XI. Hence this intellect becomes manifold, when it wishes to understand that which is beyond int«lIeot. Endeavouring, therefore, to come into contact with it u with that which is simple, it falls from it always receivings another multiplied nature in itself. Heuce, it originates from^ it not as intellect, but as sight not jet seeing. But it proceeds from it containing in itself that which it has multiplied. Hence, it indefinitely desires another thing, possessing at the same time a certain phautaem in itself. It proceeds, however, receiving another thing in itself,^ which causes it to be multitudinous. Por again, it has an impression ° of the vision [of that which is beyond itself], ' For lio^opov here, it is necessary to reatl Hiafnpai: * Instead of l-w' abr^ in tliin place, both the sense ami tlie verEdoB of FicinnB require that we shonld read Jt' airov.
^ This iinprebsion is the mte of intellect, the snmniit and as it ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 277 or it would never become the recipient of it. Thus, there- fore, it becomes manifold from the one; and thus as intel- lect it sees itself, and then becomes sight perceiving. This) however, is then intellect when it possesses; and as intel- lect it possesses.^ But prior to this, it is desire alone, and a formless sight. This intellect, therefore, projects itself towards that which is beyond intellect: and when it receives it, it becomes [perceptive] intellect. But it is always the recipient [of the ineffable], and always becomes intellect, essence, and intelligence, when it perceives intel- lectually. For prior to this it was not intelligence, in con- sequence of not possessing the intelligible; nor intellect, because it was not yet intellective. That, however, which is prior to these, is the principle of these, but not as inherent in them. For the first principle, or the from which, is not inherent in that of which it is the principle, but the things of which a thing consists, are inherent in that thing. That, however, from which each thing is derived, is not each thing, but is different from all things. Hence, it is not some one of all things, but is prior to all things; so that on this account, it is also prior to intellect. For again, all things are within intellect; so that for this reason likewise, it is prior to intellect. If, also, the natures which are posterior to it have the order of all things, and on this account likewise it is prior to all things, it is not proper that it should be a certain one of those things to which it is prior. You must not, therefore, denominate it intellect. Hence, neither must you call it the good, if the good signifies some one of all things. But if it signifies that which is prior to all things, let it be thus denomiwere flower of its nature, and a^ vestige of the ineffable. For by seeing the ineffable, it becomes stamped as it were with its super- essential nature.
^ Conformably to this, Aristotle says of intellect in his Meta- physics, ivkpyn dk tx(av, i.e., " It energizes possessing.'
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nated. If, therefore, intellect ia intellect beeauae it ltt<J multitudiuoua, and the intellection of itself as it were In* terrening, though it ia from itself, laultipliea itself, it is necessary that the nature which is perfectly simple, asd the first of all things, should be beyond intellect. For if it poaeesaed intelligence, it woald not be beyond, but would be intellect. But if it were intellect, it would also be multitude.
XII. What however hinders [it may be said, the first principle of things] from being thus multitude, ao long as it is one eaaence? For multitude here is not composition; but the energies of it are multitude. If, however, the energies of it are not essences, but it proceeds from capacity into energy, it will not be multitude indeed, yet it will be imperfect in essence before it enei^zes. But if the essence of it ia energy, and the energy of it is multi- tude, its essence will be as multitudinous as its energy. We admit, however, that this is the case with intellect, to which we attribute the intelleetion of itself; but we do not assert this of the principle of all things. For it is neces- sary that prior to multitude there should be the one, from which multitude proceeds; since in every number the one is first. Our opponents, however, may say, that this is indeed the case in number. For the things which are in fr consequent order to unity are compositions; but what necessity is there in beings, that there should be a certain one from which the many proceed? To this we reply, that the many without the one would be deriaed from each. other, one thing casually proceeding to another, in order to the composition of multitude. Hence, they also say, that energiea proceed from one intellect which ia simple j so that they now admit there is something simple prior to energies. And in the nest place, fhey should know that energiea which are always permanent are hypoatasea. Energiea, however, being hypostases, are different from ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 279 that from which they proceed; since this indeed remains simple, but that which proceeds from it, is in itself multi- tude, and is suspended from its simple cause. For if they subsist, that from which they proceed at the same time in a certain respect energizing, there also there will be multi- tude. But if they are first energies producing that which is secondary, nothing prevents that which is prior to the energies from abiding in itself, and from conceding energies to that which is second, and which consists of energies. For that which is prior to energies is one thing, but the energies which proceed from it another; because from that not energizing [these derive their subsistence]. For if this were not the case, intellect would not be the first energy. For [that which is entirely simple] did not as it were desire that intellect should be generated, and afterwards intellect was generat-ed, this desire subsisting between the simple principle, and its offspring intellect. Nor in short, did this principle desire. For thus it would be imperfect, and the desire would not yet have that which it wished to obtain. Nor again, does it partly obtain the object of its wish, and partly not. For there is nothing to which the extension [of its desire is directed]. But indeed, if any thing subsists after it, it subsists in consequence of this principle abiding in its accustomed habit. It is neces- sary, therefore, in order that something else may subsist, that this principle should be every where quiescent in itself. For if not, either it will be moved prior to being moved, and will perceive intellectually prior to intellectual perception, or its first energy wiU be imperfect, being an impulse alone. To what, therefore, can it thus be im- pelled? For either we must admit that the energy flowing as it were from it, is analogous to the light proceeding from the sun, which energy is every intelligible and intel- lectual nature, and that this principle being established at the summit of the intelligible world reigns over it, without 280 SELECT WORKS OF PL0TIKU5.
Beparatiog from itself, that wbicli is lonfolded into 1 from it; or we must admit that there ia another 1 prior to this light, which emits its eplendour, perpetua abiding in the intelligible, For that which proeeeda fi this principle ia not separated from it, nor again, ia i same with it. Nor is it a thing of each a kind as notii be essence. Nor is it, as it were, blind j bnt it sees t knows itself, and is primarily gnostic. The prinei^ itself, however, as it ia beyond intellect, so likewise it i beyond knowledge. And aa it is not in want of any t! it is not in want of knowledge; but knowledge subsists i the nature whicli is next to this. Tor to know i certain thing; but this principle is one without the a tion of certain. For if it was a certain one, it would e be the one itself. For itself is prior to a certain c particular thing.
xm. Hence, it is in reality inefEable. For of whate you speak, you speak of as a certain thing. But of t which is beyond all things, and which ia beyond even m.<A Tenerable intellect, it ia alone true to assert that it has b any other name [than the ineffable], and that it ia some one of all things. Properly speaking, however, t is no name of it, because nothing can be asserted of j We. however, endeavour as much as possible to signify 4 ourselves something respecting it. But when we i doubting, it has therefore no perception nor intellection 4 itself, and consequently does not know itself, we ought t consider this, that when we assert these things, we shotu convert ourselves to their contraries. For we make it I be multitndinoua, when we admit that it is knowable a haa knowledge: and by attributing intellection to it, 1 make it to be in want of intelligence. But if it subaii^ together vrith intellection, intellectual perception will | superfluously added to it. For in short, intellection appt to be the co-sensatjou of the whole [of that which i ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 281 lective] many things concurring in one and the same, when any thing itself intellectually perceives itself, in which also intellection properly so called consists. Each of these many, however, is itself one certain thing unattended with investigation. But if intelligence is of that which is external, it will be something indigent, and not properly intellectual perception. That, however, which is perfectly simple, and truly self-sufficient, is not in want of any thing. But that which is secondarily self-sufficient, being in want of itself, is in want of the intellectual perception of itself. And that which is indigent with respect to itself, produces from the whole of itself the self-sufficient, becoming sufficient from all [the particulars of which it consists], dwelling with itself, and being conversant with itself by intellection; since co-sensation also, is the sensa- tion of a certain multitude, as its name testifies. Intelli- gence, likewise, which is prior to sense, converts that which is intellective, and which is evidently multitudinous, to itself. For if it should alone say this, I am being, it would say this, as having discovered that it is so. And it would make this assertion reasonably. For being is multitudi- nous; since when it extends itself to that which is simple, and says, I am being, it does not meet either with itself, or with being. For it does not speak of being as of a stone, when it speaks of it truly: but by one word it pronounces many things.^ For this existence, which is truly existence, is not spoken of as having nothing more than a vestige of being; since this is not being, and therefore may be said to have the relation of an image to its archetype. Hence,' true being contains in itself multitude. What then? will it not intellectually perceive each of the many it contains? May we not say, that if you wish to assume the solitary and alone, you will not have intellectual perception?
^ Instead of aW ovk elpriKe fiif pi}<TH ^roXXd in this place, it is necessary to read aW ovv e'lprjKt k X.
282 sELiitrr works of plotisus.
Existence itself, however, is in itself luultitudinoue. thoiigli you should speak of soniethiug else, that a thiug else has existence. If, however, this be the c there is something which, is the most simple of aU thi it will not have aa intellectual perception of itself, it had [it would also have a subsistence somewhersj| Neither, therefore, does it intellectually perceive itseK, i is there any intellectual perception of it.
XIV, How, therefore, can we speak of it? We are a indeed to say something of it, but we do not speak it. have we either any knowledge, or intellectual percepti of it. How, therefore, do we speak of it, if we possess it P May we not say, that though we possess it by knowledge, yet we ai'e not entirely d of the possession of it; but we possess it in such a n that we can speak of it, but c-annot speak it T For ■» say what it is not, but we cannot say what it is; so thi we speak of it from things posterior to it. We are i however, prevented from possessing it, though v gay what it is. But in the same manner as those v energize enthusiaBtically, and become divinely inspin perceive indeed, that they have something greater ii selves, though they do not know what it is; but things by which they are excited they speak, and i these receive a certain sensation of the moving; which is different from them; — in this manner also 1 appear to be affected about that which is perfectly s ' Tha words witliin tbe brockets iire wanting in the orif Hid are supplied from the version of Ficinns. After il y therefore, it is requisite to add Ejti aai n-au ilvai. Bnc the m of Plotinas in thia place is, that if the must simple of all t had an intellectual perception of itself, it would be in ' consequently would be someaihere. For an intellectual ( because Belf-subBiatent, is said to be in itself. For so far ai the cause of, it comprehends itself; but bo far aa it is a comprehended by itself.
2S3 when possessing n, pure intellect we employ it, and eon- elude that this is the inward intellect which is the source of esaenee, and of other things which belong to thia arrangement. We are sensible, therefore, that the nature which is perfectly simple is not these things, but that it is something more excellent, more ample, and great, than that which we denominate being, because it is also superior to reason, intellect, and sense, imparting, bat not being these.
XV. But how does it impart them? Shall we say by possessing, or by not posseasing them? If, howeyer, it indeed possesses them, it is not simple. But if it does not possess them, how does multitude proceed from it? Tor perhaps some one may admit that one simple thing may proceed from it, though even in this case it may be inquired how any thing can proceed from that which is entirely one. At the same time, however, it may be said, that one simple thing may flow from it, in the same manner a.s a surrounding splendour from light. But how do many things proceed from it? May we not say, that what proceeds from is not the same with it? If, there- fore, it is not the same with, it is not better than it. [For what is better, or in short, more excellent than the one f It is therefore inferior to it. But this is more indigent.] ' For what is in a greater degree indigent than ihe one, except that which is not one 'i This, therefore, that is more indigent is many, At the same time, however, it aspires after the one. Hence it is one many. For the one saves every thing which is not one; and every thing is what it is through the one. For unless it becomes one, though it should consist of many things, it cannot yet be ' The worda mthin the brackets are supplied from the version of Ficinus; so that in the original, after ouci ye ^\twv, it is neces- Bftiy to supply ri yap pi\.TU>v roO ivuc, ij BXiuj tpiiTToy; X")"*'' °P"i TOVTO Si ivltioTipop.
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denosiiuated being. And though it may be possible t say what each thing ia, yet thia is only in consequence 4 each thing being one, and participating of aamencBS. ~' however, which has not multitude in itself, is not o the participation of one, but is the one ittelf, not f another, but because it is this; from which other thi also derive their subsiBtence, some indeed, proximate] others remotely. But since that which is next to t is characterized by sameness, and is posterior to the o is evident that the multitude of it is every where c For being multitude at the same time it subsists ii nes3, and without separation, because all things in it ezii collectively at once [in impartible union]. Eauh also c the natures which proceed fi-om it. as long as it participate of life, is one many. For it cannot exhibit itself to t view as one all. That, however, from which this "originals is one all, because it ia a great principle. For the prineipj is in reality and truly one. But that which is next t' principle, being thus after a manner [exuberantly full o and heavy with the one, becomea all things through i participation of the one; and whatever it contains is all and one. What therefore is this all P la it not tl tilings of which ihe one is the principle? But how is one the principle of all things? Ia it not because it is saviour of them, causing each of them to be one? it also because it gave subsistence to them? After fl manner therefore? Is it not because it antecedently a tained them? We have however before observed, I thus it will be multitude. They are contained in it, thei fore, in such a way as to subsist without distinction a separation.' But the things contained in the second pti] ciple [after the one\ are separated by reason: for they a now in energy. The one, however, is the power of S ' Ab all tilings proceed from die one, lience the one ia all tU^| prior to all.
ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 285 things. But what is the mode of this power? For it is not said to be in power or capacity in the same manner as matter, because it receives: for matter suffers [in conse- quence of being passive]; and thus the power of matter has an arrangement opposite to that of efficiency. How, therefore, does it produce the things which it has not? For it does not produce them casually; nor having con- sidered what it is to do, does it then produce them. It has been said, therefore, by us, that if any thing proceeds from the one, it is different from it; but being different, it is not one. For this is what the one was. If, however, that which proceeds from the one is not one, it is now necessary that it should be two things, and should be multitude. For it is now same and different, quality, and other things. That the offspring of the one, therefore, is not one [alone] has been now demonstrated. But that it is multitude, and a multitude of such a kind as that which is surveyed in what is posterior to it, is deservedly a subject of doubt. And the necessity of the subsistence of that which is posterior to it, still remains to be investi- gated.
XVI. That it is necessary, therefore, there should be something after the first, has been elsewhere asserted by us. And, in short, we have said that this which is next to the first [principle of things] is power, and an ines- timable power. This, likewise, is rendered credible from all other things, because there is nothing even among the last of things which has not a generative power. Now, however, we must say, that in things which are generated, the progression is not to the upward, but to the downward, and to a greater multitude, and that the principle of par- ticulars is itself more simple [than its effects]. Hence, that which produced the sensible world will not be itself the sensible world, but intellect and the intelligible world. Hence, too, that which is prior to the intelligible world.
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and which generated it, is something more simple than intellect and the intelligible world. For that which is multitudinous does not originate from multitude, but from that which is not multitude. For if the source of it was multitudinous, it would not be the principle, but the principle would be some other thing prior to it. It is necessary, therefore, to refer all things to that which is truly one, and which is superior to all multitude, and to every kind of [participable] simplicity, if it is truly simple. But how is that which is generated from it, multitudinous and universal reason, since it is evident it is not itself reason? If however it is not reason, how can reason pro- ceed from that which is not ^ reason? And how can that which is bonif orm proceed from the good? For what does it possess in itself that can cause it to be denominated boniform? Is it because it subsists with invariable same- ness? But what does this contribute to the good? For we seek after a sameness of subsistence when good is l^resent. Or do we not first investigate that from which it is not proper to depart, because it is good? But if it is not good, it is better to abandon the pursuit of it. Is it therefore considered by us as boniform, to live abiding in good voluntarily, and with invariable sameness? Hence, if intellect is satisfied with living after this manner, it evidently seeks after nothing else. It appears, therefore, *hsskt a sameness of subsistence is desirable, because what present is suflScient, All things, however, being now •ient to intellect, to live is desirable; and this when all jB^ are in such a manner present with it, as not to be rent from it. But if all life is present with this, and ^ perspicuous and perfect; in this, soul and every «t subsist, and nothing is wanting to it either of life ellect. Hence it is sufficient to itself, and seeks after ^ /i») is omitted in the original.
ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 287 nothing farther. But if this be the case, it possesses in itself, that which it would investigate if it were not present. It possesses, therefore, in itself the good, or a thing of such a kind as we call life and intellect, or something else which is accidental to these. If, however, this is the good, there will be nothing beyond these. But if the good is beyond these, a life tending to this, suspended from it, having its subsistence from, and living according to it, will evidently be good. For the good is the principle of intellect. It is necessary, therefore, that the good should be more excellent than life and intellect. For thus intellect, and the life which it contains, will be converted to it, since the life of intellect possesses in itself an imitation of the good, accord- ing to which intellect lives, and this is also the case with intellect itself, whatever this imitation may be.
XVII. What then is better than a most wise, irrepre- hensible, and unerring life? What more excellent than an intellect possessing all things? Or than all life, and every intellect? If, therefore, we should say that the maker of these is more excellent, and shoidd relate how he made them, and show that nothing better than him can present itself to our view, our reasoning will not proceed to any thing else, but will stop there. It is necessary, however, to ascend, both on account of many other considerations, and because self-sufficiency to this intellect is the result of all the things of which ^ it consists. But each of these is evidently indigent, because each participates of the same one, and participates of one in consequence of not being ^ Instead of Ik iravnav l^w itrriv, it is necessary to read Ik iravnov i^ 06 l(TTiv, The necessity of this emendation was not seen by Ficinus, whose translation of this part is consequently very erro- neous. For how can the sufficiency of intellect consist of an accu- mulation of all things externally? But the translation of Ficinus is, ^' tum etiam quia sufficientia huic ex cunctis accumulata pendet extriusecus."
2SH select works of PLOTINUP.
tlte one itself. What tLen is that of which this inte participates, and -which causes it to exist, aod to be a things at once? If, howerer, it causes it to be e and the multitude of it is sufficient to itself through i presence of the one, and if also it is evidently effective ^ essence and self-sufficiency, it will not be e beyond this, and beyond aelf-suffioieocy. Is what we ha^ said therefore sufficient, or is the soul yet parturient t somethiDg else, and in a still greater degree? Ferhapva therefore, it is requiaitfi that the soul should now beeomflf impelled towards the nne, being filled with parturient c ceptions about it. Again, however, let ua try if we cannoj find a certain charm for this parturiency. Perhaps, indee he will accompHsh this, who frequently enchants himse from what has now been sajd. What other new enchaid ment, therefore, as it were, is there? Por the charm whicfl runs above all realities, and above the truths which nm participate, immediately flies away from him who wishes tt speak of and energize discursively about the one; since iJ is necessary that the diacoetic power, in order that it mag speak of any thing, should assume another and anotht thing. For thus there will he a discursive energy. that, however, which is perfectly simple, there if diseursive; but it ia sufficient to come into contact with jj intellectually. That, however, which comes into conta with it, when it is in contact, is neither able to s thing, nor has leisure to speak; but afterwards [when a falls off from this contact] reasons about it. Then alsoM is requisite to believe that we have seen it, when the » receives a sudden hght. For this light is from him, aiu is him. And then it is proper to think that he is preseid when like another God entering into the house of some oifij who invokes him, he fills it with splendour.' For uolefl ' It is neceasary here to snpply oi'.
" Plotinufi, in what he liere says, doubtless alludes to the foUowinj ON GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES. 289 lie entered, he would not illuminate it. And thus the soul would be without light, and without the possession of this God. But when illuminated, it has that which it sought for. This likewise is the true end to the soul, to come into contact with his light, and to behold him through it; not by the light of another thing; but to per- ceive that very thing itself through which it sees. For that through which it is illuminated, is the very thing which it is necessary to behold. For neither do we see the sun through any other than the solar light. How, there- fore, can this be accomplished? By an ablation of all things.
lines in the 19th book of the " Odyssey," when Ulysses and Tele- machus remove the weapons out of the armory: *• Minerva preceded them, having a golden lamp, with which she produced a very beautiful light; on perceiving which, Tele- machus thus immediately addressed his father: father, this is certainly a most admirable thing which presents itself to my eyes. For the walls of the house, the beautiful spaces between the rafters, the fir beams, and the columns, appear to me to rise in radiance, as if on fire. Certainly some one of the Gods is present who inhabit the extended heaven. But the wise Ulysses thus answered him: Be silent, repress your intellect, and do not speak. For this is the custom of the Gods who dwell in Olympus.'* Homer, therefore, indicates by this, that to the reception of divine illumination, silence, and a cessation of all mental energy^ are requisite.
THAT THE NATURE AYHICH IS EEYONE BEING IS NOT INTELLECTIVE; AND WHAT THAT IS WHICH IS PRIMARILY, AND ALSO; THAT WHICH IS SECONDARILY, INTELLECTIVE., V. vi