each. These, however, [i.e. the mundane spheres] are Gods, because they are never deserted by intellect and soul; and are suspended from the primordial soul, which is as it were departing [from mundane natures]. These, therefore, so far as they are what they are, and so far as they are said to look to intellect [are divine]; the vision of soul itself being directed no where else than to intellect.^ ^ The latter part of this sentence in the original is as follows: ovdafiov 4'^x^C cLvrfjg ri atii^iarog Ikh ft\nrovai\Q; but both the sense DISCL'SSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 223 Xn. The souls of men, however, beholding the images of themselves, like that of Bacchus in a mirror,^ were from thence impelled to descend; yet were not cut off from their principle and from intellect. For they did not descend in conjunction with intellect, but proceeded as far as to the earth, their heads being at the same time established above the heavens. It happened, however, that their descent was more extended, because that which subsists in them as a medium, is compelled to exercise a guardian care, in consequence of the nature into which it amves requir- ing solicitous attention. But the father Jupiter, com- miserating laborious souls, made the bonds about which and the version of Flcinus require that the word awfiarog should be expunged.
^ The meaning of what is here said by Plotinus, will be illus- trated by the following remarkable passage from the MS. Com- mentary of Olympiodorus "On the Phaedo." "In order," (says he) "to the soul's descent, it is necessary that she should first establish an image of herself in the body; and in the second place, that she should sympathize with the image according to a simili- tude of form. For every form hastens into a sameness with itself, through an innate convergency to itself. In the third place, becoming situated in a divisible nature, it is necessary that she should be lacerated and scattered together with such a nature, and that she should fall into an ultin^te distribution, till through a cathartic life, she raises herself from the extreme dispersion, loosens the bond of sympathy through which she is united to the body, and energizing without the image, becomes established according to her primary life. And we may behold a resemblance of all this, in the fable respecting Bacchus the paradigm of our intellect. For it is said that Dionysius, establishing his image in a mirror, pursued it, and thus become distributed into tlie universe. But Apollo excited and elevated Bacchus, this God being a cathartic deity, and the true saviour of Dionysius. And on this account he is celebrated as Dionysoter. (Siovvcytornpy for so it is requisite to read, and not diovvaoTrji;. ) " See more on this subject in the second edition of my treatise, " On the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries," in Number 16 of the "Pamphleteer," for November, 1816.
224 SEI.KCT WORKS OF PIOTIXUS.
they labour mortal, causiuj them to have periodical CCBbB^ tions of their toil, aDd a liberation from bodj, that they a may become situated there where the soul of the u alwaya resides, without any conversion to these inferi realm.s, For what the world now possesses is sufficient t it, and will be perpetually through all the following rev* jutions and periodic restitutions of time, and this establ lished in measures of definite lives, in which these an to an harmonious agreement with those. At the t time, hkewiae, all things are arranged by one reason, witfl reference to the aacent and descent of sonls, and evev other particular. The eymphony, however, of gouh Kith ti order of the univeree, which neverth^legg are not from the uniuerse, but co-adapt themeelves in their detcen and make one concord wUh the mundane circulation, t tijied by thie, that their fortunes, lives, and deliberate electioni are signified by ihe figures of the stars. That the uuivei likewise, utters as it were one voice harmonicaUy i aptly, is asserted by the ancients ntore than any thing elH though obscurely. But this would not be the case, i the universe was both active and passive through its j ticipation of intellectual forms, in the measi periods, orders, and lives; souls evolving themselves a cording to the genera of discursive progressions, at ( time in the intelligible world, at another in the heavei and at another being converted to these inferior real Every intellect, however, is always in the intelligibS world, and never departing from its own proper habitll tion, hut established on high, sends through soul thet objects of sensible inspection. But soul from its prosim" to intellect, ia in a greater degree disposed according i the form which flourieheB there, and to some of the natuii posterior to itself imparts a sameness of subsistence, 1 to others a subsisteuce which ia different at different timfl| and a wandering which proceeds in an orderly coun DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 226 Souls, however, do not always equally descend, but some- times more, and at other times less, though they may belong to the same genus. But each soul descends to that which is prepared for its reception, according to similitude of disposition. For it tends to that to which it has become similar; one soul indeed to man, but another to some other animal.
XIII. For justice, which is said to be inevitable, subsists in such a manner in a ruling nature, that every thing pro- ceeds in that order with reference to which it was generated an image of archetypal pre-election and disposition. And that whole form of the soul, is similar to that to which it has in itself a disposition, and which then sends and intro- duces it where it is proper for it to be situated; not that it may then descend into body, or into this particular body; but that when the prescribed period arrives, souls may as it were spontaneously descend, and enter into that receptacle in which it is necessary for them to reside. A different soul, also, has a different time of descent; which when it arrives, souls descend, as if called by a cryer, enter into an appropriate body, and are similarly affected with those who are moved and borne along by the powers and strong attractions of magicians. They, likewise, resemble the administration which takes place in one animal, which, moves each in a certain time, and generates hair, the beard, and the nature of horns, and now impels them to, and causes them to be efflorescent in things of this kind, which they did not possess before. They are also similar to the administration in the growth of trees which vegetate in orderly pre-established periods of time. Souls, however, proceed neither voluntarily, nor from compulsion. For that which is voluntary in them [when they descend] is not as if it were deliberate choice, but resembles a physical leaping, or the natural tendencies to wedlock, or the im- pulses to certain beautiful actions, to which we are not 226 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
excited by a reasoning process. A certain particular thing, however, is always accompanied with a certain destiny. And to this thing the present time, but to another the future pertains [as to the accomplishment of the decrees of fate]. The destiny, indeed, of the intellect which is prior to the world, is to remain in the intelligible region, and from thence to impart something [to the sensible universe]. And particulars, falling under the universal law, are from thence sent hither. For in each, that which is universal is inherent. This law, also, does not receive its perfective power externally, but is imparted so as to be in the natures that use it, and to be carried about with them. When the time, likewise, arrives [which the law decreed], then that is effected which it wished to be effected, by those who possess this law. Hence, they themselves accomplish the law which surrounds them, and becomes strong through being established in them; oppressing them as it were with its weight, and producing in them a promptitude and vehement desire of arriving at that place, to which the law within them announces they should come.
XrV. These things, therefore, thus subsisting, this world having many lights, and being illustrated by souls, is adorned by other prior worlds, deriving a different gift from a different world; both from those Gods themselves, and from other intellects, through whom souls are imparted to the universe. And it is probable, that this is obscurely indicated by the fable, in which it is said that Prometheus n^ &8hioned a woman, the other Gods also contributed embellishment. It is likewise said, that he mingled with water, and inserted the human voice; that he ^ her a form resembling that of the Goddesses; that dnus and the Graces imparted something to her; and "■ lat a different divinity bestowed on her a different gift.
DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 227 And lastly, that from the gift, and all the givers, she was called Pandora. For all the Gods gave something to this figment, which was produced by a certain jprovidence,^ But what else is signified by Prometheus warning his brother ^ The recondite meaning of this fable, is thus beautifully un- folded by Olympiodorus in his MS. Scholia, " On the Gorgias of Plato: " " Prometheus is the inspective guardian of the descent of rational souls: for to exert a providential energy is the employ- ment of the rational soul, and prior to any thing else to know itself. Irrational natures, indeed, perceive through percussion, and prior to impulsion know nothing; but the rational nature is able, prior to information from another, to know what is useful. Hence, Epimetheus is the inspective guardian of the irrational soul, because it knows through percussion, and not prior to it. Prometheus, therefore, is that power which presides over the descent of rational souls. But the^re which he stole from heaven, signifies the rational soul itself; because as fire tends upward, so the rational soul pursues things on high. But you will say, why is this fire said to have been stolen? I answer, that which is stolen is transferred from its proper place to one that is foreign. Since, therefore, the rational soul is sent from its proper place of abode on high, to earth as to a foreign region, on this account the fire is said to be stolen. But why was it concealed in a reed? Because a reed is cavernous, and therefore signifies the fluid body in which the soul is carried. Why, however, was the fire stolen, contrary to the will of Jupiter? Again, the fable speaks as a fable. For both Prometheus and Jupiter are willing that the soul should abide on high; but as it is requisite that she should descend, the fable fabricates particulars accommodated to the persons. And it represents, indeed, the superior character, which is Jupiter, as unwiUing; for he wishes the soul always to abide on high: but the inferior character, Prometheus, obliges her to descend. Jupiter, therefore, ordered Pandora to be made. And what else is this than the irrational soul, which is of a feminine characteristic? For as it was necessary that the soul should descend to these lower regions, but being incorporeal and divine, it was impossible for her to be conjoined with body without a medium; hence she becomes united with it through the irrational soul. But this irrational soul was called Pandora, because each of 223 SELECT WORKS OF rLOTINUS.
EpimetheuB, not to accept the gift' [Pandora], than t the choice of that which is in the intelligible, is excellent [than of that which is in the sensible worldfl The maker, however, Prometheus, was afterwards boun^ because in a certain respect he comes into contact with t thing generated by him. A bond, also, of this kind 1 eitemal, and the solution of it is by Hercules; tecause fi posseaaes a liberating power. Of these things, howev^ any one may form whatever opinion he pleases. But] is evident that the gifts imparted t-o the world are indicate by this fable, and that it accords with what has; XV. Souls, therefore, fall from the intelligible world, S the first plaJ3e indeed, into the heavens, and there receivi a body, they now proceed through it into ni( bodies, so far as their progressions are more extended I length. And some of them indeed, proceed from i heavens into inferior bodies, but others pass from cert bodies into others; these being such as have not s sufficient to raise themselves from hence, on account of tl great weight and oblivion which tbey have attracted, ( which draw them downward by their oppressive influei tlie Gods bestowed on it some particular gift. And this s that the iUnminations which terrestrial natures receive, take jd through the celential bodies." * ' FicinQH, in what is here Baid of Prometheun, appears U entirely imstaken the meaning of Plotinu», and also not U attended to what ia asserted in the fahle itself. For the train tion of Ficinus is: " Qnod antem Epimetheus ei donam i nnllum." But the Greek is: 6 f £ sTpo/itiQiii; ajrairmoifu airoii. See the Works and Dajs of Hesiod.
" For the irrational soul is an immateriol body, words, vitalised exteiisioii, such as tlie matlieniatical iMMlies wtd we frame in the phantasy or imagination; and the celestial Ix are 01' this kind.
DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 229 But aoTils become diSerent from each other, either tlirough tlie diversity into whicli they are introduced, or through the difference of their fortunes and educatione; or again, they have a difference from themselvea; or they differ in all these respects, or in some of them. And some of th' indeed, entirely fall under the dominion of the fate which is here; but others, at one time are subject to fate, and at another are dependent only on themselves. Others again grant that such things as are neceesary must indeed be endured, but that such things as are their own worts belong to themselves, and that living according to another legislation which comprehends in itself all beings, they give themselves to another more sacred law. This legisla- tion, however, is a contexture consisting of all the reasons and causes that are here, of psychical motions and the laws derived from thence. It also accords with these, thence receives its principles, and weaves together with them whatever is of a conBe<iueut nature. And such things indeed, as are able to save themselves according to their proper habit, it preserves unshaken; but it conducts other things to that condition of being to which they are naturally, adapted, so aa to be the cause in their descent of the different situations of different things, XVI. The punishments, therefore, which are inflicted with justice on the vricked, it is proper to refer to the order which leads every thing in a becoming manner. Such things, however, aa happen to the good without justice, as punishments, or poverty, or disease, may be said to take place through offences committed in a former hfe, Por these things are woven together, and are pre-signified, so that they are also produced according to reason. Or shall we aay that these are not effected according to physical reasons, nor to be ranked among things which have a precedaneoua subsistence, but among such as are consequent to theui? As if some edifice should fall, the SELECT WORKS OF FLOTINUS.
1 animal upon which it falls would be killed, whatever might be. Or as if two certain things moving with orderlj motion, or even one thing thus moving, that whiuH happens to fall at the time, shoiold be broken or tramplfed on. Or it may be said, that this unjust circumstance Is not an evil to him who suffers it, and is useful to the con- nexion of the whole of things. Or that neither is it unjust, things having a just retribution from antecedent transactions. For it ia not proper to think that some things are co-ordinated, but that others are to be referred to the impulse of arbitrary will. For if it ia necessary that things should be generated according to causes and physical conaeciuences, and according to one reason and one order, it is also necessary to think that the smallest things are co-ordinated, and woven together. Hence the unjust conduct of one man towards another, ia indeed unjust to the doer, and the a^ent is not without blame, yet being co-ordinated in the universe, it is not unjust with reference to it, nor to him who auffere the injury, but it was thus fit that it should take place. But if he who is injured is a worthy man, the end of these things is good to him.' For it is necessary to think, that thia co-ordi- nation of things is not without divinity, and is not unjuat, but is a^xurate in the retribution of that which is appropriate; but that it has immanifest causea, and on this account is the occasion of blame to the ignorant.
' Conformably to thif, it is divinely raid by Plato in the Republic: "Whatever ooiues from the Goda to the man who la beloved by the GoAb, will all be the heal [xHsible, uulesa be hoe some necesBary ill from former miscarriRgB. Hence, if the just man happena to be in poverty, or diseaae, or iu any other of tho«e aeeming evils, these things issue to him in sotiiettiiiii; good either whilst alive or <]ea<l. For never at any time is he neglected by the Godf, who inclines earnestly to endeavoor to become just, and practises virtue, xa far as it is possible for man to resemble God.'
I DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 231 XVlI. That Houls, however, first descend from the in- telligible into the heavens, may be rationally inferred from the following consideration b. If the heaven ia in the sensible place that which is most eseellent, it will be proxi- mate to the estremitiea of intelligible a. Hence, the celestial bodies aj-e first animated from thence, and participate of them, as being more adapted to participation. But a ter- restrial body ia the last of bodies, ia naturally adapted to participate of soul in a less degree, and ia more remote from an incorporeal nature. All the celestial souls indeed illuminate heaven, and impart as it were much of them- selves, and the first procession from themselves to it, but other things become fulgid through posterior natures. The souls, however, which descend below the heavens, illumi- nate another inferior nature, but their condition ia not ameliorated by proceeding to a greater extent. For there is something which is as it were a centre; but after this is a circle shining from the centre; and after this, another circle, which is a light emanating from a light. External ti> these, however, there is no longer another circle of light, but that which ia posterior to them is indigent of its proper light, through the want of a foreign splendour. But let this be a rhombus, or rather a sphere, of such a kind as to participate of the second of these circles, to which it is the next in order, and through proximity to which it becomes resplendent. The great light, therefore, [i.e. intellect] illuminates abiding, and the hght which emanates from it proceeds according to [or ia characterized by] reason. But the other things co-iUuminate, some indeed abiding, but others being abundantly attracted by the splendour of that which is illuminated. In the nest place, since the Olumi- nated natures require much guardian attention, like ships in a atorm at sea, the pilots of which incessantly watch over them, and neglecting their own conccma, forget that they are frequently in danger of perishing together with 1 232 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
the ships; thus also these souls are abundantly hurried away from their own concerns, and afterwards are detained in the bonds of enchantment, being held in durance through their attention to nature. But if each animal was such as the universe, having a body sufficient and perfect, and free from the danger of passivity, in this case, the soul which is said to be present with body, would not be present with it, but entirely abiding on high would impart life to the body [which is suspended from it].
XVni. Again, shall we say that the soul employed the discursive energy of reason, before she came into body, and will also after her departure from it? Or shall we say that a reasoning process is employed by her here, in consequence of her being involved in doubt and filled with care, through which she becomes debilitated in a greater degree? For through a diminution of intellect, she requires the discursive energy of reason in order to be sufficient to herself; just as reasoning is requisite in the arts, through the artists being involved in doubts. But when there is no difficulty, then art subdues [its subject matter] and operates. If, however, souls live in the intel- ligible world without reasoning, how can they be any longer rational? In answer to this, it may be said, that they are still rational, because they are able to employ a reasoning process whenever circumstances render it neces- sary. It is necessary, however, to assume a ratiocination of this kind; since if some one should consider the dis- cursive energy of reason as a disposition always subsisting from intellect in souls, and a stable energy which is as it were an evolution of intellectual light, and if in the intelli- gible souls also use the reasoning power, yet as it appears to me, we must not think that voice is employed by them there, so long as they entirely subsist in the intelligible world. But when they have bodies in the heavens, they do not use the dialect which they employ here through in- DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 233 digence or ambiguity; but performing every thing in an orderly manner, and according to nature, they neither command any thing to be done, nor consult about it. They also mutually know the objects of their knowledge through a consciousness of perception; since even here likewise we know many things through the eyes, pertaining to those that are silent. There, however, every body is pure, and each inhabitant as it were an eye. Nothing likewise is there concealed, or fictitious, but before one can speak to another, the latter knows what the former intended to say. But there is no absurdity in admitting that daemons and souls that dwell in the air use voice; for such as these are animals.
XIX. Shall we however say that the impartible and par- tible, are to be considered according to the same thing [in the soul], as if they were mingled together; or that the impartible is to be assumed according to one thing, but the partible as something successive, and another part of the soul? Just as we say the rational part is one thing, but the irrational another. This, however, will be known, when we have explained what we say each of these is. The im- partible, therefore, is simply assumed by Plato, but the partible not simply; [for he says that the soul is a medium between an essence impartible] and an essence which is divisible about bodies, and that the soul is not on this account generated. It is requisite, therefore, to con- sider after what manner the nature of body is indigent of soul for the purposes of living; and to see that it is neces- sary the soul should every where be present with the body, and also with the whole of it. Every sensitive power indeed, if it perceives through the whole body, amves at the whole by being divided. For being every where in the body, it may be said to be divided; but appearing every where a whole, it may be said that it is not entirely distri- buted into parts; but that it becomes partible about bodies.
234 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
If, however, some one should say that the soul is not divided in the other senses, but in the touch alone, to this we reply, that the soul is also divided in the other senses, since it is the body whicK receives it, but that it is less divided than in the touch. The physical and augmenta- tive powers also of the soul, are divided in a similar manner. And if desire dwells about the liver, but anger about the heart, the same thing must also be asserted of these. Perhaps however, these were not assumed in that mixture; or perhaps they were assumed, but aftet another manner, and these were produced from some one of the assumed particulars. But the reasoning power and in- tellect, do not give themselves to body; for their work is not effected through corporeal instruments; since these are an impediment when they are employed in contempla- tions. Hence the impartible is different from the partible, and they are not mingled as one thing, but as a whole con- sisting of parts, each of which is pure, and separate in power. If, however, that which becomes partible about bodies, has the impartible from a more sublime power, this very same thing may be both impartible and partible, as being mingled from the partible, and the power which proceeds into it from on high.
XX. It is requisite, however, to consider whether these, and what are called the other parts of the soul are in place, or these in short are not, but the other parts are, and if they are where they are, or whether none of them is in place. For if we do not assign a certain place to the several parts of the soul, but admit that each of them is no where, and thus make them to be no more within, than without the body, we shall render the body inanimate, and shall not be able to show how those works are effected which are performed through the corporeal organs. Or if we admit that some of the parts of the soul are in place, but others not, we shall not appear to grant those parts to DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 235 be in US which we exclude from place, so that neither shall we admit that the whole of our soul is in us. In short, therefore, we must neither assert that any one of the parts of the soul, nor that the whole of it is in body. For place is that which comprehends, and is comprehensive of body; and where each thing is that is divided, there it is situated in such a way that the whole is not in any thing indis- criminately. Soul, however, is not body, and is not rather that which is comprehended than that which comprehends. Nor yet is it in body as in a vessel; for if it were, the body would become inanimate, whether it comprehended the soul as a vessel, or as place; unless it should be said that the soul is collected in itself, and by a certain distribution transmits something of itself into its vessel the body, and thus as much as the vessel participates, so much will be taken away from the soul. Place, however, properly so called, is incorporeal, and not body. So that in what will it be indigent of soul? Body also, not by itself, but by the boundary of itself, will approximate to soul. Many other objections, likewise, may be urged against him who asserts that soul is in place. For place will always be co- introduced with soul; and [it may still be asked] what will that be which introduces together with itself place? If place also is interval, much less will soul be in the body as in place. For it is necessary, that interval should be a