same; and difference, in order that it may be intellective and intelligible. For if you take away difference from it, then becoming one it will be perfectly silent. It is neces- sary, however, that intellective natures should be different from each other; and that they should also be the same with each other, since they subsist in the same thing, and there is something common in all of them. Diversity, ^ Instead of 6 nkv ovv vovq, Kard rb voiiv v^pitrrdgy rb bv, it is necessary to read as in the above translation, 6 fiiv ovv vovg, icard rb i%€ti/ v^ierrdg rb bv.
170 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
likewise, is otherness. But these becoming many produce number and quantity. And the peculiarity of each of these produces quality, from all which, as principles, other things proceed.
V. This exuberant God, therefore, exists in the soul which is here, being conjoined to him by things of this kind, unless it wishes to depart from him. Approaching therefore to, and as it were becoming one with him, it en- quires as follows: Who is he that, being simple and prior to a multitude of this kind, generated this God? Who is the cause of his existence, and of his being exuberant, and by whom number was produced? For number is not the first of things; since the one is prior to the duad. But the duad is the second thing, and being generated by the one, is defined by it. The duad, however, is of itself indefinite. But when it is defined, it is now number. And it is number as essence. Soul also is number. For neither corporeal masses nor magnitudes are the first of things. For these gross substance.which sense fancies to be beings, are things of a posterior nature. Nor is the moisture which is in seeds honourable, but that contained in them, which is not visible. But this is number and reason [or a productive principle]. What are said therefore to be number and the duad in the intelUgible world, are reasons and intellect. But the duad indeed is indefinite, when it is assumed as analogous to a subject. Number, however, which proceeds from it and the one, is each form of things; intellect being as it were formed by the species of things which are generated it it. But it is formed in one manner from the one, and in another from itself, in the same manner as sight which is in energy. For intelligence is sight perceiving, both being one.
VI. How, therefore, does intelligence see; what does it see; and, in short, how does it subsist; and how is it generated from the one, so that it may see? For now indeed the soul perceives ON THE THREE HYPOSTASES. 171 the necessity of the existence of these things. It desires, how- ever, to understand this which is so much spoken of by the wise men of antiquity, viz. how from the one being such as we have said it is, each thing has its subsistence, whether it be multitude, or the duad, or number; and why the one did not abide in itseK, but so great a multitude flowed from it, as is seen to have an existence, and which we think should be referred to the one. We must say, therefore, as follows, invoking God himself, not with external speech, hut with the soul itself, extending ourselves in prayer to him, since we shall then he ahle to pray to him properly, when we approach hy ourselves alone to the alone. It is necessary, therefore, that the beholder of him, being in himself as if in the interior part of a temple, and quietly abiding in an eminence beyond all things, should survey the statues as it were which are established outwardly, or rather that statue which first shines forth to the view, and after the following manner behold that which is naturally adapted to be beheld. With respect to every thing that is moved,^ it is necessary there should be something to which it is moved. For if there is nothing of this kind, we should not admit that it is moved. But if any thing is generated posterior to that to which the moveable nature tends, it is necessary that it should always be generated in consequence of that prior cause being converted to itself.
Let, however, the generation which is in time be now removed from us who are discoursing about eternal beings. And if in the course of the discussion we attribute genera- tion to things which exist eternally, let it be considered as indicative of cause and order. Hence, that which is from thence generated, must be said to be generated, the cause not being moved. For if something was generated in con- sequence of that cause being moved, the thing generated ^ Instead of iravra rtp Kipovfiiv(i» in this place, it is necessary to read Itti TraiTt rf Kivovfifvtf}.
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after the motion would be the third, and not the second from the cause. It is necessary, therefore, the cause being immoveable, that if anj thing secondary subsists after it, this second nature should be produced, without the cause either verging to it, or consulting,^ or in short being moved. How, therefore, and what is it necessary to con- ceive about that abiding cause? We must conceive a sur- rounding splendour, proceeding indeed from this cause, but from it in a permanent state, like a light from the sun shining, and as it were running round it, and being gene- rated from it, the cause itself always abiding in the same immoveable condition. All beings, likewise, as long as they remain, necessarily produce from their own essence, about themselves, and externally from the power which is present with them, a nature whose hypostasis is suspended from them, and which is as it were an image of the arche- type from which it proceeded. Thus fire emits from itself indeed heat, and snow not only retains cold within itself [but imparts it to other things]. This, however, such things as are fragrant especially testify. For as long as they exist, something proceeds from them, of which whatever is near them partakes. All such things, like- wise, as are now perfect generate; but that which is always perfect, always generates, and that which it produces is per- petual. It also generates something less than itself. What, therefore, is it requisite to say of that which is most per- fect? Shall we say that nothing proceeds from it; or rather that the greatest things posterior to it are its pro- geny? But the greatest thing posterior to it, and the second, is intellect. For intellect sees it, and is in want of it alone. But this most perfect nature is not in want of intellect. It is also necessary that the thing generated from that which is better than intellect, should be intellect.
^ For jSovXriOsi'Tog here, it is requisite to read ftovXivBivrog.
• ON THE THREE HYPOSTASES. 173 And intellect is superior to all tilings after the first, because other things are posterior to it. Thus, for instance, soul is the reason of intellect, and a certain energy of it, just as intellect of that first God [who is beyond intellect]. But the reason of soul is indeed obscure. For as it is the image of intellect, on this account it is necessary that it should look to intellect. After the same manner also, it is neces- sary that intellect should look to the highest God, in order that it may be intellect. It sees him, however, not * separated from him, but because it is after him, and there is nothing between; as neither is there any thing between soul and intellect. But every thing desires its generator. This also it loves, and especially when that which is gene- rated and the generator are alone. When, however, that which generates is the most excellent of things, the thing begotten is necessarily present with it in such a manner, as to be separated by otherness ^ alone.
VII. But we say that intellect is the image of this most excellent nature. For it is necessary to speak more clearly. In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that intellect should in a certain respect be generated, and preserve [in itself] much of its generator; and also that it should have such a similitude to it, as light has to the sun. Its gene- rator, however, is not intellect. How therefore did he generate intellect [so far as it is intellect']? May we not say, because intellect, by conversion, looks to him? But the vision itself is intellect. For that which apprehends another thing, is either sense or intellect. And sense indeed may be compared to a line, but the other gnostic ^ In the original hepdrtiTi, which is derived from lirspog another. And this word is properly used when we speak of two things only. Hence, irsporrjQ must not be considered in this place as merely signifying difference; for universally one thing is separated from another by diflference, but as denoting the greatest proximity and alliance.
174 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS, powers of the soul to a circle. A circle, however, of this kind is as it were partible. But this is not the case with intellect. Or may we not say that this also is one? But the one here is the power of all things. Hence intelligence surveys those things of which it is the power, divided as it were from the power; for otherwise it would not be intel- lect. For intellect now possesses from itself a co-sensation as it were of the great extent of its power; in which power, its essence, consists. Intellect, therefore, through itself defines its own being, by a power derived from him [i.c, from the first God,] and perceives that essence is as it were one of the parts of and from him, and that it is corrobo- rated by him, and perfected by and from him into essence. It sees, however, itself derived from thence, as something which is as it were partible from that which is impartible; and not only itself, but life, and intellection, and all things, because the first God is nothing of all things. For on this account all things are from him, because he is not detained by a certain form. For he is one alone. And intellect, in- deed, in the order of beings is all things. But he on this account is none of the things which are in intellect; and all things which have a subsistence among beings are derived from him. Hence also these are essences. For they are now definite, and each possesses as it were a form. Being, however, ought not to be surveyed in that which is as it were indefinite, but as fixed by bound and permanency. But permanency in intelligibles is circumscription and form, in which also they receive their hypostasis. This intellect, therefore, which deserves the appellation of the most pure intellect, and which is of the genus of intelli- gibles, originates from no other source than the first prin- ciple. And being now generated, it generates together with itself beings, all the beauty of ideas, and all the intel- ligible Gods. Being, likewise, full of the things which it generates, and as it were absorbing its progeny, it again con- ON THE THREE HYPOSTASES. 175 tains them in itself, and does not suffer tliem to fall into matter, nor to be nourished by Ehea, as the mysteries and the fables about the Gods obscurely indicate. For they say that Saturn the most wise God was born prior to Jupiter, and that he again contains the things which he generates, in himself, so far as he is fuU, and an intellect charac- terized by purity. But after this they say that he gene- rated Jupiter, who was now a boy [i.e., pure and full]. For intellect, being a perfect intellect, generates soul. For being perfect it is requisite that it should generate, and since it is so great a power that it should not be un- prolific. Neither here, however, is it possible that the thing generated should be more excellent than the gene- rator; but being inferior, it is necessary that it should be an image of it. In a similar manner it is requisite that it should be indefinite, but bounded, and as it were invested with form by its generator. But the progeny of intellect is a certain reason, and an hypostasis which energizes dianoetically. This, however, is that which is moved about intellect, is the light of intellect,* and a vestigie suspended from it. Hence, according to one part of itself it is con- joined with it, and on this account it is replete with and enjoys it, participates of, and intellectually perceives it; but according to another part, it comes into contact with things posterior to itself, or rather, generates them, and which are necessarily inferior to soul. About these, however, we shall speak hereafter. And as far as to these is the progression of divine natures.
VIII. On this account all things are distributed by Plato in a triple order about the king of all. For he says, " that all things are about the king of all; '* * second ^ i.e. Is a light emanating from intellect.
* There is evidently a defect here in the original; for there i^ nothing more than 0»ycri yap irpCjTa, But'the words of Plato in his second Epistle are irtfA rbv iravriav ^aaiXka vavr' iarif xal Ubivov 176 SELECT -WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
things about that which ia second, and such as are th about that which ranke as the third." He also says t this kin^ is the father ' of ca.uee, denominating intellec cause. For with Plato, intellect ia the demiurgua, T he says that this cause produced soul in that Crater [m tioned by him in the TimEeus]. The cause, however, 1 intellect, he says that the father' ia the good, and t which IB beyond intellect, and beyond essence. In n places, also, he calls being and intellect idea; so that f Plato we may know that intellect and idea are from ti ijood, but soul from intellect. These aaaertiona, howevw iire not new, nor of the present time, but were delivere by the ancients, though not explicitly, and what has uoi been said by us is an interpretation of them. That thee opinions also are ancient, is testified and confirmed by tl writings of Plato. Parmenides, therefore, prior to I adopted this opinion, so far as he collects into one the aame thing being and intellect. Being, Ukewise, 1 does not place among senaibles. For he says, that I perceive intellectualh/, and to be, are the same thing. also says, that thia is immoveable, though he adds, iht perceives intellectually, removing from it all corpore motion in order that it may abide invariably the b And he assimilates it to the bulk of a sphere, be< it contains all things involved in itself, and hecaaae i intellection ia not external to but in its own When, likewise, in hia writings he calla it one, he alludt to the cause of it, as if this one [of intellect] was found ti he many. The Parmenides, however, in Plato, speaki more accurately, divides from each other this and the fi one, which is more principally one. He also calls 1 'ivira jrriiTQ, mi itfivo euTtnv am'irrviv tuiv taXHv, Sivripoii dl mpi r livTipa, tai rpirov nip! ril rpi'rfl.
' wapi here is erroneoualy printed for raripa.
'' There is the same error in the original here as alxive.
OM THE THBHE HTPOSTASES. 1?7 second one many, and the third, one and mauy. And after this manner, he likewise accords with the doctrine of the three [above mentioned] natures. ' IX. But Anaxagoras, when he aajs that there is a. piu-e &nd uumingled Intellect, adniits also that the first [principle of things] is Biinple,andtliatiieowe is separate. On account of antiquity, however, he omits the accurate diacnsaion of these things- Heraclitus, also, knew an eternal and Latelli- gible one. For he says, that bodies are alwayg riaing into exUience, or becoming to be,andJlo7oing. With Empedocles, strife' indeed divides, but friendship is the one; and this according to him is incorporeal. But the elements are arranged by him analogous to matter. Aristotle, however, afterwards asseii^s that the first principle is separate and intelligible. But when he says that it intellectually per- ceives itself, again he makes it not to be the first.' When also he introduces many other iutelligibles, and as many as there are spheres in the heavens, in order that each of these may move each of the spheres, he speaks of iutelli- gibles in a way different from Plato, and not being able to assign probable reasons, adducea necessity. It may also be opportunely observed, that it is more reasonable to refer all the spheres to one co-ordination, and to assert that they look to one thing, and the first cause of all. Moreover, it may likewise be asked, whether according to him the many iutelligibles are from one first cause, or whether there are many principles in inteUigibles? And if indeed they are from one first, they wUl be analogously arranged, like ' In the ori};inal, (Icai; instead of I'eiKuc.
'' Aristotle in his writings ascended no higher tlian the intel- ligible, and thia with him is the first principle. And perliaps this was becaase he knew that the nature which is beyond the intel- ligible is perfectly ineffable and nnknown, and therefore accurately speaking, is even beyond jirinciple. See my translation of liLi Metaphyaica.
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the spheres in the sensible universe, one comprehending another, but one external to them ruling over all of them. So that the first will there comprehend the rest, and there will be an intelligible world. As here, likewise, the spheres are not empty, but the first is full of stars, and all the rest have stars; so there also the moving causes will contain many things in themselves, and what is there con- tained will have a more true subsistence. But if each is a principle, the principles will subsist fortuitously. And it may be asked, why they subsist and accord in accomplish- ing one work, viz. the concord of all heaven. How, like- wise, are the sensible natures in the heavens equal to the intelligible and motive causes. And how are they thus many being incorporeal, since matter does not separate them from each other. Hence, those ancients who especially embraced the doctrines of Pythagoras and his followers, and of Pherecydes, were investigators of this intelligible essence. Some of them, however, committed discussions of these things to writing, but others delivered them not in writing, but unfolded them in unwritten discourses, or wholly dismissed the consideration of them.
X. It has been shown, however, as far as it is possible to demonstrate about things of this kind, that it is requisite to think that beyond being there is the one, such as reason wishes to unfold; that next to this, being and intellect subsist; and that, in the third place, follows the nature of soul. But, as in the nature of things there are these three hypostases, so likewise it is proper to think, that the above mentioned three subsist with us. I do not mean to assert that they are to be found in sensibles; for they have a sepa- rate subsistence; but that they are external to sensibles, and external after the same manner in man also, as the three which we have been considering are external to all heaven. This, however, is such a man as Plato calls the inward man. Our soul, therefore, is likewise something divine, ON THE THREE HYPOSTASES. 179 and of a nature different from sensibles, sucli as is the whole nature of soul. But the soul is perfect which pos- sesses intellect. With respect to intellect, however, one kind is a reasoning intellect, but another imparts the power of reasoning. He, therefore, will not err who places in the intelligible order of things this reasoning intellect of the soul, which is not in want of any corporeal organ to the subsistence of its discursive energy, but which pos- sesses the energy of itself in purity, in order that it may reason purely, in as great perfection as possible. For we must not inquire after a place where we may establish it, but it must be arranged external to all place. For thus that which is from itself, the external, and the immaterial subsist, when they are alone, and have nothing from a corporeal nature. On this account, also, Plato in the TimBBus says, " that the Demiui^us surrounded the body of the universe with soul," indicating that part of the mundane soul which abides in the intelligible. Concerning our soul, likewise, concealing his meaning, he says, in the Phsedrus, that it sometimes hides its head in the heavens, and sometimes elevates it beyond them.^ The exhortation, too, in the Phsedo, to separate the soul from the body, does not relate to a local separation, which is effected by nature, but insinuates that the soul should not verge to imagina- tions, and to an alienation from itself, by a tendency to body. He also indicates that we should elevate the remain- ing [i.e. the irrational] form of the soul, and lead it on high together with the superior part of it; and that the part which is established in the sensible region, and is alone the fabricator and plastic maker of body, should like- wise be engaged in an employment of this kind.
XI. Since, therefore, the soul reasons about things just ^ I have followed the version of Ficinus in this place, as the original is obviously defective: for there is nothing more than, kiri dk rifiiov in Kpvirrcjv, tTr* oKpa eipi^icc ry irc^aXy.
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and beautiful, and inquires bj a reasoning process whether this thing is just, and that is beautiful, it is necessary there should be something stably just, from which the reasoning of the soul originates; or how could it reason? And if the soul at one time reasons about these things, but at another time not, it is necessary there should be an intel- lect in us, which does not reason about, but always pos- sesses the just. It is likewise necessary that we should contain the principle and cause of intellect, and G-od; the latter of these not being divisible, but abiding, yet not in place, [but in himself,] and again being surveyed in each of the multitude of things that are able to receive him. They receive him, however, as something different from themselves; just as the centre of a circle is in itself, but each of the lines in the circle has its summit terminating in the centre, and the several lines tend with their pecu- liarity to this. For by a thing of this kind which is in us,^ we also touch, associate with, and are suspended from deity. But we are established in it more or less according as we converge to it in a greater or less degree.
XII. How, therefore, does it happen, since we possess things of such great dignity, that we do not apprehend them, but for the most part are sluggish with respect to such like energies? And there are some who do not energize about them at all. Intellect, indeed, and that which, prior to intellect, is always in itself, are always employed in their own energies. Soul, likewise, is thus that which is always moved. For not every thing which is in the soul is now sensible; but it arrives to us when it proceeds as far as to sense. When, however, each thing in lis energizing, does not impart itself to the sensitive power, it does not yet proceed through the whole soul. Hence we have not yet any knowledge of the energy, because we ^ This is called by Proclus, the one, flower, and summit of the soul, and is that in \yhich our truest being consists.
ON THE THREE HYPOSTASES. 181 exist in conjunction with the sensitive power, and are not a part of the soul, but the whole soul. And farther still, each of the psychical animals in us, always energizes essentially according to its peculiarity; but we then only recognize the energy, when there is a participation and apprehension of it. It is necessary, therefore, in order that there may be an apprehension of things which are thus present, that the animadversive power should be converted to the interior of the soul, and there fix its attention. Just as if some one waiting to hear a voice which is pleasing to him, should separate himself from other voices, and excite his hearing to the pereception of the more excellent sound, when it approaches. Thus, also, here it is necessary to dismiss sensible auditions, except so far as is necessary, and to preserve the animadversive power of the soul pure, and prepared to hear supernal sounds.
IX.
ON INTELLECT, IDEAS/ AND [REAL] BEING.
V. xi.