In the first place, therefore, let these men be distin- guished by us. and let ua begin from the musician, and show who he naturally is. We must admit, then, that he is easily excited ' and astonished at the beautiful; yet is not disposed to be moved from himself, but is prepared from casual occurrences as from certain types or impres- sions, to be excited by sounds, and to the beautiful in these, just as the timid are by noises. He likewise always flies from dissonance; and pursues in songs and rythms, that whicli is one, congruous, and elegant. After these sensible sounds, rythms, and figures therefore, he is thus to be elevated, \h., by separating the matter, in which analogies and ratios are inherent, and contemplating the beauty which they contain. He must also be taught that the things about which he was astonished were, intelligible harmony, and the beauty which ia in it, and in short, the beautiful itself, and not a certain beauty only. The reasonings, likewise, of philosophy must be inserted in him, through which he will be led to a belief of truths of ' Foj- liKii'ijroi' here, it is necesaary tri renil li'mi-ijTin: ON DIALECTIC. 17 which he is ignorant, though he [occultly] possesses them. What these reasonings however, are, will be hereafter unfolded.
II. But the lover, into which the musician may be changed, and being changed will either remain [in that character] or will pass beyond it, has in a certain respect a recollection of beauty. Being however separated from it, he is incapable of learning what it is. But as he is struck by the beautiful objects which present themselves to the sight, he is seized with astonishment about them. He therefore must be taught not to be abjectly astonished about one beautiful body, but he must be led by the exer« cise of the reasoning power to all beautiful bodies, and he who does this must exhibit to him that which is one and the same in all of them, and inform him that it is different from and is derived elsewhere, than from bodies, and is rather inherent in other things, such as beautiful pursuits, and beautiful laws. For the lover will now become accus- tomed to incorporeal natures. He likewise must be led to the beauty which is in the arts, in sciences, and the virtues, and afterwards to that which is one and the same in all these; and he must be taught after what manner beauty is inherent in each of them. But after the virtues, he must now ascend to intellect, and being itself, and there commence the progression on high.
III. The philosopher, however, is naturally prompt, and as it were, winged, and does not require a separation [from sensible objects] like the other characters; since he is ex- cited to the supernal region, but is dubious, and therefore is only in want of one that may point out the way. The path, therefore, must be shown to him, and he must be liberated, since he is naturally willing, and was formerly freed [from the fetters of a corporeal nature]. Hence, he must be instructed in the mathematical disciplines, in order that he may be accustomed to the perception of and c 18 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
belief in an incorporeal essence. For he will easily admit its subsistence, as he is desirous of learning. As he is naturally, therefore, endued with virtue, he must be led to the per- fection of the virtues; and after the mathematics, he must be taught dialectic reasonings, and in short, must be rendered skilful in dialectic.
rV. What, then, is the dialectic which ought to be de- livered in addition to the former particulars? It is, indeed, a habit enabling its possessor to reason about every thing, to know what each thing is, and in what it differs from other things, what the common something is which it participates, where each of these subsists, if a thing is, what it is, what the number is of beings, and again of non- beings [which are not nothing] but different from beings. This, also, discusses the good, and that which is not good; such things as are under the good, and such as are under the contrary to it; and what that is which is eternal, and that which is not a thing of this kind. All these likewise it discusses scientifically, and not from opinion. Eesting, also, from the wandering about a sensible nature, it establishes itself in the intelligible world, and there has its employment, dismissing falsehood, and nourishing the soul in what is called the plain of truth, employing for this purpose the division of Plato, and also for the separa- tion of forms. It likewise employs this division for the purpose of defining what a thing is, and in order to obtain a knowledge of the first genera of things, intellectually connecting that which results from these, till it has pro- ceeded th;'ough the whole of an intelligible nature; and again, by an analytic process it arrives at that to which it had proceeded from the first. Then, however, it becomes quiescent, because so far as it arrives thither it is at rest, and being no longer busily employed, but becoming one, it surveys what is called logic, which is occupied about propositions and syllogisms, — just as if ON DIALECTIC. 19 giving to another art, the knowledge of writing; some of which it considers as necessary, and prior to art. But it forms a judgment of these, as well as of other things, and thinks that some of them are useful, but others super- fluous, and pertaining to the method by which these are discussed.
V. Whence, however, does this science derive its prin- ciples? May we not say that intellect imparts clear prin- ciples to the soul that is able to receive them? Afterwards, the soul compounds the things consequent to these prin- ciples, and connects and divides them, till it arrives at a perfect intellect. For, as Plato says, this science is the purest part of intellect and [intellectual] prudence. It is necessary, therefore, since it is the most honourable habit of those things that are in us, that it should be con- versant with being, and the most honourable nature; and that prudence, indeed, should be conversant with being, but intellect with that which is beyond being. What, then, is philosophy? That which is most honourable. Is philosophy, therefore, the same as dialectic? Or is not dialectic the most honourable part of philosophy? For it must not be fancied that it is the instrument of the philo- sopher; since it does not consist of mere theorems and rules, but is conversant with things, and has beings as it were for its subject matter. Nevertheless, it proceeds in a path to beings, possessing things themselves together with theorems. It knows, however, that which is false and sophistical accidentally, something else being the cause of these; and it forms a judgment of them as of that which is foreign, knowing the false by the truths it contains in itself, when it is adduced by any one, because it is contrary to the rule of truth. Propositions, therefore, are not the object of its knowledge; for these are letters. But, knowing truth, it knows that which is caUed a pro- position. And universally, it knows the motions of th^ 20 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
soul, what the soul admits, and what it rejects, and whether it rejects that which it admits, or something els^. Likewise, whether different or the same things are adduced; applying itself to them in a way resembling sense.^ But it assigns to another power an accurate discussion of these particulars.
VI. This, therefore, is an honourable part; since philo- sophy has also other parts. For it speculates about nature, receiving assistance from dialectic, in the same manner as the other arts use arithmetic. Philosophy, however, proxi- mately derives assistance from dialectic. And, in a similar manner, it speculates about manners, surveying them through dialectic, but adding habits, and the exercises from which habits proceed. The rational virtues also have habits, and what are now as peculiarities, which they derive from thence. And the other virtues, indeed, have their reasonings in pecuhar passions and actions; but prudence is a certain ratiocination, and is conversant with that which is more universal. For it considers whether it is proper now to abstain or hereafter, or in short, whether another thing is better. Dialectic, however, and wisdom, introduce all things to the use of prudence, universally and im- materially. But whether is it possible to know ^ inferior concerns without dialectic and wisdom? Or may they be known in a different and defective way? It is possible, however, for a man to be thus wise and skilled in dialectic? without a knowledge of these. Or this will not be the case, but they will coalesce, either previously, or together. And perhaps some one may have certain physical virtues, from which, when wisdom is possessed, the perfect virtues will be obtained. Wisdom, therefore, is posterior to the ' i.e. By intuition, so as to come into immediate contact "vvith tlie objects of its knowledge. It does this, however, so far as its energy is purely intellectual.
=* For ilvai here, it is necessary to read fldsvau ON DIALECTIC. 21 physical virtues, but afterwards it perfects the manners; or rather, the physical virtues existing, both are co-increased, and mutually perfected. Or, one of them being previously assumed, the one will perfect the other. For, in short, physical virtue has an imperfect eye, and imperfect manners; and the principles of both are, for the most part, derived from those things which we possess.
m.
ON MATTER.
m.
ON MATTER.
I. All those who have spoken eonceruing what ii iuatt«r, aad who have arrived at a conoeption of its nature unauiinoiisly assert, that it is a, certain subject and recep* t;icle of forms. They dissent, however, from ea*h other, i investigating what this subject nature is; and after wht manner, and of whtit things, it is a recipient. And t indeed, who alone admit bodies to be beings, and who ci tend that essence ia in these, say, that there is one matte^ which is spread under the elements, and that it is but that all other things are, as it were, the pa matter, and are matter subsisting in a certain way, and thus also are the elements. They, hkewise, dare to extend matter as far as to the Gods. And, lastly, they make even the highest ' God to be this matter, subsisting in a certain way. They, likewise, give a body to matter, calling it, body void of qiialiti/; and attribute to it magnitude. But others say, that matter is incorporeal; and some of these do not admit that there ia only this one matter, but assert that this is the subject of bodies, and that there is another ' From the version of FicinDs, it appears, that instead of aiirin tSiv t6v Bibv, we should read, Jjcfjororoi' abruv riv Sth: For Mi 11 ipBomni deuiii."
J ON MAT TEH.
23 matter prior to this in intelligiblea, whiuh is spread under the forma that are there, and under incorporeal eBsenceB, H. Hence we must enquire concerning this intelligible matter, whether it is, what it is, and after what manner it Buhsista. If, therefore, it is necessary that matter should be something indefinite and formless, but in iutelligibles as being the most excellent ' natures, there is nothing in- definite and without form, matter will not lie there. If, also, every thing in the intelligible world is simple, it will not he in want of matter, iu order that from it and some- thing else, that which is a composite may he produced. To generated natures, indeed, and to such as make some things from others, matter is necessary, in which also the matter of sensibles ia conceived to subsist; hut it ia not necessary to things which are not generated. Whence, also, does matter proceed, and how does it subsist among intelligibles? For if it was generated, it was generated by something; but if it is eternal, there are many principles i and first natures will have a casual subsistence. If, like- wise, form should accede, the composite will be a body, so that body will be there.
HI. In the first place, therefore, it must be said, that the indefinite is not every where to be despised, nor that which in the conception of it is formless, if it applies itself to things prior to itself, and to the most excellent natures. For thus soul is naturally adapted to apply itself to intel- lect and reason, being formed by these, and brought to possess a more excellent nature. In intelligiblea, however, that which is a composite subsists after a different manner, and not like bodies; since reasons, also, [or productive principles] are composites, and produce a composite in energy, through nature which has an enei^y directed to form. But if energy is directed to something different ' For aopioTois here, it i 24 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
from itself, it is derived from something else, and this in a greater degree. The matter, however, of generated natures, always possesses another and another form; but the matter of eternal natures always possesses the same form. Perhaps, also, the matter which is in sensibles sub- sists in a way contrary to that which is in intelligibles. For the former is alternately all things, and is always some different thing. Hence, nothing in it ever remains, one thing continually expelling another; and on this account, nothing is ever the same. But in the latter, matter is all things at once, and hence there is not any thing into which it can be changed. Matter, therefore, in intelligibles, is never formless, since neither is the matter in sensibles ever without form; but each of these subsists after a different manner. Whether matter, however, is eternal or generated, wiU be manifest when we have shown what it is. IV. At present, however, it is supposed by us that there are forms or ideas, for this we have demonstrated else- where; and this being admitted we shall proceed in our discussion. If, therefore, there are many forms, it is neces- sary, indeed, that there should be something common in them; and also that there should be something peculiar by which one is distinguished from another. This some- thing peculiar, therefore, and separating difference, are the appropriate form. But if there is form, there is also that which is formed, about which difference subsists. Hence, there is matter [in intelligibles], which receives the form, and is always the subject of it. Farther still, if the intel- ligible world is there, but this our world is the imitation of that, and this is a composite, and consists of matter [and form], it is necessary that there also there should be matter. Or how can you denominate it a world [or that which is adorned], unless you look to form? And how can you look to form, unless you assume that in which form subsists? For the intelligible world, indeed, is perfectly ON MATTER. 25 every where impartible; but in a certain respect is also jjartible. And if the parts of it are divulsed from each other, the section and divulsion are the passions of matter; for it is matter which is divided. But if the many which are there, are one ^ impartible being, the many subsisting in one, — if this be the case,. they are in one matter, of which they are the forms. For this various one, is to be considered as having a multiform nature. It must, there- fore, be considered as fonnless prior to its variety. Hence, if by intellect you take away its variety, its forms, its pro- ductive principles, and intellections, that which is prior to these is formless and indefinite, and this is no one of the things which subsist together with and in it.
V. If, however, it should be said, that beca,use it always possesses these things, and both [the subject and the forms] are one, this subject is not matter, neither will the subject of bodies here be matter. For the matter of sensibles is never without form, but there is always the whole body. At the same time, however, this is a composite; and intel- lect discovers its twofold nature. For it divides till it arrives at that which is simple, and which is no longer capable of being analyzed. But so far as it is able, it proceeds into the profundity of body. The profundity, however, of each body is matter. Hence all matter is dark, because reason is light, and intellect is reason. Hence, too, intellect be- holding the nature of each [i.e. of intelligible and sensible matter], conceives that which is beneath, as under light, to be dark; just as the eye which is luciform, extending itself to the light, and to colours which are illuminations, says, that what is under colours, is dark and material, and con- cealed by the colours. Nevertheless, that which is dark in intelligibles is different from that which is dark in sensibles; and the matter of the one differs as much from the matter * Instead of d Se TrdWA bv, dfiepiffTov ierrt, in this place, it is necessary to read, ti dk ttoWo. 'iv 6v dfi^piaroif Itrrt.
26 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
of the other, as the supervening form of the one from that of the other. For divine matter receiving that which defines and bounds it, possesses a definite and intellectual life. But sensible matter becomes, indeed, a certain definite thing, yet neither vital nor intellectual, but an unadorned privation of life. The morphe,^ also, is an image, so that the subject likewise is an image. In intelligibles, however, the morphe is truly form, so that the subject also is res^l. Hence, those who say that matter is essence, if they assert this of intelligible matter, speak rightly. For the subject there is essence, or rather, is the object of intellectual per- ception, together with that which it contains, and is wholly illuminated essence. To investigate, however, whether in- telligible matter is eternal, is similar to the inquiry whether ideas are eternal. For they are generated, indeed, so far as they have a principle of their subsistence; but they are not generated [according to the usual acceptation of the term] because they have not a temporal beginning, but always proceed from something else, not like the natures which are always rising into existence, or becoming to be, as is the case with the world, but they always are, in the same manner as the world which is there [has an eternal subsistence]. For the difference which is there always produces matter; since this which is the first motion is the principle of matter. Hence, it is called difference, because motion and difference were unfolded into light together with it. But the motion and difference which proceed from the first cause of all, are indefinite, and are in want of this cause in order that they may become termi- nated. They are, however, terminated, when they are con- verted to it. But prior to this, matter and difference are indefinite, and are not yet good, but are without the light of the good. For if light is from the good, that which ^ Morphe pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of super- ficies.
ON MATTER. 27 receives the light, prior to its reception of it, does not always possess it, but possesses it, being different from it, since the light is from something else. And thus much concerning intelligible matter, which we have discussed perhaps more than is fit.
VI. Of the receptacle of bodies, however, we must speak as follows: That it is necessary then, there should be a certain subject to bodies, which is different from them, the mutation of the elements into each other manifests. For there is not a perfect corruption of that which is changed; since if there was, there would be a certain essence which would be dissolved into nonentity. Nor again, does that which is generated proceed into being from that which in every respect is not; but there is a mutation from one form into another. That, however, remains, which receives the form of the thing generated, and casts aside another form. This, therefore, in short, corruption manifests; for corruption is of that which is a composite. But if this be the case, each sensible thing consists of matter and form. This, too, induction testifies, demonstrating that the thing which is corrupted is a composite. Analysis, likewise, evinces the same thing; as if, for instance, a pot should be resolved into gold; ^ but gold into water; and the water being corrupted, will require an analogous process. It is necessary, also, that the elements should either be form, or the first matter, or that which consists of matter and form. But it is impossible, indeed, that they should be form. For how, without matter, could they have bulk ^ "What Plotinus here says of the analysis into gold, is perfectly conformable to the assertion of Albertus Magnus, as cited by Becher in his ** Physica Suhterranea," p. 319, 4to. For his words are, "Non dari rem elementatam, in cujus ultima substantia- tione non reperiatur aurum." That all metals, likewise, may be analyzed into water, is the doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle. See my translation of the Timjeus of the former, and Meteors of the latter.
"28 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
and magnitude? Nor are they the first matter; for they a,re corrupted. Hence, they consist of matter and form. And form, indeed, subsists according to quality and morphe; but matter according to the subject, which is indefinite, because it is not form.
VII. Empedocles, however, who substitutes the elements for matter, has the corruption of them testifying against him. But Anaxagoras, who makes the mixture of things to be matter, and who says, that it has not an aptitude to [become] all things, but has all things in energy, subverts the intellect which he introduces; not assigning to it the production of morphe and form, nor asserting that it is prior to matter, but that it subsists in conjunction with it. It is, however, impossible that intellect and matter should be consubsist-ent. For if the mixture participates of being, it follows that being is prior to it. But if being also is a mixture, a certain third thing is wanting to these. If, therefore, it is necessary that the demiurgus should have a prior subsistence, why is it necessary that forms should be in matter according to parvitude; and that afterwards intellect by a vainly laborious process should separate them from each other? For it is possible to impress quality in matter, since it is without quality, and to extend morphe through the whole of it. And, besides, is it not impossible that all things should be in every thing? But he who asserts that the infinite is matter, should explain what this infinite is. And if it is infinite in such a way as that which cannot be passed over, it must be observed, that there is not any such things among beings, neither if it is the infinite itself, noi: if it is inherent in another nature, as an accident to a certain body. It is not, indeed, the infinite itself, because the part of it is necessarily infinite. Nor is it the infinite as an accident, because that to which it is an accident would not be of itself infinite, nor simple, and therefore evidently would not be matter.
ON MATTER. 2^ But neither have atoms the order of matter, which indeed have no subsiatence whatever/ For every body is entirely divisible. This opinion is also confuted from the con- tinuity and moisture of bodies; and also from the impos- sibility of things subsisting without intellect and souU which could not be formed from atoms. Again, it is not possible to fabricate any other nature, besides atoms from atoms; since no artificer is able to produce any thing from matter which is not continuous. Ten thousand other objections might and have been urged against this hypo- thesis, and therefore it is superfluous to dwell longer on these particulars.
VIII. What, then, is this nature, which is said to be- one, continued, and void of quality? And, indeed, that it is not a body if void of quality, is evident; ^ for if it were,.
^ i.e. As things perfectly indivisible.
* Though from the arguments adduced here by Plotinus, it appears to be impossible that the first matter should be body void of quaUty, yet I think there will not be any absurdity in admitting with Simplicius, that body is twofold, one kind as subsisting according to form and productive power, and defined by certain intervals; but another as characterized by intensions and remis- sions, and an indefiniteness of an incorporeal, impartible, and intelligible nature; this not being formally defined by three intervals, but entirely remitted and dissipated, and on all sidas. flowing from being into non-being. " Such an interval as this, we must perhaps," (says Simplicius) " admit matter to be, and not corporeal form, which now measures and bounds the infinite and indefinite nature of such an interval as this, and which stops it in its flight from being. Matter, however, is that by which material things differ from such as are immaterial. But they differ by bulk, interval, division, and things of this kind, and not by things which are defined according to measure, but by things void of measure and indefinite, and which are capable of being bounded by formal measures. The Pythagoreans appear to have been the first of the Greeks that had this suspicion concerning matter but after them Plato, as Moderatus also informs us. For he, con- formably to the Pythagoreans, evinced that the first one is above "30 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
it would have quality. But we say that it is the matter of all sensibles, and that it is not the matter of some, but the form of others; as clay is matter to the potter, but is not simply matter. We do not, therefore, speak of it in this way, but with reference to all things; and this being the case, we must not attribute to the nature of it any thing which is perceived among sensibles. Hence, besides not granting to it other qualities, such as colour, heat and <3old, we must ascribe to it neither levity or gravity, neither density or rarity, or figure; and therefore, neither must we ascribe to it magnitude. For magnitude itself is one thing, and to be great another. And figure itself is one being, and all essence; but he says, that forms are the second one, which is true being and the intelligible; and that the third one, which is psychical, or belonging to soul, participates of the onCt and of forms. He adds, that the last nature from this, and which is the nature of sensibles, does not participate them, but is adorned according to a representation of them, matter which is in them being the shadow of the non-being, which is primarily in quantity, or rather depending on and proceeding from it. According to this reasoning, therefore, matter is nothing else than the mutation of sensibles, with respect to intelligibles, deviating from thence, and carried downwards to non-being.
Those things, indeed, which are the properties of sensibles are irrational, corporeal, distributed into parts, and passing into bulk and divulsion, through an ultimate progression into generation, viz. into matter; for matter is always truly the last sediment. Hence, also, the Egyptians call the dregs of the first life, which they symbolically denominate water, matter, being as it were a certain mire. And matter is, as it were, the receptacle of gene- rated and sensible natures, not subsisting as any definite form, but as the state or condition of subsistence; just as the impartible, the immaterial, true being, and things of this kind, are the con- stitution of an intelligible nature; all forms, indeed, subsisting both here and there, but here materially, and there immaterially; viz. there impartibly and truly, but here partibly and shadowy. Hence, every form is here distributed according to material interval." See more on this subject in the notes to Book I. of my translation ^f Aristotle's Physics.
ON MATTER. 31 thing, and that which is figured another. It is necessary, however, that it should not be a composite, but simple, and one certain thing in its own nature. For thus it will be destitute of all things. And he who imparts morphe to it, will impart morphe as something different from matter. He will also prefer, as it were, magnitude and all things from the things which exist; for otherwise, he would be subservient to the magnitude of matter, and his production would not possess the quantity which he wished it should, but that which matter is capable of receiving. To assert, however, that the will of the artificer concurs with the magnitude of matter, is fictitious. But if the maker is prior to matter, in this case matter will entirely be such as the maker wishes it to be, and will with facility be brought to all things, and therefore to magnitude. If, however, it has magnitude, it is also necessary that it should have figure, so that it will be still more difficult to be fashioned by the artificer. Form, therefore, enters matter, bringing all things with it. But every form pos- sesses magnitude, and the quantity which it contains is accompanied with reason [i.e. with a productive principle] and subsists under this. Hence, in every genus of things, quantity is defined together with form. For there is one magnitude of a man, and another of a bird. And it would be absurd to suppose, that the introduction of quantity to