IX. In this dance, however, the soul beholds the foun- tain of life, the fountain of intellect, the principle of being, the cause of good, and the root of soul. And these are not poured forth from this fountain, so as to produce in it any diminution. For it is not a corporeal mass; since if it were, its progeny would be corruptible. But now they are perpetual, because the principle of them abides with invariable sameness; not being distributed into them, but remaining whole and entire. Hence, they likewise remain, just as if the sun being permanent, light also should be permanent. For we are not cut off from this fountain, nor are we separated from it, though the nature of body in- tervening, draws us to itself. But we are animated and preserved by an infusion from thence, this principle not imparting, and afterwards withdrawing itself from us; since it always supplies us with being, and always will as long as it continues to be that which it is. Or rather, we are what we are by verging to it. Our well-being also consists in this tendency. And to be distant from it is nothing else than a diminution of existence. Here, like- wise, the soul rests, and becomes out of the reach of evils, running back to that place which is free from ill. And here also, she energizes intellectually, is liberated from perturbations, and lives in reality. For the present life, and which is without God, is a vestige of life, and an imitation of that life which is real. But the life in the ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE. 317 intelligible world consists in the energy of intellect. Energy also generates Gods, througli a tranquil and quiet contact with the principle of all things. It likewise generates beauty, justice, and virtue. For the soul being filled with deity, brings forth these. And this is both the beginning and end to the soul. It is the beginning indeed, because she originates from thence; but it is the end, because the good is there, and because when the soul is situated there, she becomes what she was before. For the good which is here, and in sensible concerns, is a lapse, a flight, and a defluxion of the wings of the soul. But that the good is there, is indicated by the love which is connascent with the soul; conformably to which Love is conjoined in marriage with souls, both in writings and in fables.^ For since the soul is different from God, but is derived from him, she necessarily loves him, and when she is there she has a celestial love; but the love which she here possesses is common and vulgar. For in the intelligible world the celestial Venus reigns; but here the popular Yenus,^ who ' See my translation of the fable of Cupid and Psyche; for to this fable Plotinus now evidently alludes.
2 The celestial Venus, says Proclus (in Schol. MSS. in Craty- lum), is supermundane, leads upwards to intelligible beauty, is the supplier of an unpolluted life, and separates from generation. But the Venus that proceeds from Dione governs all the co-ordina- tions in the celestial world and the earth, binds them to each other, and perfects their generative progressions, through a kindred conjunction. He likewise informs us, that this goddess proceed* from foam, according to Orpheus, as well as the more ancient [or celestial] Venus; and that both proceed from generative powers; one from that of Heaven, but the other from that of Jupiter the Demiurgus. He adds, that by the sea (from which they rose) we must understand an expanded and circumscribed life; by its pro- fundity, the universally-extended progression of such a life; and by the foam, the greatest purity of nature, that which is full of prolific light and power, that which swims upon all life, and is as; it were its highest flower.
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is as it were meretricious.^ Every soul also is a Venus. And this tlie nativity of Venus, and Love wlio was bom at the same time with her, obscurely signify.* The soul, therefore, when in a condition conformable to nature, loves God, wishing to be united to him, being as it were the desire of a beautiful virgin to be conjoined with a beautiful Love. When, however, the soul descends into generation, then being as it were deceived by [spurious] nuptials, and associating herself with another and a mortal Love, she becomes petulant and insolent through being absent from her father. But when she again hates terrene wantonness and injustice, and becomes purified from the defilements which are here, and again returns to her father, then she is affected in the most felicitous manner. And those in- deed who are ignorant of this affection, may from terrene love form some conjecture of divine love, by considering how great a felicity the possession of a most beloved object is conceived to be; and also by considering that these earthly objects of love are mortal and noxious, that the love of them is nothing more than the love of images, and that they lose their attractive power because they are not truly desirable, nor our real good, nor that which we in- vestigate. In the intelligible world, however, the true object of love is to be found, with which we may be con- joined, which we may participate, and truly possess, and which is not externally enveloped with flesh. He however who knows this, will know what I say, and will be convinced that the soul has then another life. The soul also proceed- ing to, and having now arrived at the desired end, and participating of deity, will know that the supplier of true life is then present. She will likewise then require nothing farther; for on the contrary, it will be requisite to lay ^ Plotinus says this, looking to the illegitimate participations of this Venus hy mankind. ^ See the speech of Diotima in the "Banquet of Plato."
ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE. 319 aside other things, to stop in this alone, and to become this alone, amputating every thing else with which she is surrounded. Hence, it is necessary to hasten our departure from hence, and to be indignant that, we are bound in one part of our nature, in order that with the whole of our [true] selves, we may fold ourselves about divinity, and have no part void of contact with him. When this takes place therefore, the soul will both see divinity and herself, as far as it is lawful for her to see him. And she will see herself indeed illuminated, and full of intelligible light; or rather, she will perceive herself to be a pure light, un- burthened, agile, and becoming to be a God, or rather being a God, and then shining forth as such to the view.^ But if she again becomes heavy, she then as it were wastes away.
X. How does it happen, therefore, that the soul does not abide there? Is it not because she has not yet wholly migrated from hence? But she will then, when her vision of deity possesses an uninterrupted continuity, and she is no longer impeded or disturbed in her intuition by the body. That however which sees divinity, is not the thing ^ Hence Aristotle in his ** Politics " also says, that he who sur- passes beyond all comparison the rest of his fellow -citizens in virtue, ought to be considered as a God among men. He also observes, that such a one is no longer a part of the city, that law is not for him, since he is a law to himself, and that it would be ridiculous in any one to subject him to the laws. Let no one, however, who is not thus transcendently virtuous, fancy that law also is not for him; for this fancy in such a one is not only idle, but if not suppressed may lead to sedition, and the destruction of himself and others. In short, the man who has not completely subdued his passions, is so far from being above law, that, as Proclus well observes, * * the universe uses him as a brute. " Observe, too, that when Plotinus calls the man who is able in this life to see divinity a God, he means that he is a God only according to similitude; for in this way, men transcendently wise and good are called by Plato, Gods and divine.
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which is disturbed, but sometbing else; when that which perceives him is at rest from the vision. But it is not then at rest according to a scientific energy, which consists in demonstrations, in credibilities, and a discursive process of the souh For here vision, and that which sees, are no longer reason, but greater than and prior to reason. And in reason, indeed, they are as that is which is perceived. He therefore who sees himself, will then, when he sees, be- hold himseK to be such a thing as this, or rather he will be present with himself thus disposed, and becoming simple, will perceive himself to be a thing of this kind. Perhaps, however, neither must it be said that he sees, but that he is the thing seen; if it is necessary to call these two things^ i,e. the perceiver and the thing perceived. But both are one; ^ though it is bold to assert this. Then, indeed, the soul neither sees, nor distinguishes by seeing, nor imagines that there are two things; but becomes as it were another thing, and not itself. Nor does that which pertains to itself contribute any thing there. But becoming wholly absorbed in deity, she is one, conjoining as it were centre with centre. For here concurring, they are one; but they are then two when they are separate. For thus also we now denominate that which is another. Hence this spec- tacle is a thing difficult to explain by words. For how can any one narrate that as something different from himself, which when he sees he does not behold as different, but as one vpith himself?
XI. This, therefore, is manifested by the mandate of the mysteries, which orders that they shall not be divulged to those who are uninitiated. For as that which is divine cannot be unfolded to the multitude, this mandate forbids the attempt to elucidate it to any one but him who is for- tunately able to perceive it. Since, therefore, [in this con- ^ From the conclusion of this section, it is evident that instead of aXKd firjy in this place, we should read dXXdt ^171/.
ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE. 321 junction with deity] there were not two things, but the perceiver was one with the thing perceived, aa not being [properly speaking] vision but union; whoever becomes one by mingling with deity, and afterwards recollects this union, will have with himself an image of it. But he was also himself one, having with respect to himself no dif- ference, nor with respect to other things. For then there was not any thing excited with him who had ascended thither; neither anger, nor the desire of any thing else, nor reason, nor a certain intellectual perceptian, nor, in short, was even he himself moved, if it be requisite also to assert this; but being as it were in an ecstasy, or energiz- ing enthusiastically, he became established in quiet and solitary union, not at all deviating from his own essence, nor revolving about himself, but being entirely stable, and becoming as it were stability itself. Neither was he then excited by any thing beautiful; but running above the beautiful, he passed beyond even the choir of the virtues. Just as if some one having entered into the interior of the adytum should leave behind all the statues in the temple, which on his departure from the adytum will first present themselves to his view, after the inward spectacle, and the association that was there, which was not with a statue or an image, but with the thing itself [which the images represent], and which necessarily become the second objects of his perception. Perhaps, however, this was not a spec- tacle,, but there was another mode of vision, viz. ecstasy, and an expansion and accession of himself, a desire of con- tact, rest, and a striving after conjunction, in order to be- hold what the adytum contains. But nothing will be pre- sent with him who beholds in any other way. The wise prophets, therefore, obscurely signified by these imitations how this [highest] God is seen. But the wise priest understanding the enigma, and having entered into the adytum, obtains a true vision of what is there. If, how- Y 322 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
ever, he lias not entered, he will conceive this adytum to be a certain invisible thing, and will have a knowledge of the fountain and principle, as the principle of things. But when situated there, he will see the principle, and will be conjoined with it, by a union of like with like, neglecting nothing divine which the soul is able to possess. Prior to the vision also it requires that which remains from the vision. But that which remains to him who passes beyond all things, is that which is prior to all things. For the nature of the soul will never accede to thdit which is entirely non-being. But proceeding indeed downwards it will fall into evil; and thus into non-being, yet not into that which is perfect nonentity. Running, how.- ever, in a contrary direction, it will arrive not at another thing, but at itself. And thus not being in another thing, it is not on that account in nothing, but is in itself. To he in itself alone, however, and not in being, is to he in God. For God also is something which is not essence, but beyond essence. Hence the soul when in this condition associates with him. He, therefore, who perceives himself to asso- ciate with God, will have himself the similitude of him. And if he passes from himself as an image to the arche- tyx)e, he will then have the end of his progression. But when he falls from the vision of God, if he again excites the virtue which is in himself, and perceives himself to be perfectly adorned; he will again be elevated through virtue, proceeding to intellect and wisdom, and afterwards to the principle of all things. This, therefore, is the life of the Gods, and of divine and happy men, a liheration from all terrene concerns, a life unaccompanied with human pleasures, and a flight of the alone to the alone, ^ ^ From this solitary subsistence of the one^ the solitariness of all other divine natures is derived, and their ineffable association with themselves. Hence Plato in the " Timseus " says, " that the Demiurgus established heaven {i.e. the world) one, only, solitary ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE. 323 nature, able through viitue to converse with itself, indigent of nothing external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself." Proclus, in his Commentaries on this dialogue, admirably illus- trates these words as follows: ** To comprehend the whole blessed- ness of the world in three appellations, is most appropriate to that which subsists according to a triple cause, viz. the final, the para- digmatic, and the demiurgic. For of the appellations themselves, the first of them, viz. one, is assumed from the final cause; for the one is the same with the good. But the second, viz. ordyt is assumed from the paradigmatic cause. For the only-hegotten and onlyness (hovoxtiq) were, prior to the universe, in all-perfect animal. And the third, viz. the solitary, is assumed from the demiurgic cause. For the ability of using itself, and through itself governing the world, proceeds from the demiurgic goodness. The world, therefore, is one, so far as it is united and is converted to the one. But it is only, so far as it participates of the intelligible, and com- prehends all things in itself. And it is solitary, so far as it is similar to its father,- and is able to save itself. From the three, however, it appears that it is a Grod. For the one, the perfect, and the self-sufficient, are the elements of deity. Hence, the world receiving these, is also itself a God; being one indeed, according to hyparxis; but alone, according to a perfection which derives its completion from all sensible natures; and solitary through being sufficient to itself. For those that lead a solitary life, being con- verted to themselves, have the hopes of salvation in themselves. And that this is the meaning of the term solitary, is evident from the words, ** able through virtue to converse with itself, indigent of nothing external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself." For in these words Plato clearly manifests what the solitariness is which he ascribes to the world, and that he denominates that being solitary, who looks to himself, to that with which he is furnished, and to his own proper measure. For those that live in solitary places, are the saviours of themselves, so far as respects human causes. The universe, therefore, is likewise after this manner solitary, as being sufficient to itself, and preserving itself, not through a diminution but from an exuberance of power; for self-sufficiency is here indicated; and as he says, through virtue. For he alone among partial animals [such as we are] who possesses virtue, is able to associate with, and love himself with a parental affection. But the vicious man looking to his inward baseness, is indignant with himself and with his oum essence, is astonished with externals, and pursues an association with others, in consequence 324 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
ofhia inahUity to behold himself. On the contrary ^ the worthy man perceiving himself beautiful, rejoices and is ddighted, and pro- ducing in himself beautiful conceptions, gladly embraces an asso- ciation with himself. For we are naturally domesticated to the l)eantifTil, but hastOy withdraw ourselves from deformity. Hence, if the world possesses virtue adapted to itself, in it« intellectual and psychical essence, and in the perfection of its animal nature, looking to itself, it loves itself, and is present with, and sufficient to itself.
ADDITIONAL NOTES.
Page 3. Intellectiuzl Prudence, The following account of the virtues is extracted from the Notes to my Translation of the " Phsedo " of Plato: The first of the virtues are the physical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the tempera- ments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they are the result of energies in a former life. Of these Plato spesis in the " Politicus " and the " Laws." The ethical virtues, which are above these, are ingenerated by custom and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues of children when well educated. These virtues also are to be found in some brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato delivers in the "Laws." They pertain however at the same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these are the political virtues, which pertain to reason alone; for they are scientific. But they are the virtues of reason adorning the irrational part as its instrument; through prudence adorning the gnostic, through fortitude the irascible, and through temperance the epithymetic power (or the power which is the source of desire); but adorning all the parts of the irrational nature through justice. And of these virtues Plato speaks much in the " Republic." These virtues too follow each other. Above these are the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reason alone, withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain, repressing also the energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Plato particularly unfolds these virtues in the " Phaedo." Prior to these however are the theoretic virtues, 326 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
which pertain to the soul, introducing itself to natures superior to itself, not only gnosticallj, as some one may be induced to think from the name, but also orectically: for it hastens to. become, as it were, intellect instead of soul; and intellect pos- sesses both desire and knowledge. These virtues are the con- verse of the political: for as the latter energize about things subordinate according to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to intellect. These virtues Plato delivers in the " Theaetetus."
According to Plotinus, there is also another gradation of the virtues besides these, viz. the paradigmatic. For, as our eye, when it is first illuminated by the solar light, is different from that which illuminates, as being illuminated, but afterwards is in a certain respect united and conjoined with it, and becomes as it were solar-form; so also our soul at first indeed is illuminated by intellect, and energizes according to the theoretic virtues, but afterwards becomes, as it were, that which is illuminated, and energizes uniformly according to the paradigmatic virtues. And it is the business indeed of philosophy to make us intellect; but of theurgy to unite us to intelligibles, so that we may energize paradigmatically. And as when possessing the physical virtues, we know mundane bodies (for the subjects to virtues of this kind are bodies); so from possessing the ethical virtues, we know the fate of the universe, because fate is conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational, because they pertain to the irrational part. According to the political virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the cathartic super-mundane; but as possessing the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic intel- ligible natures. Temperance also pertains to the ethical vii^tues; justice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the cathartic, through not verging to matter; and prudence to the theoretic. Observe too, that Plato in the "Phaedo" calls the physical virtues servile, because they may subsist in servile souls; but he calls the ethical (TKioypa<f>(ai adumbrations, because their possessors only know that the energies of such virtues are rights but do not know why they are so. It is well observed too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato calls the cathartic and theoretic virtues, those which are in reality true virtues. He also separates them in another way, viz. that the political are not telestic, i.e. do not ADDITIONAL NOTES. 327 pertain to mystic ceremonies, but that the cathartic and theoretic are telestic. Hence, Olympiodorus adds, the cathartic rii'tues are denominated from the purification which is Hsed in the mysteries; but the theoretic from perceiving things divine. On this account he accords with the Orphic verses, that.
The soul that uninitiated dies, Plung'd in the blackest mire in Hades lies.
For initiation is the divinely-inspired energy of the virtues. Olympiodorus also ftirther observes, that by the thyrsus-bearers, Plato means those that energize according to the political virtues, but by the Bacchuses those that exercise the cathartic virtues. For we are bound in matter as Titans, through the great parti- bility of our nature; but we rise from the dark mire as Bacchuses. Hence we become more prophetic at the time of death: and Bacchus is the inspective guardian of death, because he is like- wise of every thing pertaining to the Bacchic sacred rites.
All the virtues likewise exhibit their proper characters, these being every where common, but subsisting appropriately in each. For the characteristic property of fortitude is the not declining to things subordinate; of temperance, a conversion from an inferior nature; of justice, a proper energy, and which is adapted to being; and of prudence, the election and selection of things good and evil. Olympiodorus farther observes, that all the virtues are in the Gods. For many Gods, says he, are adorned with their appellations; and all goodness origin^-tes from the Gods. Likewise, prior to things which sometimes participate the virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there should be natures which always participate them. In what order, therefore, do the virtues first appear? Shall we say in the psychical? For virtue is the perfection of the soul; and election and pre-election are the energies and projections of the soul. Hence the Chaldsean oracles conjoin fontal virtue with fontal soul, or in other words, with soul subsisting according to cause. But may it not also be said, that the virtues naturally wish to give an orderly arrange- ment to that which is disordered? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic order. How then will they be cathartic there? May we not say, Olympiodorus adds, that through the cathartic virtues considered according to their casual subsistence in Jupiter the demiurgus, he is enabled to abide in 328 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
his accustomed mode, as Plato sajs in tlie "Timseus"? And farther still, according to ancient theologists, he ascends to the tower of Saturn, who is a pure intellect.
As this distribution of the virtues, however, is at present no less novel than important, the following discussion of them from the *A<j>opiiai TpoQ ra vorjra, or Auxiliaries to Intblligibles, of Porphyry, is added both for the sake of the philosophic reader, and becauseit elucidates what is said by Plotinus on this subject. The substance of it is indeed evidently derived from Plotinus.
** There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the political character, and another to the man who tends to contemplation, and on this account is called theoretic, and is now a beholder. And there are also other virtues pertaining to intellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate from soul. The virtues indeed of the political character, and which consist in the moderation of the passions, are characterised by following and being obedient to the reasoning about that which is becoming in actions. Hence, looking to an innoxious converse with neighbours, they are denominated, from the aggregation of fellowship, political. And prudence indeed subsists about the reasoning part; fortitude about the irascible part; temperance, in the consent and symphony of the epithymetic with the reasoning part; and justice in each of these performing its proper employment with respect to governing and being governed. But the virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative life, consist in a depar- ture from terrestrial concerns. Hence also, they are called purifications, being surveyed in the refraining from corporeal actions, and avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are the virtues of the soul elevating itself to true being. The poli- tical virtues, therefore, adorn the mortal man, and are the fore- runners of purifications. For it is necessary that he who is adorned by these, should abstain from doing any thing prece-