defluous, as gliding away from a foreign nature which it has received, like echo from smooth and equable places, because it does not abide there, though it appears to be there, and to proceed from thence. If, however, matter so participated and received, as some one may think it does, that which proceeds into would be absorbed by it. But now it appears, that it is not absorbed, since matter ^ For TroitfH{» here, it is necessary to read Tropy, See the speech of Diotima in the ** Banquet of Plato."
106 SELECT WORKS OF PL0TINU8.
remains the same, haying received nothing, but impeding progression like some repercussive seat. It is also the* receptacle of forms acceding to, and mingled in it; just as those who are desirous of enkindling a light from the sun, place some smooth substance opposite to it, which thej also fill with water, in order that the flame being impeded by that which is inward, and of a contrary nature, may not pass through, but may stop externally. Matter, therefore, thus becomes the cause of generation, and the forms which consist in it, are constituted after this manner.
XV. In things, therefore, which collect fire from the sun about themselves, as they receive flame from a sensible fire, they become themselves objects of sense. Hence also they are apparent, because the objects are external, suc- cessive and proximate, touch each other, and have two extremities. But the productive principle in matter, has the external after a different manner. For difference of nature is sufficient, not being indigent of a twofold boim- dary; but being much more alienated than every boundary by a diversity ^ of essence which is destitute of all alliance, it possesses a power repugnant to mixture. And this is the cause of its remaining in itself, because neither that which enters into it enjoys it, nor does it enjoy that which enters; just as opinions and imaginations in the soul are not mingled with each other, but each again departs, as being alone that which it is, neither attracting, nor leaving any thing, because it was not mingled, and having the external, not because it is superjacent, and is visibly different from that in which it is, but because reason distinguishes the one from the other. Here, therefore, imagination is as it were an image, (the soul not being an image naturally,) though it appears to be the leader ' For iputrriTi here, it is necessary to read iTtporrjTi.
ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. 107 of many things, and to lead them where it pleases. The soul, nevertheless, uses the imagination as matter, or as that which is analogous to matter. The imagination, how- ever, does not conceal the soul, since the soul bv its energies frequently expels the phantasy; nor would it ever be able to conceal it, though it should be wholly diffused through it, though this by the imagination appears to be sometimes effected. For the soul contains in herself energies and reasons contrary to those of the phantasy by which the acceding [phantasms] are repelled. Matter, however, is much more imbecile than the soul, and con- tains nothing of beings whether true or false, which is properly its own. Neither has it any thing through which it may become apparent, being a solitude of all things. It is, however, the cause to other things of their apparent subsistence; but is not able to say even this of itself, I am here [though I am by no means visible]. And if at any time a certain profound reason discovers where it is concealed among beings, it exclaims that it is something deserted by all beings, and by things which appear to be posterior to beings, that it is likewise attracted to all things, and as it seems follows, and again does not follow them.
XVI. Moreover, a certain reason acceding and extending matter as far as it proceeds into it, causes it to be great, investing it from itself with greatness, which is not in matter. But matter does not through this become quan- tity; for if it did, that which is great in it would be magni- tude. If, therefore, some one takes away this form, the subject no longer is, nor will appear to be great. But if that which is generated was great, man and horse, and together with horse the magnitude of horse which accedes, would depart on the departure of horse. If, however, it should be said, that horse is generated in a certain great bulk and of a certain extent, and that the magnitude 108 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
remains, we reply that it is not the magnitude of the horse, but the magnitude of the bulk which there remains. Nevertheless, if this bulk is fire or earth, on the departure of fire or earth, the magnitude of fire or of earth will also depart. Matter, therefore, will neither enjoy, figure, nor magnitude; for otherwise it would not be something else from fire, but remaining fire, it would not become fire. Hence, matter having now become as we see, as great in extent as the universe, if the heavens should cease to exist and'^all they contain, together with these, all magnitude would likewise depart from matter, and at the same time all other qualities, and matter would be left that which it was before, preserving no one of the things which had a prior subsistence about it. In the natures, however, which suffer by the presence of certain things, something is still left in the recipients, when those things depart; but this is no longer the case with natures that do not suffer. Thus the air which is surrounded with light, retains nothing of the light when it departs. But if some one should wonder how it is possible, that a thing should become great which does not possess magnitude; it may also be doubted how that can become hot which has not heat. For it is not the same thing in matter, to be matter and to be magnitude; since magnitude is immaterial, in the same manner as figure is immaterial. And if we pre- serve matter, we must assert that it is all things by parti- cipation. But magnitude is one of all things. In bodies, therefore, which are composites, there is magnitude to- gether with other things, yet it is not indefinite; since in the definition of body magnitude also is included. But in matter, even indefinite magnitude is not included; for it is not body.
XVIT. Neither, again, will matter be magnitude itself. For magnitude is form, but not the recipient of form; and magnitude subsists by itself. If matter, likewise, cannot ON THE IMPASSIVIXr OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. 109 adapt to itself the imitations of beings/ on this account also it is not magnitude. Since, however, that which is placed in intellect or in soul, wishes to be great, it imparts to those things which by proceeding as it were, endeavour to imitate it, by the desire of, or motion towards it, the ability of impressing the same passion in another thing. That which is great, therefore, running in the progression of the phantasy so as to cause the smallness of matter to run in conjunction with it, occasions matter also to appear great, though it is not filled by the co-extension. For this greatness of matter is falsely great, since by not having the power to be great, and being extended towards magnitude, it becomes amplified by the extension. For since all beings produce in other things, or in another thing the representation of themselves as in mirrors, each of the agents is in a similar manner ^ great; and the universe also is great in this way. The magnitude, there- fore, of each productive principle, as of that of a horse or any thing else concurs with the particular thing to which the productive principle pertains. And every appearance, indeed, of things as in a mirror is great in consequence of being illuminated by greatness itself. Each portion of them, likewise, becomes something great, and all things at once present themselves to the view from every form of which magnitude is one. From each form, also, there is, as it were, an extension to every thing and to all things, and this is to be compelled in form. Power, too, produces as much in bulk as bulk is capable of receiving; so that what is [in reality] nothing, appears to be all things. Hence colour which proceeds from what is not colour, and the quality in sensibles which is derived from what is not quality, have an equivocal appellation from their producing * For avTutv here, it is necessary to read ovriov.
* Instead of u»c aifrb here, it is necessary to read uxraurojg.
110 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
causes. Magnitude, also, proceeds from that which is not magnitude, or from that which is homonymously magnitude; these ^ being surveyed as having a subsistence between matter itself, and form itself. And they become apparent, indeed, because they are derived from form themselves. They have, however, a false subsistence, be- cause that in which they are apparent is not [truly]. But each of them becomes extended into magnitude, being attracted by the power of the things which are seen in matter, and which make for themselves a place. There is, however, an attraction to all things, yet not by violence, because the universe is matter. But each thing attracts according to the power which it possesses; and derives from the representation of magnitude itself, the ability of making matter so great as it appears to be. Hence the magnitude which is here is the phantasm of it which is apparent. Matter, however, being compelled to concur with this attraction, at once imparts itself wholly and every where; for it is the matter of the universe, and not some particular matter. But that which is not of itself some particular thing, may on account of something else become contrary to what it was, and having become con- trary, no longer is [what is was]; since if it were, it would cease to be changed.
XVIII. If some one, therefore, possessing an intellectual conception of magnitude, should have this conception attended with a power not only of subsisting in itself, but also of proceeding as it were externally, and the power should receive a nature not existing in the intellectual per- ceiver, nor having a certain form, nor a certain vestige of magnitude or of any other form, what would he produce through this power? Not a horse, or an ox. For other powers would produce these. Or shall we say, that since ^ viz, ColouTj'quality, and magnitude.
ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. Ill this power proceeds from a great father, nothing else [be- sides matter] is able to receive this magnitude, and that its possession of it will only be imaginary, and not real. Hence, to that which does not so obtain magnitude, as to be in its own nature the great itself, it remains for it to be apparently only as much as possible great. But this is not to be deficient, and not to proceed to many things in many places; but to possess in itself kindred parts, and not to leave any thing destitute of itself. For it is not possible that in a small bulk, there should still be an equal image of magnitude, since it is an image of greatness; but so far as it aspires through its hope, it accedes as far as it is pos- sible for it to accede, and running in conjunction with that which is not able to leave it, it causes that to be great which is not great, yet not so as to appear to be the magnitude which is seen in bulk. At the same time, however, matter preserves its own nature, using this magnitude as a [vestment, through which it ran together with it, when magnitude running became its leader. But if at any time it should divest itself of magnitude, it would again remain the same as it was before in itself; or would be as great as form when present caused it to be. And soul, indeed, possessing the forms of beings, since she is also herself a form, contains all things at once. Since, likewise, each form is at once wholly contained in her, hence perceiving the forms of sensibles as it were converted and acceding to her, she cannot endure to receive them with multitude, but sees them divested of bulk. For she cannot become any thing else than what she is.
Matter, however, having nothing repercussive; for it has no energy; but being a shadow, stays to suffer what- ever the producing cause may effect in it. That 'also which proceeds from the reason that is in soul, has now a vestige of the thing which is about to be effected; just as 112 112 in the ioonic nature of the phantasy, reason which moved, or the motion from reaaoa, is a division into partB^ since if it was one and the same, it would not be moved, but he permanent. Matter, however, is not able to intro- duce at once all things into itself, for if it were able, it would be some one of all things. But since it is necessary that it should receive all things, yet not impartibly, it is requisite that existing as the place of all things, it should proceed to all things, meet with them, and be sulEeient for every interval, because it is not itself comprehended by interval, but is exposed to the reception of it. How does it happen, therefore, that one thing entering into matter, does not impede other things f It is because all things cannot enter together at the same time; for if they could, there would not he anything which is first. But if there is, it is the form of the universe; so that all things are indeed simultaneous, but each has a partial existence. For the matter of the animal nature is distributed in conjunc- tion with the division of the animal into parts. For if this were not the case, nothing would have been produced besides reason.
XIX. The things, therefore, which enter into matter as a mother, neither injure it, nor benefit it. For the im- pulses of these do not pertain to matter, but to each other, because the puwers of these also pertain to contraries, but not to subjects, unless the subjects are considered in con- junction with the impulses. For heat destroys cold, and the black the white; or if they are mingled together, another quality is produced from the mixture. Hence, things which are mingled suffer; but with them, to suffer, is not to be that which they were before. In animated natures, also, the passions indeed, are about tho bodies, the change in quality taking place according to the inherent qualities and powers. But when their state of existence is dissolved, or congregated, or transposed pretematu rally, 1 ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF INCORPOREAL NATURES. 113 then, the passions indeed £tre in the bodies, bilt knowledge is in the sotils that perceive the more vehement passions^ If, however, they do not perceive them, they have.no' knowledge of them, but matter stUl remains. For matter suffers nothing, when cold departs, and heat aQcedes; since neither of these is either friendly or foreign to it. Hence, the appellations of a receptacle and nurse are more appropriate to it [than any other names]. But why is it called a mother? For it does not generate. Those, how- ever, appear to have denominated it a mother, who think that a mother has the relation of matter towards her off- spring, as alone receiving, but imparting nothing to the things begotten; since whatever of body there is in the offspring, is derived from the nutriment. But if the mother imparts any thing to her progeny, it is not so far as she has the relation of matter, but because she is also form. For form alone is prolific, but the other nature is barren. Whence, also, I think the ancient wise men obscurely signifying this in their mysteries, rejpresent the ancient Hermes always ^possessing the organ of genera- tion erect, thus manifesting that it is intelligible reason which generates in the sensible universe. But they indi- cated the unprolific nature of matter which always remains the same, by the barren substances which were placed about it. For they introduce the mother of all things, which they thus proclaim, receiving the principle according to the subject, and they give her this appellation in order to render their meaning manifest, wishing to indicate to those who are desirous of more accurately comprehend- ing the nature of matter, and who do not investigate it superficially, that it is not entirely similar to a mother. By this, indeed, they demonstrate remotely, but at the same time as much as they are able, that matter is un- prolific, and not perfectly feminine; but that it is of a female nature so far as it receives, but not so far as pertains I 114 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINITS, to a generatiye power. For that which has proceeded into matter, is neither feminine, nor able to generate, but is separated from all generative power, which is alone inherent in that which continues to be of a masculine nature.
VI. ON ETERNITY AND TIME.
III. vu.
L With respect to eternity and time, we say that each of these is different from the other, and that one of them indeed is conversant with a perpetual nature, but the other about that which is generated. We also think that we have a certain clear perception of these in our souls spon- taneously, and, as it were, from the more collected pro- jections of intellectual conception; always and every where calling these by the same appellations. When, however, we endeavour to accede to the inspection of these, and to approach as it were nearer to them, again we are involved in doubt, admitting some of the decisions of the ancients about these, and rejecting others, and perhaps receiving differently the same decisions. Eesting also in these, and thinking it sufficient if when interrogated we are able to relate the opinion of the ancients concerning time and eternity, we are liberated from any farther investigation about them. It is necessary, therefore, to think that some of the ancient and blessed philosophers have discovered the truth; but it is fit to consider who those are that have obtained it, and after what manner we also may acquire the same knowledge on these subjects. In the first place, however, it is requisite to investigate what those conceive eternity to be, who admit that it is different from time.
116 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS, For that which is established as the paradigm being known, that also which is the image of it, and which they say is time, will perhaps become manifest. But if some one, prior to the survey of eternity, should imagine what time is, it will happen to him, proceeding from hence thither by reminiscence, that he will behold the nature to which time is assimilated, if the latter has a similitude to the former.
What, therefore, is it requisite. we should assert eternity to be? Shall we say it is the intelligible essence itself, just as if some one should say that time is the whole heaven and the world? For some are said to have had this opinion concerning time. For since we imagine and con- ceive eternity to be something more venerable, and ail intelligible nature is also most venerable, we are unable to say which is the most venerable of the two; and since also, that which is beyond these is not to be predicated in the same way, some one may be induced to consider eternity and an intelligible essence as the same. For again, both the intelligible world and eternity comprehend in themselves the same things. When, however, we say that the one is in the other, we place intelligibles in eternity; and when we predicate the eternal of intelligibles, as when Plato in the ** Timseus " says, " if the nature of the paradigm is eternal," we then assert that the eternal is different from the intelligible. Nevertheless, we say that it either exists about, or in, or is present with an intel- ligible essence. That each of them, however, is venerable, does not manifest a sameness of nature; for perhaps the venerableness of the one is derived from the other. With respect to comprehension also, that of the intelligible is as of parts, but eternity comprehends the whole at once not as a part, but because all such things as are eternal subsist according to it. Shall we, therefore, say that eternity exists according to the permanency which is in intelligibles; ON ETERNITY AND TIME. 117 just as here, time is said to exist according to motion? It may, however, be very properly investigated, whether eternity is the same with permanency, or whether it is not simply the same, but is the same with the permanency which is about essence. For if it is the same with per- manency [simply considered] in the first place, we cannot say that permanency is eternal, as neither do we say that eternity is eternal. For the eternal is that which partici- pates of eternity. And in the next place, how is motion eternal? For thus it will be stable. Farther still, how does the conception of permanency contain in itself the ever? I do not mean the ever which is in time, but such as we intellectually perceive when we speak of the eternal. But if it contains the ever in the stability of essence, again, we shall separate the other genera of being from eternity. Besides, it is not only necessary to conceive eternity as subsisting in permanency, but also as subsisting in one. And in the next place,, we must admit that eternity is without interval, in order that it may not be the same with time. Permanency, however, so far as it is permanency, neither contains in itself the conception of unity, nor of that which is without interval. But we predicate of eternity that it abides in one. Hence, it will participate of permanency, but will not be permanency itself.
n. What, therefore, will that be according to which we say, the whole world which is there is eternal and perpetual? And what is perpetuity? Whether it is the same with eternity, or eternity subsists according to perpetuity. Shall we say, therefore, that it is necessary to conceive of eternity as one certain thing, but a certain intelligence or nature collected together from many things, whether it be something consequent to the natures in the intelligible world, or existing together with, or perceived in them, but which is able to effect and is many things. Indeed, he who surveys an abundant power collected into one, accord- 118 SELECT WORKS OF PLOTINUS.
ing to this particular thing which is as it were a subject, he denominates it essence; afterwards, so far as he beholds life in it, he denominates it motion; and in the next place, he calls it permanency, so far as it entirely possesses an in- variable sameness of -subsistence. And he denominates it different and the same, so far as all these are at once one. Thus, therefore, composing these, so as to be at once one life alone, contracting in them difference, and beholding an unceasing sameness of energy, and which never passes from one intelligence or life to another, but always possesses the invariable, and is without interval; — beholding all these, he will behold eternity. For he will perceive life abiding in sameness, and always possessing everything present, and not at one time this, and afterwards another thing, but containing all things at once, and not now some things, and again others. For it is an impartible end; just as in a point where all things subsist at once, and have not yet proceeded into a [linear] flux. It likewise abides in the same, i.e, in itself, and does not suffer any change. But it is always in the present, because nothing of it is past, uor again will be in future, but this very thing which it is, it always is. Hence, eternity is not a subject, but that which as it were shines forth from a subject, according to sameness itself, which it announces not concerning the future, but that which is now present, indicating that it subsists in this manner, and in no other. For what can afterwards happen to this, which it now is not? Nor again, will it be in futurity what it is not at present. For there is not any thing from which it can arrive at the pre- sent time. For it is not another thing, but this. Nor will it be this in future, which it does not now possess from necessity; nor does it possess about itself that which was. For what is there which was present with it and is past? Nor does that which will be, belong to it. For what is there which will happen to it? It remains, therefore, that ON ETERNITY AND TIME. 119 in to be, it is tliat which it is. Hence, that which neither was, nor will be, but alone is, stably possessing its being, in consequence of not changing into will be, nor having been changed from the past, is eternity. The life, there- fore, which is about being, and which in existence or to he, is at once total and full, and every where without interval, is the eternity which we investigate.
III. Nor must we think that this [eternity] happens externally to that nature [viz. to being itself], but that it is in it, and from it, and subsists together with it. For it is seen to be profoundly inherent in it. For perceiving all such other things as we say are there, to be inherent, we assert that all of them are from, and subsist together with essence. For it is necessary that things which have a primary subsistence, should exist together with first essences, and should be contained in them; since the beautiful also is in and from them, and truth also is inhe- rent in them. And in a certain degree, indeed, the whole itself is as it were in a part, and the things which are there are as parts in a whole, as if in reality this were an all not collected from parts, but itself generating parts, in order that through this it may be truly all. The truth also which is there, is not a concord with something else that is intelligible, but of each thing itself of which it is the truth. It is necessary, therefore, that the whole of this which is true, if it is truly all, should not only be every thing so far as it is all things, but likewise that the all should subsist in such a way, as not to be in any thing deficient. But if this be the case, nothing will accede to it. For if some- thing vnll be added to it, it was prior to the accession of this deficient. Hence, prior to this it was not every thing.
But what can happen to it preternaturally? For it suffers nothing. If, therefore, nothing can accede to it, it neither is about to be, nor will be, nor was. If, indeed, you take away from generated natures, the it will be, since they sub-