daneously in conjunction with body. Hence in purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize alone, gives subsistence to prudence; which derives its perfection through energizing intel- lectually with purity. But not to be similarly passive with the body, constitutes temperance. Not to fear a departure from body as into something void, and nonentity, gives subsistence to fortitude. But when reason and intellect are the leadei*s, and there is no resistance [from the irrational part], justice is pro- ADDITIONAL NOTES. 329 *, duced. The disposition therefore, according to the political * virtues, is surveyed in the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man conformable to nature. But the dis- position according to the theoretic virtues, is beheld in apathy; ^ the end of which is a similitude to God.
" Since, however, of purification one kind consists in purifying, but another pertains to those that are purified, the cathartic virtues are surveyed according to both these significations of purification; for they purify the soul, and are present with purification. For the end of purification is to become pure. But since purification, and the being purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the good resulting from them will be different from that which purifies; so that if that which is purified was good prior to the impurity with which it is defiled, purification is sufficient. That, however, which remains after purification, is good, and not purification. The nature of the soul also was not good, but is that which is able to partake of good, and is boniform. For if this were not the case, it would not have become situated in evil. The good, therefore, of the soul consists in being united to its generator; but its evil, in an association with things subordinate to itself. Its evil also is twofold; the one arising from an association with terrestrial natures; but the other from doing this with an excess of the passions. Hence all the political virtues, which liberate the soul from one evil, may be denominated virtues, and are honourable. But the cathartic are more honour- able, and liberate it from evil, so far as it is soul. It is neces- sary, therefore, that the soul when purified should associate with its generator. Hence the virtue of it after its conversion consists in a scientific knowledge of [true] being; but this will not be the case unless conversion precedes.
" There is therefore another genus of virtues after the cathartic and political, and which are the virtues of the soul energizing intellectually. And here, indeed, wisdom and prudence consist in the contemplation of those things which intellect possesses. But justice consists in performing what is appropriate in a con- formity to, and energizing according to intellect. Temperance is an inward conversion of the soul to intellect. And fortitude ^ This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly supposed by most of the present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the passions to reason.
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is apathy; according to a similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally impassive. These virtues also, in the same manner as the others, alternately follow each other.
'* The fourth species of the virtues, is that of the paradigms subsisting in intellect; which are more excellent than the psychical virtues, and exist as the paradigms of these; the virtues of the soul being the similitudes of them. And intellect indeed is that in which all things subsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, prudence is science; but intellect that knows [all things] is wisdom. Temperance is that which is cdnverted to itself. The proper work of intellect, is the performance of its appropriate duty [and this is justice ^]. But fortitude is sameness, and the abiding with purity in itself, through an abundance of power. There are therefore four genera of virtues; of which, indeed, some pertain to intellect, concur with the essence of it, and are paradigmatic. Others pertain to soul now looking to intellect, and being filled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, purifying itself, and becoming purified from the body, and the irrational passions. And others are the virtues of the soul of man, adorning the man, through giving measure and bound to the irrational nature, and producing moderation in the passions. And he, indeed, who has the greater virtues has also necessarily the less; but the contrary is not true, that he who has the less has also the greater virtues. Nor will he who possesses the greater, energize precedaneously according to the less, but only so far as the necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also of the virtues, is, as we have said, generically diflerent in the different virtues. For the scope of the political virtues, is to give measure to the passions in their practical energies according to nature. But the scope of the cathartic virtues, is entirely to obliterate the remembrance of the passions. And the scope of the rest subsists analogously to what has been before said. Hence, he who energizes according to the practical virtues, is a worthy man; but he who energizes according to the cathartic virtues, is a dcBmoniacal man, or is also a good dcemon. He who energizes according to the intellectual virtues alone, is a God. But he who energizes according to the paradigmatic virtues, is the father of the Gods. We, therefore, ought especially ^ The words koi diKaiotruvr} are omitted in the original. But it is evident from Flotinus, that they ought to be inserted.
ADDITIONAL NOTES. 331 to pay attention to the cathartic virtues, since we may obtain these in the present life. But through these, the ascent is to the more honourable virtues. Hence it is requisite to survey to what degree purification may be extended. For it is a separa- tion from body, and from the passive motion of the irrational part. But how this may be effected, and to what extent, must now be said.
"In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that he who intends to acquire this purification, should, as the foundation and basis of it, know himself to be a soul bound in a foreign thing, and in a different essence. In the second place, as that which is raised from this foundation, he should collect himself from the body, and as it were from different places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly impassive with respect to the body. For he who energizes uninterruptedly according to sense, though he may not do this with an adhering affection, and the enjoyment resulting from pleasure, yet at the same time his attention is dissipated about the body, in consequence of becoming through sense ^ in contact with it. But we are addicted to the pleasures or pains of sensibles, in conjunction with a promptitude, and converging sympathy; from which disposition it is requisite to be purified. This, however, will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and the sensations of them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation from pain, in order that [the rational part"] may not be impeded [in its energies']. Pain also must be taken away. But if this is not possible, it must be mildly diminished. And it will be diminished, if the soul is not copassive with it. Anger, like- wise, must as much as possible be taken away; and must by no means be premeditated. But if it cannot be entirely removed, deliberate choice must not be mingled with it, but the unpremeditated motion must be the impulse of the irrational part. That however which is unpremeditated is imbecile and small. All fear, likewise, must be expelled. For he who requires this purification, will fear nothing. Here, however, if it should take place, it will be unpremeditated. Anger therefore and fear must be used for the purpose of admonition. But the desire of every thing base must be exterminated. Such a one also, so far as he is a cathartic • philosopher, will not desire meats and drinks.
^ Instead of icar* avTr^v h(re, it is necessary to read Kar aia^riaiv.
i PLOTISUS.
Neither must tbere be the unpremeditated in ilatural renerei connexioiifl; hut if this ahovld late /ilaer, il must he only at fa ax to that prti-ipitate imagitiation which energises in sleep. I short, the intellectual soul itself of the purified man, must b liberated from all these [corporeal propenaities]. He must Uki wise eudenvoiir that what b moved ta the irratioual nature < corporeal passions, ma^ be moved wilhnat sjmpathf, and withoi atiimod version; bo that the motions themselves maj be immi diatelj dissolved, through their vicinitj to the reaBoiting poire This, however, will not take place while the purification eeeding to its perfection; but will happen to those ii reason rules without opposition. Hence in these, the inferii part will BO venerate reason, that it will be indicant if it ia i all moved, in consequence of not being qniet when its master present, and will reprove itself for its imbecility. Theie, howevei Hre yet only moderations of the passions, but at length termiufti in apathy. For when co-passivity is entirely exterminated, thi apathy is present with him who is purified from it. For paisic becomes moved, when reason imparts excitation, through TCFgii [to the irralional nature]."
Faqb 11, The endeavour is not to be leithout sin, lut ta he God, That is, tn be a God according to a similitude to divinjt itself. For through this similitude, good men are also called b; Plato Gods, Hence, too, Empedoeles says of himself, " Farewell, no mortal, but a God am I."
From this magnificent conception of human nature by th Pythagoreans and Plato, considered according to its true cot dit ioo, the lofty language of the Stoics about their wise man in btleas derived. For they assert of him that he posEeast 1 hUarity, and sublime joy; that lie is biesfted ; that he is without perturbation, because he ADDITIONAL NOTES. 338 and erect mind which looks down upon fortune with contempt. They farther add, that all things are the property of the wise man, and that he alone is to be considered rich, because he uses all things in the way which they ought to be used, and because he alone possesses the virtues, which are more precious than all treasures. That he alone is free, but that all bad men are slaves: for he neither fears any thing, nor does any thing cause him to grieve, ner is he subservient to any subordinate nature. That he alone is a king; for he governs both himself, and others. Hence Seneca, " Are you willing to have great honour, I will give you a great empire: obtain dominion over yourself." And lastly they add, that the wise man is obnoxious to no injury. For, as Seneca says in his treatise "De Constantia Sapientis," ** Fortune takes away nothing except that which she gave.; but she does not give virtue, and therefore does not take it away. Virtue is free, inviolable, unmoved, unshaken, and so hardened against casualties, that she cannot even be made to incline, much less can she be vanquished. Hence the wise man loses nothing of which he will perceive the loss; for he is in the possession of virtue, from which he can never be driven, and he uses every thing else as something different from his proper good. If, there- fore, an injury cannot hurt any of those things which are the property of a wise man, because they are safe through virtue, an injury cannot be done to a wise man." And afterwards, speaking of Stilpo the philosopher, who on being asked by Demetrius whether he had lost any thing by the capture of Megara, answered that he had lost nothing; for, said he, all that is mine is with me,* and yet his patrimony was a part of the plunder, and the enemy had ravished his daughters, and conquered his country; speaking of this very extraordinary man, he observes as follows,. " Stilpo shook off victory from the conqueror, and testified that though the city was taken, he himself was not only unconquered,. but without loss; for he had with him true goods, upon which no hand can be laid. Whatever may be dissipated and plundered, he did not consider as his own, but as *a thing adventitious, and which follows the nod of fortune, and hence he did not love it as his proper good. It must therefore be admitted that this perfect man, who was frill of human and divine virtues, lost nothing. His goods were begirt with solid and insurmountable fortifica- tions. You must not compare with these the walls of Babylon,.
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whicli Alexander entered; nor the walls of Carthage or Nu- mantia, which were captured by one hand; nor the Capitol, or the citadel; for these possess an hostile vestige. But the walls which defend the wise man are safe from flames and incursion: they afford no entrance, are unconquerable, and so lofty that they reach even to the Gods.'* Agreeably to this, also, the great Socrates said with a magnanimity which has seldom been equalled, and never surpassed, e/ue ^e *'Awtoq koI McXtroc airoKTBivai fxev ^vyayraif fiXdij^ai Be oh ^vyayraL " Anytus and Melitus may indeed put me to death, but they cannot injure me."
These magnificent conceptions, and this elevated language arising from the cultivation of true virtue and wisdom, were no longer to be found when the hand of barbaric despotism abolished the schools of the philosophers. For then, as a necessary conse- quence, a night of ignorance succeeded, which is without a parallel in the history of any period; and Philosophy, accom- panied by all the great virtues, retired fromr the Cimmerian darkness into the splendid and dignified solitude in which the Genius of antiquity resides.
Page 14. Dialectic, For the sake of the truly philosophic reader who may not have my translation of Plato in his posses- sion, the following additional observations on that master science, dialectic, are extracted from the 3rd volume of that translation, and principally from the notes on the Parmenides.
The method of reasoning employed by the dialectic of Plato, was invented by the Eleatic Zeno the disciple of Parmenides, and is as follows: Two hypotheses being laid down, viz. if a thing is, and if it is not, each of these may be tripled, by considering in each what happens, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen; so that six cases will be the result. But since, if a thing is, we may consider itself either with respect to itself, or itself with respect to others; or we may consider others themselves with respect to themselves, or others with respect to that thing itself, and so likewise if a thing is not: hence the whole of this process will consist of eight triads, which are the following. 1. If a thing is, what happens to itself with respect to itself, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 2. If a thing is, what happens to itself with respect to others, what does not appen, what happens and at the same time does not happen.
ADDITIONAL NOTES. 335 3. If a thing is, what happens to others with respect to them- selves, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 4. If a thing is, what happens to others with respect to that thing, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. And the other four, which are founded on the hypothesis that a thing is not, are to be distributed in exactly the same manner as those we have just enumerated. Such (says Proclus in MS. "Commen. in Par- menid.*') is the whole form of the dialectic method, which is both intellectual and scientific; and under which those four powers the definitive and divisive, the demonstrative and analytic, receive their consummate perfection.
The "Parmenides" of Plato gives a specimen of this method logically and synoptically; comprehending in eight the above- mentioned four and twenty modes. Plato also adds, that the end of this exercise is the perception of truth. "We must not, therefore,'* says Proclus, "consider him as simply speaking of scientific truth, but of that which is intelligible, or which, in other words, subsists according to a superessential characteristic. For the whole of our life is an exercise to the vision of this; and the wandering through dialectic hastens to that as its port. Hence Plato in a wonderful manner uses the word dio\l>e(Tdai, to look through: for souls obtain the vision of intelligibles through many media.'* That the dialectic method, however, may become conspicuous to the reader, the two following specimens of it are subjoined from the above-mentioned admirable Commentary of Proclus. The fii'st of these is an investigation of the four and twenty modes in providence. If then providence is, there will follow to itself with respect to itself, the beneficent, the infinitely powerful, the efficacious; but there will not follow, the subversion of itself, the privation of counsel, the unwilling. That which follows and does not follow is, that it is one and not one. There will follow to itself with respect to other things, to govern them,- to preserve every thing, to possess the beginning and the end of all things, and to bound the whole of sensibles. That which does not follow is, to injure the objects of its providential care, to supply that which is contrary to expectation, to be the cause of disorder. There will follow and not follow, the being present to all things, and an exemption from them; the knowing, and not knowing 336 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
them. For it knows them in a different manner, and not with powers co-ordinate to the things known. There will follow to other things with respect to themselves, to suffer nothing casually from each other, and that nothing will be [really] injured by any thing. There will not follow, that any thing pertaining to them will be from fortune, and the being unco-ordinated with each other. There will follow and not follow, that all things are good; for this will partly pertain to them, and partly not. To other things with respect to it there will follow, to be suspended from it, on all sides to be guarded and benefited by it. There will not follow, an opposition to it, and the possibility of escaping it. For there is nothing so small that it can be concealed from it^ nor so elevated that it cannot be vanquished by it. There will follow and not follow, that every thing will participate of provi- dence. For in one respect they partake of it, and in another not of it, but of the goods which are imparted to every thing from it.
But let providence not have a subsistence, again there will follow to itself with respect to itself the imperfect, the unprolific, the inefficacious, a subsistence for itself alone. There will not follow, the unenvying, the transcendently full, the sufficient, the assiduous. There will follow, and not follow, the unsolicitous, and the undisturbed. For in one respect these will be present with that which does not providentially energize, and in another respect will not, in consequence of secondary natures not being governed by it. But it is evident that there will follow to itself with respect to other things, the unmingled, the privation of communion with all things, the not knowing any thing. There will not follow, the assimilating other things to itself, and the imparting to all things the good that is fit. There will follow and not follow, the being desirable to other things; for this in a certain respect is possible and not possible. For if it should be said, that through a tran- scendency exempt from all things, it does not providentially energize, nothing hinders but that it may be an object of desire to all secondary natures; but yet, considered as deprived of this power, it will not be desirable. To other things with respect to themselves there will foUow, the unadorned, the casual, the in- definite in passivity, the reception of many things adventitious in their nature, the being carried in a confused and disordered manner. There will not follow, an allotment with respect to one ADDITIONAL NOTES. 337 thing, a distribution according to desert, and a subsistence ac- cording to intellect. There will follow and not follow, the being good. For so far as thej are beings, thej must necessarily be good; and yet, providence not having a subsistence, it cannot be said whence thej possess good. But to other things with respect to providence there will follow, the not being passive to it, and the being unco-ordinated with respect to it. There will not follow, the being measured and bounded by it. There will follow and not follow, the being ignorant of it. For it is necessary they should know that it is not, if it is not; and it is also necessary they should not know it; for there is nothing common to them with respect to providence.
In the next place, let it.be proposed to consider the conse- quences of admitting or denying the perpetual existence of soul.
If then soul always is, the consequences to itself with respect to itself, are, the self-motive, the self- vital, and the self-subsistent. But the things which do not follow to itself with respect to itself, are, the destruction of itself, the being perfectly ignorant, and knowing nothing of itself. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, the impartible and the partible (for in a certain respect it is partible, and in a certain respect impartible), per- petuity -and non-perpetuity of being. For so far as it communi- cates with intellect, it is eternal; but so far as it verges to a corporeal nature, it is mutable.
Again, if soul is, the consequences to itself with respect to other things, i,€, bodies, are communication of motion, the con- necting of bodies, as long as it is present with them, together with dominion over bodies, according to nature. That which does not follow, is to move externally. For it is the property of animated bodies to be moved inwardly; and to be the cause of rest and immutability to bodies. The consequences which follow and do not follow are to be present with bodies, and yet to be present separate from them. For soul is present with them by its pro- vidential energies, but is exempt from them by its essence, because this is incorporeal. And this is the first hexad.
The second hexad is as follows: If soul is, the consequence to other things, i.e. bodies, with respect to themselves, is sympathy; for according to a vivific cause, bodies sympathize with each other. But that which does not follow, is the non-sensitive. For in consequence of there being such a thing as soul, all things z 338 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
must necessarily be sensitiye; some things peculiarly so, and others as parts of the whole. The consequences which follow and do not follow to bodies with respect to themselves are, that in a certain respect they move themselves, through being ani- mated, and in a certain respect do not move themselves; for there are many modes of self-motion.
Again, if soul is, the consequences to bodies with respect to soul, are, to be moved internally and vivified by soul, to be pre- served and connected through it, and to be entirely suspended from it. The consequences which do not follow are, to be dissi- pated by soul, and to be filled from it with a privation of life; finr bodies receive from soul, life and connection. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, that bodies participate, and do not participate of soul. For so far as soul is present with bodies, so far they may be said to participate of soul; but so far as it is separate from them, so far they do not participate of soul. And this forms the second hexad.
The third hexad is as follows: If soul is not, the consequences to itself with respect to itself are, the non-vital, the unessential, and the non-intellectual; for not having any subsistence, it has neither essence,^ nor life, nor intellect. The consequences which do not follow are, the ability to preserve itself, to give subsistence to, and be motive of itself, with every thing else of this kind. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, the unknown and the irrational. For not having a subsistence, it is in a certain respect unknown and irrational with respect to itself, as neither reasoning nor having any knowledge of itself; but in another respect, it is neither irrational nor unknown, if it is con- sidered as a certain nature, which is not rational, nor endued with knowledge.
Again, if soul is not, the consequences which follow to itself with respect to bodies are, to be unprolific of them, to be un- mingled with, and to employ no providential energies about them. The consequences which do not follow are, to move, vivify, and connect bodies. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, that it is different from bodies, and that it does not ^ I.e. Not being soul, it has not the essence of soul; but this does not prevent it from being something else. For the hypothesis is, if soul is not, which is equivalent to the assertion that if a thing is not soul, it is something else.
ADDITIONAL NOTES. 339 communicate with them. For this in a certain respect is true, and not true, if that which is not soul is considered as havinnr indeed a being, but unconnected with soul. For thus it is different from bodies, since these are perpetually connected with soul: and again, it is not different from bodies, so far as it has no subsistence, and is not. And this forms the third hexad.
In the fourth place then, if soul is not, the consequences to bodies with respect to themselves are, the immovable, privation of difference according to life, and the privation of sympathy with each other. The consequences which do not follow are, a sensible knowledge of each other, and to be moved from them- selves. That which foUows and does not follow is, to be passive to each other. For in one respect they would be passive, and in another not; since they would be alone corporeally and not vitally passive.
Again, if soul is not, the consequences to other things with respect to it are, not to be taken care of, not to be moved by soul. The consequences which do not follow are, to be vivified and connected by soul. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, to be assimilated and not assimilated to soul. For so far as soul having no subsistence, neither will bodies sub- sist, so far they will be assimilated to soul; for they will suffer the same with it; but so far as it is impossible for that which is not to be similar to any thing, so far bodies will have no simili- tude to soul. And this forms the fourth and last hexad.
Hence we conclude, that soul is the cause of life, sympathy and motion to bodies; and in short, of their being and preserva- tion. For soul subsisting, these are at the same time intro- duced: but not subsisting, they are at the same time taken away.
P. 122. Note. Hence there is something even beyond the one, — The most sublime of the arcane dogmas of the Platonic Theology is this, that the ineffable principle of things is some thing even beyond the one, as is demonstrated by Proclus in his second book " On the Theology of Plato," and particularly by Damascius in his MS. treatise irepi apyu,v, "On Principles." See my translation of the former of these works, and of an extract from the latter in the Additional Notes at the end of the third Volume of my Plato, and in my "Dissertation on the 340 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
Philosophy of Aristotle." From this extract, the following observations are selected. '* The one is not (he one as that which is smallest, but it is the one as all things. For bj its own sim- plicity it accedes to all things, and makes all things to be one. Hence all things proceed from it, because it is itself all things prior to all. And as that which has an united subsistence is prior to things which are separated from each other, so the one is many prior to the many. All things, therefore, are from the one, and with reference to the one, as we are accustomed to say. If then according to a more usual manner of speaking, we call things which consist in multitude and separation all things, we must admit that the united, and in a still greater degree the one, are the principles of these. But if we consider these two as all things, and assume them in conjunction with all other things, according to habitude and co-ordination with them, we must then investigate another principle prior to all things, which it is no longer proper to consider in any way as all things, nor to co- arrange with its progeny. For if some one should say that the one, though it is all things which have in any respect a subsbtence, yet is one prior to all things, and is more one than all things; since it is one by itself, but all things as the cause of all, and according to a co-ordination with all things; — if this should be said, the one will thus be doubled, and we ourselves shall become doubled, and multiplied about its simplicity. For, by being the one it is all things after the most simple manner. At the same time also, though this should be said, it is necessary that the principle of all things should be exempt from all things, and con- sequently that it should be exempt from the most simple allness, and from a simplicity absorbing all things, such as is that of the one. Our soul, therefore, prophesies that the principle which is beyond all things that can in any respect be conceived, is unco- ordinated with all things. Neither, therefore, must it be called principle nor cause, nor that which is first nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no means, therefore, must we cele- brate it as all things, nor, in short, is it to be celebrated, or recalled into memory. We may also add, that the one is the summit of the many, as the cause of the things proceeding from it: and that we form a conception of the one according to a purified suspicion extended to that which is most simple and most comprehensive. But that which is most venerable must ADDITIONAL NOTES. 341