DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 249 absent object is present with this, it will now remember it. And if it remains, indeed, bnt for a little time, the remem- brance will be little; but if for a long time the remem- brance will be greater, in consequence of this power being stronger, so that not being easily perverted, it will not be compelled to lose its remembrance. Memory, therefore, belongs to the power of the phantasy, and to remember will consist of things of this kind. We say, however, that souls are differently disposed with respect to memory, either through differently possessing the powers of it, or by frequently or not frequently exercising it; or by corpo- real temperaments being or not being inherent, and pro- ducing or not producing a change in quality, and causing as it were perturbation. These things, however, must be elsewhere discussed.
XXX. What, however, shall we say of the conceptions of the dianoetic power? Does the phantastic power pertain also to these? If, indeed, imagination followed every intellection, perhaps this imagination remaining, and being as it were an image of the dianoetic conception, there will thus be a remembrance of the thing known; but if not, something else must be investigated. Perhaps, however, memory will be a reception into the phantastic power of reason following the conception. For a conception is impartible, and not yet having proceeded as it were out- wardly, it latently remains within. But reason evolving and educing into the phantastic power from each concep- tion, exhibits the conception as it were in a mirror: and thus the apprehension, permanency, and remembrance of it are effected. Hence, since the soul is always moved to intelligence, when it perceives intellectually, then the apprehension of what it perceives is produced in us. For intelligence is one thing, and the apprehension of intelli- gence another. And we always indeed perceive intellec- tually, but we do not always apprehend that we do so.
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This, howeyer, ie because the recipieDt not only receirSd intellection B, but also the senses, and this altematelj.
XXXI. If, however, memory pertains to the phantasti power, but each soul is said to remember, there wi powers of the phantasy. The two souls, therefore, beiaj separate, each will iwssess a phantastic power. But eim they are with ua in the same thing, bow will they be twi and in which of them will memory be ingenerated? For jj in both, there will always be twofold imaginations. For 3 must not be said, that the remembrance of inteUigibla pertains to the one, but of sensibles to the other; thus there will in every respect be two aoimals, havr nothing in common with each other. If, therefore, then is memory in both what will be the difference? In tly next place, what should hinder ua from knowing thiafl Shall we aay that we are then ignorant of the difference when the one power is in symphony with the other j phantaatic powers not being separate, but that which i the more escellent of the two prevailing, one phantasia Ij produced, since the one follows the other hke a shadow, a is subservient to it like a less to a greater light however, there is a contest and dissonance between the ti then the one shines forth through itself; but it is c cealed in the other, because in short that there e souls is concealed from us. For both coalesce in o: the one is diffused but not the other. The one, therefoz sees all things, and possesses some things indeed, proce ing from it, but dismisses others, as pertaining to theothei power. Just as when we have sometimes conversed ^ persons of a viler character, and afterwards betake om selves to those who are more worthy, we remember 1 little of our conversation with the former, but much o£; with the latter.
XXXII. What, however, ought we to say concermngt] remembrance of friends, and children, and wives; and a' DISCUSSION OF DOUBTS RELATIVE TO THE SOUL. 251 of our country, and other things which it is not absurd to recollect? Shall we say that the image of the soul will remember each of these accompanied with passion, but that the superior soul will recollect these impassively? For passion, perhaps, was from the first in this image. And such of the passions as are of an elegant nature, are in the worthy [i.e., the superior] soul, so far as it communicates with the other. It is fit, however, that the inferior soul should also desire the recol- lection of the energies of the other soul, and especially when it has likewise become itself elegant and worthy. But this inferior soul may from the first become better, in consequence of being disciplined by the more excellent souL The latter, however, will gladly resign to oblivion the concerns of the former. For it may happen, that the latter soul being worthy, the former which is of an inferior nattire, may be forcibly restrained by the superior soul. And in proportion as this more excellent soul hastens to the intelligible, it wiU forget the concerns of this world, tmless the whole of its life here, has been such as to pre- serve the remembrance alone of things of the most exalted nature. For here also it is beautiful to abandon human pursuits: [and this is the work of perfect virtue ']. A forgetfulness, therefore, of such pursuits, is necessary in another life. Hence, he who says that the worthy soul is oblivious, will in such a way as we have mentioned speak rightly. For it will fly from the many, and will col- lect multitude into one, dismissing that which is infinite. For thus it will not associate with multitude, but expelling it will live by itself: since here also, when it wishes to be in the inteUigible world, while an inhabitant of earth, it dismisses all other concerns. Hence, when it is there, it ^ It appears from the version of Ficinns, that the words kuI rovro TTiQ TiKiioQ dperrjc ^pyov, are wanting in the original in this place.
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remembers but few things of a terrestrial nature; but it remembers more of tbem when it is in the heavens. And Hercules, indeed, [when in Hades] may speak of his own fortitude; but in the intelligible world, he will con- sider these things as trifling, being transferred into a more sacred place, and strenuously engaging even above him- self, in those contests in which the wise wish to engage.
xn.
ON THE GENERATION AND ORDER. OF THINGS AFTER THE FIRST, V. ii I. The one is all things, and yet no one of all. For the principle of all is not all things; but the one is all, because aU things run as it were into it, or rather do not as yet exist, but will be. How, therefore, [does multitude proceed] from the one which is simple, and in which no variety, nor any duplicity present themselves to the view? Is it because there was nothing in it, on this account all things are from it? Hence, in order that being might exist, the one is not being, but being is the progeny of it, and as it were its first-bom. For the one being perfect, in consequence of not seeking after, or possessing, or being in want of any thing, it becomes as it were overflowing, and the superplenitude of it produces something else. That, however, which is generated from it is converted to it, and is filled, and was generated looking to it. But this is intellect. And the permanency indeed of it about the one, produced being; but its vision of the one, intellect. When, therefore, it is established about the one, in order that it may see it, then it becomes at once intellect and being. Hence, being in the same manner as the one produces things similar to itseK, through an effusion of abundant power. Its offspring also 254 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
has the form of it, in the same maimer as prior to this i| likewise flowed forth from the one. And this enei^y fro eeseoce is aoul, which was generated from intellect pern neatly abiding. For intellect also was generated, thtH which is prior to it abiding. Soul, however, does not pro duce abiding, but being moved generates an image of itself. Soul, therefore, looking thither whence it was generated, is filled. But proceeding into another and contrary motion, it generates an image of itself, viz., sense, and the nature which is in plants. Nothing, however, is separated or cut off from that which is prior to itself. Hence, also, the soul of man is seen to proceed as far as to plants. For after a certain manner it proceeds into them, because that which is in plants is derived from it. Nevertheless, the whole of the human sonl is not in plants, but it is thus ingenerated in plants, because it bo far proceeds into an inferior nature, having made another hypostasis by its progression into and propensity to that which is subordinate; since the soul which is prior to this, being suspended from intellect, per- mits intellect to abide in itself.
n. The procession, therefore, of these is from the prin- ciple to the extremity, each thing at the same time being always left in its proper seat. But that which ia generated receivfes another order, which is subordinate. NevertheleBB, each thing becomes the same with that which it follows, as long as it follows it. When, therefore, soul [i.e. the human soul] is ingenerated in a plant, there is one part, viz., the part which is in the plant, which is most rash and iusane j and as far as to this soul proceeds. But when the eoxd is in a brute,' it is led by the sentient power, which then has ' "When liuman souls," says SalluBt, in Lis golden treatise " On tbe Gods and tlie World," " transmigrate Into irrational animals, they follow externally, in the eame manner as our;ire- siding dienions attend us in their beneficent operations, ratiooal part never becomes the aoul of the irrational i ON THE GENERATION AND ORDER OF THINGS. 255 dommion. When, however, it is ingenerated in man, then in short, either the motion is in the rational nature, or from intellect, in consequence of the soul having its proper intellect, and deriving from itself the power of intellection, or of being moved. Again, therefore, returning [whence we digressed], when some one cuts off either the germina- tions, or certain branches of a plant, whither does the soul that is in the plant depart? Shall we say, to that from whence it came? For it is not distant by place from its source. It is, therefore, in its principle. But if you cut off or burn the root, where is the life which was in the root? In soul, not proceeding to another place, but it may also be in the same place. It will, however, be in another place, if it should run back. But if not, it will be in another vegetable nature. For it is not contracted into a narrow space. But if it should run back, it will be in the power which is prior to it. Where, however, is this power situated? In the power prior to itself. And this again in another, as far as to intellect. But not in place. For no one of these was in place. And much less is intellect in place; so that neither is soul. Hence, soul being no where, in that which is no where it is thus also every where. But if soul proceedii^ to the supernal realms, should stop in its progression in that which is between, before it has entirely arrived at the summit, it wiU have a middle life, and will be established in that part of itself. Intellect, however, is all these, and yet it is not. It is, indeed, because they are from it; and again, it is not, because abiding in itself, it gave them to exist. Hence, there is an abundant life in the universe, which is as it were extended into length, and has each of its parts in a successive order. The whole, however, is in continuity with itself, but the parts are distinguished by a proper difference, that which This doctrine, which originated from Syrianus and Proclus, was universally adopted by all the succeeding Platonists.
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is prior not being destroyed in tliat which is posterior. What then is the soul which is ingenerated in plants? And does it generate nothing else than that in which it is? How this is effected, however, must be considered by us, assuming for this purpose another principle.
XIII.
ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES, AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND THEM, V. iii.
I. Is it therefore necessary, that intellect should be in itself various, in order that by one of the things contained in itself, having surveyed the rest, it may be thus said to understand itself, as if it would not be able to be converted to, and have an intellectual perception of itself, if it was entirely simple? Or is it also possible for that which is not a composite, to have the intellection of itseK? For that which is said to perceive itself intellectually because it is a composite, and because by one of the things in itself it understands the rest, just as if by sense we should appre- hend the form ^ of ourselves, and the other nature of the body, will not have a truly intellectual perception of itself. For in a thing of this kind, the whole will not be known, unless that which understands other things that are with itself, understands also itself; since otherwise we shall not have the object of investigation, viz., that which perceives itself, but we shall have one thing perceiving another. It is necessary, therefore, to admit that the intellectual per- ception of itself is the province of a simple nature, and how * The word used here by Plotinus is fiop^fi, which, as we have elsewhere observed, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies.
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thia is effected must, if possible, be considered; or we n abandon the opinion that there ia something which tn intellectually perceives itself. To abandon, howeTer, tld opiuion is not easy, since the rejection of it is attended widS many absurditiea. For if we do not admit that to aesig this i>ower to the soul is not very absurd, yet not to ascrilN it to the nature of intellect is perfectly absurd; yIz., if n ' grant that it has indeed a knowledge of other thi but has no knowledge and science of itself. For sense, a not intellect, will have an apprehension of things estemalS and if you are willing to grant it, this will also be the o with the dianoetic power and opinion. But whether intelJ lect has a knowledge of these or not, it ia fit to considerfl It is evident, indeed, that intellect knows such things i are intelligible. Does it, therefore, know these alone, i also itself that know these? And does it thua far knoi itself, that it knows these alone, but does not km itself is? Hence, it will perceive that it knows some thingj belonging to itself, but it will not know what itself is j it will both know the things which are its own, and itse And wha,t the mode of this knowledge ia, and how far it| extends, must be considered.
II. In the first place, however, we must inquire concern the soul, whether the knowledge of itself ia to be attribute to it, what the gnostic power of it ia, and how it subsist! "With respect to the sensitive power, therefore, of tl we must immediately say that its energy is directed t externals alone. For though there is d co-sensation ( things which inwardly take place in the body, yet here thij apprehension is of things which are external to sense: then there is a sensation of the passions which are in body. But the power in the soul which reasons, and whuj forms a judgment of the phantasms adjacent from ai collects and divides them, surveys the impressions as ifl were which are derived from intellect, and poaaesBes aboiq ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES.. 259 these the same power [as intellect]. It likewise assumes intelligence, as knowing and adapting new and recently acceding impressions to those in itself which are ancient. And this knowledge and adaptation, we say, are the remi- niscences of the soul. The intellect of the soul, also, stops as far as this in its power. [It must be investigated, there- fore, whether the reasoning power also,^] is converted to, and knows itself, or whether this must be referred to intel- lect. For if we attribute a knowledge of itself to this part, we must admit that it is intellect; and in this case, we must investigate in what it differs from a superior intellect. But if we do not grant that it has a knowledge of itself, by a reasoning process we must proceed to the intellect which is superior, and we must consider what it is for this to know itself. And if we grant that this is also the pro- vince of the reasoning power, we must investigate what the difference is between the two in self-knowledge. For if there is no difference, then this our intellect is the highest. This dianoetic part, therefore, of the soul, is it converted to itseK, or not? Or has it [only] a knowledge of the im- pressions which it receives both from intellect and sense? And in the first place, it must be investigated how it pos- sesses this knowledge.
in. For sense, indeed, sees a man, and transmits the figure of him to the dianoetic part. But what does this part say? Perhaps it does not yet say any thing, but only knows that it is a man, and there stops. Unless, indeed, it should consider with itself, who this is, if it happens that it has before met with him, and should say, employing memory for this purpose, that it is Socrates. If, however, it should also evolve the form of the man, it will then distribute into parts those things which it received from ^ It appears from the version of Ficmus, that it is necessary here after the word dvvafin in the original, to supply and read as follows: Kftrrirkov apa, €i rb \oyiZ,6fiivov kcu iIq kavrhvf k, X.
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the imagination. And if it should also say, Is he a good man? it will make this inquiry from the information which it derived through sense. But that which it says on this occasion, it will now possess from it«elf, containing in itself a rule by which it forms a judgment of good. How then does it contain the good in itself? May we not say, so far as it is boniform, and is corroborated to the perception of a thing of this kind, in consequence of intellect shining upon it? For the pure part of the soul is this, and receives the supervening vestiges of intellect. Why, however, is not this intellect, but the rest beginning from the sensitive power is soul? May we not say, because it is necessary that soul should consist in the discursive energies of reason? But all these are the works of the reasoning power. Why, however, do we not grant to this part the power of intel- lectually perceiving itself, and thus become liberated from doubt? Is it because we assign to it the office of consider- ing, and being busily employed about externals; but we conceive it to be the province of intellect, to survey both itself, and the forms which it contains? If, however, some one should say, what therefore prevents this part from considering things pertaining to itself, by another power? He who says this, does not investigate either the dianoetic or reasoning power, but assumes a pure intellect. What then prevents a pure intellect from existing in the soul?
We reply, nothing prevents this. But farther still, it is necessary to inquire, whether this pure intellect is some- thing belonging to soul?^ We reply, it does not belong to the soul, and yet it is our intellect, being different from the dianoetic power, and proceeding on its summit. At^the same time, however, it is ours, though we must not con- numerate it with the parts of the soul. Or we may say, ^ Both the sense of this passage, and the version of Ficinus require that instead of dXX' In Set Xsynv, xj/vxng tovto, we should read dXX* In del Xcygiv, ii ri iJ/ux^C tovto; ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 261 that it is ours, and yet not ours. Hence we use, and do not use it; but we always employ the dianoetic power. And it is ours indeed, when we use it, but not ours when we do not use it.^ But what is it to use a pure intellect? Is it ^ The intellect which is ours when we use it, and not ours when we do not, is a partial intellect of the Minerval series, which is proximately participated by dsdmoniacal souls, and illuminates ours when we convert ourselves to it, and render our rational part intellectual. This in the ** Phsedrus " is said to be the governor of the soul, and to be the only thing which perceives real being. But the soul also perceives it in conjunction with this intellect, when she is nourished by the summit of her reasoning power and by science. This intellect, likewise, is spoken of in the ** Timaeus," and is denominated intelligence. For it is there said, that true being is apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. Hence, as Proclus beautifully obswves, " when reason intellectually perceives eternal being, as reason indeed, it energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellecttuzllyy it energizes with simplicity, under- standing each thing as simple, yet not understanding all things at once, but passing from some things to others. At the same time, however, it perceives each of the things which it sees transitively as one simple thing."
In another part of his Commentary on the " Timaeus " (p. 321), he also admirably observes respecting this partial intellect as follows: *' What the impartible is in each partial soul {i.e, in a soul such as ours) is truly dubious. For it must not be admitted, that there is an intellect in each, and this partial. May we not say, therefore, that each partial soul is essentially suspended from a certain daemon; and as every daemon has a dsemoniacal intel- lect above itself, a partial soul also has this same intellect arranged as an impartible essence prior to itself? Hence, the daemoniacal soul participates primarily of this intellect; but the partial souls that are under it, secondarily; and which also causes them to be partial. For each partial soul has the partible as its peculiarity, but has the impartible in common with the daemons that are above these souls and whose peculiarity is the impartible. Hence, too, daemons remain on high, but partial souls at a certain time descend, and divide themselves about bodies, as being more adapted to these. For if in partial souls, the genus of difference is exu- berant, which is the reason why they are not always able to 262 • SELECT WORKS OF PL0T1SU«.
to pronounce ourselyes as becoming either sucli an intelle or uontormable to it? For we are not intellect. We Bubdfa therefore, conformable or accordiug to it, the first reasonia power being the recipient of it. Tor we are sentient throuj aease, and we ourselves perceive sensibly. Are we therefoS thua diaaoetically perceived, and do we thus dianoetica" energize? Or shall we say that we indeed are reasoni beings, and that we intellectually perceive the conceptioH which are in dianoia? For we are this. But the conception arising from the energies of intellect, are in such a above us, as those arising from the energies of sense a beneath us. And we are this peculiarity of soul, viz., middle of a twofold power, the worse and the better; seni energize itccording to all tbeir powers, it is necessary that tht should be in a. greater degree adapted to a life divisible a" body, and in a greater degree be separated from an impartila essence; by this means preserving an analogy to each of t' extremes. Just as it is necessary that the most divine of si through their similitude to intellect, should in a greater degree p exempt from partible natnres, but be more united to the impartin essenoQs above them, and from which they are coiinascently n pended. They also have an intellectual arrangement among son And it is reasonable to suppose, that the intellect of each diemcd so far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the diemon whij ' proximately [Le. immediately] participates it, but tl prehends in itself the number of eoula that are under it, and ^ intellectual paradigms of them. Each partial?oul, therefore, Wj liave its appropriate paradigm in this inteUect, and not simply tl whole of this int«Uect, in the same manner as the dromon whoa essentially the leader of these soula. Defining, therefore, i accurately, we may say, that the impartible of each partial si is the form that is above it, which is cumprehended in thi intellect that is allotted the government of the deemoniacal si under which each partial hodI is arranged. And thua both % assertions are true, viz. that the intellect alone of each of t souls ranks among things which are always established o and that every partial soul is the medium of the impartible a it, and the partible nature posterior to it."
ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 263 being the worse, but intellect the better power. And with respect to sense, indeed, it seems that we always grant it to be ours; for we are always sentient; but this is dubious with respect to intellect, because we do not always use it* and because it is separate. But it is separate because it does not verge to us, but we rather looking on high, tend to it. Sense, however, is our messenger, but intellect is our king. IV. We also reign when we energize according to it. But we energize according to it in a twofold respect; either because letters as it were, which are as laws, are inscribed in us by intellect; or because we are filled with it; or when it is present, are able to see and be sentient of it. We also know by such a spectacle, that we are able to learn other things through a thing of this kind; so that we either learn the nature of the power which knows such an object as this, learning by the power itself; or we become a thing of this kind.'* Hence, that which knows itself is twofold; one indeed being the dianoetic part of the soul, but the other being superior to this. And, therefore, that which knows itself has a subsistence conformable to pure intellect itseK. It also intellectually perceives itself through this, not as any longer man, but as having entirely become something else; and hastily withdrawing itself to that which is on high, it alone draws upward together with itself, the more excellent part of the soul, which. is alone able to be winged with intelligence, in order that he who possesses it may there deposit what he knew. Does not the dianoetic part, therefore, know that it is dianoetic, and that it receives the knowledge of things external; that it forms a judgment also of the things which it investigates, and this by the rules in itself which it derives from in- tellect? Does it not also know that there is something * Instead of kuI ore firj ahrb ati in this place, it is necessary to read koI on. firi avrf xpu}fihQa aei. ^ I.e. We become intellect.
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better than itself which does not ' investigate, bat poEW every thing in itself? If, therefore, it aays that it ii intellect, and is the second after, and the image of ii leet, having all things aa it were written in itself, as t he who writes and has written, will be, who thus ki himself, atop as far as to those things? Shall we, howerel employing another power, survey intellect knowing i or shall we aasumiug it, since it also is ours, and we a it, thus both know intellect, and ourselves? Or is no latter of these necessary, if we are to know what that ii intellect, for itself to know itself? Then, however,! one becomes himself intellect, when dismissing other thi pertaining to himself, he beholds intellect through iii4 lect, and by it also surveys himself, just aa intellect I wise beholds itself.