conformable to that of the ancients? For this assertion will in no small degree promote the object of our investi- gation. For if, indeed, virtue consists in the parts of the soul being naturally concordant with each other, but vice, in their not being concordant, nothing adventitious or ex- traneous will take place; but each part will proceed such as it is, into an appropriate order, and being such will not enter into dissonance, like dancers who in dancing do not accord with each other; either one of them singing, when the rest do not sing, or each singing by himself. For it is not only necessary that they should sing together, but that each should sing well with an appropriate music, as far as pertains to his own part of the performance; so that then also in the soul there is harmony, when each part performs that which is adapted to it. It is requisite, however, prior to the harmony, that there should be another virtue of each of the parts, and another vice of each prior to their dissonance with respect to each other. What is it there- fore, from which being present, each part is evil? Is it from vice being present? And again, is each part good through the presence of virtue? Perhaps, therefore, some one may say that ignorance in the reasoning power is the vice of it, this ignorance consisting in the negation of knowledge, and not in the presence of a certain thing. But when false opinions are inherent, which especially produce vice, how is it possible in this case that something should not be ingenerated, and that this part of the soul should not thus be changed in quality? Is not also the irascible part affected in one way when it is timid, and in another when it is brave? And is not the epithymefic ^ part likewise, affected differently when it is intemperate, and when it is temperate? Or may we not say, that when ^ i,e. The part characterized by desire; the whole soul receivin«^ a triple division, into reason, anger, and desire, which last is a tendency to the possession and enjoyment of external good.
ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. 83 each part possessing virtue, energizes according to the essence by which it is characterized, we then say it is obedient to reason? And the reasoning part, indeed, is obedient to intellect, but the other parts to reason. Or shall we say that to be obedient to reason is as it were to see, that which is obedient not being figured, but seeing, and being in energy when it sees; just as sight both when it is in capacity, and when in energy, is the same in essence; but energy is not a change in quality, but at once applies itself to that to which it is essentially adapted, and per- ceives and knows without passivity. The reasoning power also thus subsists with reference to intellect, and thus sees. And the power of intellection is this, not becoming inter- nally, the impressions as it were of a seal, but it possesses, and again does not possess that which it sees. It possesses the spectacle indeed, in consequence of knowing it; but does not possess it, because nothing is impressed in it from the object of vision, like the figure in the wax. It is, how- ever, necessary to recollect, that memory is not a certain repository of impressions, but a power of the soul exciting itself in such a way as to possess that which it had not.
What then, was it not one thing before it thus recollected, and another afterwards when it now recollects? [It was] if you are willing to call it another, and not to say that it is changed in quality; unless some one should assert that a progression from power to energy is a mutation in quality. Nothing however is here added, but that is effected which there was a natural aptitude to effect. For in short, the energies of immaterial natures are not themselves in ener- gizing changed in quality, or they would perish, but they much rather energize by remaining permanent. But to energize with passivity is the province of things which are connected in their energies with matter. If however that which is immaterial is passively affected, it will not be able any where to abide, as in the sight, vision energizing, 84 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS, it is the eye which suffers [and not the energy of seeing]. And opinions are as it were visions. But how is the irascible part timid? And how also does it possess forti- tude? Shall we say it is timid indeed, either because it does not look to reason, or because it looks to depraved reason; or that it is so through a defect of instruments, such as the want or the weakness of corporeal arms, in consequence of which it is either prevented from energizing, or is not moved so as to be as it were incited? But it pos- sesses fortitude, if the contrary takes place; in neither of which cases, there is not any change of quality, or passion. Again, that part of the soul which desires, when it ener- gizes alone, produces what is called intemperance. For [sometimes] it performs all things alone, other things not being present, whose province it is in their turn to have dominion, and to point out to this part [what it ought to do]. In the mean time the power whose province it is to see, performs something else, and not all things; but is elsewhere at leisure, in consequence of seeing as much as possible other things. Perhaps, too, what is called the vice of this part, consists very much in a bad habit of the body; but the virtue of it is a contrary habit; so that no addition is in either case made to the soul.
III. But how is it that familiarities and alienations, pains, anger, and pleasures, desires and fears, are not mutations and passions inherent and exciting? It is neces- sary, therefore, thus to distinguish concerning these. For not to acknowledge that changes in quality are ingenerated in us, and also vehement sensations of these, is the province of one who denies things that are evident. It is requisite, therefore, admitting the subsistence of these, that we should investigate what that is which is changed. For by asserting that these things take place about the soul, we are in danger of falling into the same absurdity as if we should admit that the soul is red, or becomes pale, not ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. 85 considering that these passions are produced indeed on account of the soul, but subsist about another composition [than that of the soul]. And shame, indeed, in the soul, arises from an opinion of baseness; the body (that we may not err in our conceptions) being as it were contained in the soul, and not being the same with that which is inani- mate. The animated body, therefore, when it is moved with facility, undergoes a change in the blood, from the shame which subsists in the soul. And with respect to what is called fear, the principle of it, indeed, is in the soul; but the paleness produced by it, arises from the blood retreating inwardly. In pleasure, also, the sensible diffusion of it subsists about the body; but that which takes place about the soul is no longer passion. The like also must be asserted with respect to pain. For the principle of desire latently subsisting in the soul, that which proceeds from thence is recognized by sense. For when we say that the soul is moved in desires, in reasonings, and in opinions, we do not say that it produces these in consequence of being agitated, but that motions are generated from it; since also, when we assert that life is motion, we do not conceive that it is a change of quality. But the natural energy of each part of the soul, is life not departing from itself. In short, it will be sufficient if we do not admit that energies, lives, and appetites, are mutations in quality; that recollections are not types impressed in the soul; and that imaginations are not configurations described as it were in wax. For every where, in all passions and motions, the soul must be acknowledged to subsist with invariable sameness in its subject and essence; and that virtue and vice are not produced in it after the same manner as black and white, or heat and cold about the body. But it must be admitted that the soul subsists with reference to both these, and in short, about all contraries, according to the above mentioned mode.
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IV. Let us, however, direct our attention to what is called the passive part of the soul; though we have already after a manner spoken concerning this, when we discussed all the l»assions which are produced about the irascible and epithy- metic part, and showed how each of them subsists. Never- theless, it is requisite to discuss it more amply; in the first place assuming what that which is passive in the soul is said to be. It is said, therefore, to be that about which the passions appear to subsist. But these' are things to which pleasure and pain are consequent. Of the passions, however, some originate from opinions, as when some one being of opinion that he shall die, is terrified, or fancying that he shall obtain some good is delighted; the opinion indeed, being in one thing, but the exciting passion in another. But other passions are such as, existing involun- tarily, produce opinion in that which is naturally adapted to opine. And we have already observed that opinion permits the nature which opines to remain immovable. Unexpected fear, however, when it accedes, will be found to originate from opinion, affording as it were a certain perception to the part of the soul which is said to be afraid. For what does this being afraid effect? Perturbation it is said, and astonishment from the expectation of evil. It is evident, however, that the phantasy is in the soul, both the first ^ which we call opinion, and the second which is derived from the first, and is no longer opinion [truly so called,] but is conversant with that which is beneath, being as it were obscure opinion, and an unadvised and rash ^ The phantasy or imagination is the highest of the gnostic irrational powers of the soul. But this in its summit is united to ojnnion, or that gnostic rational power which knows that a thing is, but does not know why it is; and in its other extremity it is conjoined with sense. So far, therefore, as it is united to opinion, it may be said to be the same with it. See my Introduction to, and translation of, Aristotle's treatise **0n the Soul."
ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. 87 imagination, such as the energy which is said to be inherent in nature, according to which it produces every thing without phantasy. But a sensible perturbation from these is produced about the body; viz. a trembling and concus- sion, paleness, and an inability of speaking. For these effects are not in the psychical part; since if they were, we should not say that they are corporeal. For if they per- tained to the soul, that power of it whose province it is to transmit these, would no longer perform its office, in con- sequence of being detained by passions, and departing from itself. This passive part, therefore, of the soul, is not indeed body, but a certain form. Nevertheless, it is in matter, as are also the epithymetic, the nutritive, aug- mentative, and generative powers, the three latter of which are the root and principle of the epithymetic and passive form. It is requisite, however, that no perturbation, or in short passion should be present with any form; but it is necessary that form should remain permanent, and that the matter of it should be conversant with passion, when passion is produced through the presence of the exciting power of form. For the vegetable power does not itself vegetate when it causes other things to vegetate; nor is increased when it increases other things; nor in short when it moves, is moved according to the motion with which it moves, but is either not moved at all, or has another mode of motion or energy. Hence it is necessary that the nature itself of form should be energy; and should produce by being present, just as if harmony should of itself move the chords [of a musical instrument]. The passive part of the soul, therefore, will be indeed the cause of passion, whether the motion is produced by it from the sensitive phantasy, or also without the phantasy. This, likewise, must be considered, whether opinion origi- nating supernally, that which is passive in the soul subsists alone in the form of the harmony; but the motive causes 88 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
are analogous to the musician; and the things which are struck through passion have the relation of chords. For in a musical instrument also, harmony does not suffer, but the chord. And the chord is not moved, though the musician wishes that it should be, unless harmony com- mands it to be moved.
V. Why, then, is it requisite to endeavour to render the soul impassive by means of philosophy, if from the first it is without passivity? Shall we say, it is because a phan- tasm as it were proceeding into it from what is called the passive part, the consequent passion produces a perturba- tion [in this part] and the image of expected evil is con- joined with the perturbation? Iteason, therefore, thinks it fit that a passion of this kind should be extirpated, and that it should not be suffered to be ingenerated, because where it is, the soul is not yet in a good condition. But where it is not ingenerated, there the soul is impassive, the vision which is the cause of the passion about the soul, having no longer an inherent subsistence. Just as if some one wishing to expel the visions of sleep, should recal the dreaming soul to wakefulness; or as if he should say that external spectacles produce the passions, and should assert that these passions belong to the soul. ±5ut what will the purification of the soul be, if it is in no respect defiled? Or in what will the separation of it from the body consist? May we not say that the purification of it will be, to leave it by itself alone, and not suffer it to associate with other things [that are hostile to its nature], nor permit it to look to any thing external; nor again, to have foreign opinions, whatever the mode is, as we have said, of opinions or passions; nor to behold images, nor fabricate passions from them? If, however, it is converted to supernal from inferior objects, is not this a purification and separa- tion of the soul, which in this case is no longer in body, so as to be something belonging to it, but resembles a light ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. 89 not merged in turbid mire, though at the same time that which is merged in it is impassive? But the purification, indeed, of the passive part of the soul, is an excitation from the vision of absurd images. And the separation of it will consist in not verging downward, and in the imagi- nation not being conversant with inferior natures. It will also consist in taking away those things by the ablation of which this part likewise will be separated, when it is not permitted to lie in a spirit turbid from gluttony, lest it should be suffocated in flesh, but when that in which it dwells is attenuated, so that it may be quietly carried in it.
VI. That the intelligible essence, indeed, the whole of which is aranged according to form, is necesarily impassive, has been already shown. Since, however, matter also is something incorporeal, though after another manner [than the intelligible,] concerning this likewise it must be con- sidered after what manner it subsists; whether it is pas- sive, as it is said to be, and in all things mutable, or whether it is necessary to opine that this also is impassive, and if it is so, the mode of its impassivity must be un- folded. In the first place, therefore, this must be assumed by those who speak concerning the nature of it, and who endeavour to show what it is, that the nature, essence, and existence of being, is not such as the multitude conceive it to be. For being which may be so denominated in reality, is truly being; but this is that which is entirely being; and this again is that which in no respect is deficient in existence. But since it is perfectly being, it is not in want of any thing in order that it may be preserved and be, but to other things which appear to be, it is the cause of their apparent existence. If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, it is necessary that it should subsist in life, and in a perfect life; for if it were deficient in this, it would not be essence in a more eminent degree. This, however, 90 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
is intellect and perfect wisdom. Hence it is bounded and definite, and nothing is there in capacity which does not also possess a mighty power; since otherwise it would be deficient. Hence, too, it is eternal, invariably the same, and unreceptive of any thing. For if it should receive any thing, it would receive something besides itself; and this would be non- being. It is necessary, however, that it should be perfectly being. Hence it is requisite it should accede to existence, possessing all things in itself, and being at once all things, and one all, if by these peculiari- ties we define being. But it is necessary that we should thus define it, or intellect and life would not proceed from being, but these would be adventitious to it, though they will not emanate from non-being, and being will be de- prived of life and intellect. That which is truly non- being, therefore, will have these in such a way as it is requisite for them to subsist in less excellent natures, and in things posterior to being. For that which is prior to being, imparts these indeed to it, but is not itself indigent of these. Hence, if being is a thing of this kind, it is necessary that it should neither be a certain body, nor that which is the subject of bodies, but that existence to these should consist in non-being.
It may, however, be said, how is it possible the nature of bodies and matter should not have a [real] being, in which these mountains and rocks exist, the whole solid earth, and all resisting substances? Indeed, things which are struck, confess that their essence subsists by compul- sion. If, therefore, some one should say, how is it possible that things which neither press, nor are impelled, nor resist, and which in short are not visible, viz. soul and in- tellect should be beings, and truly beings, — we reply, that among bodies, earth is most stable, but that which is more movable, is also less ponderous, and of this that which is on high is most movable. And hence, fire flies [as it ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. 91 were] from the nature of body. I am of opinion, however, that things which are more sufficient to themselves, dis- turb others in a less degree, and occasion them less pain. But things which are more ponderous and terrene, be- cause they are in a defective and fallen condition, and are unable to elevate themselves, strike against others, falling on them through imbecility, and oppressing them by their descending and sluggish weight. For dead bodies cause greater molestation ^ when they fall, and strike and injure more vehemently. But animated bodies, as they partici- pate of [real] being, are the more innoxious the more they participate of it. Hence motion, which is a certain life as it were in bodies, and an imitation of life, is in a greater degree present with those things that have less of body, as if a defect of being rendered that with which it is present, more corporeal. From what are called passions, likewise, it may be seen, that what is in a greater body is more passive, earth than other things, and other things according to the same ratio. Foi other things when divided, return again into one, when nothing prevents them. But when a terrene body is divided, the parts always continue separate from each other, as being natu- rally averse to reunion, and by a small impulse are dis- posed to remain as they are impelled, and be corrupted. Hence, that which becomes body in a most eminent degree, as having especially arrived at nonentity, is incapable of recalling itself into one. Ponderous, therefore, and vehe- ment concussions, by which some things act upon others, are attended with ruin. But one debile thing falling on another, possesses with respect to it the same efficacy and power, as '^ nonentity falling on nonentity. And this we think a sufficient refutation of their opinion who placje beings among bodies, and who are induced to do so by the ' For (m^kfmpa it is necessary to read ar)^k(TTepa, ^ wc is omitted in the original.
testimony of impulsions and concuaaious; ajid from 1 jihantasma produced through sense derive their belief < the truth. Such as these are affected in a manner similar to those who are dreaming, and who imagine that what they perceive is true, though it is nothing more than a. dream. For sense is alone the employment of the dor- mant soiil; since as much of the aoul as is merged in hody, so much of it sleeps. But true Tigilance is a true eleva^ tion from, and not in eonjunetion with body. For indeed a resurrection with body, is a trausmigi-atiou from sleep to sleep, [and from dream to dream] like a man passing [in the dark] from bed to bed. But that elevation is entirely true, which wholly risea [from the shadowy essence] of bodies. For these possessing a nature contrary to soul, have also that which is contrary to essence. And this also is testified by their generation, their flowing and cor- ruption; all which are foreign to the nature of real Vn. Let us, however, again return in the first place, to the subject matter, and afterwards to the things which are said to be in matter, from which it will be known that matter itself has no [real] existence, and that it is im- passive. It is therefore incorporeal, since body is posterior to it, and is a composite, and matter in conjunction with another thiug [i.e. with form,] produces body. For thus it is allotted the same appellation according to the incorpo- real, because both being and matter are different from bodies. Since, however, matter is neither soul nor intellect, nor hfe, nor form, nor reason, nor bound; for it ia in- finite; nor power; for what can it effect; but falls off from all these, neither can it rightly receive the appeUation of being. But it may deservedly be called non-being. Yet it is not non-being in the same manner as motion is, or permanency; but it is truly non-being, the image and phantasm of bulk, and the desire of subsistence. And it ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. 93 stands, indeed, but not in that which is permanent, is of itself invisible, and flies from him who wishes to behold it. When, likewise, some one does not see it, then it is pre- sent; but is not perceived by him who strives intently to behold it. Add too, that contraries are always apparent in it; the small and the great, the less and the more, the deficient and the exceeding, being an image neither able to remain, nor yet to fly away. For it has not even power to effect this, as receiving no strength from intellect, but sub- sisting in the defect of all being. Hence it deceives us in whatever it announces of itseK; so that if it should appear to be great, it is small; if more, it is less; and the being which we meet with in the imagination of it, is non-being, and as it were a flying mockery. Hence, also, the things which appear to be ingenerated in it, are mockeries, and images in an image, just as in a mirror, where a thing which is situated in one place appears to be in another. It likewise seems to be full and to be all things, and yet has nothing. But the things which enter into and depart from matter, are imitations and images of [real] beings, flowing about a formless resemblance; and on account of its form- less nature are seen within it. They also appear, indeed, to effect something in it, but effect nothing; for they are vain and debile, and have no resisting power. And since matter, likewise, is void of resistance, they pervade without dividing it, like images in water, or as if some one should send as it were forms into what is called a vacuum. For again, if the things which are beheld in matter were such as those from which they proceeded into it, perhaps a certain power of these might be ascribed to material forms, and matter might be supposed to suffer by them. But now, since the things which are represented are of one kind, and those that are beheld in matter of another, from these also we may learn that the passion of matter is false; that, which is seen in it being false, and in no 94 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
respect possessing any similitude to its maker. Hence, being imbecile and false, and falling into a false receptacle, as in a dream, or in water, or a mirror, it necessarily per- mits matter to be impassive, though in the things which have been just mentioned,^ there is a similitude between the representations in them, and the originals of which they are the resemblances.
Vm. In short, that which suffers ought to be a thing of this kind, so that it may be as it were in the contrary powers and qualities of the things which accede and pro- duce passion. For to the inherent heat the change in quality is from that which refrigerates; and to the in- herent humidity the change is from that which causes dryness. And we say that the subject is changed in quality, when from being cold it becomes hot, or moist from being dry. But what is called the corruption of fire, testifies the truth of this, the mutation being made into another element. For we say that the fire and not the matter is corrupted; so that passions are about that, about which corruption also subsists. For the reception of passion is the path to corruption; and to be cor- rupted pertains to that to which likewise it belongs to suffer. It is not however possible, that matter should be corrupted. For into what, and how can it be cor- rupted? But is not matter [it may be said] co-passive, since qualities in their mixture with each other suffer, and matter receives in itself myriads of heats and colds, and in short infinite qualities, and is distinguished by these, and has them as it were connascent and mingled with each other? For each of these is not separate from the rest, and matter is left in the middle of them. Unless perhaps some one should place it external to them. But everything which is in a subject, is in such a manner