For nothing is omitted, which a beautiful and natural image can possibly possess; since it was indeed necessary that this imitation should exist, but yet that it should not be an imitation resulting from the discursive energy of reason, and an artificial care. For it was not possible that 58 the intelligible Bhould be the laat of things; since ii neceBSfiry that the energy of it should be twofold, or deed abiding in itself, but the other proceeding into s thing else. Hence it wae necessary that there shoul be something posterior to it. For that alone which i the most powerless of all things, has nothing of itse which proceeds downwards. But an admirable flourishes in intelligibles, so that this power perpetual fabricates.
If, however, there is another [sensible] world 1 than this, what is it? But if it is necessary that i world should exist, and there is no other, it is this v which preserves the imitation of the intelligible univers Tor the whole earth indeed, is full of v and of immortal beings; and all things are replete w these, as far as to the heavens. And with respect t stars, both those which are in the inferior spheres, and tl which are in the highest orb, what r why they are not Gods, since they are moved in order, i revolve with such beautiful bodies? Why should they no( possess virtue, or wliat can hinder them from obtaining H For those things have no plaee there, which are the causes of evils here; nor is that evil of body there, which here is disturbed and disturbs. What, likewise, prevents celestial natures from possessing intellectual energy, since they are iilwaya at leisure, and from receiving in their intellect divinity, and the other intelligible G-ods. But to assert that our wisdom is more excellent than theirs, will be said by no one who is not insane; since if souls have descended hither, through being compelled by the soul of the world, how since they suffer compulsion are they better than that soul? For in souls, that which has dominion is more ' It appenni from the version of Ficinns, that oil is here wfuiting ia the original. And indeed, the nense requires it ahonld be inserted.
AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. 59 excellent. And if souls descended hither voluntarily, why do you blame this sensible region, into which you willingly came? Especially since you may be liberated from it, if it is not agreeable to you to stay. If, however, this universe is a place of such a kind, that it is possible to obtain wisdom in it, and while dwelling here to live according to a similitude of intelligibles, does not this testify that sensible are suspended from intelligible forms?
IX. If, however, some one should blame wealth and poverty, and the inequality in the dispensation of every thing of this kind, in the first place, such a one is ignorant that the worthy man does not seek for equality in such like particulars; nor ^ of opinion that those who possess many things, have more [of good;] nor that rulers are better than private individuals, but suffers others to make such things as these the objects of their pursuit. He also knows that the present life is twofold, the one being that of worthy men, but the other that of the multitude. And that the life of worthy men tends to the summit, and that which is on high; but that the life which is merely human is again twofold, the one kind being mindful of virtue, and participating of a certain good, but the other pertaining to the vile rabble and to artificers, who administer to the necessities of more worthy men. But if one man slays another, or is vanquished by pleasure, through imbecility of mind, what is there wonderful in this, since the guilt is not in intellect, but in souls that are of a puerile nature? And if this should happen to be an exercise of the victors and the vanquished, how is it possible that this also should not subsist rightly? But if you should be injured, what dreadful thing is there in this to an immortal nature? And if you kill another [instead of being killed yourself,] you have what you wish. If, however, you still blame the administration of things, there is no necessity for you to continue any longer in life. But it is acknowledged 60 SELECT WOliKS OF PIOTIKUS.
that there are judicial deciaions here, and puniahmenl How, therefore, is it right to blame a city for distributi to eTerj- one according' to hla deeert, eiiice virtue is honoured in it, and vice has its appropriate disgrace? There are, likewise, in the world, not only statues of the Gods, but the Gods themselves, beholding from on high, who easily, as it is said, escape the accusations of men, since they conduct all things in order from the beginning U> the end, and distribute an appropriate allotment to every one, conformable to the mutations of lives, and to actions in a pre-existent state; of which he who is igno- rant, is of all men the most rash and rustic in divine con- cerns. It is requisite, however, tlaat, you should endeavour to become a most excellent character, and not think that you alone are able to become so; for thus you will not yet be most excellent. But you ought to be persuaded that there are other transcendently good men. and also good dwmons; and much more Gods, who dwell in this world, and look to that which is intelligible; and especially that there is that most blessed soul the leader and ruler of this universe. From hence alto, it m proper that you should cele- brate the intelligible Gods; and besides all these, the great king which is there, and should demonstrate that the magni- tude of his nature espeeittlh) consists in the multitude of Qods. For it ia the province of those who know the power of Qod, not to contract this power into one, bitt to show that the ampUiude of divinity is as great as he himself has demon- siraied it to be; since remmning thai which he is, he has pro- duced many Qods, all of whom are suspended from, and subsist Ihro^igh atid by him. This world, likewise, is throitgh him, nnd wholly looks to his divinity, as does also each of the Gods, who prophetically anjiounce to men what they there heJuAd, and by oracles unfold their will.
If, however, the Gods that proceed from, are not the same with the first God, this very thing also is according AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. 61 to nature. But if you wish to despise superior beings, and arrogantly extol yourself as not inferior to them, in the first place [it should be remembered,] that by how much more excellent any one is, by so much the more is he bene- volently disposed towards all other beings, and towards mankind. And in the next place, it is proper to have a moderate conception of our own dignity, and unaccom- panied with any rusticity: exalting ourselves only so far as our nature is able to ascend; conceiving that there is also a place with divinity for others, as well as for our- selves, and not, as if flying in a dream, an^ange ourselves alone immediately after the highest God; and thus deprive ourselves of that power by which it is possible for the soul of.man to become a God. But this is possible so far as intellect is the leader of the soul. To attempt, however, to pass beyond intellect, is to fall from intellect. But stupid men are persuaded when they suddenly hear such sounds as these: " You are better, not only than all other men, hut also than the Gods.^' For there is much arrogance among men [of the present time\ And he who prior to this was humble and modest, and a man of no consequence, becomes exalted beyond measure when he is told, " You are the son of God, but other men whom you formerly admired, are not the sons of God; as neither are those beings which msn honour conformably to the rites of their ancestors. It may be shown, however, without any labour, that you are more excellent than the heavens themselves" ^ Others, also, ^ Of this most stupid and arrogant opinion was the slashing Dr. Bentley, as Pope calls him, as is evident from the foUomng extract: "Nor do we count it any absurdity, that such a vast and immense universe should be made for the sole use of such mean and unworthy creatures as the children of men. For if we con- sider the dignity of an intelligent being, and put that in the scales against brute inanimate matter, we may affirm, without over- valuing human nature, that the soul of one virtuous and reli- 62 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
vociferate the same things. Just as if some one in the company of many persons who knew not how to numerate, should hear it said that he was a thousand cubits in height. If, therefore, he should think himself so tall as this, but should hear that other men were five cubits in height, he would only have a confused imagination that a thousand was a great number.
Farther still, they acknowledge that the providence of G-od is attentive to human concerns. Why, therefore, does he neglect the whole world, of which we are a part? If it is because he is not at leisure to look to it, neither there- fore is it lawful for him to survey that which is inferior and us. Why also, while he surveys us, does he not behold that which is external; and thus look to the world in which we are contained? But if he does not look to that which is external, in order that he may not see the world, neither will he behold us. Divinity, however, knows the order of the world, and the manner in which men who are contained in it subsist. Those, also, who are dear to divinity, bear mildly whatever happens to them from the world, if any thing necessarily befalls them from the motion of all things. For it is not proper to look to what is pleasing to an individual, but we should direct our attention to the universe, and honour every one according to his desert; hastening to that goal to which all things that are able hasten, and by the attainment of which they become blessed; some things as far as they have ability obtaining an allotment adapted to their nature. Nor should any man ascribe this ability to himself alone. For it does not follow that a man possesses what he pretends to possess; since many assert they possess that of which they know they are destitute, and also fancy they have a gious man, is of greater worth and excellency than the sim and his planets, and all the stars in the world." See Bentley's 8th Sermon at Boyle's Lectures.
AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. 63 thing when they have it not, and that they alone are the possessors of that which they alone do not possess.
X. He, therefore, who investigates many other par- ticulars, or rather every particular respecting their opinions, will be able to show copiously what the nature of them is. We, indeed, are ashamed of certain of our friends,^ who before they were intimate with us were conversant with these opinions, and who still, I know not how, persevere in them, and endeavour to render them credible. We, however, speak to those with whom we are acquainted, and not to the many who are auditors of these men. For we shall effect nothing by endeavouring to persuade them not to be disturbed by the arguments of the Gnostics, which are not accompanied with demonstrations; (for how is it possible they. should?) but are the assertions of arrogant men. For there is another mode of properly confuting those who dare to reprehend the doctrines of ancient and divine men, and a mode which adheres to the truth. We shall, therefore, dismiss the enquiry how they are to be persuaded. For those who accurately under- stand what has now been said, will know what the nature is of every other particular. We shall dismiss, however, the consideration of that assertion which surpasses every thing in absurdity, if it is requisite to call it an absurdity, viz. that soul and a certain wisdom verged downward, whether soul was the first that began to verge, or wisdom was the cause of this tendency to an inferior condition, or both had the same intention. They add, that other souls and the members of wisdom descended at the same time, and entered bodies, such for instance as those of men. They say, however, that the soul for the sake of which other souls descended, did not descend, as if it did not verge downward, but that it only illuminated the dark- ^ Plotinus, I suppose, alludes here to Origen the Christian father, among others, who had formerly been one of his disciples.
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ness; and that afterwards an image was from thence pro- duced in matter. Again, also, after this fashioning an image of an image, they assert that it pervades through matter or materiality, or whatever else they may please to call it; for they call this by one name, and that by another, devising many appellations for the purpose of rendering what they say obscure. And thus they generate what is denominated by them the demiurgus. Making the world, likewise, to revolt from the mother, they say that it proceeds from the demiurgus as far as to the last of images.^ XI. In the first place, therefore, if this soul did not descend, but illuminated the darkness, how can it be rightly said to have verged downward? For it is not proper to say that it now verged, because something flowed from it such as light; unless one thing belonging to it was situated in the region beneath, but another proceeded locally to this region, and becoming near to it, illuminated it. But if this soul illuminated, abiding in itself, and not at all operating for this purpose, why did this soul alone illuminate, and not those natures also which are more powerful than it in the order of beings? If, however, they say that this soul, in consequence of forming a rational conception of the world, illuminated it from the discursive energy of reason, why did it not at one and the same time illuminate and make the world, but instead of this waited for the generation of images? In the next place, this rational conception of the world, which is called by them a foreign land, and which was produced as they say by greater causes, did not occasion the makers of it to ^ After this in the original, the words Via <T<}>6dpa XoidopriarjTai 6 TouTo ypdxj/ag follow, i.e. " in order that he who writes this may be more vehemently reprehended." But as I do not see what con- nection they have with the words immediately preceding them, I have not inserted them in the translation.
AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. 66 verge downward. Besides, how did it happen that matter being illuminated, made psychical images, but not the nature of bodies P For the image of soul, would not be at all in want of darkness or matter; but that which was generated would when generated follow its maker, and be suspended from him. Again, whether is this illumination from a reasoning process, essence, or as they say, a concep- tion? For if it is essence, what is the difference between it, and that from which it proceeds? But if it is another species of soul, and this rational, perhaps it is vegetable and generative. If, however, this be the case, how will it any longer be true that it made the world in order that it might be honoured for so doing; and how did it make it through arrogance and audacity, and in short, through imagination? And still more absurd is it, that it should have made the world through a reasoning process. Why, also, was it requisite, that the fabricator of the world should have made it from matter and an image? But if this illumination is a conception, in the first place it must be shown whence the name derives its origin; and in the next place how it produces, unless it imparts to the con- ception a fabricative power. But how can there be produc- tion with a fiction? They will say, that this thing is first, and another is posterior to it. This, however, is asserted without any authority. Why, also, was fire the first thing produced [and afterwards other things]?
XII. After what manner, likewise, did this image when just produced attempt to fabricate? Was it through a recollection of what it previously knew? But in short it had not then an existence, neither itself, nor the mother which they assign to it, in order that it might know this. In the next place, is it not wonderful, since they came into this world, not as images of souls, but as true souls, that scarcely one or two of them being raised from the world, and recovering their recollection, have been able to rememp 66 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
ber something of what they formerly saw; and jet this image, as soon as it was generated, formed a conception, though as they say, obscurely, of supernal natures? Or that this should have been the case with the mother of it. who is a material image; and that it should not only have formed a conception of these natures, and of both this and the intelligible world, but should also have learned what the things are from which the sensible universe was gene- rated? Whence did it conceive that fire should first be produced, and think that this was necessary? For why did it not conceive this of something else? But if it was able to produce fire from the conception of it, why did it not produce the world from a conception of the world? For it is in a similar manner requisite, that the production of the world should be simultaneous with the conception of it. For both fire and the world were comprehended in the conception of them; since this image fabricated entirely in a more physical way, and not like the arts. For the arts are posterior both to nature and the world. And even now, in the individuals which are generated by natures, fire is not first produced, afterwards each par- ticular, and in the next place the mixture of these, but the enclosure and circumscription of the whole animal, im- pressed in the menstrual effluxions. Why, therefore, might not matter be there circumscribed in the impression of the world, in which impression, earth and fire and the rest of things were comprehended? But perhaps they would thus have made the world, in consequence of employing a more true soul. The artificer of the world, however, knew not how to make it in this manner, though he foresaw the definite magnitude of the heavens, the obliquity of the zodiac, the motion of the bodies under it, and [the central position of] the earth; and all this in such a way as to possess the causes through which they thus subsist; though such foreknowledge could not belong to an image, AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. 67 but entirely proceeded from a power derived from the best of things, and which they also though unwillingly acknow- ledge. For the illumination diffused through the dark- ness, compels them to assent to the true causes of the world. For why was it requisite to illuminate, if it was not entirely necessary? For this necessity was either according to nature, or preternatural. And if, indeed, it was according to nature, this illumination always existed; but if it was preternatural, then among supernal beings that which is irregular had a subsistence, and evils existed prior to this world. Hence, this world is not the cause of evil, but supernal beings are the causes of evils to the world. And evil to the soul is not from the universe, but the evils that are here are derived from soul. And thus by a reasoning process we are led to refer the world to the first of things. But if matter also is the cause of evil, whence does it appear that it is so? For soul verging downward, saw, as they say, the darkness, and illuminated it. Whence, therefore, did the darkness originate? For if they say that soul verging downward produced it, then it will follow that the darkness did not exist prior to this downward tendency of the soul. Nor will the darkness itself be the cause of this tendency, but the nature of soul. This, however, is the same thing as to attribute the cause to precedaneous necessities. So that the cause is from the first of beings.
Xni. He therefore who blames the nature of the world, does not know what he does, nor whither this audacity of his tends. This, however, arises from the Gnostics not knowing the successive order of things, viz. of first, second, and third natures, this order always extending itseK as far as to the last of things, and from not considering that subordinate beings ought not to revile such as are:first, but should mildly yield to the nature of all things; and that they should betake themselves to the first of beings.
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abandoning the tragic fears, whicli they fancy are pro- duced from the spheres of the world, all which are the causes of bland effects. For what do they contain of a terrible nature, with which those that are unskilled in arguments, and such as are strangers to erudite and elegant knowledge, are terrified? For though the bodies of these spheres are of a fiery ^ characteristic, yet it is not proper to be afraid of them, since they subsist with com- mensuration both to the universe and to the earth. But they ought to look to ^ the souls of these spheres, by whom they imagine themselves to be considered as beings of a very honourable nature, though their bodies transcendently surpass ours both in magnitude and beauty, and contribute to and co-operate with natural effects. For otherwise sub- ordinate beings would not be generated, as long as the first of things subsist. These spheres also give completion to the universe, of which they are likewise mighty parts. If men, however, possess something honourable beyond other animals, much more do the starry spheres, which do not exist in the universe for tyrannical purposes, but impart to it ornament and order. But with respect to those things which are said to be effected by them, these are to be considered as signs of future events; and that things which are generated are produced accompanied with different fortunes. For it is not possible that the same things should happen to each individual, since they are much distant from each other, in the times of their genera- tion, the places in which they reside, and in the dispositions of the soul. Nor again, is it fit to require that all things ^ The fire of which the heavenly bodies consists is unbuming and innoxious, perpetually shining, as Proclus says in the "Timseus," with vivific heat, illuminative power, purity, and transparent light.
* i^or £1 dk rag rj/vxag here, it is necessary to read elg 6k Tag AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. 69 should be [perfectly] good, nor, because this is impossible, rashly to blame [the order of the universe].^ Nor is it proper to think that these inferior differ in no respect from superior natures, or to conceive that to be evil which is more defective with respect to the possession of wisdom, and is less good, and thus always considering a thing to be evil in proportion as it is more inconsiderable. Just as if some one should say that nature is evil, because it is not sense. And that which is sensitive is evil, because it is not reason. For those who thus think must be com- pelled to assert that evil also subsists in the intelligible world. For there, likewise, soul is inferior to intellect, and intellect to something else [or the good],