XTV. After another manner, also, they especially make supernal natures not to be incorruptible. For when they write incantations, and utter them as to the stars, not only to [the bodies* and] souls of these, but also to things superior to soul, what do they effect? They answer, charms, allurements, and persuasions, so that the stars hear the words addressed to them, and are drawn down; if any one of us knows how in a more artificial manner to utter these incantations, sounds, aspirations of the voice, and hissings, and such other particulars as in their writings are said to possess a magical power. If, however, they are not willing to assert this, but that sounds possess certain incorporeal powers, it will follow that while they wish to render their assertions more venerable, they ignorantly subvert their renown. They likewise pretend that they can expel disease. And if, indeed, they say that they ^ The words rnv ra^iv rov iravroQ are oinitte<l in the original; but both the sense, and the version of Ficinus, require they should be inserted.
^ Instead of oh fiovov wpbg rrjv yj^vx^jv in the original, from the version of Ficinus, it is necessary to read, ou ^ovov ttj&oc rd (Tiofiara aXXa Kal rrjv yl/vxH^* ?0 SICLKCT WORKS UF PLOTINUS.
] efEMct tbia by t«m|X)r»uee aarl an orderly mode of life, apeak rightly, and conformably to philoaopliera. But when they asaert that diseases are dtemons, and that they are able to expel these by words, and proclaim that they poasess thia ability, they may appear to the multitude to be more venerable, who admire the powers of magiciana; but they will not persuade intelligent men that diseases have not their (^uses either from labours, or satiety, or indigence, or putrefaction, and in short from mutations which either have an e£t<.>ma] or internal origin. This, however, ia manifest from the cure of diseaaes. For disease is deduced downward, so as to pass away exter- nally, either through a flus of the belly, or the operation of medicine. Disease, also, ia uured by letting of bloodi and fasting. Perhaps, however, [tbey will say] that the dtemon is then hungry, aud the medicine causes him to wast« away; but that sometimes health is suddenly ob- tained, through the dsmon departing, or remaining within the body. But if this is effected while the dtemon still remains within, why, while he ia within, is the person no longer diseased? And if be departs, what is the cause of his departure? Tor what did he suffer? Is it because he was nourished by the disease r The disease, therefore, was something different from the dtemon. In the next place, if the dtemon enters without any cause, why is not the body always diseased? But if he enters when the cause of the disease is present, why is the dsemon necessary in order to the body becoming diseased? For the cause is sufficient to produce the fever. At the same time, how- ever, it is ridiculous, that as soon as the cause of the diseaae exists, the dtemon should immediately be present, as if subsisting in conjunction with the cause. The manner, however, in which these things are asserted by the Gnostics, and on what accorint is evident; since for the sake of this, no less than of other things, we have AHAINST THE fJSOSTICS. 71 mentioiied these daemons. Other particulars, however, we shaD leave to the consideration of the reader. And thig muet every where he congidered, that he who pUTSueu our form af philosophy, will, besides all other goods, genuiTiely exhibit simple and venerable mwnners, in conjuwdion with the pos- session of wisdom, and will not endeavow to become insolent and proud; but mUl possess eonfidenee accompanied with reason, much security and oaution, and great circwmspection.' XT. What these aaaertions, however, Effect in the ioiils uf those that hear them, persuading them to despiee the world, and the things that are in it, ought not by any means lo be concealed from us. For there are two secta of philo- sophers with respect to the attainment of the end of life, one of which places the pleasure of the body as the end; but the other chooses the beautiful and virtue, the desire of which is derived and Buapeaded from God. The manner, however, in which this is aceomphshed, must be elsewhere discuaaed. And Epicurus, indeed, taking away providenci', exhorts U8 to pursue pleasure aud delight, as the only things which then remain. But the doctrine of the G-nostica, as still more juvenile than this, blames the domination of providence, and providence itself, despises all human laws, and virtue which has existed in every age, and considers temperance as ridiculous, in order that nothing beautiful and good may be seen to subsist among men. Together with temperance also it subverts justice which is uonnascent with it iu manners, and which derives its perfection from reason and exercise; and in short, it subverts every thing by which a man may become a worthy character. Hence, nothing else ia left for them to puraue but pleasure, and their own concerns and utility, and not that which is common to other men; unless some one among ' There are fonr lines more iti tiiis Beoticm in the nrJKii'al; but the moaniiig of them Ik en very obscure, that I have not attempted tn traaalate them.
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them happens to be superior to these assertions. For none of the above-mentioned particulars are considered as beautiful by them, but something else whatever it may be which they pursue; though they ought to endeavour to correct those with whom they are well acquainted, applying themselves from a divine nature to human concerns. For it is the province of this nature which despises the pleasure of the body, to know what is beautiful and good. But those who are destitute of virtue, are not at all excited to supernal natures. This is testified by their never saying any thing about virtue, and by their entirely omitting the discussion of things pertaining to it. Nor do they say what virtue is, or how many virtues there are, or direct their attention to the numerous and beautiful assertions which may be surveyed in the writings of the ancients, or to the means of acquiring and possessing virtue, and of cultivating and purifying the soul. For it is to no purpose to say, looJc to God, unless you also teach how we are to look to him. For what hinders, some one may say, but that a man may look to God who does not abstain from any one pleasure, and who suffers his anger to be without any restraint; such a one recollecting indeed the name of God, but being held in bondage by all the passions, and not at all endeavouring to expel them? Virtue, therefore, indeed proceeding to the end [i.e. to its perfection,^ and being ingenerated in the soul in conjunction with wisdom, will present God to the view. But to speaJe of God without true virtue, is to utter nothing but a name.
XVI. Again, to despise the world, and the Gods, and other beautiful natures that are contained in it, is not to becoine a good man. For, every bad mxin will in the first place despise the Gods; and no one is completely bad till he does despise them. Hence, if he is not bad in every thing else, from this very thing he will become so. For the honour which the Gnostics say is paid by them to the intelligible Gods, is AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. 73 utterly incongruous. For he who loves any thing ^ is delighted with every thing which is allied to the object of his love. For you also love the children of the father whom you love. But every soul is the daughter of the father of the universe. And the souls in the mundane spheres, are intellectual, and good, and are united to intelligible essences much more than ours. For how could this world be separated from the intelligible world; or the Q-ods in it, from the intelligible Grods? But these things have been discussed by us before. Now, how- ever, we must say, that those who despise things allied to the intelligible Q-ods, have no knowledge of those Q-ods, except what is merely verbal. For how can it be pious to assert as they do, that providence does not extend to terrene affairs, and to every thing whatever it may be? How also is this consonant to their own doctrine? For they say that divinity providentially attends to them alone. Whether, therefore, did he pay attention to them while they were with supernal natures, or does he also attend to them during their existence here? For if the former, how came they to descend? But if the latter, how is it that they are still upon the earth? How, likewise, does it happen that divinity is not present in the earth? For whence does he know that they are here, and that being here and revolting from him, they have become evil? But if he has a knowledge of souls that have not become evil, he will also know those that have, in order that he may be able to distinguish the former from the latter. He will, therefore, be present to all things, and will be in this world, whatever the mode may be of his subsistence in it. So that the world will participate of him. But if he is absent from the world, he will also be absent from you; and you will not have any thing to say either about him, or the natures posterior to him. But whether a certain providence proceeds from divinity to you, or whatever you may think fit to assert respecting it, the world certainly derives its subsistence 74 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
from thence, and is not, nor ever will be, deserted by him* For the providence of divinity is in a much greater degree extended to wholes than to parts; and the former of these participate of him more abundantly than the latter. And much more does he providentially attend to the soul of the world. This is evident from the existence of the world, and from the wisdom of the mode in which it exists. For who among those that are stujoidly proud, is so orderly and wise as the universe? Indeed, to compare the one with the other is ridiculous, and is attended with great absurdity. Hence, when the comparison is made for any other purpose than that of argument, it is attended with impiety. Nor is it the province of a wise man to investigate things of this kind [as if he was dubious about them], but of one who is mentally blind, who is entirely destitute both of sense and intellect, and who being very remote from a knowledge of the intelligible world does not look to the sensible universe. For what musician is there, who on perceiving the harmony in the intelligible world, is not moved when he hears the harmony arising from sensible sounds? Or who that is skilled in geometry and numbers, when he beholds through his eyes that which is commensurate, analogous and orderly, is not delighted with the view? For those who view through the eyes the productions of art, in pictures, do not behold them in the same way as they do the originals of which they are the resemblances. But the geometrician and arithme- tician, knowing in the sensible object the imitation of that which subsists in intellection, they are as it were agitated, and brought to the recollection of reality. And from this passion also, love is excited. He however, who sees beauty resplendent in the face, tends thither. But his mind must be dull and sluggish in the extreme, and incapable of being incited to any thing else, who on seeing all the beautiful objects in the sensible world, all this symmetry and great arrangement of things, and the form apparent in the stars AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. 75 though so remote, is not from this view mentally agitated, and does not venerate them as admirable productions of still more admirable causes. For he who is not thus affected, will neither direct his attention to the one, nor have a knowledge of the other.
XYII. K also, they are induced to hate the nature of body, because they have heard that Plato greatly blames it as being an impediment to the soul, and says, that the whole of a corporeal nature is inferior to the soul, yet separating this by the discursive energy of reason, it is requisite to survey what remains, viz. the intelligible sphere, comprehending in itself the form of the world, souls in an orderly series without bodies, imparting magni- tude according to the intelligible, and producing it into interval; so that the magnitude of that which is generated, may as much as possible be adequate to the impartibility of the paradigm. For that which is there great in power, is here great in bulk. And whether they wish to under- stand this sphere as circularly moved by a divine power, which contains the beginning, middle, and end of the whole sphere, or whether they consider it as stable, and not yet governing any thing else, they will thus be led to form a proper conception of the soul which governs this universe. They ought likewise to connect body with this soul in such a manner that soul may not be at all passive, but may im- part something to the body, which it is able to receive, because it is not lawful there should be envy in the Grods. They should likewise ascribe such a power to the soul of the world, as is able to render the nature of body which is not of itself beautiful, a participant of beauty as far as it is capable of being adorned; which beauty also excites divine souls. Unless, indeed, the Grnostics should say that their souls are not excited by beauty, and that they do not in a different manner survey deformed and beautiful bodies. If, however, this be the case, neither are they 76 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
differently affected by base and beautiful studies, nor by beautiful disciplines and the contraries to these. Hence neither do they perceive the ti'anscendency of the contemplative energy, nor of G-od himself. For on accoimt of first natures the above-mentioned parti- culars subsist. If, therefore, the latter are not beau- tiful, neither are the former. Hence, the latter are beau- tiful after the former. When, however, they say that they despise the beauty which is here, they would do well to despise the beauty in boys and women, so as not to be vanquished by lust. But it is requisite to know that they ought not to boast, if they despise what is base, but if they despise what they before had acknowledged to be beautiful, and by which they were in a certain respect affected. In the next place it must be observed, that there is not the same beauty in a part and the whole, in all individuals and the imiverse. And in the third place, that there is so great a beauty even in sensibles, and partial natures such as dsemons, as to cause us to admire the maker of these, and to believe that they are derived from him. Hence, when we are not detained by these lower beauties, but proceed from these without reviling them to supernal natures, we then proclaim that the beauty of the latter is immense. And if, indeed, we are inwardly as well as outwardly beautiful, we must say that the one accords with the other.
But if we are internally bad, we ought then to acknowledge that we suffer a diminution in things of a more excellent nature. Nothing, however, that is truly beautiful exter- nally, is internally deformed. For every thing which is externally beautiful, is so in consequence of the domination of inward beauty. But those who are said to be beautiful, and are at the same time internally deformed, have a false external beauty. And if some one should say that he has seen those who are outwardly truly beautiful, but are inwardly base, I am of opinion that he has not seen such AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. 77 persons, but has mistaken others for them; or if he has seen them, their inward deformity has been adventi- tious to them, they being naturally beautiful. For there are many impediments here which prevent our arriving at the end. But what is there to prevent the universe which is externally beautiful from being so internally? Moreover, those to whom nature has not given perfection from the beginning, are perhaps incapable of arriving at the end; so that it is possible for them to become depraved. The universe, however, was never once a child so as to be imperfect; nor does it acquire any thing new ^ by proceeding, and which is added to its body. For whence could it acquire this? Since it already possessed all things. Nor can any addition to the soul of it be devised. But even if some one should grant the G-nostics that there can, yet nothing evil can be added to it.
XYIII. Perhaps, however, they will say that they by their arguments cause those who believe in them, to fly far from, and hate the body, but that our doctrines detain the soul in body. But this is just as if two persons dwell- ing in the same house, one of them should blame the furni- ture and the builder of it, and yet nevertheless stay in it; but the other should not blame either of these, but assert that the builder of it had constructed it in a most artificial manner, and should wait for the time as long as he dwells in it, in which he may be liberated, and may no longer be in want of a house. The former of these, however, is thought to be the wiser of the two, and more prepared to depart, because he knows that the house is composed of inanimate stones and wood, and is very far from being a true edifice, though he is ignorant of the great difference between bearing [properly], and not bearing things of a necessary nature; since he would not be indignant if he * n viov is omitted in the original.
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was moderately pleased with the beauty of the stones. It is necessary, however, that those who have a body should remain in the habitations which are fabricated by a sister beneficent soul, and who possesses an abundant power of fabricating without labour. Indeed the Gnostics think fit to call the vilest men their brethren, hut refuse thus to denominate the sun^ and the other stars; and with an insane month separate the soul of the world from an alliance with ours. While, therefore, we are bad, it is not indeed lawful to conjoin us with supernal natures; but then only this can take place, when we become worthy, since we are not bodies, but souls resident in bodies, and capable of dwell- ing in them in such a manner, as to approximate very nearly to the mode in which the soul of the universe in- habits the whole body of the world. This however, con- sists in being free from impulsion, in not yielding to ex- ternally-acceding pleasures, or visible objects, and in not being disturbed at any severe occurrence. The soul of the world, therefore, is not impelled; for there is not any thing by which it can be. And we dwelling in this region of sense, may indeed by virtue repel the percussions of ex- ternal objects, so as by magnitude and strength of decision, to diminish some of the percussions, and prevent others from taking place. But when we proximately accede to that which cannot be impelled, then we shall imitate the soul of the universe, and the soul of the stars, and becom- ing near through similitude, we shall hasten to be one and the same with them. Then also those things which were the objects of their vision from the first, will be ours, in consequence of being well prepared for this [felicitous event] both by nature and study. The G-nostics, however, will not, by saying that they alone are able to survey "^ivine natures] behold more of them on this account; ' they assert that when they die they shall he body, though this is not permitted to AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. 79 the souls that always adorn the heavens. For they say this through ignorance of the meaning of being out of the body, and of the manner in which the whole soul of the universe pays attention to that which is inanimate. It is possible therefore, not to be a lover of body, to become pure, to despise death, to have a knowledge of more excel- lent natures, and to make them the objects of pursuit; and also not to envy those who are able to pursue them, and always do so, as if they did not. Nor should we be affected in the same manner as those who fancv that the stars do not move, because sense announces to them that thev stand still. For on this account also, the G-nostics fancy, that the nature of the stars does not survey the intelligibles that are as it were external to them, because they them- selves do not see the soul of them externally subsisting.
V.
ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES.
III. vi.
I. If we should say that the senses are not passions, but energies and judgments about the passions, the passions indeed subsisting about something else, as for instance about a body affected in a certain manner, but judgment about the soul; judgment not being passion, for if it were, another judgment would again be necessary, and thus we should be obliged to proceed in an infinite ascent; — if we should thus speak, it would nevertheless be here dubious, whether judgment itself has nothing in it of the subject of its decision, or whether if it has an impression of it, it is not passively affected. At the same time, however, let us speak about these impressions as they are called, and show that the mode of their subsistence is entirelv different from what it is apprehended to be, and is such as that of intel- lections, which being energies are able to know without passivity. And in short, neither our reason, nor our will permits us to subject the soul to such conversions and changes in quality, as are the calef actions and refrigera- tions of bodies. With respect to what is called the passive part of the soul also, it is requisite to see and consider, whether we must admit this likewise to be immutable, or ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAI. NATURES. 81 grant that passivity belongs to this alone. This however, we shall discuss hereafter. But let us now direct our attention to the doubts pertaining to the former particulars. For it is dubious how that part of the soul, whatever it may be, is immutable, which is prior to the passive part, and to sense, since depravity is ingenerated in it, and false opinions and ignorance; and besides these, familiarity and alienation, when it is pleased and pained, is angry and envious, is emulous and desirous; and in short, which is never quiescent, but is moved and changed by every inci- dental circumstance. If, indeed, the soul is body and has magnitude, it is not easy, or rather is wholly impossible to show that it is impassive and immutable in any one of the particulars, which are said to take place about it. But if it is an essence void of magnitude, and it is necessary that the incorruptible should be present with it, we should take care not to ascribe to it passions of this kind, lest we should also ignorantly grant that it is corruptible. Whether, likewise, the essence of it is number or reason, as we say it is, how can passion be ingenerated in number or reason? But we ought rather to think that irrational reasons, and impassive passions are produced in it. And these being transferred to it from bodies, are each of them to be oppositely assumed, and according to analogy, so that the soul [after a manner] possessing these, does not [really] possess them, and being passive to them does not suffer. And it must be considered what the models of such like affections. n. In the first place however, it is requisite to speak of virtue and vice, and to show what then takes place when vice is ^aid to be present with the soul. For we say it is necessary to take away something, as if a certain evil was in the soul, and that virtue should be inserted in it, and it should be adorned and made beautiful, instead of being, as it was before, base and deformed. If therefore we should say that virtue is harmony, but vice dissonance, shall we adduce an opinion G 82 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.