possesses that which it investigates, because it is not different from that which it intellectually perceives. At the same time, it is requisite that he should act in this manner, who intends to philosophize about the one. Since, therefore, that which we investigate is one, and we direct our attention to the principle of all things, to tTie good, and the first, we ought not to be far removed from the natures which are about the first of things, nor fall from them to the last of all things, but proceeding to such as are first, we should elevate ourselves from sensibles which have an ultimate subsistence. The soul, likewise, should for this purpose be liberated from all vice, in consequence of hastening to the [vision of the] good; and should ascend to the principle which is in herself, and become one instead of many things, in order that she may survey the principle ' of all things, and the one. Hence it is requisite, that the soul of him who ascends to the good should then become intellect, and that he should commit his soul to, and establish it in intellect, in order, that what intellect sees, his soul may vigilantly receive, and may through intellect survey the one; not employing any one of the senses, nor receiving any thing from them, but with a pure intellect, and with the summit [and as it were, flower] of intellect, beholding that which is most pure. When, therefore, he who applies himself to the survey of a thing of this kind, imagines that there is either magnitude, or figure, or bulk about this nature, he has not intellect for the leader of the vision; because intellect is not naturally adapted to per- ceive things of this kind, but such an energy is the energy of sense, and of opinion following sense. But in order to perceive the one, it is necessary to [receive from intellect a declaration of what intellect is able to accomplish. Intel- ^ For &px^v here, it is necessary to read npxriQ; and it is also requisite to alter the punctuation conformably to the above trans- lation.
ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE. 305 lect, however, is able to see either things prior to itself, or things pertaining to itself, or things effected by itself. And the things indeed contained in itself, are pure; but those prior to itseK are still purer and more simple; or rather this must be asserted of that which is prior to it. Hence, that which is prior to it, is not intellect, but some- thing more excellent. For intellect is a certain one among the number of beings; but that is not a certain one, but is prior to every thing. Nor is it being; for being has, as it were, the form of the one} But that is formless, and is even without intelligible form. For the nature of the one being j generative of all things, is not any one of them. Neither, therefore, is it a certain thing, nor a quality, nor a quantity, \ nor intellect, nor soul, nor that which is moved, nor again I that which stands still. Nor is it in place, or in time; but is by itseK uniform, or rather without form, being prior to all form, to motion and to permanency. For these subsist about being which also cause it to be multitudinous. Why, however, if it is not moved, does it not stand still? Because it is necessary that one or both of these should subsist about being. And that which stands still, stands still through permanency, and is not the same "with it. Hence permanency is accidental to it, and it no longer remains simple. For when we say that the one is the cause of all things, we do not predicate anything as an. accident to it, but rather as something which happens to us, because we possess something from it, the one in the mean time subsisting in itself. It is necessary, however, when speaking accurately of the one, neither to call it that, nor this. But we running as it were externally round it, are desirous of explaining the manner in which we are ^ Instead of rot) ovtoq here, it is necessary to read tov hoc. For it is absurd to suppose Plotinus would say, tJiat being has as it were the form of being, and yet Ficinus so translates it: ** Nam ens velut formam ipsam entis habet."
X 306 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
aff<«t«d about it- And at one time, indeed, we draw near to it. but at another time fall from it, hy our doubti about it.
IT. In this affair, however, a doubt esj^cially ariEes, bi>rati9e the pen-eption of the highest God ie not effected bv st-ience. nor bv intelligenc*, like other intelligiblea, but br tho presence of him, which is a mode of knowledge Bii|>erior to that of seience. But the soul euffera on a|ioataaT from Me one, and is not entirely one when it rwwivea scientific knowledge. For science is reason, and reason is multitudinous. The soul, therefore, io this case. deviates from the one, and Falls into number and multitude. Honce it is necessary to run above science, and in no res)>ect to depart from a subsistence which ie profoundly ouo; but it is requisite to abandon science, the objects rf gcience, every other thing, and every beautiful spectacle. For eVHry thing beautiful is posterior to the supreme, and is derived from him, in the same maaner as all diurnal light is derived from the sun. Hence Plato sars, he is iieilher effable, nor to be described by writing. W^e speak however, and write about him, extending ourselves to him, and exciting others by a reasoning process to the vision of him! pointing out, as it were, the way to him who wishes to behold something [of Uia ineffable nature]. For doctrine extends as far as to the way and the progression to him. But the vision of him ia now the work of one who is boE- citoUB to perceive him, He, however, wlU. not arrive at the vision of him, and will not be affected by the survey, nor will have in himself as it were an amatory passion from the view, (which jiassion causes the lover to rest in the object of his love) nor receive from it a true light, which surrounds the whole soul with its splendour, in consequence of becoming nearer to it; he, I aay, will not behold this light, who attempts to ascend to tlie vision of the supreme while he is drawn downwards by those things which are ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE. 307 an impediment to the vision. He will likewise not ascend by himself alone, but will be accompanied by that which will divulse him from the one, or rather he will not be himself collected into one. For the one is not absent from any thing, and yet is separated from all things; so that it is present, and yet not present with them. But it is present with those things that are able, and are prepared to receive it, so that they become congruous, and as it were pass into contact with it, through similitude and a certain inherent power allied to that which is imparted by the one. When, therefore, the soul is disposed in such a way as she was when she came from the one, then she is able to perceive it, as far as it is naturally capable of being seen. He, therefore, who has not yet arrived thither, but either on account of the above-mentioned obstacle is de- prived of this vision, or through the want of reason which may conduct him to it, and impart faith respecting it; such a one may consider himself as the cause of his disappointment through these impediments, and should endeavour hy separating himself from all things to he alone. But with respect to arguments in the belief of which he is deficient, he should conceive as follows: V. Whoever fancies that beings are governed by fortune and chance, and are held together by corporeal causes, is very remote from God, and the conception of the one. Our arguments, likewise, are not addressed to these, but to those who admit that there is another nature besides bodies, and who ascend [at least] as far as to soul. It is necessary, therefore, that these should be well acquainted with the nature of soul, both as to other things, and to its being derived from intellect; from which also participating of reason, it possesses virtue. After these things, however, he should admit the subsistence of another intellect, different from that which reasons, and which is denomi- nated rational. He should likewise consider reasonings to SELECT WORKS OF PLOTJl subsist now a^ it were in interval and motion, and scieE to be auch-like reasons in the soul, with an [eToWed] A manifest Bubeiatence; in consequence of intellect whlet the cause of sciences being now infnscd into the i Hence in thia case, the soul has as it were a sensible p ception of intellect, through apprehending it incumbent on soul, and containing in itself the intelligible world, & tranquil intellect, and a quiet motion, and having and being all things, — a multitude without separation, and again a separate multitude. For it is neither separated like the reasons [i.e. forms or ideas in the human soul] which are perceived by our intellect one at a time,' [and not simultaneously,] nor is it a confused multitude. For each of the forms contained in it proceeds separate from the rest; in the same manner as in the sciences, where all thing's subsisting in an impartible nature, at the same time each is separate from the rest. This multitude, there- fore, subsisting at once is the intelligible world, which is immediately united to the first principle of things, and which the same reason that demonstrates the existence of soul says has a necessary subsistence. This, however, has a more principal subsistence than soul, yet is not the first of things, because it is not [profoundly] one, and simple. But the ove, and the principle of all things, is simple. Hence that which is prior to the most honourable thing; among beings," if it is necessai^ there should be something prior to intellect, which wishes indeed f« be one, yet is not one, but has the form of one, because intellect is not in ' In the originaJ, ubti yip fmciKpiroi iis o'l \iyai oi >Jji) to? tv vaoufiiroi, which Ficinus not underatantling has erroneoUBly trans- lated as follows; " Neque enim diecernitnr sicut rationes in pro- batione eolent, sed tanquain rationes jam Becundam naiini 'luidd&m excoKit'aDte." For the hiunan intellect perceives only one form or idea at a, time; but a, divine intellect sees all forms at odcc.
" Instead of tA Ei) irpb roD iv Toic ub S' Tifinuraroti here, it ie neces- sary to read ro S/i irpe mi iv tocc aiaii- Tifiuiirarvv.
ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE. 309 itself dispersed, but is truly present with itself, and does not, in consequence of its proximity to the one, divulse itself, though in a certain respect it dares to depart from the one; — that, I say, which is prior to intellect and is the one, is a prodigy, and is not being, lest here also the one should be predicated of another thing, to which no name is in reality adapted. But if it is necessary to give it a name, it may appropriately be called in common one, yet not as being first something else, and afterwards one. It is indeed on this account difficult to be known; but is principally to be known from its offspring essence. And intellect leads to essence. The nature also of the one is such, that it is the foimtain of the most excellent things, and a power generating beings, abiding in itself without diminution, and not subsisting in its progeny. But we de- nominate it the one from necessity, in order that we may signify it to each other by a name, and may be led to an impartible conception, being anxious that our soul may be one.^ We do not, however, here speak of the one and the impartible in such a way as when we speak of a point or the monad. For that which is after this manner one, is the principle of quantity, which could not subsist unless essence had a prior existence, and also that which is ante- cedent to essence. It is necessary therefore to project the dianoetic power to these; but we should consider the monad and a point as having an analogical similitude to the one, on account of their simplicity, and their flying from multi- tude and division.
yi. How, therefore, can we speak of the one, and how can we adapt it to intellectual conception? Shall we say that this may be accomplished, by admitting that it is more transcendently one than the monad and a point? For in these, indeed, the soul taking away magnitude and ^ Instead of Kai Trjv ypvxrjv 'iv ov OeXovteq in this place, it is requisite to read xai rfiv ^vxt)v sv elvcu BkXovrig, 310 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
the multituJe of number, ends in that which is a and fixes iteelf in a certain thing which is indeed impt ible, but which was in a partible nature, and is thing different from itaeH. But the one ia neither ii thing, nor in that which is partible. Nor ia it ii in the same way as that which is smaUeat. For it ii greatest of aU things, not in magnitude, but in power. that it is without magnitude in power. For the natiq also wbiuh are [immediately] poaterior to it, a: in powers, and not in bulk. The principle of aU i likewise must he admitted to be infinite, not because b magnitude or number which ca,nnot be passed o because the power of him is incomprehensible.' Fori* you conceive him to be intellect or God, he is more [ei lent] than these. And again, when by the dianoetic p you equalize him with tte one, or conceive him to be Go! by recurring to that which is most united in your iutellefl tual perception, be even transcends these appellatioOl For he ia in himself, nor is any thing accidental to h By that which ia sufficient to itself also the imity of t nature may be demonstrated. For it is necesaary that t! principle of all things should be most aufiicient 1: other things, and to itself, and that it should also \. un-indigent. But every thing which is multitudinous a not one, is indigent; since conaiating of many things ii not one. Hence the essence of it requires to be o the one is not in want of itself. For it is the one over, that which ia many, is in want of aa many thinga; it ia. And each of the thinga that are in it, i in conjunction with others, and is not in itsel: of other thinga; and thus a thing of this kind exhibits ii digence, both according to parts and according to the w If, therefore, it is necessary there ahould he somethin ' For TTepiAijTrTip here, it is necessary to renJ awtpikiiirTip, ON TDE GOOD, OR TllE ONE.
t^t BulKcient to itself, it is necessary there ^ one, which alone is a thing of B,uch a kind, be indigent with reference to itself, nor with aiother thing.' For it does not seek after any r that it may be, nor in order that it may be ent condition, nor that it may be there estab- r being the cause of existence to other things, i-iving that which it is from others, nor its hapjji- , addition can be made to it external to itself? ) happiness, or the excellency of ita condition, is dental to it. For it is itself [all that is sufficient to There is not likewise any place for it. For it is ,. want of a foundation, as if it were not able to sua- itself. For that which is eBtabUshed in another thing inanimate, and a falling mass, if it is without a founda- n. But other things are established on account of the 'one, through which also they at the Bame time subsist, and have the place in which they are arranged. That, however, which seeks after place is indigent. But the principle is not indigent of things posterior to itself. The principle, therefore, of all things is unindigent of all things. For that which is indigent, is indigent in consequence of aspiring after its principle. But if Ike one was indigent (if any thing it would certainly seek not to be the one; so Ab, however, a. tiling cannot be said to lie a principle or oaneo without tlie snbaifitenco of the ihinga of which it is the principle or cause; hence the one, bo fax aa it is a principle or cause, will he indigent of the snbxistence of these. "Indeed." as Daniascius sayB, " how is it possible it ahould. not be indigent so for as it is me? Jast as it is all other things which proceed from it. For the indigent alsoia something belonging to all things." Henc» there is aomelbing even be;ond the mte, which ha« no kind of ' indigence whatever, wMcii is in every respect incapable of being j apprehended, and about wliieli we must be perfectly silent. See the Introduction to my ■* Plato," and the additional notes t« the j 3rd Volume of it. | 312 SEIECT WORKS OF PIOTISTJS.
that it would be indigent of its destroyer. Every thi however, which is said to be indigent, is indigent of a condition, and of that which preserves it. Hence to ( one nothing ia good, and, therefore, neither is the wish f any thing good to it. But it iB guj>er-good. And it is n good to itself, bnt to other things, which are able to part pate of it.!Nor does the one possess int-elligence, li should also possess difference; nor motion. For it is to motion, and prior to intelligence. Por what is which it will intellectually perceive? Shall we say it Prior to intellection, therefore, it will be ignorant, and ^ be in want of intelligence in order that it may know ii though it is sufficient to itself. It does not follow, I ever, that because the one does not know itself, and d not intellectually perceive itself, there vrill be ignorance i] it. For ignorance takes place where there is diyeraity, s when one thing is ignorant of another. That, howev^ which is alone neither knows any thing, nor has any thi of which it is ignorant. But being one, and associatij with itself, it does not require the intellectual perception itself J since neither is it necessary, in order that youn preserve (he one, to adapt to it an association with i But it is requisite to take away intellectual perception, ai association with itself, and the knowledge of itself, i other things. For it is not proper to arrange it accc to the act of perceiving intellectunlly, but rather accc to intelligence. For intelligence does not perceive inte tually. but ia the cause of intellectual perception to ai thing. Cause, however, is not the same vrith the caused. But the cause of all things is not any c them. Hence neither must it be denominated that % which it imparts to others; but it is after another mam (he good, in a way transcending other goods.
Vn. If, however, because it is none of these things,; become indefinite in your decision, in this ease establi ON THE GOOD, OR ^ 313 yourself in the fttove mentioned particukra, and from these [ascend to] and fix yourself in God, But for this purpose you must not extend the diaooetio power outwardly. For G-od ia not iu a certain place, bo as to desert other things; but wherever any thing is able to come into contact with him, there he ia prcBeofc. Hence, as in other things, it is not possible to perceive something intellectually, while uuderstanding and attending to another thing, but it is necessary not to introduce any thing else to the object of intellectual vision, in order tbat the ]>erceiver may be the thing itself which is perceived; — thus also here, it is not possible for the soul to perceive God, while it retains the impression of something else, and energizes according to that impression. Nor again, ia it possible for the sonl ■while occupied and detained by other things to be im- pressed with the form of something contrary to them. But as it is said of matter, that it ought to be void of all qualities, in order that it may receive the impressions of all things; thus also, and in a much greater degi-ee, it is necessary that the soul should become formless, in order that tbere niay be no impediment to its being filled and illuminated by the first principle of things, J£, however, this be the case, it is requisite that the soul, dismissing all externals, should be entirely converted to its inmost recesses, and should not be called to any thing extenial, but should be unintelleetive of all things; and prior to this indeed, in inclination, but then also it should be with- out the perception of forma. It is likewise necessary that the soul, being ignorant oE herself, should dwell on the contemplation of Gk)d, and associating, and as it were sufficiently conversing with him, should announce, if possible, the conference which it there held to another; which Minos perhaps having accomplished, was on this account said to be the familiar of Jupiter. Calling to mind also this conference, he established laws which were 314 SELECT WOKKS OF PLOTIKUS, tie ima^ea of it, being; filled through the contact i di'rimty with materials for the institution of laws, may we not eay that the soul, if she wishea to abide o high, will consider political concerns as unworthy to \ the subject of conference with deity? For this indee will be the language of him who has seen much of diTini^ For. as U IB taid, God ia not eiderjial io any one, but i present with aU thinge, though they are ignorant that ho | so. For they fly from him, or rather from themaelTi They are unable, therefore, to apprehend that from 7 they fly. And having destroyed themselves, they i incapable of seeking after another. For neither will i child, when through insanity he becomes out of himse recognize hia father. But he who knows himself, will a know from whence he was derived.
VIII. If, therefore, a certain soul has known itself S another time, it will also tnow that its motiun is m linear, but that its natural motion is as it were in about a certain thing, not externally, but about a The centre, however, is that from which the circle pKJ ceeds; and therefore such a soul will be moved about t source of its eaistenee. It will also be suspended i this, eagerly urging itself towards that to which all BOut onght to hasten. But the souls of the Goda always t thither; and by tending to this they are Gods. For whi ever is conjoined to this is a God. But that which is v distant from it, is a multitudinous man and a brut«. therefore, that in the soul which ia as it were a centre, i object of investigation? Or is it necessary to think t it is something else, in which as it were all centres concu^j| This centre, however, and this circle are assumed by 1 according to analogy. For the soul is not a circle in t" same way as a flgure; but because an ancient nature is % it and about it. And because the soul is suspended froi^ a thing of this kind, and in a still greater degree when f ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE. 315 is wholly separated from tlie body. Now, however, since a part of us is detained by the body; just as if some one should have his feet in the water, but with the rest of his body should be above it; — thus also being elevated by that part which is not merged in body, we are conjoined to that which is as it were the centre of all things; after the same manner as we fix the centres of the greatest circles in the centre of the sphere by which they are com- prehended. K, therefore, the circles were corporeal and not psychical, they would be conjoined to the centre locally, and the centre being situated in a certain place, the circles would revolve about it. Since, however, these souls are themselves intelligible, and this centre is above intellect, it must be admitted that this contact is effected by other powers than those by which an intellective nature is adapted to be conioined to the object of intellectual per- ception. The contact, also, is greater than that by which intellect is present [with the intelligible] through simili- tude and sameness, and is conjoined with a kindred nature, nothing intervening to separate the conjunction. For bodies, indeed, are prevented from being united to each other; but incorporeal natures are not separated from each other by bodies. Hence, one is not distant from the other by place, but by otherness and difference. When, there- fore, difference is not present, then the natures which are not different are present with each other. The principle of all things, therefore, not having any difference, is always present; but we are present with it when we have no difference. And it indeed does not aspire after us, in order that it may be conversant with us; but we aspire after it, in order that we may revolve about it. We indeed perpetually revolve about it, but we do not always behold it. As a band of singers, however, though it moves about the coryphaeus, may be diverted to the survey of something foreign to the choir [and thus become dis- I \ 316 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
cordant], but when it converts itself to him, sings well, and truly subsists about him; — thus also we perpetually revolve about the principle of all things, even when we are perfectly loosened from it, and have no longer a knowledge of it. Nor do we always look to it; but when we behold it, then we obtain the end of our wishes, and rest [from our search after felicity]. Then also we are no longer discordant, but form a truly divine dance about it.