vacuum. Body, however, is not a vacuum, but perhaps that will be a vacuum in which body is; so that body will be in a vacuum. Moreover, neither will soul be in the body as in a subject. For that which is in a subject, is a passion of that in which it is, as colour and figure. But soul is separable from the body. Nor yet, is soul in the body, as a part in the whole: for soul is not a part of the body. But if some one should say that soul is a part as in the whole animal, in the first place indeed, the same doubt will remain how it is in the whole. For it is not proper to 236 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
conceive that it subsists either as wine in a vessel of wine, or as a vessel in a vessel; nor in the same manner as a thing is in itseK. Nor again, will it be in body as a whole in the parts. For it is ridiculous to say that the soul is a whole, but the body parts. Neither is it as form in matter: for the form which is in matter, is inseparable from matter. And matter now existing, form afterwards accedes to it. But soul produces the form in matter, being itself some- thing different from material form. K, however, it should be said that soul is not a generated, but a separate form, it will not yet be manifest how this form is in body; and soul will be separate from body. How then is it said by aU men, that the soul is in the body? Shall we say it is because not the soul but the body is visible? Perceiving therefore the body, and conceiving it to be animated because it is moved and has sensible perception, we say that the body has the soul. Hence, therefore, we say that the soul is in the body. If, however, the soul were visible and sensible, so as to be perceived to be full of life, to comprehend entirely the body in life, and to extend itself equally to the extremities of it, we should no longer say that the soul is in the body, but that in the more principal nature that which is not such subsists, in that which contains, the thing contained, and that which flows in that which does not flow.
XXI. What then shall we say, if some one should ask us how the soul is present with the body, without giving us any information himseK on the subject? And also if he should ask us whether the whole soul is similarly pre- sent, or a different part is differently present with the body? Since, therefore, none of the above-mentioned modes of the subsistence of one thing in another^ is adapted to the subsistence of the soul in the body; but * And these modes are enumerated by Aristotle in his "Physics.'* DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 237 the soul is said to be in the body in such a way as the pilot in a ship, this is well said so far as pertains to the power by which the soul is able to separate itself from the ^ody; yet it does not entirely exhibit to us the mode which we are now investigating. For the pilot, so far as he is a sailor, will be from accident a pilot in the ship. But if the soul is present with the body in the same manner as the pilot alone with the ship, how is this effected? For the pilot is not in all the ship, in the same manner as the soul is in all the body. Shall we, therefore, say, that the soul is in the body, in the same way as art is in the instruments of art? For instance, as art in the rudder, if the rudder was animated, so that the piloting art is within it, moving it artificially. Now, however, there is this difference be- tween the two, that art operates externally. If, therefore, we admit that the soul is in the body, conformably to the paradigm of the pilot within the rudder, as in a natural in- strument; for he thus will move it, in whatever he wishes to effect; shall we make any accession to the object of our investigation? Or shall we again be dubious how the soul is in the instrument? And though this mode is different from the former modes, yet we still desire to dis- cover [something farther], and to accede still nearer to the thing proposed.
XXII. Shall we therefore say, that when the soul i& present with the body, it is present in the same manner a» light is with the air? For again, this v^hen present is [in reality] not present. And being present through the whole, is mingled with no part of it. It is also itself per- manent, but the air flows by it. And when the air becomes situated out of that in which there is light, it departs possessing nothing luminous; but as long as it is under the light, iib is illuminated. Hence, here also, it may be rightly said, that air is in light, rather than light in air.. On this account, likewise, Plato [in the " Timseus "] doe» not place sonl in the body of the uiiiverae, but the body d the umverse in soul. And he says, that there ia soot thing of soul in which body is contained, and also a thing in which there is nothing of body; meaning by ti latter those powers of the soul, of which the body is r indigent. The same thing, likewise, must be said of othl BOuls. Hence, we must assert, that the other powers of tf soul are not present with the body; but that those powea are present with it of which it is indigent; and that thoy are present, without being estabhshed either in the parts, or in the whole of the body. We must also say, that for the purpose of sensation indeed, the sensitive power is pre- sent with the whole of the sentient [oi^ans]; but that with respect to energies, a different energy is present with a different part of the body. But my meaning is as follows: XXIII. Since the animated body is illuminated by the eoul, a different part of the body differently participates of it; and the power fitted to effect a certain wort, is de- nominated according to the aptitude of the organ to the work. Thus the power in the eyes is denominated visive, in the ears acoustic, in the tongue gustic, and in the nostrils olfactive; but we say that the power of the touch is present with the whole body. Por in order to effect this per- ception, the whole body ia present as an instrument with the soul. Since, however, the instruments of the touch are in the nerves first, which also have the power of moving the animal, this power imparts itself from the nerves. But the nerves beginning from the brain, which is the principle of sense and impulse, and in short of the whole animal, aa they are derived from hence to the other parts of the body, that which uses these instruments is considered as sub- sisting there where the principles of the instruments sub- sist. It is better, however, to say, that the principle of the enei^y of the power is there; for from whence the instrument is to he moved, there it is requisite that the power of the artificer, which is adapted to the instniment, should be as it were firmly fixed; or rather not the power, since power la every where. But the principle of energy is there, where the principle of the instrument exists. Since, therefore, the power of sensible perception, and the power of impulse, pertain to the sensitive soul, and the nature of the phantasy, which aa being nearer to that which is beneath, have reason situated above them;— this being the case, where this principle is in the supreme part, there reason was placed by the ancients in the summit of the whole animal, viz. in the head; not as being [immediately] situated in the brain, but in this sensitive power, through which [as a medium] reason is established in the brain. For it IB requisite to assign the sensitive power to the body, and to that which is especially the recipient of the energy of the body. But it is necessary that the form of the soul which is able to receive apprehensions from reason, should communicate with reason which has no communica- tion with tbe body. For the sensitive power is in a certain respect judicial; and tbe fantastic power is at it were in- tellectual Impulse and appetite also follow the phantasy and reason. Hence the reasoning power is there, not as in place, but because that which is [locally] there, enjoys this power [by participation]. But how that which is there subsists, has been shovm in the sensitive power. Since, however, the vegetative, and also tbe augmentative and nutritive powers never fail, but each of them nourishes through the blood, and the blood which nourishes ja in the veins, but the principle of tbe veins and the blood is in the liver, in which these powers are firmly fixed; — this being the case, the ancients assigned this place to a por- tion of the epithymetic soul. For that which generates, nourishes, and increases, must neecBsariLy desire these [viz. the veins and blood]. But as attenuated, light, acute, and pure blood, is an instrument adapted to anger.
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the fountain of the blood, the heart, was considered by the ancients as a fit habitation for anger. For here a blood of this kind is secreted, which is adapted to the effervescence of anger.
XXIV. Souls, however, still having a body undergo corporeal punishments. But where does the soul dwell on its departure from body? It will not indeed be here, where there is not any thing to receive it. For it is not able to abide in that which is not naturally adapted to receive it, unless the recipient has something of an unwise and insane nature which attracts the soul to it. But the soul is in such a recipient as this, if it has something besides itself; and it there follows where this recipient is naturally adapted to be and to be generated. Since, how- ever, each place is ample, it is necessary that a difference should be produced both from the disposition of the soul, and the justice which has dominion in things. For no one can ever fly from the punishment which it becomes him to suffer for unjust deeds. For the divine law is inevitable, containing at once in itself the power of accomplishing what it has now judged to be fit. In the mean time, he who suffers is ignorantly led to that which it is proper he should suffer, being every where in his wanderings con- ducted in a circuitous course ^ by an unstable motion, but at length, like one wearied by the resistance which he has made, falling into a place adapted to him, he undergoes an involuntary suffering through a voluntary motion. In the law, however, it is promulgated how much and how long it is necessary to suffer. And again, at the same time a remission of punishment concurs with the power of flying from those places [in which the punishment is inflicted] through a power of harmony bj which all things are de- ^ Instead of aiwpovytvoQ in this place, it appears from the version of Ficinus, that we should read Trcjoiayo/tcvoc. And indeed, the sense of the passage requires this emendation.
DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 241 tained. But to souls that have bodies, it also pertains to undergo corporeal punishments. Souls, however, that are pure, and attract nothing whatever to themselves of body, are also necessarily unconfined by the body. If^ fherefore^ they are not at all in body, for neither have they a body, they are there where essence and being, and that which is divine, subsist, viz, in God. Hence, a soul of this kind will be here, and together with these, and in deity. If, how- ever, you still inquire where it will be, you must also inquire where they are. But in exploring this, do not explore it with the eyes, nor as if you were investigating bodies.
XXV. With respect to memory, it must be considered whether souls on departing from these places recollect [what happened to them on the earth]; or whether this is the case with some souls, but not with others; and like- wise, whether they have a recollection of all things, or of certain things only. And in a similar manner, it deserves to be investigated whether they always remember, or for a certain time near to their departure from hence. K, how- ever, we intend to investigate these things rightly, what that is which remembers must be first assumed. I do not mean that we must inquire what memory is, but what that is in which it is naturally adapted to subsist. For we have elsewhere shown what memory^ is, and it has been fre- quently mentioned; but it must now be more accurately assumed what that is which is naturally adapted to re- member. If, therefore, the power of memory is something adventitious, or something belonging to discipline or passion, remembrance will not happen to beings which are impassive and superior to time. Hence, memory must not be placed in deity, or in being, or intellect. For to these nothing accedes; nor does time, but eternity subsist about being.
^^ Memory is summarily, stability of knowledge; just as immor- tality is stability of life, and eternity is stability of being.
1 in sarne*^ 242 SlLLECr WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
Nor is either temporal priority or tliat 'whioh. is Hucce there; but each of these always eubaista a " neas, receiving no mutation. How, therefore, can ttat which is in flie same and the similar be in want of memory? For it IB not at all diajioaed in futurity in a way different from what it waa before; nor has it one intelligence after another, in order that it may abide in another, or that it may remember another intellection whioh it formerly pos- sessed. But what prevents it from knowing the mutations of other things, without being changed itself, such aa the periods of the world? Shall we say it is beeauae it intel- lectually perceives one thing as prior, but another aa posterior which ia consequent to the mutations of that which is convolved? Besides, remembrance is different from intellectual perception: and it must not be said that the intellection of itself ia recollection. For it does not proceed in its energy for the purpose of detaining it, lest it should depart; for thus it might fear leat the essence of itself should depart from itself. Neither, therefore, must it be said that soul remembers after the same manner, as we say it recollects those things which it innately possessea. But having descended hither, it possesses these innate con- ceptions, yet does not [always] enei^iae according to them, and especially when it has profoundly descended into body. The ancients, however, appear to have considered memory and reminiacenoe to be the same thing as for the soul to energize according to those things which it now possesses } BO that this is another species of memoiy. Hence, time is not present with memory thus denominated. Perhaps, however, these things are considered by ua lightly, and not accurately. For perhaps it may be doubted, whether memory and reminiacence belong to such a soul as this [which we are now considering] or whether they do not rather pertain to another more obscure soul, or to this animal which is a composite of soul and body. And if , I DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS KELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 243 they belong to another soul, it may also be doubted when and how it received what it recollects; and a similar doubt will arise if they are said to pertain to the composite of soul and body. Hence, that must be investigated which was the subject of our inquiry from the first, what that is which possesses in us the power of remembering. And if, indeed, it is the soul which remembers, it must be con- sidered what part or power of the soul it is; but if it is the sentient power, as to some it has appeared to be, what the mode is of its subsistence must be investigated, and what ought to be called the animal. And again, whether it is proper to admit that the same thing appre- hends both sensibles and intelligibles, or that one thing perceives the former, but another the latter of these.
XXYI. If, therefore, the animal is both at one and the same time in the senses according to energy, it is also necessary that sensible perception should be a thing of this kind. Hence, likewise, it is said to be common, in the same manner as to bore with an auger and to weave; in order that soul may subsist comf ormably to the artificer, in sensible perception, but the body according to the instru- ment; the body indeed suffering and being ministrant, but the soul receiving the impression of the body, or that which is effected through the body. Or the soul must receive the judgment arising from the passion of the body; where, indeed, sense may thus be said to be the common work, but memory will not be compelled to per- tain to that which is common, the soul now receiving the impression, and either preserving or ejecting it; tmless some one should infer that remembrance also is something common, because we acquire a good memory, and likewise become forgetful from the temperaments of the body. It may also be said, that the body either impedes or does not impede reminiscence, but that remembrance will neverthe- less be the province of the soul. And with respect to dis- 244 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTISUS.
ciplines, how will the remembrance of tbeee pertai ■which is common [or to the animal which is the compomB of soul and body], and not rather belong to the soul? T if the animal is both at once in BOch a way that e thing is produced from both, in the first place indeedij will be absurd to say that the animal is neither body n soul. For both being changed, the aninial will not \ something different from both; nor again, both beiorf nungled, will the soul be in the animal in capacity oold though even in this case, remembrance will neverthel belong to the soul. Just as in the mixture of honey ii wine, if there ia stiil something of sweetness in it, this H be derived from the honey. What then, if it should | said that the soul indeed herseK remembers, yet ii qaence of being in the body, and therefore not being pai but as it were affected with quality, she ia able to h in the body the types of sensiblea, and to establish a were a seat in it, for the purpose of receiving forms, t preventing them from gliding away p To this we reply, j the first place indeed, these types are not magnitudes; in the second place, are they like impressions from a b or resistances, or figurations, because neither is there a impulsion there, nor does the same thing take place a&M was; but the mode even in sensibles resembles that | intellection. In intellection, however, what resistance q there be? Or what need is there of body, or corpoM quality in intellectual energy? Moreover, it is necesu that soul should remember its own motions, such i tendencies to the objects of its desire, and to things whi it has not obtained, and which have not arrived at i body. For how could the body speak of things which i not arrived to it? Or how can the soul recollect in c junction with body, that which the body is not at all n rally adapted to know? But it must be said, indeed, 1 some things end in the soul; and these are such as e DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 245 through the body; but that others pertain to the soul alone, if it is necessary that the soul should be something, and that there is a certain nature and work of it. If, however, this be the case, and it desires, and remembers its desire, it will also remember the attainment, or non-attain- ment of the object of its desire, since its nature does not rank among things of a flowing condition. For if this is not admitted, we must neither grant that it has a co-sensa- tion, nor a power of following the conceptions of intellect, nor a certain conspiration, and as it were consciousness of itself. For unless the soul naturally possessed these things, it would not obtain them through its union with the body; but it would indeed have certain energies, the works of which would require the assistance of corporeal organs; and of some things it would bring with itself the powers; but of others it would also bring the energies. With respect to memory, however, the body is an impedi- ment to it; since even now also oblivion is produced from the addition of certain things; but through ablation and purification, memory frequently emerges. When the soul, therefore, is alone, it is necessary that the moveable and flowing nature of the body, should be the cause of oblivion and not of memory. Hence, also, body may be understood to be the river of Lethe. Let, therefore, this passion [i.e. memory] belong to the soul.
XXVII. To what soul, however, does memory pertain? Does it belong to that more divine soul according to which we subsist, or to the other which we derive from the universe? May we not say, that memory pertains to each of these; but that one kind of memory is peculiar, and another common? and that when they are conjoined, all the species of memory subsist at once; but that when they are separated, if both should exist and remain, each soul wiU preserve for a long time the remembrance of things pertaining to itself, but for a short time the recollection of things foreign to its natxire? The image, t! fore, of Hercules, is in Hades.' For it appears to i requisite to think, that this image haa a recollection i every thing that has been tiunsacted in life. For to t image life especially pertained. Other souls, howei being both these together, have nothing more to say t what pertains to this life, and in consequence of being ti composite of soul and body, know the concerns i " present state of e^stence, or besides this, something 1 longing to justic*. But we have not yet shown ■' Hercules himself, who is without the image, will i What, therefore, will the other soul aav that is liberatfl and alone? For the soul, indeed, which is attracted ) body, wOl recollect every thing which the n; suffered [in the present life]. In the course of time, ho^ ever, after death, the recollection of other things also fi former lives will arise, so that some of these will be i missed and despised. For the soul becoming ii degree purified from the body, will recollect those thin) the remembrance of which she had lost in the present li But when she becomes situated in another body, she i then indeed departing [from aa intellectual] speak o concerns of an est«rual life. She will, hkewise, speak | the things which she has just left, and also of n pertaining to a superior life. But as many adventitiot circumstances will arise in the course of time, she ' always be oppressed with oblivion. Wbat, however, i the aonl which becomes alone remember? Or should T not first consider to what power of the soul remembm belongs?
XXVlll. Do we, therefore, remember through 1 powers by which we perceive sensibly and learn? Or ^ we remember the objects of desire through the power 1 ' i.e. Tlie irrational, which is the image of the rational Honl,fl in the oliscnrity of the sensible life.
DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS KELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 247 which we desire, and the objects of anger through the irascible power? For it may be said, that it is not one thing which enjoys, and another which remembers what that thing enjoyed. The epithymetic power, therefore, is again moved through memory to the objects which it once enjoyed, when they present themselves to its view. For why is it not moved by another object, or not after the same manner? What hinders us, therefore, from granting to it a sensation of things of this kind? And why may we not, therefore, attribute desire to the sensitive power, and this in every respect, so that every thing may be named according to that which predominates? Or shall we say, that we ascribe sense to each thing in a different manner? Thus, for instance, it is sight indeed that per- ceives, and not the power which desires. But the power which desires is moved by sense, as it were in succession; yet not in such a way as that sense can tell what the quality is of the desire, but so as to suffer without per- ceiving what it is. Thus also with respect to anger, sight sees the author of the injury, but anger rises in opposition to the injurer; just as when a shepherd sees a wolf among his flock, the dog, though he does not himself see the wolf, yet is excited by impulse, or by the noise [which this cir- cumstance produces]. For the power, indeed, which desires, possesses in itself a vestige of what it formerly enjoyed, not as memory, but as a disposition and passion. But it is another thing which perceives the enjoyment, and possesses in itself the remembrance of what has been done. That it is so, however, this is an argument, that memory frequently does not know what the things are of which desire participates, though they still reside in it.
XXIX. Shall we, therefore, ascribe memory to the sen- sitive power, and will the sensitive power be the same thing with us as that which remembers? If, however, the image of the soul remembers, as we have said, the sensitive ;r,ECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
power will be twofold. And if tbe Bensitive power <i not remember, but something else, this aometliiog else ^ have the power of remembering in a twofold respc Farther stiU, if the aenBitive power ia capable of t hending diadplines, it will also apprehend the obje the dianoetic power [i.e. the diBCursive power of reason], something else will apprehend the objects of each of tl Shall we, therefore, by admitting that the power whi apprehends is common, attribute to it the remet both these? If. however, one and the same thing a bended sensiblea and intelligiblea, something to the pm would perhaps be asserted. But if it is divided ii fold respect, there will nevertheless be two things, if we ascribe both to each soul, four things will be | duced. In short, what necesaity is there that v remember through the same power by which we peruer and that both sensible perception and recollection shoi be effected by the same power, and also that we b1 remember dianoetic objects through the power by v we energize dianoetically? For the same persons do i escel in dianoetically cKergizing and remembering, f those whose sensible perceptions are equally acute, d remember equally. Some also excel in sensible percepti but others in memory whose sensations are not t Again, however, if each is different, it will be i that the power also should be different which remem.b<i what sense had before perceived, and it will be n to perceive that which it is requisite to remember, may we not say that nothing hinders a sensible percepti from being a phantasm to bim who remembers, and t memory and retention may belong to the power of i phantasy, which is something different from memory. it is this power in which sense ends; and when sense 1 longer energizes, the sensible spectacle is present with t phantastic power. K, therefore, the imagination of i