One kind of intelligence is the intellectual perception c another thing, but another ia the perception of a thing b itself, or when a, thing perceives itself; the latter of whi<4l flies in a greater degree from duplicity, or doubleneas in ii tellection. Biit the former wishes also to avoid this d sity, but is leaa able to accomplish its wish. For it h indeed with itself that which it sees, but it is difEerent" from itself. Tha.t, however, which intellectually perceives itself, is not separated essentially from the object of its perception, but being co-existent with it sees itself. therefore, become one being. Hence it perceives in a gr degree because it possesses that whiiih it perceives, also primarily intellective, because that which perceivj intellectually ought to be both oue and two. For if H not one, that which perceives wUl be one thing, and t which ia intellectually perceived another. Hence it i not be prim.a,rily intellective, because iu consequence o ceiviug the intellectual perception of another thing, i not possess that which it perceives, as something beloi ON THE NATURE WHICH IS BEYOND BEING. 291 to itself; so that the thing perceived will not be the per- ceiver itself. Or if it should possess it as itself, in order that it may properly perceive intellectually, two things will be one. Hence it is necessary that both should be one. Or if there is indeed one thing, but again, this one does not consist of two things, it will not possess intelligence; so that neither will it perceive intellectually. Hence it is necessary that the nature which is intellective should be simple and at the same time not simple. He, however, who ascends from soul will in a greater degree apprehend that an intellective nature is a thing of this kind. For here [i.e. in soul] it is easy to divide, and duplicity may here be easily perceived. If some one, therefore, should make a twofold light, soul, indeed, according to the less pure, but the intelligible of it according to the purer light, and afterwards should cause that which sees to be a light equal to that which is seen, not having any further occa- sion to separate by difference, — ^he who does this, will ad- mit that these two are one. And this perceives intellec- tually, indeed, because it is two things; but it sees because it is now one thing. Thus, therefore, such a one will appre- hend intellect and the intelligible. Hence we, by a reason- ing process, have made two things from one. On the con- trary, however, it is two things from one, because it intellectually perceives, making itself tp be two; or rather being two because it intellectually perceives; and because it is one thing [being intellective].
II. If, therefore, there is that which is primarily intel- lective, and also that which is after another manner [i.e. secondarily] intellective, that which is beyond the first in- telligent nature, will not perceive intellectually. For it is necessary that it should become intellect in order that it may have intellectual perception. But being intellect it will also have the intelligible. And if it is primarily intel- lective, it will have the intelligible in itself. It is not, 292 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
however, necessary that whatever is intelligible should have that which is intellective in itself, and perceive intellec- tually. For in this case, it will not only be intelligible, but also intellective. But being two things it will not be that which is first. Intellect, likewise, which possesses the intelligible, could not subsist without the existence of an essence which is purely intelligible; and which with re- spect to intellect, indeed, will be intelligible, but with re- ference to itself will be properly neither intellective, nor intelligible. For that which is intelligible, is intelligible to another thing. And intellect which darts itself forward by intelligence would have a vacuum, unless it received and comprehended in itself the intelligible which it intellectually perceives. For it is not intellective without the intelligible. Hence it is then perfect when it possesses the intelligible. It is necessary, however, prior to its perceiving intellec- tually, that it should have with itself a perfect essence. Hence, that with which the perfect is essentially ^ present, will be perfect prior to intellectual perception. To this, therefore, nothing of intellectual perception is necessary. For prior to this it is sufficient to itself. Hence it does not perceive intellectually. There is, therefore, that which is not intellective; there is also that which is primarily intellective; and there is that which is intellective in a secondary degree. Farther still, if that which is first per- ceives intellectually, something is present with it. Hence it is not the first, but that which is second. It is also not one, but is now ^ many; and is all such things as it intel- lectually perceives. For if it only intellectually perceived itself, it would be many.^ ' There is an omission in the original here of icar' ovtriav, but both the sense and the version of Ficinus require it should be inserted.
2 For itSri here, it is necessary to read ijSrj, ^ The intelUgible is prior to intelligence; for the former is ON THE NATURE WHICH IS BEYOND BEING. 293 III. If, however, it should be said, that nothing hinders this same thing which is the first from being many, we reply that in these many there will be a subject. For it is not possible for the many to subsist, unless the one exists, from which, or in which they subsist; or in short, unless there is a one which is prior to other things that are num- bered among themselves, and which it is necessary to receive itseK in itself alone. But if it subsists in conjunc- tion with other things, it is necessary having received this with other things, but which at the same time is different from them, that we should suffer it to be with other things, but that we should also investigate this subject, no longer in conjunction with other things of which it is the subject, but itself by itself. For that which is the same in other things, will indeed be similar to this, but will not be this.^ It is necessary, however, that it should be alone, if it is to be seen in other things, unless it should be said that the being of it has its hypostasis in conjunction with other things. Hence, there will not be that which is itself simple; nor will there be that which is composed of many things. For since that which is simple has no subsistence, neither will that which is a composite of many things subsist. For because each simple characterized by essence, but the latter by intellect. And being is prior to intellect. The intelligible, however, contains in itself intellect casually. Hence it has a knowledge which is beyond intellect. Much more, therefore, is the ineffable principle of things, who is beyond the intelligible, above the possession of intellectual perception. For his knowledge like his nature is more impartible than every centre, and more ineffable than all silence. For it is, if it be lawful so to speak, a darkness which transcends all gnostic illumination. Hence by energizing about it, knowledge is refunded into ignorance.
* For the imparticipable or exempt one, is not consubsistent with any thing, but the participate one is consubsistent either with being, or life, or intellect, or soul, or body. See my transla- tion of Proclus' "Elements of Theology."
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thing is unable to exist, no one certain simple thing sub- sisting from itself, hence since that which is multitudinous is not able to have an hypostasis by itself, nor to impart itseM to another thing, because it has no existence, how can there be that which is composed of all things, when it must consist of nonentities, which are not merely n^ations of a certain thing, but have no subsistence whatever? If, therefore, a certain thing is multitude, it is necessary there should be one prior to the many. Hence, if that which is intellective is a certain multitude, it is necessary that there should not be intellectual perception in that which is not * multitude. This, however, is the first [principle of things]. In the natures, therefore, posterior to it, there will be intel- lectual perception and intellect.
IV. Farther still, if it is necessary that the good should be simple and unindigent, it will not be in want of intellec- tual perception. But that which is not necessary to it, will not be present with it; since, in short, nothing is present with it. Intellectual perception, therefore, will not be inherent in it, because neither will any thing else. Besides, intellect is something different from the good. For it becomes boni- form by the intellectual perception of the good. Again, as in two things where there is one and another thing, it is not possible for this one which subsists in conjunction with something else to be the one itself ^ but it is necessary that the one which is one by itself, should be prior to that which is with another; thus also it is necessary, that where a certain one which is in a certain respect simple subsists in conjimction with another thing, there should prior to it be the one which is perfectly simple, and which has nothing in itself of the things contained in that which subsists in conjunction with others. For whence could one thing be another, unless piior to these that had a separate sub- * /i^ is omitted in the original.
ON THE NATURE WHICH IS BEYOND BEING. 295 sistence, from wliicli the thing that is another is derived? For that which is simple, cannot be derived from another. But that which is multitudinous or two, must necessarily be suspended from another thing. Hence, that which is first may be assimilated to light; that which is next to it, to the sun; but that which is the third, to the moon, deriving light from the sun. For soul, indeed, has an ad- ventitious intellect, which, as soul is of an intellectual nature, colours it [with a light derived from the good]. Intellect, however, contains in itself an appropriate light of its own; for it is not light alone, but that which is illumi- nated essentially. But that which imparts this light, since it is not any thing else, is a simple light, affording to intellect the power of existing that which it is. Why, therefore, should this simple light be in want of any thing? For it is not the same with that which is in another; since that which is in another is different from that which subsists itself by itself.
V. Farther still, that which is multitudinous will seek itself, and will wish to verge to and be co-sentient of itseK. Where, however, will that which is entirely one proceed to itself? And where will it be in want of co- sensation? For this same thing is more excellent than all co- sensation and intellection. For intellectual perception is not the first of things, either with respect to existence, or dignity of nature; but it is the second thing, and generated posterior to the subsistence of the good. As soon as generated, also, it moved itself towards the good. But being moved towards, it also knew it. And intellectual perception is this, viz, a motion towards the good, and an aspiration after it. For desire generated intelligence, and is consubsistent with it. For sight is the desire of seeing. The good, therefore, is not at all in want of intellectual perception. For there is not any thing else beside itself which is the good of it; since when that also which is different 296 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
from ike good intolleotually perceives it, it does this in c Bequeace of being bonifonn, and posaeasiug a similitude a the good. It likewise intellectually perceives that wliich 1 sees, as good and desirable to itseU; and iu consequeace S receiving aa it were the imagination of good. And if it 1 always thus affected, it ia alway this [i.e. it is always h form]. For again, in the intellection of itself, it accidt ally perceives the good. For looking to the good, it i lectually sees it, and also sees itself energiaiug. energy of all things is directed to the good.
VI. If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, i telligence will have no place whatever in the good. For tl good which is present with an intellective ' nature i ferent from the good itself. Hence the good is unenergt For why is it necessary that energy should energize? in short, no energy whatever has again energy. But i other energies which are directed to another thing, we a bute something else, it is however necessary, that the fi energy from which other energies are suspended, should h that very thing which it is, and that nothing else should Tj added to it. An energy, therefore, of this kind is nc tellectnal perception. For it does not possess that a it intellectually perceives; since it is the first enei^. the next place, neither does intelligence intellectual perceive, but that which possesses intelligence, therefore, two things take place in that which pereeiw intellectually. But that which is first is by no means t Farther still, the truth of this may be seen in a still g degree by him who considers how this twofold nature s sists in every thing wliich ia more clearly intellective, we say, indeed, that beings as beings, that each thing ii [by itself,] and truly existing beings, are iu the intelligitil ' Instead of rA vobv t a this plac B neccBBBiy to read ^ ON THE NATURE WHICH IS BEYOND BEING. 297 place; and this not merely because some things abide in- variably the same in essence, but others, and these are such as are in the sensible region, continually flow and are not permanent.^ For perhaps there are some things in sensibles of a permanent nature. But we assert this of intelligibles, because they possess the perfection of exist- ence. For it is necessary that the essence which is primarily so called, should not be the shadow of existence, but should have the fulness of being. Existence, however, is then full, when it receives the form of intellectual perception, and of life. Hence, in [real] being, to perceive intel- lectually, to live, and to exist, are consubsistent. If, there- fore, it is being, it is also intellect, and if it is intellect it is being. And intellectual perception is simultaneous with existence. Hence, to perceive intellectually is many things, and not one thing. It is necessary, therefore, that with the nature which is not a thing of this kind, there should not be intellectual perception. Hence, among the several forms contained in true beings, there are man, and the intellectual perception * of man; horse, and the intellectual perception of horse; the just, and the intellection of the just. Hence too, all things there are double, and the one is two. And again, two passes into one. But that which is the first of things is not either of these; nor does it consist of all the things which are two; nor is it, in short, two. It has been, however, elsewhere shown by us, how two de- rives its subsistence from the one. But since the one is beyond essence, it is also beyond intellectual perception. There will be no absurdity therefore, in asserting that the one does not know itseM, For being one it does not possess with itself that which it may learn. But neither is it necessary that it should know other things. For it ^ Instead of ov vtvti here, it is necessary to read ov fikvst.
^ It is requisite here, to supply the words avOpuiirov vorimQ nai.
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imparts to them sometliing better and greater than the knowledge of them; and this is the good of other things. But it rather imparts to them the ability, as much as possible, of coming into contact with it in the same thing.
XV. ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE.
VI. ix.
I. All beings are beings through the one, both such as are primarily beings, and such as in any respect whatever are said to be classed in the order of beings. For what would they be, if they were not one? For if deprived of unity, they are no longer that which they were said to be. For neither would an army, or a choir, exist [as such], unless each of them was one. Nor would a herd exist, if it were not one. But neither would a house or a ship have an existence, unless they possess the one; since a house is one thing, and also a ship, which one if they lose, the house will no longer be a house, nor the ship a ship. Continued magnitudes, therefore, unless the one is present with them, will not have an existence. Hence, when they are divided, so far as they lose the one, they change their existence. The bodies, also, of plants and animals, each of which is one, if they fly from the one, in consequence of being broken into multitude, lose the essence which they before possessed, no longer being that which they were, but becoming instead of it other things, and continuing to be these so long as they are one. Health, likewise, then has a subsistence, when the body is congregated into one [i.e., when it possesses symmetry], and beauty then flourishes when the nature of the one confines the parts of the body. Virtue also exists in the soul when the soul tends to unity, and is united in one concord. Since, therefore, the soul conduct all things t« one, bj fabrica,tiDg, fashioning, forniing a co-a,rrang;ing them, ia it necessary to assert when ■? arrived as far as to soul, that she supplies the one, and tht she ia the one itself? Or mast we not say, that as when b. imparts other things to bodies, such as morphe and f ia not herself which she imparts, but things different fi herself, thua also it is requisite to think if she impi the t»ie, that she imparts it as something different f herself; and that looking to the one, she causes each oi productions to he one, in the same manner as looking ti man, she fabricates man, assuming together with man ii one contained in man.' For of the things which are c nominated one, each ia in such a manner one as is t' which it possesses," So that things which are i degree beings, possess in a less degree the one; but thai that have more of entity have also more of the one. Mt over, soul being difEerent from the one, possesses more o in proportion aa it is more truly soul, yet is not the one itt For soul is one, and in a certain I'espect the one which ^ possesses is an accident. And these are two things, soul and one, in the same manner as body and one. iudeed which is decrete multitude, as a choir, is i remote from the one, but that which ia continuous is to it. But soul which has more alhance with, participate more abundantly of the one. If, however, because e cannot esast unless it is one, it should be said that soul ai the one are the same, we reply in the first place, that o ' Tha origiuftl here is defectivB, wliich deBcieney may t plied from the veraion of Ficinua, by reading fiontp nai TpJf rii-^ jiKiirovaai' aiiBptairov lijfiioepfu, instead of uiirntp itai wpo^ Sp8 ' I.e. The natare of its being depends on the natnre of t unity which it participates; so that iltt l>eing ia more or lent according oa this unity partakes in a greater or les) the one itself.
ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE. 301 tliiiigs also are what they are in conjunction with being one, but at the same time the one is difEerent from them. For body and one are not the same; but body participates of the one. In the next place, each soul is a multitude, though it does not consist of parts. For there are many powers in it, viz., those of reasoning, appetition, and apprehension, which are connected by unity as by a bond. Soul, therefore, being itself one imparts the one, to other things. But she also suffers [i.e. participates] this one from something else. II. Shall we say, therefore, that in each of the things which subsist according to a part, the essence of it and the one are not the same? In true being indeed, and true ' essence, essence, being, and the one, are the same. So that he who discovers being in these, will also discover the one, and will find that essence itself is the one itself. Thus, for instance, if essence is intellect, the one also is here intellect, viz., an intellect which is primarily being, and primarily one. And when it imparts existence to other things, thus, and so far as it imparts this, it also imparts the one. For what else besides intellect and being, can the one of these be said to be? For either the one is the same with being, as a man is the same thing as one man; or it is as a certain number of each thing, as when you speak of a certain two. And thus the one is asserted of a certain thing alone. If, therefore, number pertains to beings, it is evident that the one also pertains to them: and what it is must be inves- tigated. But if the one is nothing more than the energy of the soul attempting to number, the one will have no existence in things themselves. Eeason however has said, that whatever loses the one, loses entirely at the same time its existence. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether each thing that has a being, and each thing that is one are the same, and whether in short, being and the one are the same. If, however, the being of each thing is multitude, but it is impossible for the one to be multitude, each of 302 SELECT trOBKS OF PLOTISCS.
these nill be different from tbe otfa«r. Haa. t1 an animal, ia rati(qial, and haa maoT paits, and tliiaian] tode is bound together br unitT. Hence, man is oiu and imitT another; smce the former is partible, bul latter impartible. MoreoTer, being wluch lants as a n and contains all beings in itself, will rather be man; b [than one], and will be different &onL llu one. aeaumption and participation, it ipll possess Ike one. likewise, has life and intellect: for it is not deprired i life. Hence, being is many things. If also it ii it is thus again necessary that it should be multitadinoasa and this in a still greater degree, if it comprehends ii forms or ideas. For idea is not onity, bat is rathej number. And this ia true both of each idea, and of t which is all ideas coUectively. Idea, likewise, is in sue manner one, as the world is one. In short, the one is tlw J first of things, but Intellect, forms, and being are not Ota J first. For each form consists of many things, and ia ■ composite, and posterior. For those things from whielt;^ each form consists hare a priority of subsistence. that it is not possible that intellect can be the first of thing^.] is evident from tbe following considerations. It is neceBearjT t that intellect should consist in intellectual perception; s that the most excellent intellect, and which does not loofc] to what is eitemal to, should intellectually perceive t which is prior to itself. For being converted to itse" is [at the Hame time] converted to the principle of i And if indeed it is both inteilective and intelligible, it be twofold and not simple, and therefore not the one. Bnti if it looks to Bometbing different from itself, it will entirely i look to that which is more excellent than, and prior toj itself. If, however, it both looks to itself, and to t which is better than itself, it will thus also be And it is requisite to admit that such an intellect as tl is present indeed with the ijood, and with that which i ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE. 303 first, and that it beholds it. It likewise associates with, \ and intellectually perceives itself, and knows that it is / itself all things. By no means, therefore, since it is thus various, is it the one. Neither, therefore, will the one be all things; ^ since if it were, it would no longer be the one. Nor is it intellect. For thus it would be all things; intel- lect being all things. Nor is it being. For being like- wise is all things.
III. What then will the one be; and what nature will it possess? Or may we not say tHaFit is not at all wonderful, it should not be easy to tell what it is, since neither is it easy to tell what being is, or what form is. But our knowledge is fixed in forms. When, however, the soul directs its attention to that which is formless, then being unable to comprehend that which is not bounded, and as it were impressed with forms by a former of a various nature, it falls from the apprehension of it, and is afraid it will possess [nothing from the view]. Hence, it becomes weary in endeavours of this kind, and gladly descends from the survey frequently falling from all things, till it arrives at something sensible, and as it were rests in a solid substance; just as the sight also, when wearied with the perception of small objects, eagerly converts itself to such as are large. When, however, the soul wishes to perceive by itself, and sees itself alone, then in consequence of being one with the object of its perception, it does not think that it yet ^ It is well observed by Damascius in his MS. treatise Trtpi dpx^^Vf that neither the one nor all things accords in reality with the nature of the one. For these are opposed to each other, and distribute our conceptions. For if we look to the simple and the one, we destroy its immensely great perfection: and if we con- ceive all things subsisting together, we abolish the one and the simple. But this is because we are divided, and look to divided pecuUarities. In short, so far as it is ^Ae one, it is exempt from all things, and is without any multitude; but so far as it is the principle of all things, it is all things prior to all.
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