I. Since all men from their birth employ sense prior to intellect, and are necessarily first conversant with sensibles, some proceeding no farther pass through life, considering these as the first and last of things, and apprehending that whatever is painful among these is evil, and whatever is pleasant is good; thus thinking it sufficient to pursue the one and avoid the other. Those too among them, who pretend to a greater share of reason than others, esteem this to be wisdom, being afEected in a manner similar to more heavy birds, who collecting many things from the earth, and being oppressed with the weight, are unable to fly on high, though they have received wings for this pur- pose from nature. But others are in a small degree elevated from things subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul recalling them from pleasure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, however, unable to look on high, and as not possessing any thing else which can afEord them rest, they betake themselves together with the name of virtue to ^ For a more ample discussion of Ideas than is contained in this treatise of Plotinus, see the Introduction and Notes to my trans- lation of the ** Parmenides of Plato," and the notes to my transla- tion of Aristotle's ** Metaphysics," in which the reader will fincf treasures of antiquity on this subject unfolded.
ON INTELLECT, IDEAS, AND [REAL] BEING. 183 actions and the election of things inferior, from which they at first endeavoured to raise themselves, though in vain. In the third class is the race of divine men, who through a more excellent power, and with piercing eyes, acutely per- ceive supernal light, to the vision of which they raise them- selves above the clouds and darkness as it were of this lower world, and there abiding despise every thing in these regions of sense; being no otherwise delighted with the place which is truly and properly their own, than he who after many wanderings is at length restored to his lawful country.
II. What then is this place? And how may some one arrive at it? He, indeed, will arrive thither, who is by • nature amatory, and who is truly a philosopher in dis- '% position from the beginning. For as being amatory, he*^ will be parturient about the beautiful, yet will not be ^ ^ satisfied with the beauty which is in body, but will fly from ^^a^^^v^' thence to the beauty of soul, to virtues and sciences, studies and laws, and will again from these ascend to the cause of the beauty contained in soul. If, also, there is a beauty prior to this, he will ascend to it, till he at length arrives at that which is first, and which is beautiful from itself. Having likewise arrived hither, he will be liberated from his parturiency, but not before. But how will he ascend, whence does he derive the power of ascending, and what is the reasoning which will conduct this love [to the desired end?] Is it the following? This beauty which is in bodies, is adventitious to bodies. For the morjphce, or forms themselves of bodies, are in them as in matter. The subject, therefore, is changed, and from being beautiful becomes deformed. Hence reason says that body is beautiful by participation. What is it then which causes body to be beautiful 't This, indeed, is effected in one way by the presence of beauty, but in another by soul, which fashions body, and inserts in it a morjphe, or form of such a kind.
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What then? Is soul of itself beautiful or not? Certainly not; since if it were, one soul would not be wise and beautiful, but another unwise and base. Hence, the beauty which is~in soul is derived from wisdom. Who is it, there- lore, that imparts wisdom to the soul? Is it not neces- sarily intellect? But it is an intellect, which is not at one time intellect, and at another deprived of it: for it is true intellect, and which is therefore beautiful from itself. Is it then necessary to stop here as at that which is first, or is it requisite to pass beyond intellect? Intellect, indeed, as with reference to us precedes the first principle of things, announcing as it were in the vestibules of the goody that all things subsist in itself; as being a multi- tudinous impression of the good which entirely. abides in unity.
III. This nature, however, of intellect must be con- sidered, which reason announces to be truly being, and true essence, previously confirming, by proceeding in another way, [what we have before asserted] that it is necessary there should be a certain nature of this kind. Perhaps, therefore, it is ridiculous to investigate whether intellect ranks in the order of beings; though perhaps some persons may be dubious concerning this. And they may be in a still greater degree dubious whether there is such an intellect as we have maintained there is, and which is separate ^ [from soul]. Likewise, whether this intellect is [real] beings, and whether it contains the nature of forms, about which we now propose to speak. We see, therefore, that all the things which are said to exist are composites, and that no one of them is simple, whether they are fashioned by art, or constituted by nature. For artificial substances consist of brass, or wood, or stone, and do not yet obtain perfection from these, till they are ^ For iJxwp«<"'oc here, it is necessary to read xtapitrroQ, ON INTELLECT, IDEAS, AND [REAL] BEING. 186 elaborated by the several arts, one of which produces a statue, another a bed, and another a house, and each effects this by the insertion of the form which it contains. Moreover, with respect to the things which are constituted by nature, such of them as are composed of many parti- culars, and which are said to be co-mingled, may be analyzed into the form which is inherent in all substances that are mingled together. Thus man may be analyzed into soul and body; and body into the four elements. But finding that each of these is a composite, consisting of matter and that which gives it form (for the matter of the elements is of itself formless) you will again also investi- gate respecting the soul, whether it now ranks among simple natures, or whether one thing in it has the relation of matter, but another, viz. the intellect which it contains, the relation of form; one indeed being analogous to the morphe in brass, but the other to the artist who produces that morphe. He, likewise, who transfers these very same things to the universe, will also here ascend to intellect, and will admit that it is truly the maker and demiurgus [of all things]. He will, likewise, say that the subject matter receiving forms, becomes either fire or water, or air, or earth; but that these forms proceed from another cause, and that this is souL Again, also, he will assert, that soul imparts morphe to the four elements of the world; but that intellect becomes the supplier of pro- ductive principles to soul; just as pfoductivfe principles being inserted from the arts in the souls of artists enable them to energize [according to art]. With respect to intellect, also, one which is as the form of the soul is analogous to morphe^ but another which imparts this form, is analogous to the maker of the statue, in whom all things are inherent which he imparts. The things, however, which body receives, are now nothing more than images and imitations.
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IV. Why, therefore, is it necessary to ascend to soul, and yet not admit that it is the first of things P Is it not be- cause in the first place, indeed, intellect is different from, and more excellent than soul? But that which is more excellent is prior by nature. For soul when perfect, does not, as some fancy it does, generate intellect. For whence will that which is in capacity become in energy, unless there -is a cause which leads into energy? Since if it becomes in energy casually, it is possible that it may not proceed into energy. Hence, it is necessary that first natures should be established in energy, and that they should be unindigent and perfect. But imperfect natures are posterior to them. The progeny also of imperfect, are perfected by first natures, who after the manner of fathers give perfection to what posterior natures generated imper- fect from the beginning. That, likewise, which is gene- rated, has at first the relation of matter to the maker of it, Ifbut is afterwards rendered perfect by the participation of jfform. But if it is necessary that soul should be connected with passion, and if it is likewise necessary that there should be something impassive, or all things would perish in time; it is necessary that there should be something prior to soul. And, if soul is in the world, but it is neces- sary there should be something beyond the world, on this acccount also it is necessary that there should be something prior to soul. For if that which is in the world, is in body and matter, nothing would remain the same [if that which is mundane only existed]. So that man, and all productive principles, would not be perpetual, nor always the same. Hence, that it is necessary intellect should be prior to soul, may be surveyed from these and many other arguments.
V. It is necessary, however, to consider intellect truly so called neither as intellect in capacity, nor as proceeding from the privation to the possession of intellect. For if ON INTELLECT, IDEAS, AND [REAL] BEING. 187 we do not, we must again investigate another intellect prior to this. But we must assume intellect in energy, and and which is always intellect. K such an intellect, how- ever, has not an adventitious intellection, whatever it intel- lectually perceives, it perceives from itself. And whatever it possesses, it possesses from itself. But if it perceives intellectually by and from itself, it is itself that which it perceives. For if the essence of it was one thing, but the objects of its perception different from it, its very essence would be destitute of intellection; and again, it would be intellect in capacity, but not in energy. Neither of these, therefore, must be separated from the other. With us, however, it is usual, from the things with which we are conversant, to separate in our conceptions intellect, and the objects of its perception. What therefore is its energy, and what does it intellectually perceive, in order that we may admit it to be those things which it perceives? Is it not evident, that being intellect, it intellectually perceives in reality, and gives subsistence to beings? Hence it is itseK beings. For it either intellectually perceives them existing elsewhere, or it perceives them in itself as being it- self. It is impossible, therefore, that it can perceive them existing elsewhere. For in what other place can they exist? Hence it intellectually sees itself, and perceives them in itself. For it does not perceive these, as some fancy, in sensibles. For each of the things which have a primary subsistence, is not a sensible object. For the form which is in sensibles is in matter, and is truly an image. Every form, also, which is in another thing, is derived from another thing, proceeds to it, and is the image of it. If, likewise, it is necessary that intellect should be the maker of this universe, it will not intellec- tually perceive things in that which does not yet exist, in order that it may produce it. Hence, it is necessary that these things should be prior to the world, not as im- 188 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
pressions from other things, but as archetypes, and primary natures, and the essence of intellect. If, however, some should say that [seminal] productive principles are suffi- cient, it is evident that these must be perpetual. But if they are perpetual and impassive, it is necessary that they should subsist in intellect, and in such an intellect as is prior to habit, and nature and soul. For these are in capacity. Intellect, therefore, is truly beings, not intel- lectually perceiving such things as are situated out of itself. For the objects of its perception are not external to itself. But it is as it were the first legislator, or rather the law itseK of existence. Hence it is rightly said, that it is the same thing to perceive intellectually and to be, and that the science of things without matter, is the same with the things themselves. I have also investigated myself as one among the number of beings. And the same thing is testified by reminiscence. For no one of [real] beings sub- sists out of intellect, nor is in place; but they always abide in themselves, neither receiving mutation nor corruption. Hence, also, they are truly beings; since if they were gene- rated and corrupted, they would have an adventitious existence; and they would no longer be [real] beings, but that which is adventitious to them would be being- Sensibles, therefore, are indeed by participation that which they are said to be, the subject nature [i.e. matter] receiving form externally derived; as for instance, brass receiv- ing form from the art of the statuary, and wood from the tectonic art; in consequence of art proceeding into these materials through an image. Art itself, however, abides in sameness, external to matter, and possesses in itself the true statue, and the true bed. Thus also in bodies, this universe which participates of images, evinces that real beings are different from bodies; since the former are immutable, but the latter mutable. The former, like- wise, are established in themselves, and are not in ON INTELLECT, IDEAS, AND [REAL] BEING. 189 want of place. For they are not magnitudes, but have an hypostasis intellectual, and sufficient to themselves. For the nature of bodies is indebted to something else for its preservation. But intellect, since it sustains through an admirable nature things which are of themselves in a perishable condition, does not seek where it may be itself established.
VI. Let, therefore, intellect be [real] beings, and possess all things in itself, not as in place but as itself, and as being one with them. But all things there subsist collec- tively at once, and yet nevertheless they are separated from each other; since the soul also which has many sciences in itself simultaneous, possesses them without any confusion. Each also, when it is requisite, performs what pertains to it, without the co-operation of the rest. And each conception energizes with a purity unmingled with the other inward conceptions. Thus, therefore, and in a still greater degree, intellect is at once all things; and again, not at once, because each is a peculiar power. Every intellect however, comprehends all things,^ in the same manner as genus comprehends species, and as whole comprehends parts. The powers of seeds, likewise, bring with them an image of what we have said. For in the whole seed, all things are without separation, and the reasons [or productive principles] are as it were in one centre. That there is one productive principle likewise of the eye, and another of the hand, is known from what is sensibly generated from them. With respect, therefore, to the powers in seeds, each of them is one whole produc- tive principle, together with the parts comprehended in it. And that which is corporeal indeed in the seeds, possesses a certain quantity of matter which is as it were moist; but the productive principle itself is according to the whole of ^ irdvra is omitted in the original.
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its form, and the same thing is also reason, generating a certain thing by the form of a soul, and which is the image of another more excellent soul. Some, however, denominate this principle which is inserted in the seeds, nature; which being thence excited from things prior to itself, in the same manner as light from fire, changes and gives form to matter; effecting this, not by impulsion, nor by employing levers [or any other mechanical power], but by imparting seminal productive principles.
VII. The sciences, however, of sensibles, which are in the rational soul, if it is proper to say that there are sciences of these, since the appellation adapted to them is that of opinion, in consequence of being posterior to sensible things, are the images of them. But the sciences of intelligibles, which are truly sciences, and which descend from intellect into the rational soul, understand indeed nothing sensible; but so far as they are sciences, are each of the things which are the objects of their perception; and possess internally the intelligible and intelligence. This, however, is because intellect is inward, which is primary natures themselves, is eternally present with itself, and exists in energy. It likewise does not extend itself to the objects of its perception as if it did not possess them, or as if it acquired them externally, or obtained them by a dis- cursive process, as if they were not already present with it (for these are the passions of soul); but it stands firmly in itself, being at once all things, and does not energize intel- lectually in order that it may give subsistence to every thing. For it does not, when it intellectually perceives G-od, become G-od, nor when it understands motion does it become motion. Hence, if the assertion that forms are intellections signifies, that when intellect understands this particular form it then becomes that form, it is not true.
For it is necessary that the object of intellection should be prior to this intellectual perception. Or how would intelli- ON INTELLECT, IDEAS, AND [REAL] BEING. 191 gence arrive at the perception of it? For it cannot be fortuitously, nor does intelligence extend itself towards the intelligible in vain.
Vin. If, therefore, intelligence is truly one, that form which is the object of its perception and idea itself are one. What therefore is this? Intellect and an intellectual essence, each idea not being different from intellect, but each is intellect. And, in short, intellect is all forms; but each form is each intellect; just as the science which ranks as a whole is all the theorems [of the several sciences] Each theorem, however, is a part of whole science, not as separated by place; but each possesses power in the whole. This intellect, therefore, is in itself, and possesses itself in quiet, being always exuberantly full. Hence, if intellect were conceived to subsist prior to being, it would be requisite to say that intellect, by energizing and intellec- tually perceiving, generated and perfected beings. But since it is necessary to conceive being to be prior to intel- lect, it is requisite to admit that beings are established in that which is intellective, but that energy and intelligence are posterior to beings; just as the energy of fire is posterior to fire. Hence, since beings are established in intellect, they possess in themselves their. own energy. Being, likewise, is energy; or rather, both are one. Hence, too, both being and intellect are one nature; and on this account also, beings, the energy of being, and an intellect of this kind, are one. Such intellections, also, are form, and the morphe and energy of being. In consequence, however, of these being divided by us, we conceive some of them to be prior to others. For the intellect which makes this division, is different from them. But impartible intellect and which does not divide, is being and all things.
IX. What then are the things in this one intellect, which we divide in our conceptions of it? For it is necessary to 192 SELECT WOHKS OF PLOTINUS, exliibit them quiescent, and to survey them proce from thence, as if froia science Bubaisting in unity, world, therefore, being an animal comprehending in aJl animals, and possessing its exiutenue, and the qualit; its existence from something different from itself, that all from which it is derived being referred to intellect — ttu being the case, it is net-essary that the archetypal uni should be in intellect; and that this intellect should t intelligible world, which Plato [in the Timteus] says e; in that which iE animal itself. For as where there is [or a productive principle] which is a certain animi where also there is at the same time matter which n the spermatic reason, it is necessary that an animal ehodj be generated; after the same manner, an iuteliec nature being present, which is all- powerful, and 1 thing to impede its energy, (nothing existing b this, and that which is able to receive it) it is necesa that the recipient should be adorned, and that i should adorn. And that, indeed, which is i possesses distributed forms, here man, and there tlW! t But in the adorning cause all things are in odo.
X. Such things, therefore, as are forma in thi< i world, are derived fi-om the iiifolli./ih!" "."iH'l: '" things as are not forme du i-^ Hence, nothing preternatuml i^ ' ill the arts anv ihiuir wliii'li lameness in ' i ' feet which ii' ON INTELLECT, IDEAS, AND [REAL] BEING. 193 intelligible world. Instead of time, however, eternity is there. But place is there intellectually, being the [im- partible] subsistence of one thing in another. Hence, since all things there exist simultaneously, whichever of them you assume is essence, is intellectual, and participates of life. Sameness, also, and difference, motion and per- manency, that which is moved, and that which is stable, essence and quality, are there, and all things there are essence. For each thing is being in energy, and not in capacity; so that quality is not separated from each essence. Are, therefore, those things alone these which the sensible world contains, or are there likewise many other things? Prior to the discussion of this, however, the things pertaining to art must be considered. For there is no paradigm of evil there. For evil here happens from indigence, privation, and defect. And evil is the passion of matter frustrated of form, and of that which is assimi- lated to matter.
XI. With respect, therefore, to things pertaining to the arts, and the arts themselves, the arts that are imitative, such as painting, statuary, dancing and pantomine, since they derive their subsistence from sensibles, and employ and imitate a sensible paradigm, and also transfer [to their originals] the forms, motions and symmetries which they perceive, cannot properly be referred to intelligibles, except so far as the forms in the human soul may be called in- telligible. If any one, however, considers the habit in all animals arising from the symmetry of their formation, this will be a part of the power which in the intelligible world surveys and contemplates the symmetry of all things that are there. Moreover, with respect to all music which is conversant with harmony and rythm, so far as its concep- tions are employed about rythm and harmony, it will sub- sist after the same manner as the music which is conver- sant with intelligible rythm. With respect to such arts as o 194 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
are productive of sensible things conformably to art, as the builder's and the carpenter's art, — ^these, so far as they employ symmetry, will derive their principles from intelli- gibles, and from the wisdom which is there. But as they mingle these with a sensible nature, the whole of them will not be in intelligibles, except so far as they subsist in man [i.e. in the human soul]. Neither will the agriculture be there which is conversant with a sensible plant; nor the medicine which surveys the health of the body, or which contributes to strength and a good corporeal habit. For there is another power, and another health there, through which all animals are sufficiently corroborated. With respect to rhetoric also, and the military art, economics, and the art pertaining to regal government, if some of these partake in actions of the beautiful, and make it the object of their contemplation, — in this case, they have a scientific allotment from the science which is there. But geometry, which is conversant with intelligibles, must be arranged in the intelligible world; as likewise must the highest wisdom which is conversant with real being. And thus much concerning the arts, and things pertaining to the arts.
XII. If, however, the idea of man is there, the ideas of the rational and the artificial are also there, and likewise the arts which are the progeny of intellect. It is also requisite to assert, that the forms of universals are there, i.e, not of Socrates, but of man; though it must be con- sidered with respect to man, whether the form of a parti- cular man is there, not because he is the same with another man, but because one man has a flat, and another an aquiline nose. These nasal differences, however, must be placed in the form of man [as certain differences of forms], just as there are differences of animals. But that one noau has an aquiline nose of this, and another of that kind, originates from matter. With respect to the differences of ON INTELLECT, IDEAS, AND [REAL] BEING. 195 colours, also, some of them exist in their productive prin- ciples, but others are produced by matter and difference of place.