XIII. It remains to consider whether what the sensible world alone contains is in the intelligible world, or whether as man himself is different from the sensible man, so with respect to soul, soul itself is different from the soul which is here, and intellect itself from the human intellect. In the first place, therefore, it must be said, that it is not proper to think that all things which are here, are images of archetypes; or that the human soul is the image of soul itself, but that here also one soul differs from another in dignity. Perhaps, however, soul, so far as it is here, is not soul itself. But since each [rational] soul has a real subsistence, as likewise have justice and temperance, there is also in our souls true science and not images only, nor merely Ihe similitudes of intelligibles, as in the sensible region. For true science, justice, and temperance them- selves exist here, though after another manner than in the intelligible world. For they are defined in a certain place. So that where the soul emerges from the body, there also these subsist. For the sensible world, indeed, is in one place only; but the intelligible world is every where. Such things, therefore, as a soul of this kind possesses here, these things also are there. So that if the things which are in the sensible world, are assumed to be those which are in the number of visible objects, not only the natures which are in the regions of sense are there, but also more than these. But if among the natures which are said to be in the world, soul, and what soul contains are comprehended, then all such things are here as subsist there.
XrV. Is this nature, therefore, which comprehends all things in the intelligible, to be considered as the first prin- ciple of things? But how is this possible, since that which 196 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTI>i:S.
is trulj the principle is one, and entirely simple, but multi- tude subsists in beings? After what manner, however, this all-comprehending nature subsists besides the one, how multitude exists, and how all these subsist, and why and whence intellect is all these, must be shown by beginning' the discussion from another principle. With respect, how- ever, to things generated from putre&iction, and to things artificial,^ whether there are forms of these, and also of mud and clay in the intelligible world, it must be said, that such things as intellect derives from the first prin- ciple, are all of them most excellent. But the above- mentioned particulars are not among the number of these, nor does intellect consist of the forms of such particulars. Soul, however, which is derived from intellect, receives from matter other things [besides what she receives from intellect], and such particulars as the above are in the number of these. The discussion of these, however, will be rendered clearer by recurring to the doubt, how multi- tude proceeds from the one. In the mean time it is evident that such composite natures as are casual are not derived from intellect, but from a concurrence of sensibles in them- selves, and do not subsist in forms. Those* things, also, which are produced from putrefaction, are the progeny of a soul which is perhaps incapable of effecting any thing else; for if this were not the case, it would produce something conformable to nature. It produces, therefore, where it is able. But with respect to the arts, such of them as are referred to things natural to man, are comprehended in [the soul of] man. The art also, which is universal, is ^ Instead of x«^«'»'wv here, it is evidently necessary from what afterwards follows to read rcxi^ticaij/ or rsxvutv, Ficinus, from not seeing the necessity of this emendation, has made nonsense of the passage. For he translates irtpi dk r&v U <t^^6<i>c xat t&v xaXcTrc!;]^, ** Ubi vero quseritur nunquid ibi sit species eorum etiam quae ex putrefactione fiunt, difficiliumque, et admodum molestorum," ON INTELLECT, IDEAS, AND [REAL] BEING. 197 prior to other arts, and soul itself is prior to universal art, or rather this must be asserted of the life which is in intellect, before it became soul, and which is necessary to the generation of soul. And this life it is requisite to denominate soul itself.
ON THE ESSENCE OF SOUL.
IV. ii I. In inyestigating the essence of soul, if we show that it is neither body, nor the harmony in incorporeal natures; and likewise if we omit what is said of its being the entelecheia,^ or perfection of the body, as not true, as the words [taken literally] imply, and as not manifesting what the soul is; and if also we should say that it is of an intelligible nature, and a divine allotment, perhaps we shall assert something perspicuous concerning its essence. At the same time, however, it will be better to proceed still further than this. For this purpose, therefore, we shall make a division into a sensible and intelligible nature, and place soul in the intelligible. Hence, let it be at present admitted that it ranks among intelligibles: and let us in another way investigate that which is proximate to, or the peculiarity of, its nature. We say, therefore, that some things are primarily partible, and in their own nature dissipable; but these are such as have no part the same, either as another part, or as the whole; and in which it is * The cause, according to Aristotle, by which the animal is vitally moved, is the rational soul, but the cause by which the animal thus moved is defined or bounded, is entelecheia, or form, which imparts to it perfection. See my Introduction to, and translation of, Aristotle's treatise ** On the Soul."
ON THE ESSENCE OF SOUL. 199 necessary that the part should be less than all and the whole. These, however, are sensible magnitudes and masses, each of which has an appropriate place, nor is it possible among these, that the same thing should be in many places at once. But there is another essence opposed to this, which in no respect admits of a separation into parts, since it is without parts, and therefore impartible. It likewise admits of no interval, not even in conception, nor is indigent of place, nor is generated in a certain being, either according to parts, or according to wholes, because it is as it were at one and the same time carried in all beings as in a vehicle; not in order that it may be established in them, but because other things are neither able nor willing to exist without it. It likewise possesses an essence which subsists according to sameness, and is the foundation ^ of all following natures, being as it were a centre in a circle, the lines drawn from which and termi- nating in the circumference, nevertheless permit it to abide in itself. For they possess from the centre their genera- tion and being, participate of the point, and have for their principle that which is impartible. They also proceed, suspending themselves from the centre. This, therefore, [of which the centre in a circle is an image] being primarily impartible in intelligibles, and the leader among beings, and again that which is in sensibles being in every respect partible, — ^this being the case, prior to that which is sensible, but which nevertheless is something near to and in it, there is another certain nature, which is partible in- deed, yet not primarily so like bodies, but becomes partible in bodies. Hence, when bodies are divided, the form which is in them is also divided, though it still remains a whole in each of the divided parts; the same thing in this case becoming many, each of which is perfectly distant ^ It appears from the version of Ficinus, that the word (rrfipiyna is wanting in this place in the original.
200 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
from the other, in consequence of the form becoming entirely partible. Of this kind are colours, and all qualities, and each morjphs, which is capable of being wholly at one and the same time in many things, that are separated from each other, and which has no part suffering the same thing with another part. Hence this must be admitted to be in every respect partible.
Again, besides the nature which is perfectly indivisible, there is another essence proximately suspended from it, and which has indeed from it the impartible, but by a progression from thence, hastening to another nature, is- established in the middle of both; viz. in the middle of. that which is impartible and primary, and that which is divisible about bodies, and is inherent in bodies. This nature does not subsist after the same manner as colour and every quality, which are indeed every where the same in many masses of bodies, yet the quality which is in one mass, is entirely separate from the quality in another, so far as one mass is also separate from another. And though the magnitude should be one, yet that which is the same in each part, has no communion whatever so as to produce co-passivity, because this sameness is at the same time attended with [a predominant] difference. For the same- ness is passion, and is not itself also essence. That, how- ever, in this middle nature which accedes to an impartible essence, is itself essence, and is ingenerated in bodies, about which also it happens to be divided; yet it does not suffer this, till it gives itself to bodies. When, therefore, it is inherent in bodies, though it should be inherent in the greatest body, and which is every where most extended, yet though it gives itself to the whole, it does not depart from the unity of its nature. Yet it is not one in the same manner as body. For body is one by continuity, but one part of it is different from another, and is situated in a different place. Nor again is it one, in the same manner * ON THE ESSENCE OF SOUL. 201 as one quality. The nature, however, which is at once partible and impartible, and which we say is soul, is not one like that which is continued, having another and another part; but it is partible indeed, because it is in all the parts of that in which it subsists; and impartible, be- cause the whole of it is in all the parts, and likewise in each of the parts. He, therefore, who perceives this, and be- holds the power of it, will know what a divine and admirable thing soul is, and that it possesses a super- natural essence; not indeed having magnitude, but being present with all magnitude, and existing in this place, and again not existing in it, and this not by a different, but the same nature. So that it is divided into parts, and again not divided; or rather, it is neither divided, nor generated divisible. For it remains with itself a whole. But it is divided about bodies, because bodies in consequence of their proper partibility, are not able to receive it impartibly. So that the distribution into parts, is the passion of bodies, and not of soul.
II. That it is necessary, however, that the nature of soul should be a thing of this kind, and that it is not possible for soul to be any thing besides this, being neither alone impartible, nor alone partible, but that it is necessarily after this manner both these, is manifest from the follow- ing considerations. For if it was like bodies hawig another and another part, when one part suffered, another part would not be sensible of the suffering, but that soul for instance, which is in the finger, would have a sensation of the passion, as being different, and subsisting in itself. And, in short, there would be many souls, governing each of us. One soul, likewise, would not govern this universe, but an infinite number of souls separate from each other. For with respect to what is said about continuity, unless it contributes to unity, it is introduced in vain. For that which is asserted by some who deceive themselves, is not to 202 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
be admitted, viz. that the senses gradually arrive at the ruling part, by a continued succession.^ In the first place, therefore, to say that the senses arrive at the ruling part of the soul, is said without examination. For how do they divide, and assert this to be one thing, but that another, and the ruling part something else? By how much quantity, also, do they divide each of these; or by what difference, the quality being one, and the bulk continued? Whether, likewise, is the ruling part alone sentient, or have the other parts also a sensible perception? And if this is the case with the ruling part alone, it will then perceive, when the sensible passion falls on this part established in a certain place; but if it falls on another part of the soul, which is not naturally adapted to be sentient, this part will not deliver the same passion to the ruling part, nor, in short, will there be sensation. If, also, the sensible passion falls on the ruling part, it will either faU on a part of it, and this being sentient, the remaining parts will no longer be sensitive; for it would be in vain; or there will be many and infinite sensible perceptions, and all of them will be dissimilar. Hence, one sensible perception wiU say, I primarily suffer, but another will say, I perceive the passion of another sense. Each sensation, likewise, except the first, wiU be ignorant where the passion was generated.
Or.each part of the soul will be deceived, fancying that the passion was there generated, where it is. If, however, not only the ruling part, but any other part has a sensible per- ception, why will this part be the leader, but anothei* part not? Or why is it necessary that sensation should arrive at the ruling part? How, likewise, will the sensations arising from many senses, such as the ears and eyes, know one particular thing? But again, if the soul is entirely one, so as to be perfectly impartible, and one in itself; and ^ For StadooBi here, it is necessary to read, conformably to the version of Fioinos, duidoxv» ON THE ESSENCE OF SOUL. 203 if it entirely flies from the nature of multitude and parti- bility, no body which may participate of the soul, will be wholly animated; but the soul establishing itself as it were about the centre of each, will leave all the bulk of the animal without animation. Hence it is necessary that soul should be thus one and many, partible and at the same time impartible: and we ought not to disbelieve that it is impossible for one and the same thing to be in many places at once. For if we do not admit this, there will not be a nature which con- nects and governs all things; and which at once compre- hends all things, and conducts them by wisdom. And this nature is indeed multitude, because beings are many; but it is also one, in order that the nature which compre- hends may be one. By its multitudinous one, therefore, it supplies all the parts of body with life; but by its im- partible one it conducts all things wisely. In those things, however, which are deprived of wisdom, that which is the leading one imitates this one of the soul. Hence, this is the meaning of what is divinely though obscurely asserted by Plato, viz. that from an essence impartible and always subsisting according to sameness, and from an essence divisible about bodies, the Demiurgus mingled a third species of essence from both.^ Soul, therefore, is after this manner one and many; but the forms in bodies are many and one; bodies are many only; and that which is supreme is one alone.
^ See my Introduction to, and translation of, the ''Timseus " of Plato.
XI.
A DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS EEL ATI VE TO THE SOUL.
IV. iii.
I. Is it necessary to consider such doubts as pertain to the soul as sufficiently solved; or shall we say that the doubts themselves are accompanied with this gain, that to know the difficulty with which they are attended, will be a right discussion of the affair? For what can any one reasonably more abundantly consider and discuss than this; both on many other accounts, and also because it contributes to the knowledge of those things of which it is the principle, and of those from which it is derived? By so doing, likewise, we shall comply with the mandate of the God who calls upon us to know ourselves. And since we wish to investi- gate and discover other things, it is but just to enquire what this is which investigates, especially since we desire to apprehend that which is lovely in the objects of contem- plation. For in every intellect there is that which is two- fold; ^ so that in partial intellects it is reasonable to admit that one has [the intelligible] in a greater, but another in a less degree. It is likewise requisite to consider, how souls become the receptacles of the Gods; but this, indeed, we shall discuss when we investigate how soul subsists in * viz. The intelligible and the intellectual.
DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 205 body. Now, therefore, again, let us return to those who assert that our souls also are derived from the soul of the universe. For perhaps they will say it is not sufficient [in order to establish this hypothesis,] that our souls extend as far as the soul of the ' universe, nor that they are similarly intellectual with it; since parts are of a similar species with their wholes. They will, likewise, adduce Plato ^ as the patron of this opinion, when proving that the universe is animated, he says: "As our body is a part of the body of the universe, thus also our soul is a part of the soul of the universe." This, too, is confirmed by the asser- tion, that we follow the circulation of the universe. And it is clearly asserted and demonstated that our manners and fortimes are thence derived; and that as we are gene- rated within the world, we receive our soul from the universe in which we are comprehended. Farther still, as each part of us partakes of our soul, so likewise we for the same reason, since we have the relation of parts to the whole, participate as parts of the soul of the universe. The assertion [of Plato ^] likewise, that every soul pays a guardian attention to every thing inanimate, has the same signification, and does not leave any thing else externally of soul, after the soul of the universe. For it is this soul which "p&js attention to every thing inanimate.
II. In answer to these things, therefore, in the first place it must be said, that those who admit souls to be of a similar species, because it is granted that they come into contact with the same things, and ascribe to them a common genus, exclude them from ranking as parts of one soul, and will rather make one and the same soul, and each to- be every soul. But making one sotQ, they will also sus- pend it from something else, which no longer being some- 1 See his " Philebus " and " Timseus."
2 Inthe^Phsedrus.^' 206 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
thing pertaining to this thing or that, but neither belong- ing to the world, or to any other thing, will effect the veiy same thing, as is effected by [the life] of the world, and of any animated being whatever. For it rightly happens that not every soul is something belonging to another thing, since soul is an essence; but that there should be a certain soul which is wholly exempt from a subordinate nature; and that such souls as belong to something else, are from accident at certain times connected with that which is inferior to themselves. Perhaps, however, it is necessary to show more clearly how a part in such souls is to be con- sidered. Part, therefore, belonging to bodies, whether the body is of the same or of a different species, must be dis- missed; observing thus much alone, that when part is asserted of bodies consisting of similar parts, the part is according to bulk, and not according to form; such for instance as whiteness. For the whiteness which is in a part of milk, is not a part of the whiteness of all the milk; but it is the whiteness indeed of a part, and not a part of the whiteness. For whiteness is entirely without magni- tude, and is void of quantity. This, therefore, thus sub- sists. When, however, in things which are not bodies we speak of a part, we either assume it in such a way as in numbers, as when we say that two is a part of ten; (but let this be considered as asserted in mere numbers alone) or as when we speak of the part of a circle and a line; or as a theorem is a part of science. In monads and figures, indeed, it is necessary in the same manner as in bodies, that the whole should be diminished, by a division into parts, and that the several parts should be less than the wholes [of which they are the parts]. For being quantities, and having their existence in quantity, and also not being the same quantity, they necessarily become greater and less. A part, therefore, cannot after this manner be asserted of i»oul. For it is not quantity in such a way as the decad is DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 207 the whole, but the monad a part of the decad. Many other absurdities also will happen [from admitting that the soul is quantity]; nor are ten things one certain thing. Either, likewise, each of the monads will be soul, or soul will con- sist of all inanimate things. Besides, the part of. the whole soul is admitted to be of the same kind with the whole; but it is not necessary in continued quantity, that the part should be such as the whole. Thus, for instance, the parts of a circle are not of the same species with the circle, nor the parts of a triangle with the triangle; at least, all the parts in these, in which a part may be assumed, are not similar [to the whole]. For all the parts of a triangle are not triangles; [and so in other figures] but there will be a difference between the form of some of the parts and that of the whole. Soul, however, is acknowledged to be of a similar form. In a line, likewise, a part of it is still a line, but here also there is a difference in magnitude. But in soul, if the difference between that soul which is partial, and that which ranks as a whole, should be considered as a difference in magnitude, soul wotQd be a certain quantity and a body; since in this case, it would receive the difference so far as it is sotQ, from quantity. All souls, however, are admitted to be similar and wholes. It appears, likewise, that neither is soul divided after the same manner as magnitudes; nor do even our opponents admit that the whole of the soul can be divided into parts; since if this were the case, the whole would be destroyed. And unless the first soul was every soul, it would be a name alone; just as if it should be said, when wine is dis- tributed into many amphorse, that the portion of it in each amphora, is a part of the whole wine. Shall we say, therefore, that part is to be assumed in the soul, in the same manner as a theorem is a part of science P the whole science, indeed, nevertheless remaining; but the separation into parts, being as it were the utterance and energy of 208 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
each. In a thing of this kind, however, each possesses the whole science in capacity, but the whole nevertheless con- tinues to be the whole. If, therefore, a part in the whole soul and other souls is to be thus assumed, the whole soul, of which things of this kind are parts, will not be the soul of a certain thing, but will itself subsist from itself. Neither, therefore, will it be the soul of the world, but will be a certain soul, and will rank among those that are of a partial nature: hence aU the parts being of a similar species, are the parts of one soul. But how is one the soul of the world, and another the soul of a part of the world?
III. Are parts, therefore, so to be assumed, as if some one should say, that the soul which is in the finger of a certain animal, is a part of the whole soul which is in the whole animal? This assertion, however, either leaves no soul independent of body, or admits every soul not to be in body, and contends that what is called the soul of the universe is external to the body of the world. But this must be considered; and now must be investigated by an image. For if the soul of the universe imparts itself to all partial animals, and thus each soul is a part [of the whole soul]; for if this soul were divided, it would not impart itself to each; in this case, in consequence of imparting itseK wholly, it will be every where the same, being one and the same at once in many animals. After this manner, however, one soul will no longer rank as a whole, and another as a part, and especially in those things in which the same power is present. For where the employment of one thing is different from the employment of- another, as in the eyes and ears, there it must not be said that one part of the soul is present to the sight, and another to the ears (for such a division as this belongs to other things), but the same part, though a different power energizes in each. For all the powers of the soul are in both the parts; but the apprehensions are different in consequence of the DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 209 organs being different- Nevertheless, all the powers rank among forms, and are reduced to a form which is capable of being fashioned according to all things. This is evident from the necessity that all things should arrive at one thing [and concur in it]; but the nature of the instru- ments through which the concurrence is effected, is not able to receive all things, and the passions become different in the different instruments of sensation. The judgment, however, is from the same thing, as from a judge directing his attention to what is said and done. But it has been shown, that it is every where one thing which energizes in different actions. And if the apprehensions are as sensations, it is not possible for each of the senses to under- stand, but the whole soul. But if intelligence is appro- priate, each intellectual perception subsists through itself. And when the soul is rational, and is rational in such a way as to be denominated wholly so, then that which is called a part is the same with the whole, and is not a part of it.