussed; but the other teaches and reminds the soul of the greatness of its origin, and its true dignity; which discussion is prior to the former, and when manifested will render that manifest. Of this, therefore, we must now speak. For this is proximate and con- ducive to the object of enquiry. For that which is investi- gated is soul; and what it investigates should be known by it, in order that it may in the first place learn whether it has the power of investigating things of this kind; and also whether it has such an eye as is able to see them, and whether they are properly objects of its enquiry. For if they are foreign to its nature, why should it investigate them? But if they are allied to it, it is expedient and possible to discover them.
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II. Every soul, therefore, ought to consider in the first place, that soul produced all animals, and inspired them with life; viz. those animals which the earth and sea nourish, those which live in the air, and the divine stars contained in the heavens. Soul also made the sun; soul made and adorned this mighty heaven. Soul, too, circum- volves it in an orderly course, being of a nature different from the things which it adorns, which it moves, and causes to live, and is necessarily more honourable than these. For these are corrupted when soul deserts them, and generated when it supplies them with life. But soul always exists, because it never deserts itself. What the mode is, however, by which life is supplied to the universe, and to each of its parts, may be considered to be as follows: Let a certain other soul whose dignity in contemplating is not small, being liberated from deception, and the allure- ments which fascinate other souls, be established in a quiet condition and survey a mighty soul. And let not only the surrounding body and the storms of body be at rest with respect to it, but the whole of that by which it is surrounded. Let the earth, therefore, be still; let the sea be still, the air, and the heavens themselves which are more excellent than the elements.^ Afterwards, let this ' Proclus had evidently this beautiful passage in view, when, in his second book ** On the Theology of Plato," he celebrates the ineffable principles of things, with the following matchless magni- ficence of diction.
" Let us now, if ever, remove from ourselves multiform know- ledge, exterminate all the variety of life, and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. For this purpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions alone which impede our anagogic impulse to the first be at peace; but let the air be still, and the universe itself be still. And let all things extend us with a tranquil power to communion with the inefifable. Let us also, standing there, having transcended the intelligible (if we contain any thing of this kind), and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the rising sun since it is not lawful for any ON THE THREE HYPOSTASES. 16e5 quiet soul behold that other mighty soul, externally as it were, on all sides flowing and infused into, penetrating and illuminating the quiescent mass. For just as the rays of the sun darting on a dark cloud cause *it to become splendid, and golden to the view, thus also, soul entering into the body of heaven gave it life, gave it immortality, and excited it from its torpid state. But heaven being moved with a perpetual motion, through the guidance of a wise soul, became a blessed animal. It also acquired dignity through soul becoming ^*® inhabitant, since, prior to soul, it was a dead body, viz. earth and water, or rather the darkness of matter and non-entity; and, as some one says, that which the Gods abhor. The power, however, and nature of soul will become still more apparent and manifest, if any one directs his attention to the manner in which it comprehends and leads heaven by its will. For it gives itself to the whole of this vast magnitude; and every interval, both great and small, is animated by it: one body indeed, being situated differently from another, and some bodies being opposite, but others being sus- pended from each other. This, however, is not the case being whatever intiently to behold him — let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean; and again, from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and from intellect, employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to ourselves what the natures are, from which, in this progression, we shall consider the first god as exempt. And let us as it were celebrate him, not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence to souls, and the generations of all animals; for he produced these indeed, but among the last of things. But, prior to these, let us celebrate him, as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intellectual genus of gods, together with all the supermundane and mundane divinities — as the god of all gods, the unity of all unities, and beyond the first adyta, — as more ineffable than all sUence, and more unknown than all essence, — as holy among the holies, and concealed in the intelligible gods."
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with soul. For it does not give life to individuals, througli a division of itself into minute parts, but it vivifies all things with the whole of itself; and the whole of it is present every where, in a manner similar to its generator, both according to oneness and ubiquity. Heaven, also, though it is ample, and different parts of it have a dif- ferent situation, yet is one through the power of souL And through this the sensible world is a Gk>d. The sun, like- wise, is a God, because it is animated. And this is also the case with the other starfi^J► Whatever we too possess, we possess on account of this. For dead bodies are more worthless than dunghills. It is necessary, however, that soul, which is the cause to Gods [i.e. to the mundane Gods] of their being Gods, should be itself a more ancient God. Similar to this likewise is our soul. And when it is surveyed in a pure condition, without any thing ex- traneous adhering to it, this same thing which is soul will be found to be a venerable thing, and more honourable than every corporeal nature. For [perhaps without soul ^] all things would be earth. And though fire should then exist, what would there be [venerable] in its burning power, or in the composites from fire and earth, even though you should add to these, water and air? But if body is ian object of pursuit because it is animated, why does any one, neglecting himself, pursue another thing?
Since, therefore, you admire soul in another thing, admire yourself.
III. Hence, as the soul is so honourable and divine a thing, now confiding in a cause of this kind, ascend with it to divinity. For you will not be very distant from him; nor are the intermediate natures many. In this, therefore, which is divine, receive that part which is more divine, viz. the vicinity of the soul to that which is supernal, to which ^ It appears from the version of Ficinus, that the words itrutg dvtv ^^xnCi ought to be suppUed in this place.
ON THE THREE HYPOSTASES.
167 the soul is posterior, and from which it proceeds. For though it is 80 great a thing as we hare demon atrated it to be, yet it is a. certain image of intellect. And, just as external discourse is an image of the discursive energy within the soul, after the same manner, soul, and the whole of its energy, are the diBcourse of intellect, and a life which it emits in order to the hypostasis of another thing; just as in fire, the inherent heat of it is one thing, and the heat which it imparts another. It is necessary, however, ) assume there, not a, life flowing forth, but partly abiding 1 intellect, and partly giving subsistence to another life. Hence, since bouI is derived from intellect, it is intellectual, and the intellect of soul is conversant with discursive energies. And again, the perfection of soul is from in- tellect, as from a father that nourishes it, who generat-ed soul, as with reference to himself, not perfect. This hypostasis, therefore, is from intellect, and is also reason a energy when it perceives intellect. For when it looks to intellect, it poaseases internally, and appropriately, the things which it understands, and the energies which it performs. And it is necessary to call those enei^es alone the enei^ea of the soul, which are intellectual and dwell with it. But its subordinate energies have an external source, and are the passions of a soul of this kind, fiitellect, therefore, causes the soul to be more divine, both because it is the father of it, and because it is present with For there is nothing between them, except the differ- ence of one with i-eterence to the other, soul being auc- aive to, and the recipient of intellect; but intellect subsisting as form. The matter also of intellect is beauti- ful, since it has the form of intellect, and is simple. The great excellence, however, of intellect, is manifest from this, that though sou! is such as we have described it to be. yet it is surpassed by intellect.
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sensible world; who surveys its magnitude and beauty, and the order of its perpetual motion; the Gods it con- tains, some of whom are visible, and others invisible; and the daemons, animals and plants, with which it is replete; and who ascends from these to its archetype, and the more true world [of which this is the image]. For there he will behold all intelligibles, which together with the intelligible world are eternal, and subsist in an appropriate intelli- gence and life. An undecaying intellect, likewise, and immense wisdom preside over this intelligible world; and a life which is in reality under Saturn, flourishes there; Saturn being a God, and a pure intellect. For he comprehends in himself all immortal natures, every intel- lect, every God, and every soul, all which subsist in him with invariable stability. For why should he seek after change, since he possesses an excellent condition of being? Or whither should he transfer himself, since he possesses all things with himself? But neither, being most perfect, will he seek to be increased. Hence, all things that are with him are perfect, in order that he may be entirely perfect, having nothing which does not partake of perfec- tion; and possessing nothing in himself which he does not intellectually perceive. But he intellectually perceives, not investigating, but possessing.' Its blessedness, also, is not adventitious to it, but it possesses all things in eternity.
And it is itself truly eternity, which time running round soul imitates, omitting some things, but applying itself to others. For other and again other things are about soul; since at one time the form of Socrates, and at another the form of horse present themselves to its view; and always one certain thing among the number of beings. But intellect has all things. Hence, it possesses in the same all things established in the same. It likewise alone is, ^ Conformably to this, Aristotle also, in his Metaphysics, says of intellect, " that it energizes possessing," Ivi/wyci dk cxwv.
ON THE THREE HYPOSTASES. 169 and is always, but is never future; for when the future arrives, it then also is; nor is it the 'past. For nothing there has passed away, but all things abide in the present now; since they are things of such a kind, as to be satis- fied with themselves thus subsisting. But each of them is intellect and being. And the whole is every intellect, and every being. Intellect, therefore, derives its subsistence as intellect, from the intellection of being. ^ But being subsists as being, through becoming the object of in- tellectual perception to intellect, and through imparting to it, intellection and existence. There is, however, another cause of intellection, which is also the cause of existence to being. Of both therefore at once, there is another cause. For both these are con-subsistent, and never desert each other. But being two, this one thing [resulting from both] is at once intellect; and is being, intellective, and intelligible. It is intellect, indeed, so far as it is intellective; but being, so far as it is intelligible [or the object of perception to intellect]. For intellectual perception could not subsist, difference and sameness not existing. Intellect, therefore, being, difference and same- ness, are the first of things. But it is likewise necessary to assume together with these, motion and permanency. And motion, indeed, is necessary if being intellectually per- ceives; but permanency in order that it may remain the