V. Does intellect, therefore, by one part of itself t another part? In this case, however, one part will 1 that which sees, but another, that which is seen. Andti is not for the same thing to see itself. What then? the whole is a thing of such a kind as to consist o parts, so that the perceiver differs in uo respect tiling perceived, in this case, the perceiver seeiug that p which is the same with itself, will also see itself. For ti perceiver does not at all differ from the thing perceiye Or may we not indeed in the first place say that: division of intellect is absurd? For how is the divisioa || be made? since it cannot be casually. Who likewise ii that divides it? Is it he who arranges himself in 1 order of the perceiver, or he who arranges himself aa t thing perceived? In the next place, how will the perceifl know himself, when in perceiving he arranges himself i the order of that which is seen? For that which sees Vi le in that which is seen. Or will not t ' For D Ji)7iJ liere, it is necesaary to reaii ii ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 265 who thus knows himself, understand himself to be that which is perceived, but not that which perceives? So that he will not know all, nor the whole of himself. For that which he knows he knows as a thing seen, but not as a thing that sees, and thus he will be the perceiver of another thing, and not of himself. May he not, however, of him- self add, that he is also that which sees, in order that he may perfectly know himself? But if he comprehends in himself that which sees, he also at the same time compre- hends the things that are seen. If, therefore, in the per- ceiver the things perceived are contained, if indeed, they are impressions of the things seen, he will not contain the things themselves. But if he possesses the things them- selves, he does not see them through dividing himself [into the perceiver and the thing perceived]; but prior to the division of himself, he both beheld and possessed them. If, however, this be the case, it is necessary that contempla- tion shoidd be the same with the object of contemplation, and intellect the same with the intelligible. For if it is not the same, there will not be truth. For unless this is admitted, he who is said to possess beings, will only possess an impression different from beings, which is not truth. For truth ought not to be of another thing, but that which it says, that also it should be. Thus, therefore, intellect, the intelHgible, and being are one; and this is the first being, and the first intellect, possessing beings; or rather, it is the same with beings. If, however, intelligence and the intelligible are one, how on this accoimt does that which is intellective intellectually perceive itself? For in- telligence, indeed, as it were, comprehends the intelligible, or is the same with it. Intellect, however, which intellec- tually perceives itseK, is not yet manifest. But intelli- gence and the intelligible are the same; for the intelligible is a certain energy, since it is neither power, nor void of life, nor again is its hfe adventitious, nor its intellection in 266 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS, sometluug different from itself, hb in a stos€, or a certaia| iTianimate tiling, and it is also the first essence. If, there fore, it is energy, and the first energy, intelligence likewi will be moat beautiful, and will be essential intelligence For intelligence of this kind is moat true, is the fira and aubsista primarily, and will therefore be the first ii tellect. For this intellect is not in capacity, nor is thiq one thing, but intelligence another; since thus again, thi essential of it would be in Capacity. If, therefore, it i energy, and the essence of it is energy, it will be one a the same with energy. Since, however, being and the il telligible are one and the same with energy, all will be t the same time one, viz., intellect, intelligence, and the idi telligible. If. therefore, the intelligence of it ia t" gible, but it is the intelligible, hence it will itself intc tually perceive itself. For it will perceive itself by intelB gence, which it is, and will understand the intelligibn which also it ia. According to each of these, therefor^ it will intellectually perceive itself, both so far as it i intelligence, and so far as it ia the intelligible, and i understand by intelligence, which it is.
VI. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that there is Si thing which properly and principally itself intellectual perceives itself. This, however, when it is in soul, inteilt tually sees in one way, but in intellect more principa For soul, indeed, knows itself, that it is the progeny i another thing; but intellect knows that it is from itaelq and what its nature is, and who it is; and this by i natural conversion to itself. For beholding beings it I holds itself and beholding is in energy; and the enei^y H itself. For intellect and intelligence are one. With t whole of itself also it perceives the whole, and not a p by a part. Does, therefore, reason demonstrate it to be 4 thing of such a kind as to have an energy which is mere an object of belief; or is it indeed necessary that it shou] ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 267 be such as it is, but that it should not have persuasion? For necessity indeed is in intellect, hut persuasion in soul. Hence we investigate as it seems, rather for the purpose of persuading ourselves, than to behold truth in a pure in- tellect. For as long as we continued on high, and adhered to the nature of intellect we were satisfied, energized in- tellectually, and contemplated, collecting all things into one. For it was intellect that then energized, and spoke of itself. But soul was quiet, yielding to the eilergy of intellect. When, however, we descended hither, we were desirous of producing persuasion in the soul, wishing to behold the archetype in an image. Perhaps, therefore, it is requisite to teach our soul, how its intellect once beheld itself; and to teach that part of the soul this, which is in a certain respect intellectual, and which we assume to be dianoetic; by this appellation latently signifying, that it is a certain intellect, or that it is a power through intellect, and that it derives its subsistence from intellect. It is fit, therefore, that this part should know, that it also knows such things as it sees, and such things as it says. And if it were the things which it says, it would after this manner know itself. Since, however, the things which it sees are present with, or are supemally imparted to it from that region whence it also originates, it happens to this part likewise since it is reason, and receives things allied to itself, that by an adaptation of the vestiges which it contains, it is enabled to know itself. It may, therefore, transfer the image to true intellect which is the same with the things that are truly the objects of intellectual percep- tion, and which have a real and primary subsistence. For it is not possible that such an intellect as this should be external to itself. Hence, if it is in and with itself, and is [truly] that which it is, it is intellect. But intellect can never be deprived of intellect; so that the knowledge of itself is necessarily present with it; and this because it is i OF PLOT IN US, in itaelf, and its employmeDt and eaaeace consist in beii intellect alone. For this ia not a practical intellect, looking to that which pertains to external action, and which in consequence of not abidiag in itself, is a certain know- ledge of externals. There is. however, no necessity if intellect is practic, that it should know itself; but this ia the province of that intellect which is not engaged in practical affairs. For appetite is not in pure intellect j but this being absent, the consequent conversion to itseK, not only demonstrates that the knowledge of itself is reason- able, but also necessary. For otherwise what would be the Kfe of it, when liberated from action, and established in intellect?
VII. It may however, be said, that pure intellect be- holds deity. But if it is acknowledged that it knows Oroi, he who grants this, must also necessarily admit that it knows itself. For such things as it possesses from deity it knows, and also what he imparts, and what he is able to impart. But learning and knowing these things, it will likewise through this know itself. For divinity is one of the things imparted, or rather he ia all that is imparted. If, therefore, intellect also knows him, and learns the powers that be possesses, it will likewise know itself to be generated from thence; and that it derives from him all that it is able to receive. If, however, it is unable to see him clearly, since to see is perhaps the very thing that is seen, on this account especially that which remains to It, will be to see and know itself, if to see is to be the very thing itself which is seen. For what else can we confer upon it? By Jupiter, quiet. The quiet of intellect how- ever, is not mental alienation, but is the tranquil energy of intellect, withdrawing itself from other things; since to other natures also that are at rest from other employments, their own pvoiKT energy remains; and especially to those things whose existence is not in capacity, but in energy.
i ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 269 Where, therefore, existence is energy, and there is nothing else to which energy is directed, there energy is directed to itself. Hence intellect perceiving itself, is thus with itseK, and has its energy directed to itself. For if something else is suspended from it, that something else is in itself, because its energy is directed to Itself. For it is necessary that it should first be in itself, and afterwards that its energy should be directed to something else, or that something else should proceed from it, assimilated to it: just as fire, which is first in itself, and has the energy of fire, and thus is enabled to produce the vestigie of itself in something else. For again, intellect indeed, is energy in itself; but soul is so in proportion as it tends as it were internally to its own intellect. But so far as it departs from intellect, so far it tends to that which is external. And partly indeed, it is assimilated to that from whence it came; but partly, though it becomes dissimilar, yet here also it retains a similitude to it, whether it acts, or pro- duces. For when it acts, at the same time it contemplates; and when it produces, it produces forms, which are aB it were intellections derived from first intelligibles. Hence, all things are vestigies of intelligence and intellect, pro- ceeding conformably to their archetype; those that are near to it, imitating it in a greater degree; but such things as are last preserving only an obscure image of it.
Vm. What kind of intelligible, however, does intellect see, and what does it perceive itself to be? With respect to the intelligible indeed, it is not proper to investigate such a thing as colour or figure in bodies: for intelligible^ are prior to these. And the reason [or productive prin- ciple] in seeds which produces these, is not these. For these seminal principles also, are naturally invisible, and still more so are intelligibles. There is likewise the same nature of them and of the things that possess them, after SELECT WORKS OF PLOTIHtrS.
270 the Bame manner as the reason which its in seed, and s which participates of these. The vegetable sonl ho'weTe^ does not see the things which it poaaesses: for neither di^l it generate these,' but both itself, and the reasons it con taiua are an image. But that from whence it came i manifest and true, and primary. Hence, also, it is of itself and with itself. The vegetable soul however, mJess it pei tained to, and was in another thing, would not t what it is. For it belongs to an image, since it i another thing, to be generated in something different f; itself, unless it is suspended from it. Hence, neitlier dot it aee as not having aufBcient light for thia purjjose. if it should see, since it is perfected in another thingf.S it would behold another thing, and not itself. Notbing, j however, of this kind takes plaee with pure intellect; buti vision ia there, and that which ia visible ia consubaistent € with it. Such also is the visible, aa is the vision; and theil vision as the visible. Who is it therefore, that will apeak 'l of the visible such as it ia? He who aeea it. But intellecfe I seea it; since in the aensible region also, eight being light,. J or rather being united to light, sees light; for it sees eolonr. 1 There, however, sight does not perceive through another! thing, but through itself, because there is nothing eiternat-1 to it. With another light, therefore, and not througUi] another, it sees another light. Hence, hght seea anothet light; and therefore itself beholds itself. This light how- J ever, when it ahinea forth in the soul illuminates it, i cauaes it to be intellectual. And jn consequence of thia, ] the aoul is in itself, similarly with supernal light. If such, J therefore, ia the vestige of light ingenei'ated in the soul, by I conceiving supernal light' to be of this kind, and to bo J still more beautiful and clear, you will approach nearer to 1 the nature of intellect and the intelligible. For this wheo 4 ' Javta is omitted in the originaL ' I.e. Intelligible light.
ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 271 it shines forth, imparts to the soul a clearer, but not a generative life. For on the contrary it converts the soul to itself, and does not suffer it to be dissipated, but causes it to love and joyfully receive the splendour which is in it. Neither does it impart a sensitive life^ For this looks to externals, but does not on this account perceive more acutely. He, however, who receives that light which is the fountain ^ of truth, beholds as it were more acutely visible objects; but the contrary is not true.'* It remains, there- fore, for the soul to assume an intellectual life which is a vestige of the life of intellect. For there realities subsist. But the life and energy which are in intellect, are the fii'st light primarily shining in itself, and a splendour directed to itself, which at one and the same time illuminates, and is illuminated. This also is that which is truly intelligible, is intellect, and the object of intellect, and is seen by itself. Nor is it in want of another thing in order that it may see, but for the purpose of perceiving is sufficient to itself. For that which sees is itself the thing which is seen. This very thing also takes place with us, so that the knowledge of it by us, is effected through it. Or whence should we be able to speak concerning it? For it is a thing of such a kind as to have a clearer apprehension of itself, and we likewise more clearly perceive ourselves through it. Through arguments, however, of this kind, we should elevate our soul to it, considering also that our soul and its life are an image; a resemblance, and an imitation of it; and likewise that when it sees intellectually, it becomes deiform, and has the form of intellect. And if some one should inquire what the nature is of this perfect intellect, which is every intel- ^ Urjyriv is omitted in the original, but is added from the version of Ficinus.
* Instead of aXXd rovvavriovj it is necessary to read a\X oh TovvavTiov, The meaning of Plotinus is, that intelligible light is not seen more acutely by the perception of visible objects.
272 SliLECT WORKS OF PLOTIKCS.
lect, and primarily knows itself, suth a one eliould first come established in intellect, or Bliould yield tliat energy- his soul to intellect, whieh is employed about thinga which he retains the memory in himself. But it be possible for the soul thus disposed, to show that it'B able through itself as an image to behold after a certail manner that pure intellect, through [a life] more accurately assimilated to it, aa far as a part of the soul ia capable of arriving at a similitude to intellect.
IX. It ia necessary, therefore, as it seems, that the soul in order that it may see the most divine part of soul, ought to consider what that is which intellect may know. Perhaps, however, this may be effected, if you first separate body from the man, viz. from yourself. And if after this, you separate the soul which faahions the body, and as much as possible take away sense, desire and anger, and other trifles of this kind, as very much verging to the mortal nature. For then, that which remains of the soul, is what we have denominated the image of intellect, and which preaervea something of its light; so as to resemble the light proxi- mate to the sphere of the sun which emanating from, diffuses its light about the sun. No one therefore, will admit that light to be the sun, which proceeds from, and shines about it. For this light originatea from the sun, and permanently surrounds it; but another light always proceeds from another prior to it, until it arrives as far aa to us and the earth. All the light, however, which ia about the sun, must be admitted to be situated in some- thing else, iu order that there may be no interval void of body after the aun. But soul ia a hght derived from, and subsisting about intellect. It also is suspended from intel- lect, which it surrounds, and ia not in any other thing. Nor ie there any place in which it ia received; for neither is intellect in place. Hence, the light of the sun indeed, is in the air; but soid of this kind is so pure, that it is visible 1 ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 273 of itself, so that it is seen by itself, and by another soul similarly pure. Soul indeed, must reason about [in order to perceive] intellect, and must investigate from itself what the nature of it is. But intellect beholds itself without reasoning about itself. For it is always present with itself. But we are present with ourselves and with intellect when we tend to it. For our hfe is divided, and consists of manv lives. But intellect is not at all in want of another life, or of other things; but what it imparts, it imparts to others, and not to itself. For it is not indigent of things inferior to itself; nor, since it possesses the universe, does it confer on itself that which is less. Nor does it contain first natures in itself as vestiges; or rather, it does not contain, but is itself these very things. If, however, some one is incapable of having such a primary soul, which per- ceives intellectually with purity, let him assume a doxastic soul, and afterwards, from this ascend [to intellect]. But if he cannot even assume this, let him employ sense, bring- ing with itself more dilated forms: I mean sense in itself, together with the things which it is able to contain, and which now exists in forms. If some -one however, wishes to descend, let him proceed to the generative power, and as far as to its effects. Afterwards, let him from hence ascend from the last to the last forms, or rather to those that are the first.
X. And thus much concerning these particulars. If, however, not ^ only forms that are produced, are in intel- lect, for they are not the last of things [when they are considered as having an intellectual subsistence]; but their productive forms are the first of things, whence also they are first; — if this be the case, it is necessary, that the pro- ducing cause of forms should also be there, and that both the productive cause and the forms produced should be ^ oh is omitted in the originaL T 274 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
one. For if this is not admitted, intellect will again be in want of sometliing else. What then, will that which is beyond this be again in want? Or is not this, indeed, which is indigent intellect? Will not, therefore, that which is beyond intellect see itself? Or must we not rather say, that this is not at all in want of vision? But of this here- after. Now, however, we shall resume what we were before discussing. For the speculation is not about a casual thing. Again, therefore, we must say that this intellect is in want of the vision of itself; or rather that it possesses the perception of itself. And in the first place, it sees that it is manifold. In the next place it sees that it is the per- ception of something else [i.e. of the intelligible], and hence, that it is necessarily perceptive of the intelligible. It likewise sees that the essence of itself is vision. For in consequence of there being a certain other thing, it is necessary there should be vision; since if there were nothing else, vision would be in vain. Hence, it is necessary that in intellect there should be more things than one, in order that there may be vision. It is also necessary that vision should concur with the visible; and that what is seen by intellect should be multitude, and not entirely one. For that which is entirely one has not any thing about which it may energize? but being alone and solitary, it is perfectly quiescent. For so far as it energizes, it is another and another. For if it were not another and another, what would it do, or where would it proceed? Hence it is neces- sary that the nature which energizes, should either ener- gize about another thing, or be itself something manifold, if it intends to energize in itself. If, however, it does not proceed into any thing else, it will be quiescent. But when it is entirely quiescent, it will not perceive intellectually. Hence it is necessary that the nature which is intellective, should, when it perceives intellectually, be in two things; and that either one of the two should be external, or that ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 275 both should be in the same thing, and that intelligence should always subsist in difference, and also from necessity in sameness. Those things also which are properly the objects of intellectual perception are the same and different. And again, each of the intelligibles co-introduces with itself this sameness and difference. Or what will that per- ceive intellectually, which does not contain in itself another and another? For if each of the objects of intellectual vision is reason,^ it is a multitude. Intellect, therefore, will leam that it is itself a various eye, or that it consists as it were of various colours. For if it should apply itself to the one, and to be impartible, it would be silent. For what would it have to say, or discuss about it? Indeed, if it were requisite that the impartible should entirely speak of itself, it would be necessary that it should first say what it is not. So that thus it would be many in order that it may be one ^ [which is absurd]. In the next place, when it says " I am ® this thing," if it says tlm thing as some- thing different from itself, it asserts what is false; but if as an accident to itself, it says that it is a multitude. Or it will say this, lam, lam, and I, I, What then, if it should be alone two things, and should say I, and this? * Will it not in this case necessarily be more than two things? For these two are to be considered as different from each other, and different in a certain respect. Hence, there will now be number and many other things. It is necessary, there- fore, that the nature which is intellective, should receive another and another, and that the objects of its perception ^ I,c, If it is a distributed cause. For this is what reason and reasoning signify when ascribed to intelligible, and intellectual, or divine essences.
^ For in this case, it would be at least two things; since in addition to the impartible it would have speech. And the duad is the first multitude.
^ Instead of £( /ii) here, it is necessary to read et/ii.
^ The words nai tovto are omitted in the original.
276 SKLEC-f" being intelligible, should be various; for otbei-wise t will not be an intellectual perception of, but a contact '4 it. There will likewise be as it were, an adlieBion i inefEable, and without intfillettion, possessing a prior to intelligeaue, inteUet-t not jet eiisting, in coi quence of that which adheres not perceiving intellectiM It ia neceBsary, however, that the nature which sees i^ lectually, should not itself remain simple, and esp when it perceives itself. Por it will itself divide i even though it should be silently intellective. In the ■ plaue, that which is entirely simple wDl not be ii a busy energy, as it were, about itself. For what will? learn by intellectual perception? Por prior to this percep- ' tion, it esiste that which it is to itself. For again, know- ledge is a, certain desire and as it were, an investigating discovery. Hence, that which ia without any difference ' in itself with respect to itself, is quiescent, and investigates nothing respecting itself. But that which evolves itself, will also be multitudinous.